Minister of Foreign Affairs - Briefing book

May 2025
Published: September 3, 2025

Table of contents

1. Your role and responsibilities
   1. Letter from the Deputy Minister
   2. Minister of Foreign Affairs’ key portfolio responsibilities
   3. Foreign Affairs – Upcoming ministerial high-level events
2. Background on the department
   1. The department at a glance
   2. The Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act
   3. Deputy ministers and Assistant deputy ministers
   4. Global Affairs Canada executive organizational structure
   5. Network map
3. Top issues
   1. Canada-United States
   2. The Arctic
   3. Ukraine
   4. China
   5. India
   6. The Israel-Hamas conflict and Lebanon
   7. Canada’s G7 presidency
   8. Consular assistance
   9. Multilateral engagement
4. Select tools and instruments
   1. International assistance
   2. International assistance envelope
   3. Strategic export controls
   4. Sanctions 
5. Additional issues
   1. Indo-Pacific
   2. Europe
   3. North America
   4. Latin America and the Caribbean
   5. Middle East
   6. Africa
   7. Efforts to counter foreign information manipulation and interference  
   8. International trade

A. Your role and responsibilities

1. Letter from the Deputy Minister      

Dear Minister,

Congratulations on your appointment. You take this position at a historic moment.

As Minister of Foreign Affairs, you will help to define and advance Canada’s interests abroad, working closely with the Prime Minister and your Cabinet colleagues. As the nation’s chief diplomat, you will steer the conduct of Canada’s international relations, the provision of assistance to Canadians in distress abroad, the expansion of economic opportunities for Canadians, and the delivery of international assistance as a tool of foreign policy. You will work closely with the Minister of International Trade and the Minister of International Development, who are both, by legislation, mandated to assist you in carrying out your responsibilities. You will also work closely with ministerial colleagues who will be active internationally, including those overseeing the portfolios of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, National Defence, and Public Safety.

You will have the opportunity to help articulate a vision for Canada’s future and implement approaches that will safeguard its security and prosperity for the next generation. Canada’s G7 presidency in 2025 is a significant platform for Canada to lead and influence global discussions. An important aspect of my role will be to assist you in achieving your and the government’s vision, and in delivering on the mandate commitments which the Prime Minister may assign to you.

A moment of profound shifts  

The United States is engineering a major shift in the global economic and security systems it created and has largely sustained over the last 80 years, based on its military and economic superiority. It is refocusing squarely on its perceived national interests, [REDACTED] Significantly, this is happening at a time when economic power has tilted from West to East, and North to South (e.g., the Indo-Pacific will account for 50% of world GDP by 2040; and the G7’s share of the global economy has dropped from 66% at the end of the Cold War to 45% today). 

[REDACTED]

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine showed its disregard for the fundamental rules of the international order, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The UN80 reform initiative is an effort to refocus the UN efforts on its core functions and ensure that the UN system delivers results on the ground.

The U.S. decision to pause and review all foreign aid (with limited exceptions for humanitarian assistance funding) and its drastic reductions to the programs delivered by the United States Agency for International Development, are having a major impact globally. [REDACTED]

In this fraught context, the emergence of increasingly sophisticated technologies (e.g., AI, quantum computing, biotech) is a source of geopolitical power as well as competition, while new digital threats (e.g., cyber, disinformation operations) threaten national security, social cohesion, and Canada’s democratic institutions.

Your portfolio

[REDACTED]

The challenge of your role will be to support Canada by championing investments and policies that enhance Canada’s autonomy and its international value proposition [REDACTED]

International trade  

As Minister of Foreign Affairs, you will work closely with the Minister of International Trade and other federal ministers to advance Canada’s economic and security objectives through trade partnerships with our allies and partners. [REDACTED]

International assistance 

International assistance is a key component of the Government of Canada’s foreign policy toolkit, with Canada’s international assistance envelope estimated at $7.89 billion in 2024-2025, of which $6.24 billion is allocated to Global Affairs Canada. International assistance provides an entry point to strengthen bilateral relations with other countries and facilitate collaboration in multilateral forums. It supports social and economic progress in developing countries, humanitarian and crisis response, and advances peace, security, and governance. [REDACTED]

Consular work 

While you may expect to focus on international policy, consular work will also occupy a significant amount of your time. Increased travel, geopolitical instability, war and civil unrest, earthquakes, climate-related events and the diversity of Canada’s population are all factors that have increased the volume, complexity, and resource demands of consular work. For example, the consular program now receives approximately 40% of the department’s media inquiries. [REDACTED] 

The Department that will support you

To drive your agenda, you will be able to rely on over 13,000 active employees, more than half of whom work abroad. In 2024-2025, Global Affairs Canada’s budget was $9.2 billion (1.7% of the federal budget). A unique aspect of the department’s work is its responsibility for the government’s presence abroad (181 missions in 112 countries), including a portfolio of properties and assets around the world that support the work of other government departments, agencies, Crown corporations, provinces and territories.

Upcoming milestones and decision points

Many of your engagements will be driven by the international calendar, or events beyond Canada’s borders and control. There is potential for significant travel to strengthen bilateral relationships or represent Canada in multilateral meetings. Early mandate milestones (Speech from the Throne, spring Budget or other economic statement) will set the foundations for your own agenda, along with any dedicated instructions from the Prime Minister. You will also be frequently solicited by communities across the country who will seek your support. In these engagements, also consider your own priorities and where your energies are best invested.

As you set out your agenda for the spring and summer, there are some key milestones to bear in mind:

• This year, you will chair a group of G7 Foreign Ministers, which connects regularly. This will bring your own engagement on issues concerning Ukraine and the Middle East in sharper focus.
• [REDACTED]
• [REDACTED]

Congratulations again, Minister, on your appointment. I look forward to assisting you in charting a new international course, in keeping with the new government’s mandate, in the coming period.

David Morrison

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

2. Minister of Foreign Affairs’ key portfolio responsibilities

Issue 

• As Minister of Foreign Affairs, you preside over the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (legal title) more commonly/currently known as Global Affairs Canada. You are responsible for Canada’s foreign policy, diplomatic relations, trade policy, most of its international assistance, and consular services for Canadians.

Background

As Minister of Foreign Affairs, and pursuant to the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act (2013), you are responsible for the management and direction of the department in Canada and abroad. Supported by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, your key responsibilities are:

• The conduct of diplomatic and consular relations on behalf of Canada;
• Official communication between the Government of Canada and any foreign government or international organization;
• International negotiations;
• International economic relations;
• The expansion of Canada’s international trade and commerce;
• International development and poverty reduction in developing countries, and humanitarian assistance during crises;
• The administration of the foreign service, management of Canada’s diplomatic missions, and coordination of direction from the Government to heads of missions abroad;
• The development of international law and its application in Canada’s external relations.

Although you are responsible for the whole department, the Act provides for a Minister of International Trade and a Minister of International Development to support you in carrying out your duties.

