Audit of the Armoured Vehicle Program

September 2025
Published: March 6, 2026

Table of contents

• Executive summary
• Introduction
• Findings and recommendations
  1. Planning
  2. Acquisition
  3. Operations
     • 3.1 Records management
     • 3.2 Vehicle maintenance
     • 3.3 Driver training
  4. Decommissioning
  5. Conclusion
• Appendix A: About the audit
• Appendix B: Recommendations and management response and action plan

Executive summary

Global Affairs Canada supplies armoured vehicles to missions in high-threat locations to fulfill its duty of care obligations to ensure the safety and security of all personnel abroad. The department currently has a total of 178 armoured vehicles in hostile or potentially threatening environments in 48 missions. The department’s armoured vehicle program, which had an operating and capital budget of approximately $10M in fiscal year 2024-2025, is one of the security initiatives funded through the duty of care envelope.

Objective and scope

The objective of the Audit of the Armoured Vehicle Program was to assess whether the program effectively meets the operational security needs of missions abroad while complying with relevant policies and exercising sound stewardship of public funds. The scope of the audit included a review of the armoured vehicle program’s controls, activities, systems, and records from January 2019 to March 2025.

More details about the audit are presented in Appendix A.

Conclusion

Overall, the armoured vehicle program requires strengthening to effectively meet the operational security requirements of missions abroad and to support the department’s legal duty of care to employees. Due to fragmented planning, short-term mission-specific needs are prioritized over long-term strategic foresight. This limits the department’s ability to proactively manage its armoured vehicle fleet and anticipate future needs. A lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities among internal stakeholders has contributed to inefficiencies and hindered collaboration. Furthermore, the absence of a centralized, reliable data system and inconsistent documentation, particularly in the decommissioning process, undermines oversight and accountability.

As part of the broader transformation initiative, the department is striving to enhance agility and responsiveness by ensuring priorities and resources are adjusted to address emerging threats and opportunities. As such, it is equally important that the armoured vehicle program evolve by adopting a global planning perspective, implementing an agile procurement strategy, and ensuring that lifecycle management practices are sound, transparent, and data driven.

Management has acknowledged these challenges and has begun taking corrective actions. Given that armoured vehicles are high-value government assets, continued efforts are needed to implement robust practices to support sound stewardship of resources and fulfill duty of care obligations to personnel abroad.

Recommendations

1. The Assistant Deputy Ministers of Emergency Management, Legal and Consular Affairs and International Platform Branches should work collaboratively to:
   • clarify roles and responsibilities in the planning phase of the management of armoured vehicles; and
   • identify and plan current and future armoured vehicle needs on a global basis.
2. The Assistant Deputy Ministers of the International Platform Branch and the People and Corporate Management Branches should develop an agile procurement strategy for armoured vehicles to meet evolving operational security needs and fleet readiness.
3. The Assistant Deputy Minister of the International Platform Branch should put in place and maintain a central repository system of relevant and reliable information to support decisions made throughout the lifecycle management of armoured vehicles.
4. The Assistant Deputy Minister of the International Platform Branch should modify Guidelines on the Destruction of Armoured Vehicles to require the retention of key documentation thereby enhancing the integrity and verifiability of the destruction process.

Statement of Conformance

The engagement was conducted in conformance with the Institute of Internal Auditors' Global Internal Audit Standards and with the Treasury Board Policy and Directive on Internal Audit, as supported by the results of the quality assurance and improvement program.

Introduction

The Audit of the Armoured Vehicle (AV) Program was conducted as part of Global Affairs Canada’s (GAC) 2024-2026 Risk-Based Audit Plan to assess risks associated with the management of AVs. This audit builds on previous efforts including the 2019 Audit of Fleet Management that included the AV program. Since 2016, the management of AVs has also been reviewed, when relevant, through mission audits, reflecting GAC’s ongoing commitment to effective oversight in this area.

The Armoured Vehicle Program

According to GAC’s Policy on Armoured Vehicles, the department supplies AVs to missions in high-threat locations to help fulfill its duty of care obligations to support the safety and security of all employees. The department’s AV program, which had an operating and capital budget of approximately $10M in fiscal year 2024-2025, is one of the security initiatives funded through the Duty of Care special purchase allotment.

According to the AV program’s inventory list as of April 1, 2025, GAC has a total of 178 AVs in 48 missions.

An AV is a motor vehicle that is fitted with specialized structural components that render the vehicle capable of withstanding attacks such as gunfire and improvised explosive device detonations. The level of armour of the vehicle and its ability to blend into the local environment are critical for ensuring the safety of both driver and passengers. All of GAC’s AVs feature a high level of armour certification providing robust protection. AVs are used for transportation in hostile or potentially threatening environments where the use of a standard vehicle would be deemed unacceptable from an operational security standpoint.