Considerations

Diplomatic relations

Articulating Canada’s diplomatic positions and then building and maintaining relationships to Canada’s advantage will be core to your work. This can be achieved through incoming and outgoing visits, leveraging multilateral fora via engagements at and on the margins of multilateral meetings, official communications, and by other means facilitated by information technology. Working with your ministerial colleagues, supported by officials, and building on your own engagements with stakeholders in Canada, you will play a central role in defining and advocating for Canada’s international agenda and interests—including at the Cabinet table—in a way that aligns with the government’s broader objectives, and that takes into account a rapidly changing global environment. Heads of missions abroad (Ambassadors, High Commissioners and Consuls General) will support you and you will guide their work in service of such agendas. Leveraging Canada’s mission footprint and reporting will inform this work.

Conducting diplomacy

The speed with which information travels, and the different ways to build and maintain relationships in the information age, have profoundly affected the practice of diplomacy. [REDACTED]

To address international peace and security concerns, gross violations of human rights, and significant foreign corruption, sanctions are another option in your toolkit; they can form part of a comprehensive foreign policy approach along with other measures such as political dialogue, engagement, and programming. As you make decisions on the use of sanctions, their impacts on Canadians and Canadian businesses, as well as their ability to achieve results, is also worth considering. Sanctions are most effective when implemented in coordination with like-minded countries.

Consular and emergency assistance

Given the volatile international environment, you are likely to spend a good portion of your time on consular issues and cases. Last fiscal year, GAC provided 271,340 routine consular services to Canadians abroad. This included providing information, issuing passports, citizenship certificates and notarial services. GAC also opened more than 7,208 consular cases for more complex consular requirements, including for detained Canadians, those who died overseas, victims of crime or those in distress. The department also provides information to Canadians about safety and security risks abroad via online travel advice and advisories, updated more than 2,000 times in 2024.

The department leads global efforts against arbitrary detention for diplomatic leverage and responds to these cases, and other incidents such as terrorist hostage-takings, with a whole-of-government approach, which may draw on diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, and military tools, depending on the situation. In addition, the department provides emergency assistance to Canadians during crises and coordinates the Government of Canada’s response. Recently, the government provided emergency responses in Sudan, Haiti, Israel, West Bank, Gaza, and Lebanon. Your role and leadership will be central in such situations.

Canada’s diplomatic and consular missions

You are accountable for Canada’s global mission network, which supports diplomatic, consular, trade, development, and security objectives abroad. Under your leadership, Global Affairs Canada manages and coordinates the Government of Canada’s international platform, enabling the operations of 21 federal departments and agencies in 112 countries. The department also provides infrastructure and administrative support to 10 provinces, Crown corporations, as well as 5 co-located foreign governments. 

Your authorities for the stewardship of the real property portfolio are grounded in the Financial Administration Act and the Federal Real Property and Federal Immovables Act. The global platform includes 181 offices, 87 official residences, and 2,300 staff quarters — valued at approximately $3 billion. Global Affairs Canada’s workforce abroad includes over 8,300 personnel, approximately 70% of which is locally engaged under host-country labour laws, underscoring the Department's broad human resources and operational responsibilities abroad.

In a rapidly evolving global security environment, you are also responsible for ensuring the safety and security of all personnel abroad. The Government of Canada’s duty of care extends to both Canadian diplomats and locally engaged staff, requiring ongoing risk management, contingency planning, and the strengthening of security infrastructure at missions worldwide.

International assistance

International assistance supports the social and economic welfare of developing countries, responds to humanitarian needs as a result of conflict or natural disasters, and supports peace, security and governance efforts globally. It is an instrument of soft power, and forms part of the Government’s suite of tools to engage with the world and address its challenges.

You co-manage the “International Assistance Envelope” along with the Minister of International Development and the Minister of Finance. This envelope is the government’s main fiscal planning tool to support international assistance objectives. Currently, the envelope includes 6 thematic funding “pools”: core development; humanitarian assistance; peace, security, and governance; support for international financial institutions; the crisis pool; and the strategic priorities fund.

In particular, you oversee the Envelope’s peace and security pool. This includes programs such as the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program, the Weapons Threat Reduction Program, and the Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program.

3. Foreign Affairs – Upcoming ministerial high-level events 

*Note: High-level events only. Subject to change after discussions with the Minister. 

B. Background on the department

1. The department at a glance 

Issue 

• The department is responsible for managing Canada’s foreign policy, trade, consular relations, and most of its international development assistance with a view to advancing the security and prosperity of Canadians. Since 2013, these functions exist under a single roof.
• The scope of the department’s mandate and footprint is wide, with over 13,000 active employees in Canada and abroad, and a total budget of $9.2 billion in fiscal year 2024-2025.

Background

What the Department Does 

At its core, the work of the department is geared towards Canada’s and Canadians’ security and prosperity through the management of the government’s relations with foreign governments, international organizations, and other stakeholders. The department is part of a broader ecosystem of other players who advance Canadian interests abroad, including other federal government departments, provinces and territories, and private citizens and businesses.

People and skills

Global Affairs Canada (GAC) employees have a range of skills and functions. Employees include foreign service officers, whose career is geared towards representing Canada in work related to diplomacy, trade promotion, international development assistance, and consular services. It also includes senior executives and heads of mission, who provide leadership at headquarters, in regional offices, and at Canada’s embassies, high commissions, consulates and trade offices abroad. There are approximately 1,350 foreign service officers and executives working abroad and in our regional offices. The work of representing Canada in the world is supported by approximately 5,500 locally engaged staff (these are employees hired under local labour laws). At headquarters, there are also approximately 6,500 staff comprising policy officers, programming specialists, communications specialists, and the legal, administrative, financial, and IT support staff needed to keep a complex organization running.

The department has 6 regional offices in Canada, notably to engage with Canadian businesses. They are located in Vancouver, Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto, Montreal, and Halifax.

The international platform

A unique aspect of the department’s work is its responsibility for the government’s presence abroad, which includes a portfolio of properties and assets around the world. Working in 181 missions in 112 countries, the department’s international platform supports the work abroad of other government departments, agencies, Crown corporations, provinces and foreign government partners co-located within Government of Canada mission premises. While some missions are more focused on tracking political developments, and some others have a trade promotion or international development assistance focus, all require office space, human resources, and material support often in complex operating environments.

Core work

A core part of the work of the department’s officials abroad concerns advocating and promoting Canada’s interests (as defined by the government). This takes place through building and maintaining bilateral and multilateral relationships; leading on global issues and negotiations; and encouraging respect for international law, including through the use of sanctions.

The department promotes expanded trade and investment for the benefit of all Canadians, including by fostering the success of Canadian exporters and innovators through the Trade Commissioner Service. It also works to safeguard an open rules-based global trading system, negotiate trade agreements, and manage international trade disputes.

In order to ensure the safety of Canadians abroad, the department provides travel information and consular services. This includes visits to places of detention; deployment of staff to evacuate Canadians in crisis situations (up 3.4 times over the past 5 years); and provision of emergency documentation.

The department also has legal responsibilities and is the principal source of advice on public international law as well as international trade and investment law, and treaty negotiation, for the government.

Various funding envelopes support the government’s international work, with total budget amounting to $9.2 billion in 2024-25. The most significant is the International Assistance Envelope of which GAC administers almost 80%. In 2024-25, this envelope was targeted towards: supporting poverty reduction; alleviating suffering in humanitarian crises; mitigating the impact of climate change; reinforcing opportunities for economic growth; promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment; and improving health and education outcomes. The envelope also supported activities that bolster peace and security, for example by countering violent extremism and terrorism, supporting the building of capacity to counter crime, and supporting peace operations and conflict management.

Considerations 

GAC has three Deputy Ministers and one Associate Deputy Minister, who work to support ministerial mandates. The department has recently undergone transformation efforts that include a new organizational structure and governance model, as part of a wider 3-year transformation agenda focused on 5 pillars: organizational culture, people, global presence, policy, and tool and processes. Currently at its midway point, this multi-year organizational transformation effort aims to position GAC as a best-in-class foreign affairs, international development, trade and consular services department where employees are proud to work and are equipped. This is in recognition that the department needs to evolve to better serve Canadians both at home and abroad, to face changing global contexts.

Twelve branches are headed by assistant deputy ministers, reporting to the deputy ministers. These assistant deputy ministers work with ministers, their own staff, and external partners to deliver on government priorities, with their responsibilities ranging from geographic regions to functional and corporate issues.

A departmental plan provides an overview of policy priorities, core responsibilities, planned results and associated resource requirements for the coming fiscal year. It is approved by the ministers and normally tabled in Parliament in February/March. The plan also presents the performance targets against which the department will report results. A departmental results report is then tabled in Parliament in the fall for the previous fiscal year.

The department’s total 2024-25 budget to date is $9.2 billion. This amount includes:

• Operating costs: $2.4 billion
• Capital costs: $212.9 million
• Grants and contributions: $6.1 billion
• Locally engaged staff pension, insurance, social security programs: $113.0 million
• Statutory items (e.g., direct payments to international financial institutions; contributions to employee benefit plans): $389.0 million.

2. The Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act  

Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act

3. Deputy ministers and Assistant deputy ministers 

Deputy ministers

USS – David Morrison, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

On October 12, 2022, David Morrison was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Prior to this, Mr. Morrison served as Deputy Minister of International Trade. He was also Foreign and Defence Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister (2019-2022), the Personal Representative of the Prime Minister for the G7 Summit (2018-2023) and held roles such as Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (2017-2019) and Assistant Deputy Minister of the Americas Branch at Global Affairs Canada (2013-2017).

Earlier, Mr. Morrison was Senior Vice-President at the former Canadian International Development Agency (2012-2013). He was also Executive Secretary of the UN Capital Development Fund (2008-2012) and Director of Communications at the UN Development Programme (2004-2008). He began his career with the UN Development Programme in North Korea and held various diplomatic and leadership roles.

Mr. Morrison holds a Master of Philosophy from Oxford and a BA from Yale.

DMT – Rob Stewart, Deputy Minister of International Trade

Rob Stewart was appointed Deputy Minister of International Trade in October 2022. Before this, he served as Deputy Minister of Public Safety for three years, providing leadership on national security, community safety, and emergency management.

Mr. Stewart spent most of his career at the Department of Finance Canada, starting in 1993. He was the Government of Canada's finance deputy for the G7, G20 and the Financial Stability Board (2016-2019) and held roles such as Assistant Deputy Minister of International Trade and Finance (2010-2014) and Assistant Deputy Minister of Financial Sector Policy (2008-2010). Before joining the Department of Finance Canada, Mr. Stewart worked at Export Development Canada and in the Canadian sport system.

He holds a BA from Carleton University and an MBA from the University of Ottawa.

DME – Christopher MacLennan, Deputy Minister of International Development

Christopher MacLennan was appointed Deputy Minister of International Development in January 2022. Prior to his current role, he was the personal representative of the Prime Minister for the G20 Summit (2020-2024) and the Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (2020-2022). As Assistant Deputy Minister at Global Affairs Canada, he led Canada's international development assistance efforts and served as Canada’s G7 foreign affairs sous-sherpa (2017-2020).

Mr. MacLennan has held various roles in the Privy Council Office, including Acting Assistant Secretary for Priorities and Planning and Assistant Deputy Minister of Policy Innovation (2015-2017). He also held executive roles in the former Canadian International Development Agency, such as Director General, Health and Nutrition (2013-2015), and Director General, Thematic and Sectoral Policy Directorate (2009-2013).

Mr. MacLennan holds a Ph.D. from Western University, specializing in constitutional development and international human rights.

DMA – Sandra McCardell, Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Sandra McCardell was appointed Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in July 2024. Prior to this, she was Assistant Deputy Minister of the International Affairs Branch of Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC). She has held several senior positions such as Assistant Deputy Minister of Europe, Arctic, Middle East, and Maghreb Branch at Global Affairs Canada (2020-2023) and Director General of the Middle East Bureau (2019-2020).

Ms. McCardell served as High Commissioner of Canada to South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Mauritius, and Madagascar (2015-2019), Ambassador of Canada to Morocco and Mauritania (2012-2015) and Ambassador of Canada to Libya (2009-2011). In line with her commitment to a healthy workplace, Sandra has been the co-champion for values and ethics at ECCC and champion for women at GAC (2020-2023).

Ms. McCardell holds a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Alberta.

Assistant Deputy Ministers

Functional branches

CFM – Tara Denham, ADM, Emergency Management, Legal and Consular Affairs Branch and Senior Official for Hostage Affairs

Tara Denham is the Assistant Deputy Minister of Emergency Management, Legal and Consular Affairs (CFM) & Senior Official for Hostage Affairs. Previously, Ms. Denham was the Director General for Human Rights, Freedoms and Inclusion at Global Affairs Canada and the Senior Official on cyber, digital and emerging technology policy issues.

IFM – Richard Arbeiter, ADM, International Security and Political Affairs Branch and Political Director 

Richard Arbeiter is currently the Political Director and Assistant Deputy Minister for International Security and Political Affairs. From 2018 to 2024, Mr. Arbeiter served as Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, New York.

RFM – Catherine Jobin, ADM, Strategy, Policy and Public Affairs Branch 

Catherine Jobin is Assistant Deputy Minister, Strategy, Policy and Public Affairs. Earlier in her career, Catherine worked at the Privy Council Office’s Priorities and Planning Secretariat, with the Canadian International Development Agency, and was posted at the Canadian Embassy to Afghanistan.

TFM – Sara Wilshaw, Senior ADM, International Trade Branch and Chief Trade Commissioner 

Sara Wilshaw is currently Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, International Trade and Chief Trade Commissioner. Prior to this, Ms. Wilshaw served as Director of Operations, Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat at the Privy Council Office.

YFM – Leslie Norton, ADM, International Assistance Partnerships and Programming Branch 

Leslie E. Norton is the Assistant Deputy Minister of the International Assistance Partnerships and Programming Branch. Prior to this, she was appointed Canada’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

Geographic branches

EGM – Alexandre Lévêque, ADM, Europe, Middle East and Arctic Branch 

Alexandre Lévêque is the Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for Europe, the Middle East, and the Arctic. Previously, he was the Assistant Deputy Minister for Strategic Policy at Global Affairs Canada and Assistant Secretary to Cabinet at the Privy Council Office’s Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat. He also served as High Commissioner of Canada in Tanzania, with concurrent accreditation in the Republic of the Seychelles, and Ambassador to the Union of the Comoros.