There are four stakeholders at GAC who are responsible for delivering the AV program:

• Regional Security Operations Division (CSS) – is responsible for identifying new AV requests based on threat and vulnerability assessments.
• Physical Security Programs (AWST) – is responsible to initiate the procurement process and manage AVs throughout its lifecycle, within the Duty of Care budget.
• Missions – are responsible for operating and maintaining AVs in collaboration with AWST.
• Procurement, Asset Management and National Accommodation (SPD) – are GAC’s procurement specialists, action the procurement process and liaise with Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC), when required.

The lifecycle management of high-value assets, such as AVs, is critical so that resources are used efficiently throughout the assets’ life. As per the department’s guidance documentation, the four phases of the lifecycle of AVs are listed below.

1. Planning and allocation require collaboration among CSS, AWST and the missions.
2. Acquisition and shipping require collaboration among AWST, SPD, the missions, and the supplier.
3. Operations and maintenance require collaboration between AWST and the missions.
4. Decommissioning requires collaboration between AWST and the missions.

Findings and recommendations

1. Planning

According to Global Affairs Canada’s Policy on Armoured Vehicles, the department must have the necessary AVs in place at all times to support Canada Based Staff (CBS) who work at missions in high-threat environments. There is a documented process to identify the needs of missions and allocate AVs accordingly.

Currently, the need for AVs is driven by requests from missions to CSS, vulnerability assessments conducted by CSS and/or threat assessments conducted by the International Security and Political Affairs Branch (IFM), or identification of replacement needs by missions or AWST. This information, originating from various sources, is neither consolidated nor jointly reviewed by CSS and AWST leading to potential gaps in decision-making. Due to uncoordinated planning, evolving security demands, and a lack of supply, the AV program often prioritizes short-term mission-specific needs over long-term strategic planning. As a result, there is no global and proactive planning for AVs to assess whether requirements can be met by reallocating existing assets or acquiring new ones.

CSS and AWST roles are documented in the AV Standard Operating Procedures dated November 2022 with an updated draft version dated April 2024. However, based on a review of documentation and interviews, the roles carried out by CSS and AWST with respect to the planning and allocation of AVs are different than that documented. While CSS and AWST share the common goal of protecting personnel abroad, their priorities can sometimes conflict. CSS focuses on addressing security vulnerabilities and adherence to security requirements. Nevertheless, AWST has multiple priorities of fulfilling security requirements and the timely delivery of a sufficient number of vehicles within budget. Efforts to meet comprehensive security requirements with operational efficiency - timeliness, quantity, and cost –often leads to friction and a lack of cohesion between the two units, resulting in delays in fulfilling the AV needs of missions.

With coordinated planning by CSS and AWST, resources can be allocated more effectively to help ensure that the department has the appropriate number of AVs at the right location.

Recommendation 1: The Assistant Deputy Ministers of Emergency Management, Legal and Consular Affairs and International Platform Branches should work collaboratively to:

• clarify roles and responsibilities in the planning phase of the management of armoured vehicles; and
• identify and plan current and future armoured vehicle needs on a global basis.

2. Acquisition

The acquisition process must take into account clearly defined operational needs and security requirements to facilitate procurement activities that are aligned with actual operational demands and address security vulnerabilities. The department currently has a contract in place with a single supplier since 2018 for 76 AVs for $16.5M. There were another four AVs pending manufacturing and delivery from a 2017 contract with the same supplier resulting in a total order for 80 AVs. To date, 20 AVs are yet to be manufactured with delivery date up to May 2026.

Due to certain mission needs not being met and outstanding contractual obligations, the department has taken certain measures to help mitigate security risks. The decommissioning process has been paused to extend the life span of AVs as much as possible, beyond its typical useful life of 8 to 10 years. In addition, some AVs have been transferred from missions operating in a lower threat environment to a higher one. Furthermore, the department is currently in the process of putting in place an emergency contract to obtain 10 AVs to respond to urgent needs in five missions.

The department is currently exploring options to launch a new contracting process. Relying on a single supplier highlights difficult procurement planning and can expose the department to elevated operational, security, and reputational risks. A more agile procurement strategy is needed to meet the evolving needs of missions and mitigate risks. Allowing for the adjustment of priorities and resources to effectively respond to emerging needs also align with the aim of the department’s ongoing transformation initiative to be fit for purpose in an ever-changing complex world.

Recommendation 2: The Assistant Deputy Ministers of the International Platform Branch and the People Corporate Management Branches should develop an agile procurement strategy for armoured vehicles to meet evolving operational security needs and fleet readiness.