NGM –Shalini Anand, ADM, Americas Branch 

Shalini Anand is the Assistant Deputy for the Americas. Prior to this, she was the Director General of the Trade and Export Controls Bureau, Trade Policy and Negotiations Branch. She served abroad during three postings in Asia, across foreign policy and trade promotion portfolios, including as Consul and head of the political section at the Consulate General of Canada in Hong Kong.

OGM – Weldon Epp, ADM, Indo-Pacific Branch 

Weldon Epp is the Assistant Deputy Minister for Indo-Pacific. Prior to this, he was the Director General of the Northeast Asia Bureau. Abroad, he has served as Consul General in Guangzhou and in Shanghai, and has had assignments in Jakarta, Taipei, and Beijing.

WGM/GFM – Cheryl Urban, ADM, Africa Branch and ADM, Pan-geographic Affairs Branch 

Cheryl Urban is the Assistant Deputy Minister for Africa and Pan-Geographic Affairs branches. Prior to this, she was Director General for Economic Development, leading the department’s engagement with international financial institutions. Ms. Urban was also Director General of Corporate Planning, Performance and Risk Management; Program Director, Southeast Asia; and Policy Director with the Afghanistan Task Force, which included field assignments in Kabul and Kandahar.

Corporate branches

ACM – Stéphane Cousineau, Senior ADM, International Platform Branch 

Stéphane Cousineau is leading the International Platform Branch as Senior Assistant Deputy Minister since January 2022. Prior to this, he served as Senior Assistant Deputy Minister of Corporate Services at Shared Services Canada for nearly four years. His previous roles include Assistant Deputy Minister of Corporate Management Services and Chief Financial Officer at the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada.

SCM – Shirley Carruthers, ADM, People and Corporate Management Branch and Chief Financial Officer 

Shirley Carruthers is the Senior Assistant Deputy Minister of the People and Corporate Management Branch, and Chief Financial Officer (CFO).  Between 2021 and 2023, Shirley occupied the position of ADM, Corporate Management and Services Sector, and CFO at Natural Resources Canada (NRCan), where she was responsible for finance, human resources, information management, information technology, real property, and security.

Special bureaus

DMFT – Antoine Chevrier, Chief Transformation Officer 

Antoine Chevrier is the Chief Transformation Officer of the department. Prior to this, he was Director General for Pan-African Affairs and subsequently Assistant Deputy Minister for Intergovernmental Affairs at the Privy Council Office, before assuming the position of Assistant Deputy Minister for Sub-Saharan Africa.

DSMX – Daniel Desfossés, ADM, Summits Management Office 

Daniel Desfossés was appointed Assistant Deputy Minister, Summits Management Office. Prior to this, Mr. Desfossés served as Regional Director General for Québec and Atlantic at Environment and Climate Change Canada. He was also Director General Planning, Summits Management Office, for the 2018 G7 Summit, at Global Affairs Canada (2017-2019).

4. Global Affairs Canada executive organizational structure

Annex: Global Affairs Canada executive organizational structure (HQ)

Legend

ADM: Assistant Deputy Minister

AADM: Associate Assistant Deputy Minister

DG: Director General

Departmental symbols: Conventions and designations

At Global Affairs Canada, designations for symbols are three letters, with four letters for subgroups and special groups.

• The first letter represents the branch it is associated with (e.g. for TFM Branch, all symbols within the branch will start with “T”).
• The second letter of a branch symbol designates if it is a
  • functional (F), e.g. RFM;
  • geographical (G), e.g. NGM; or,
  • corporate (C) unit, e.g. SCM.
• The third letter of any symbol is determined by the level or function of the symbol:
  • branch-level symbols will end with “M”;
  • bureau-level will end with “D”; and,
  • divisional-level will end with other alphabetical letters.
• Associate ADMs will typically have the same branch symbol, ending with an “A”, for associate (TFMA)

There are exceptions to the general rules for special bureaus (e.g. DMFT, JUS, VBD, etc.).

5. Network map 

C. Top issues 

1. Canada-United States

Issue 

• Canada and the United States have long shared one of the most productive, collaborative, and mutually beneficial bilateral relationships in the world. However, U.S. tariffs and the administration’s shift in global strategy have challenged the bilateral relationship.
• President Trump sees an imbalanced Canada-U.S. relationship, which he characterizes as the United States “subsidizing” Canada’s economy and social welfare at the expense of U.S. national and economic interests. Comments by President Trump and members of his administration signal intentions to extract significantly more favourable terms from Canada in return for the security and economic benefits that flow from a close partnership with the United States.
• Managing the U.S. relationship and Canada’s interdependence with its neighbour will define the government’s mandate and intersect with managing the federation. This responsibility is compounded by the significant economic impacts of U.S. policy decisions and the geopolitical shifts they have triggered.

Background

The United States is the world’s predominant military power, largest economy, traditionally its largest provider of official development assistance (US$64.7 billion in 2023, and around 42% of total global humanitarian aid in 2024), and an indispensable foreign partner for Canada. Under the second Trump administration, the United States is in the midst of a sweeping change that has already significantly affected both domestic and global norms. The Trump administration is explicitly seeking to strengthen the authority of the presidency while dramatically reducing the scale and cost of government and drastically reducing its foreign aid and international commitments. Economically, the administration is using tariffs to rebalance all trading relationships, generate revenue, and compel action in areas unrelated to trade by both allies and adversaries. While some tariffs are presented as tied to specific goals (e.g. border security for Canada and Mexico), most of them also appear to serve multiple objectives, including competing with China, bolstering domestic manufacturing capacity, reducing supply chain dependencies on foreign countries, and addressing rising national debt and deficit.

The actions of the administration are not only countering the established systems and norms, but in many cases appear to favour a more bilateral approach to international relations. This strategic shift indicates that the United States perceives its global multilateral leadership role as unsustainable and recognizes the necessity for a drastic change to ensure its ability to prevail in the strategic geopolitical competition with China. The administration is seeking to rebalance all partnerships, including with close allies, to ensure that the United States is the net beneficiary. The administration shows preferential treatment to partners that are explicitly supportive of the president and his agenda, contribute substantial net economic benefits to the United States, or are ideologically aligned with the America First movement. Going forward, the lens through which the United States views its international engagement will be: does it make America safer, stronger, and more prosperous?

Considerations

Bilateral engagement

The department serves as the whole-of-government lead for coordinating and supporting engagement and advocacy activities on Canada-U.S. relations. In the United States, advocacy focuses on key elected officials, decision-makers, influencers and the private sector. In Canada, this plan involves engagement with provincial, territorial, municipal as well as private sector leaders who have strong and influential ties in the United States. The department has supported this "Team Canada" effort by developing and sharing timely key messages and tracking engagements and the resulting insights.

Security and defence 

The Canada-U.S. defence and security partnership has a long history of deep collaboration and interdependence, supporting the defence of the continent and pursuit of shared interests around the world. This cooperation includes the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Five Eyes intelligence sharing, the deep integration of our defence industries, and strong relations between law enforcement agencies. In November 2024, the United States, Canada and Finland signed a Memorandum of Understanding and announced the ICE Pact (Icebreaker Collaboration Effort), a partnership to produce and maintain best-in-class polar icebreakers and other capabilities. However, there are bipartisan concerns in the United States with Canada’s insufficient defence spending level, including our timeline to reach the NATO 2% target by 2032.

Trade, investment and economic cooperation  

Canada and the United States have a long history of cooperation to manage the secure and efficient flow of goods and people across the border, which Canada continues to see as vital to both countries’ economic competitiveness, security, and prosperity. Our supply chains have integrated to a point where in many sectors virtually all goods made in the United States are also partly made in Canada or with Canadian components and resources. More than 70% of Canadian goods exported to the United States are then used by U.S. companies as inputs in their own production. Canada has a trade surplus with the United States due to energy exports. With energy taken out of the mix, the United States has a large trade surplus with Canada. Nearly 8 million U.S. jobs are supported by trade with Canada. Canada is the largest export market for 32 States, and top three for 45 States. Canada is the number one supplier of energy to the United States.

Border management and transboundary affairs 

You are also responsible for several bilateral treaties and institutions established to manage transboundary issues linked to energy, water, and the border. Canada’s energy relationship with the United States plays a critical role in assuring energy security and can support the U.S. administration’s objective of energy dominance. Cross-border energy infrastructure (70+ pipelines and 35+ electricity transmission lines) provide for mutual energy reliance. One cross-border pipeline, Enbridge’s Line 5, is subject to ongoing litigation in the United States, and the focus of diplomatic negotiations between the Department and the Department of State under the1977 Canada-U.S. Transit Pipelines Treaty. Canada and the United States also manage transboundary water issues through agreements and institutions like the Columbia River Treaty, International Joint Commission and Great Lakes Fishery Commission. When it comes to the shared border, the United States has always emphasized security, but the current administration approach linking border security to tariffs is unprecedented. Canada’s recent investments in border security have been well received by the U.S. administration.

Consular  

In 2023-24, a total of 746 new Canadian consular cases were opened in the United States. The most common types of cases in the region include arrest and detention cases, accidents and medical assistance, natural deaths abroad, and wellbeing and whereabouts. As of March 2025, there are 603 known cases of Canadians detained in the country. The most complex consular cases in the United States are those of Canadian citizens on death row, of which there are currently 4 known cases. Under the U.S. criminal system, both the federal government and some state governments can impose death penalty sentences on various crimes. In a recent executive order, President Trump directed the Justice Department to systematically seek the death penalty where possible.

On April 4, Canada updated its travel advisory to the United States to take account of President Trump’s executive actions and their implementation. The updates highlight new guidelines for visa application, enhanced scrutiny at the border, including for electronic devices, gender identification, and new requirements to register for stays longer than 30 days. Canada’s updated travel advisory now also recommends to Canadians in the United States to always carry a valid ID as well as evidence of status in the United States. The Department continues to monitor the domestic situation in the United States and will advise when/if further updates to the travel advisory are needed.

Annex A: Regional Footprint 

Canada has an embassy in Washington, D.C., consulates general in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis, New York, San Francisco, and Seattle, a consulate in Phoenix, 3 consulates (trade offices), and 14 honorary consuls. Canada’s Ambassador to the United States is Kirsten Hillman (appointed on March 26, 2020). 

The United States maintains an embassy in Ottawa and consulates in Calgary, Halifax, Montreal, Quebec City, Toronto, Vancouver, and Winnipeg. The U.S. Ambassador is Peter Hoekstra.

Annex B: Regional Trade  

Source: Statistics Canada Tables 12-10-0171-01 (Merchandise Trade), 36-10-0007-01 (Service Trade), and 36-10-0008-01 (Direct Investment Stock).

2. The Artic

Issue

• The Arctic region is home to more than 4 million people across Canada, the Nordic states (Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden), Russia and the United States.
• The system of rules and institutions in the Arctic is under increased threat following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine [REDACTED].
• The Arctic is of interest to China and other non-Arctic states and actors aspiring for a greater role in Arctic affairs, with some adversaries engaging in malign activities such as dual-use research, foreign interference and economic coercion.
• The Arctic Council is the premier forum for cooperation in the Arctic. The Council has not been functioning at full capacity, largely is under stress as a result of limits on cooperation with Russia following its invasion of Ukraine.

Background

The Arctic is a region of growing geostrategic importance. For many years, the Arctic has been cooperatively managed by Arctic states to foster a low-tension region free from military competition. However, strategic competition, climate change, technological advancement and economic interests have come together to change the Arctic context in recent years. International guardrails to prevent and resolve conflict have weakened and broader geopolitical considerations (e.g. Russia’s war against Ukraine, [REDACTED], increasing challenges from non-Arctic states to Arctic state primacy in Arctic governance) have had spillover effects in the Arctic.

Canada’s international Arctic interests are advanced by the department, both at headquarters and by our missions, through a whole-of-government approach. The department’s activities are guided by the Arctic Foreign Policy (2024) and the international chapter of the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (2019). The department also manages the Global Arctic Leadership Initiative, an $8 million annual program, that promotes Canada’s interests and values in international Arctic engagement. Across all lines of effort, the department seeks to connect international Arctic engagement with domestic priorities and to maintain close collaboration with Northerners, in particular Indigenous Peoples.

Considerations

Bilateral and regional multilateral engagement  

A long-standing principle of Canada’s Arctic foreign policy is that the Arctic should be governed by Arctic states in collaboration with Arctic and northern Indigenous Peoples. Arctic states preside over a well-governed region operating under extensive national and international legal frameworks. The premier forum for Arctic cooperation is the Arctic Council, which brings together 8 Arctic states and 6 Indigenous Peoples organizations to advance issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic. While Russia remains an Arctic Council member, like-minded states have limited engagement due to its invasion of Ukraine. The Arctic Council also includes 38 Observer states and organizations, including China, India, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and de facto the EU.

The United States has been and will continue to be an important partner for Canada in the Arctic given our shared geography and intertwined security and defence relationship. [REDACTED]

Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE Pact) 

The ICE Pact, signed by Canada, the United States and Finland in November 2024, remains a priority to coordinate expertise and capabilities to produce best-in-class polar vessels, including icebreakers. Implementation is being challenged by President Trump’s imposition of 25% tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum and the discussion on March 29 between the U.S. President and Finnish President regarding President Trump’s desire to procure 40 icebreakers [REDACTED].

Arctic Security  

The region emerges today as an area for military activity, new technologies and modern weapon systems that threaten collective security. Current tensions with Russia, and China’s growing interest and presence in the region, have introduced a high degree of uncertainty regarding the future of Arctic security.

In response to the deteriorating security environment, and to safeguard national sovereignty and security, Canada is investing in its Arctic military capabilities, deepening collaboration with Arctic Allies, and moving to modernize NORAD alongside the United States. Russia continues to be the most capable military actor in the Arctic, viewing NATO as a significant threat to its Arctic and Baltic interests. With Sweden and Finland now in NATO, the Alliance is increasingly focusing on its northern periphery.