3. Operations

3.1 Records management

Accurate and accessible records provide valuable insights and data to support informed decision-making and are essential to support the integrity, security, and operational readiness of the department’s AV fleet.

Currently, AV records are fragmented across multiple platforms at headquarters: a heat map developed by CSS, an inventory list maintained by AWST using an Excel spreadsheet, and the department’s Financial Administration System (FAS) – with no system linkages or centralized data management. This siloed approach has led to numerous discrepancies such as mismatched status and duplicate vehicle identification numbers (VIN). 

Discrepancies relating to the status of AVs and gaps in operational data on AWST’s inventory list were also noted. After confirming with missions, it was found that 17 AVs were wrongly identified as non-operational. In addition, essential lifecycle dates (such as manufacturing, armouring, shipping, and deployment) were missing from the AWST inventory list. This absence of key data limits the department’s ability to evaluate vehicle readiness, schedule maintenance, extend service life, or plan for decommissioning.

Without a reliable AV record-keeping system, the department cannot effectively manage its fleet, assess future procurement needs, or guarantee that missions are adequately equipped with operational vehicles.  This not only compromises logistical efficiency but may also undermine personnel safety and the department’s ability to respond to evolving security environments.

3.2 Vehicle maintenance

Regular and timely maintenance is essential so that AVs are available when needed, particularly given ongoing delays in procuring new vehicles. Minor preventative maintenance (i.e.: oil change) and major, corrective repairs (i.e.: armouring equipment replacement) are funded through the International Platform Branch.

A review of a risk-based sample of 56 maintenance transactions revealed multiple gaps in documentation within the Financial Administration System (FAS). Key records such as maintenance requests, service provider invoices, and section 34 approvals were frequently missing. In addition, important maintenance-related dates were also not always available, preventing the audit team from assessing whether vehicle downtime adversely impacted mission operations. As shown in the adjacent graph, from a survey sent to 70 mission personnel, about half of the 48 respondents highlighted a moderate or significant impact on mission operations that resulted in plans either being modified, delayed, or cancelled.

With limited options to expand the fleet in the short term, maintaining the current AVs in peak condition is essential. AWST has taken measures to improve the collection of information related to the condition of AVs. Examples of measures are putting in place an annual technical inspection contract to assess the operational status of all AVs; requiring missions to provide detailed information about AVs when submitting a maintenance request form; and holding regular meetings with missions. Data obtained through these measures is subsequently used to maintain and update AWST’s fleet repository.

Accurate and complete maintenance records not only support vehicle readiness but also provide vital data to inform decisions on lifecycle management ensuring vehicles are used efficiently and mission needs are met without disruption.

Recommendation 3: The Assistant Deputy Minister of the International Platform Branch should put in place and maintain a central repository system of relevant and reliable information to support decisions made throughout the lifecycle management of armoured vehicles.

3.3 Driver training

Ensuring that drivers who operate AVs are properly trained and certified is crucial for both the safety of personnel and the operational effectiveness of missions. The department requires drivers who operate AVs to complete an initial five-day mandatory training as well as a re-certification every three to five years. AWST is responsible, along with the missions, for identifying those who require initial training as well as recertification. In addition, AWST is responsible for prioritizing training needs and maintaining a centralized list of drivers that indicates the status of their driver training.

The department has 223 trained drivers, to operate its 178 AVs. Of these, 178 (80%) drivers have a valid certification while 45 (20%) must be recertified so that they continue to operate AVs safely with updated skills. There are 48 missions currently using AVs and 46 of them (96%) have at least one certified driver.  The majority of the survey respondents indicated that missions have sufficient certified drivers, and they are trained in a timely manner. However, two missions are currently using AVs with drivers whose certifications have expired for more than four years. In addition, although an optimal ratio of drivers to AVs has not been established, there were notable differences in the following missions:

The above findings highlight the requirement for a needs analysis of driver training that aligns with the evolving number of AVs at each mission. In an environment where threats are constantly changing, maintaining an up-to-date, well-trained driver workforce is essential to maintain the safety and security of all personnel on the ground.

At the time of this report, AWST was verifying drivers’ information with all missions to update their list and support future decisions regarding driver training.

4. Decommissioning 

Decommissioning of AVs is an essential part of maintaining a safe, cost-effective and efficient fleet. As per GAC’s AV Decommissioning Standard Operating Procedures, various options exist to decommission AVs, such as complete destruction, cannibalization for spare parts, redeployment to another mission, or transfer to other Government of Canada departments. As a controlled good, AVs may not be sold, donated, or transferred to persons, governments, or organizations outside of the Canadian government, unless authorized to do so.