Chinese and Russian collaboration is increasingly taking on a northern dimension, including air and sea patrols near Alaska, and Chinese icebreakers regularly sailing in the Arctic Ocean to undertake scientific research, which Canada and its Allies assume has dual-use purposes. In addition, China has increased its commercial exploration, investment and development of critical minerals, oil and gas, and fisheries. Furthermore, adversaries actively target Canadians, including Northerners and Indigenous Peoples, with disinformation and influence campaigns, malicious cyber operations, and espionage. To support communities' ability to make informed decisions about their security, the Government has enhanced information and intelligence sharing with relevant territorial, provincial and Indigenous governments.

Arctic Sovereignty

With retreating sea ice and new technologies improving navigation and accessibility to varying degrees, foreign interest to the Arctic will continue to increase. Canada’s sovereignty over the lands and islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago is not subject to dispute. Its waters, including the various waterways known as the Northwest Passage (NWP), are internal waters of Canada by virtue of historic title, and thus Canada has full sovereignty over them. However, the United States considers the NWP to be a strait for international navigation, with a right of transit for all states. [REDACTED]

 Following the conclusion of a 2022 boundary agreement with the Kingdom of Denmark – which resolved the land boundary on Hans Island (Tartupaluk), the maritime boundary in the Lincoln Sea, and extended continental shelf overlap in the Labrador Sea – Canada’s remaining Arctic boundary dispute is with the United States. In September 2024, Canada and the United States announced a task force to resolve the maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea, including the overlap in the continental shelf in the Central Arctic Ocean. [REDACTED].

Annex A: Regional Footprint

Source: Mission Network Map

Annex B: Regional Trade

Source: Statistics Canada Tables 12-10-0171-01 (Merchandise Trade), 36-10-0007-01 (Service Trade), and 36-10-0008-01 (Direct Investment Stock).

3. Ukraine

Issue

• Since February 24, 2022, Ukraine has faced a full-scale war of aggression from Russia, creating the largest geopolitical and security challenge in Europe since World War II.
• Since 2022, Canada has committed almost $20 billion in financial ($12.4 billion), military ($4.5 billion), humanitarian ($372.2 million), development ($585 million), security and stabilization ($225 million), and immigration assistance. Canada currently ranks 6th among the G7 in the provision of military assistance to Ukraine, ahead only of Japan, which does not contribute lethal assistance.
• The United States is looking to rapidly negotiate an end to the war, while European partners are working to identify means to secure Ukraine's long-term capacity to defend itself from future Russian aggression, including through a European-led “Coalition of the Willing.”
• Canada, along with its allies and partners, is seeking to ensure that Ukraine is an equal partner in peace negotiations, and that no decisions about Ukraine are taken without Ukraine.

Background

General  

Ukraine declared its independence from the Soviet Union on August 24, 1991, and became a democratic state with a free market economy, recognized by the Russian Federation the same year. In the late 2000s and early 2010s, Ukraine became progressively Western-leaning, seeking to join the European Union.

Following the Maidan Revolution in 2014, Russia illegally annexed Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula and instigated a proxy war in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine. For the next eight years, there was a frozen conflict in the Donbas, and unsuccessful attempts to end the war through 2 Minsk Accords. Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

Battlefield Situation  

[REDACTED] In recent months, Moscow has made gains in Donbas, despite facing record-breaking casualties. In March 2025, Russian forces were able to recapture most of the Ukrainian-held territory in Russia’s Kursk region. [REDACTED]

Russian Objectives

President Putin seeks to weaken Ukraine’s defence, demoralize its armed forces and create among the broader population a sense of inevitable Russian victory. Russia has transitioned towards a wartime economy and plans to augment its defence spending by a further 25% in 2025, to a record US$140 billion. Record inflation and the impact of sanctions are creating pressure on the Russian economy, [REDACTED] Russia’s partners – China, the DPRK, and Iran – are providing important supplies that enable Putin’s war. Beijing supports Moscow through dual-use items, helping to reconstitute Russian military-industrial capabilities. The DPRK has sent more than 11,000 troops to Russia, including to fight against Ukrainian forces in Russia’s Kursk region. Pyongyang’s direct involvement in Russia’s war is a significant escalation, with dangerous implications for security and stability in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. [REDACTED].

Bilateral Security Arrangements Initiative 

All G7 Members and several NATO Allies and partners (27 countries plus the EU) have finalized bilateral security arrangements with Ukraine, as a way for the West to demonstrate enduring security support to Ukraine.

EU and NATO Membership 

Ukraine is keen to join the EU and NATO. Ukraine applied for EU membership in February 2022, shortly after Russia's invasion. By June 2022, Ukraine received candidate status, and accession negotiations began in December 2023. The first Accession Conference at the ministerial level was held in Luxembourg on June 25, 2024, officially opening negotiations. [REDACTED] Ukraine has made notable progress in aligning with EU standards, particularly in justice, anti-corruption reforms, and minority rights protection. At the 2024 NATO Summit, Allies reaffirmed their continued support for Ukraine on its “irreversible path” to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership.

Ceasefire Negotiations  

[REDACTED] In late February, Ukraine and the United States started negotiating a rare earths mineral deal that would tie U.S. investment to Ukraine’s reconstruction; this was signed on 30 April [REDACTED] Direct conversations between the United States and Russia have led to advanced discussions of a ceasefire agreement and settlement to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Most countries have emphasized that Ukraine must be an equal partner in any negotiations and that no settlement should be imposed upon Ukraine against its will.

While negotiations have taken place on a ceasefire, [REDACTED]. Russian attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure have continued, with the latest attacks on April 6 and April 12 launched from the Black Sea. In the discussions President Zelenskyy has prioritized the return of Ukrainian Prisoners of War, unlawfully detained civilians, and deported and transferred children, which the United States has agreed to support. Canada, with Ukraine and Norway, co-chairs the Human Dimension working group of Ukraine’s Peace Formula. Canada also co-chairs the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children, which includes 41 member states and the Council of Europe. In October 2024, Minister Joly hosted the Ministerial Conference on the Human Dimension of Ukraine’s Peace Process, which resulted in the Montreal Pledge which was supported by 53 countries and which identified concrete steps forward to support returns. [REDACTED].

Security Guarantees 

[REDACTED] The United States has stated that it expects European and non-European Allies and partners to provide such security guarantees for Ukraine. In recent months, the UK and France have co-chaired a series of political and military discussions regarding a potential European-led “Coalition of the Willing.” Canada is actively participating in these discussions. In early April, President Zelenskyy said publicly that the Coalition format would be finalized “in about a month,” and that discussions comprise elements “on the ground, in the air, and at sea,” along with “other delicate matters.” Moscow has vocally opposed such a Coalition. [REDACTED]

Trade, investment and economic cooperation

Enduring and war-related challenges to the business environment have not prevented Canadian firms from exporting and investing in Ukraine. [REDACTED] In 2024, Canada’s merchandise exports to Ukraine totalled $478.8 million, and merchandise imports from Ukraine totalled $293.7 million. The top 3 exports to Ukraine were armored fighting vehicles and parts, unmanned aircrafts, and firearm parts and accessories. Canada’s top imports from Ukraine were natural uranium, sunflower seed and oils, and apple juice. In 2023, the stock of Canadian direct investment in Ukraine stood at $92 million (total book value). Other sectors of interest to Canadian companies include rebuilding Ukraine’s infrastructure and the energy sector. [REDACTED].

The Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) entered into force on August 1, 2017. The modernized CUFTA entered into force on July 1st, 2024. It represents an ambitious, comprehensive, and high-standard agreement that will underpin our commercial ties for years to come, while supporting Ukraine’s long-term economic recovery and trade interests.

International development context and Canadian international assistance  

The Government of Ukraine, the World Bank Group, the European Commission, and the United Nations released the fourth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment on February 25, 2025. It estimates the total cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine to be USD$524 billion over the next decade.

Mobilizing private sector investment and continued development assistance over the long term will be necessary.

Consular  

Since February 1, 2022, the Government of Canada has advised against all travel to Ukraine, highlighting that our ability to provide consular services in Ukraine is severely limited, and pointing to the high risk to safety, particularly if engaging in active combat.

Map of Ukraine 

4. China 

Issue

• Under President Xi Jinping, China has become ever more authoritarian, with focus shifting from economic growth to national security as the over-riding priority.
• Internationally this has translated into the use of coercive diplomacy, as well as growing assertiveness in the geo-strategic context.
• Canada and the United States share concerns over China's non-market policies and practices, economic coercion, nuclear proliferation, human rights violations, and its growing assertiveness around the world, among other issues.

Background

China sees itself as a Great Power peer of the United States and the dominant power in Asia. President Xi Jinping’s core policies focus on a comprehensive vision of national security, encompassing political, military, economic, societal, and science and technology security, to shield against perceived threats to the continued rule of the Communist Party. China’s foreign policy priorities include: managing relations with the United States; promoting regional economic integration; pushing for global governance reforms that better align with China’s interests; and bolstering its military and soft power. China-United States relations are likely to continue to be marked by intense rivalry as both view the other as its principal long-term strategic competitor. Addressing the trade deficit with China remains a key U.S. priority, prompting recent tariffs aimed at correcting trade imbalances. Anticipating such measures, China has been diversifying its trade partnerships and preparing a multi-faceted response. [REDACTED]

Civil and political rights are increasingly constrained in China. The punishment and ill-treatment of human rights defenders, persecution of minorities, and restrictions on civil society are on the rise. Freedom of religion or belief is also increasingly under pressure, especially in the Tibet and Xinjiang autonomous regions, and against Falun Gong practitioners. Widespread state surveillance, state controls over the media, and a heavily restricted internet all severely impede freedom of expression. Hong Kong’s status as a stable international business hub has eroded in recent years, with weakened rights and freedoms, diminishing judicial independence, and the arbitrary application of local laws.

China is now highly integrated into the multilateral system, presenting itself as a leader and voice for the Global South, and a defender of the multilateral trading system. China’s vision of multilateralism emphasizes state sovereignty and non-interference, while downplaying international law and states’ international obligations, especially on human rights, by redefining existing concepts to its advantage. [REDACTED]

Tensions across the Taiwan Strait remain high, with Beijing's recent military exercises around the island increasing the pressure on Taipei amidst a deteriorating regional environment. On April 1 and 2, 2025, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) conducted a large-scale joint training drill simulating a blockade around Taiwan. The drills were in apparent response to a major speech by Taiwan president Lai Ching-te in March labelling the People's Republic of China (PRC) a “foreign hostile force,” [REDACTED]

In parallel, China has aggressively asserted its maritime and territorial claims in the South China Sea, often through illegal actions aimed at obstructing freedom of navigation and overflight, undermine the rule of law, and fuel tensions with its neighbours. As part of its pursuit of influence in all functional and geographic domains of strategic significance, China continues to increase its presence in the Arctic, including commercial exploration and development of critical minerals, oil and gas, and fisheries. China also actively engages in malign influence and foreign interference activities, as well as dual-use research activities in the Arctic. To support domestic partners’ ability to make informed decisions in their interactions with China, the Government has enhanced information sharing with relevant territorial, provincial, and Indigenous partners.

Considerations 

Bilateral engagement  

The Government of Canada pursues constructive, predictable engagement with China, but has been firm in the protection of our national and economic security. The government has sought to advance these interests by focusing on high impact objectives and working with partners and allies where our interests align. Significant challenges remain in the relationship as a result of China’s interference and transnational repression activities, non-market policies and practices, coercive activities in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, widespread human rights violations and support to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Chinese foreign interference and transnational repression are of major concern for the Government of Canada. The Public Inquiry into Foreign interference determined that China is the most persistent and sophisticated foreign interference threat to Canada.

Established in 1970, Canada’s One China Policy recognizes the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China, taking note of—neither challenging nor endorsing—the Chinese government’s position on Taiwan. This policy forms the basis of Canada’s diplomatic relations with the PRC and unofficial ties with Taiwan. For over five decades, Canada has maintained and advanced unofficial but valuable economic, cultural and people-to-people ties with Taiwan.

Trade, investment and economic cooperation

The Government of Canada has pursued opportunities and fair market access while balancing economic security interests, through the removal of market access barriers and prudent promotion in sectors that do not pose a national security risk. In 2024, Canada’s two-way merchandise trade with China totalled $118.4 billion. Canada’s top merchandise exports to China were canola seeds (13.4% of total merchandise exports to China), coal (9.2%), and crude oil (8.2%) while top imports from China comprised of electronics (16.9%), vehicles, and parts (5.1%), and furniture (1.9%). While exports to China have grown 54% over the past decade, ongoing market access issues for Canadian beef and dry pet food containing poultry ingredients remain a challenge. Canada’s two-way service trade with China totalled $12.0 billion in 2024. Service exports and imports amounted to $7.9 billion and $4.2 billion respectively.

To respond to China’s pervasive use of non-market policies and practices, the Government took extraordinary measures in October 2024 by imposing surtaxes of 100% on electric vehicles (EV) and 25% on steel and aluminum imported from China. In retaliation, China took certain measures against Canada, including WTO dispute settlement consultations and canola and halogenated butyl rubber anti-dumping investigations - decisions on these actions are still pending. China also launched an antidiscrimination investigation against Canada’s EV measures which resulted in China imposing additional tariffs on Canadian products (e.g., 100% tariffs on canola oil, canola meal (cake), and peas, and 25% tariffs on aquatic products and pork). In response, Canada initiated a WTO consultation process in early April 2025, which is currently ongoing.

[REDACTED]

Consular 

In 2024-25, approximately 250 new consular cases were opened in China. Cases of arrest and detention of Canadian nationals are the most complex. At any given time, approximately 100 Canadians are in Chinese custody for various allegations and crimes, the majority of which relate to narcotics, corruption, and economic crimes. China has very strict penalties, including the death penalty, for both violent and non-violent offences, such as serious drug crimes. Canada advocates for clemency in all death penalty cases. Despite enhanced advocacy efforts, four Canadians were executed by China in early 2025. Robert Schellenberg remains on death row. Canada has deemed his case to be arbitrary sentencing and continues to advocate for clemency.