The department has documented destruction procedures in place to ensure that AVs deemed unsafe or unfit are properly destroyed to prevent misappropriation. AWST is required to inform missions when and how an AV must be decommissioned as well as direct the Financial Management Support unit and Physical Resources (SWCP) to remove the AV from the department’s records. However, documentation to support these communications was not always retained by AWST, which is important to demonstrate key decision points in the decommissioning process. Based on a sample of 31 destructions that took place between 2019 and 2023, 29 vehicles (94%) had a disposal report on file. In addition, all of the sampled vehicle destructions had photos, where required. The requirement for photos of vehicle destruction came into effect in 2023 based on a revision of GAC’s AV Decommissioning Standard Operating Procedures following a recommendation made in the Audit of Management Practices of Missions – Islamabad. Also, for most of the samples, the witness to the destruction process could not be identified. Some disposal reports were signed by a locally engaged staff rather than a Canada-based staff or their spouse who must witness the destruction and prepare the disposal report. By revising the disposal report template to clearly indicate that the preparer of the report is also the witness to the destruction as well as to identify the title of the preparer/witness, this would demonstrate adherence to a key step in the destruction process.

To further verify destruction of AVs, the audit team tried to obtain invoices of the company selected to destroy the AV; however, invoices couldn’t be found for 20 vehicle destructions out of 31 (65%). In one case where the invoice was available, the VIN in the invoice and the disposal report did not match. While the current procedures don’t require retaining such invoices in the disposal records, this would further corroborate the destruction. The photos below show an AV from a mission that was destroyed locally. The disposal report did not identify the witness to the destruction.

Example of AV destruction

Addressing the deficiencies noted above would enhance the integrity of the AV destruction process and mitigate the risks of fraud, waste and abuse. Furthermore, without proper and complete documentation for disposals, AVs may not be appropriately accounted for in the department’s inventory or accounting system.

Recommendation 4: The Assistant Deputy Minister of the International Platform Branch should modify Guidelines on the Destruction of Armoured Vehicles to require the retention of key documentation thereby enhancing the integrity and verifiability of the destruction process.

5. Conclusion

Overall, the armoured vehicle program requires strengthening to effectively meet the operational security requirements of missions abroad and to support the department’s legal duty of care to employees. Due to fragmented planning, short-term mission-specific needs are prioritized over long-term strategic foresight. This limits the department’s ability to proactively manage its armoured vehicle fleet and anticipate future needs. A lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities among internal stakeholders has contributed to inefficiencies and hindered collaboration. Furthermore, the absence of a centralized, reliable data system and inconsistent documentation, particularly in the decommissioning process, undermines oversight and accountability.

As part of the broader transformation initiative, the department is striving to enhance agility and responsiveness by ensuring priorities and resources are adjusted to address emerging threats and opportunities. As such, it is equally important that the armoured vehicle program evolve by adopting a global planning perspective, implementing an agile procurement strategy, and ensuring that lifecycle management practices are sound, transparent, and data driven.

Management has acknowledged these challenges and has begun taking corrective actions. Given that armoured vehicles are high-value government assets, continued efforts are needed to implement robust practices to support sound stewardship of resources and fulfill duty of care obligations to personnel abroad.

Appendix A: About the audit

Objective

The objective of the audit was to assess whether the armoured vehicle program effectively meets the operational security needs of missions abroad while complying with relevant policies and exercising sound stewardship of public funds.

Scope

The scope of the audit included a review of the armoured vehicle program’s controls, activities, systems, and records from January 2019 to March 2025. The audit did not assess procurement and contracting processes.

Criteria

The criteria were developed following the completion of a detailed risk assessment. These were discussed and agreed upon with the auditees as follows.

1. The program effectively provides and maintains armoured vehicles to meet operational needs while exercising sound stewardship of public funds.
2. The program decommissions and transfers armoured vehicles in compliance with policies and procedures.

Approach and methodology

The engagement was conducted in conformance with the Institute of Internal Auditors' Global Internal Audit Standards and with the Treasury Board Policy and Directive on Internal Audit, as supported by the results of the quality assurance and improvement program.

The audit methodology included, but was not limited to, the following:

• Review and analysis of policies, directives, guidelines, standards, program files and other relevant documentation
• Process walkthroughs and mapping
• Data analysis
• Survey to 70 Management and Consular Officers, Deputy Management and Consular Officers, and Readiness Program Managers at 48 missions that use armoured vehicles
• Interviews with departmental stakeholders and other government departments (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Department of National Defence, Public Services and Procurement Canada)

Appendix B: Recommendations and management response and action plan