Annex A: Regional Footprint

Source: Mission Network Map

Annex B: Regional Trade 

Source: Statistics Canada Tables 12-10-0171-01 (Merchandise Trade), 36-10-0007-01 (Service Trade), and 36-10-0008-01 (Direct Investment Stock).

5. India

Issue

• India, the world’s most populous country and fifth largest economy, is projected to account for one fifth of global economic growth over the next decade, driven by a rapidly growing middle-class, a largely English-speaking workforce adding 9.7 million potential workers per year, and dramatic improvements to physical and digital infrastructure.
• India is a counterbalance to China in the Indo-Pacific region. An increasing number of countries actively engage India on long-term strategic interests, including international security, mobility, energy and food security, technology and climate change.
• India views the Khalistan independence movement, in Canada and in other countries, as a serious threat to its national security. Canada’s longstanding and consistent position is to recognize the unity and territorial integrity of India.

Background

The Republic of India is a federal parliamentary democracy with the world’s largest population and fifth largest economy. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration, India has largely eliminated extreme poverty and made major strides to improve infrastructure, as well as access to financial services and education for girls. However, some organizations have expressed growing concern over the shrinking space for civil society, minority rights and media freedoms.

India’s growing strategic, economic and demographic importance make it a critical partner in the Indo-Pacific. India has become more assertive in South Asia and beyond, competing with China for leadership among emerging markets and developing countries. It has also deepened engagement in the Indo-Pacific through ASEAN and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with the United States, Australia and Japan (the Quad). In its immediate neighbourhood, India’s priorities are managing difficult relationships with Pakistan and China, while exploiting growing ties with Gulf Cooperation Council countries and investors.

Canada and India share over 75 years of diplomatic relations and deep people-to-people ties. These ties include the shared tragedy of the terrorist bombing of an Air India flight 40 years ago, killing 329 passengers and crew, including 268 Canadian citizens and 22 Indian citizens. Bilateral relations were formally designated as a Strategic Partnership in 2018, structured around various Ministerial Dialogues. These dialogues, along with trade negotiations, are currently dormant largely due to bilateral tensions in response to intelligence-based allegations of involvement of agents of the Government of India in the murder of Canadian citizen Hardeep Singh Nijjar. Although Foreign Ministers and senior officials continue to meet regularly, India has severely reduced Canada’s diplomatic presence at the High Commission in New Delhi. In-person services at Canadian Consulates General are currently suspended. Both countries are currently represented by Chargé d’affaires.

Both India and Canada have publicly stated that current bilateral tensions should not obstruct our long-standing people-to-people and commercial ties, including $5.6 billion of Canadian foreign direct investment and $47.3 billion in Canadian portfolio investment in India. India is Canada’s largest source country across most immigration categories, with 392,810 study permit holders with Indian citizenship in the 2024 calendar year. As of the 2021 federal census, there are more than 1.8 million Canadians of Indian origin.

Considerations

Bilateral and regional multilateral engagement

The Government has engaged India on allegations that its agents were involved in the Nijjar murder, issues of Khalistani extremism, as well as broader concerns regarding foreign interference.

India’s concerns about Khalistani extremism in Canada are a significant factor in the relationship. [REDACTED]

Over the past few years, India has closely monitored events in Canada related to pro-Khalistan demonstrations and referendums, security of its diplomats, the Nijjar murder investigation, the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference, and changes to various Canadian immigration programs – the primary participants of which are Indian citizens. Indian nationals also make up the majority of asylum claimants in Canada and illegal entrants to the United States from Canada.

Trade, investment and economic cooperation 

In 2024, Canada’s two-way merchandise trade with India was $13.3 billion ($5.3 billion in exports; $8 billion in imports). Canada's largest exports to India were peas ($788,875,921), lentils ($608,784,284), bituminous coal ($602,072,390) and potash ($404,113,957). In terms of services, in 2023, Canada’s two-way trade with India reached a new high of $17.3 billion. Service exports to India were valued at $14.1 billion and were led by travel spending, which accounted for 95.7% of Canadian service exports to India, followed by commercial services at 2.33% and transportation services at 2%.

Canada and India have been negotiating a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) since 2010. On 11 March 2022, former Minister Ng and Minister Goyal relaunched negotiations toward a CEPA, with consideration of an Early Progress Trade Agreement (EPTA). Officials held nine EPTA negotiating rounds between March 2022 and July 2023, before negotiations were paused in September 2023.

As Canada's third largest two-way services trade partner (2023) and tenth largest merchandise export market (2024), India has the potential to play a significant role in Canada’s trade diversification strategy in the medium to long term, while recognizing it remains one of the world’s most protected and challenging markets for doing business. Despite the CEPA negotiation pause, significant investments, in particular in the Indian infrastructure sector, have continued to be made by Canadian pension funds.

In February 2025, Prime Minister Modi became one of the first world leaders to meet with President Trump at the White House. [REDACTED] President Trump announced a 26% tariff on Indian goods. However, a 90-day pause was subsequently announced on April 9, 2025.

International development context and Canadian international development assistance

Canada’s bilateral development program ended in 2006 following a change in Indian government policy on aid. Canada previously provided $2.4 billion in international development assistance over a 56-year period. Canada continues to provide international development assistance to India through partnerships between Indian and Canadian NGOs and academic institutions; multilateral programs; and the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI). In FY 2023-2024, Canada provided $39.41 million in international development assistance to India via all channels.

Consular

As of April 8, 2025, there are up to 18 Canadians detained in India (3 are in jail and 15 released on bail). In FY 2023-24, a total of 120 new cases were opened in India, dealing primarily with arrest, medical assistance, death, wellbeing/whereabouts, and children and family issues.

During a February 2025 press conference, President Trump announced the extradition of a Canadian citizen to India to face charges for his alleged role in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. On April 10, he was extradited to India. If convicted of charges in India, he could face the death penalty.

Annex A: Regional Footprint 

Source: Mission Network Map

Annex B: Regional Trade  

Source: Statistics Canada Tables 12-10-0171-01 (Merchandise Trade), 36-10-0007-01 (Service Trade), and 36-10-0008-01 (Direct Investment Stock).

6. The Israel-Hamas conflict and Lebanon 

Issue

• The conflict in Gaza continues after a brief 2-month truce. [REDACTED] .
• [REDACTED] Israeli strikes targeting Hezbollah and intermittent rocket fire from Lebanon.

Background

Israel-Hamas

Hamas, a designated terrorist organization in Canada, won the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections and seized control of the Gaza Strip following a brief conflict with the Fatah party in 2007. Unlike the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, which supports a negotiated peace with Israel, Hamas calls for armed struggle. After Hamas took control of Gaza in June 2007, [REDACTED]. Hamas is a central player in the Iranian-backed "Axis of Resistance", aiming to counter the influence of Israel in the Middle East.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched an attack on Israel, resulting in the deadliest day in the country’s history and the largest single-day loss of Jewish life since the Holocaust. Approximately 1,200 people were killed and 250 hostages taken into Gaza. Israel's military response continues to this day, with over 52,400 Palestinians killed and 60–70% of Gaza's buildings and infrastructure either partially or completely destroyed. Since October 2023, the Government of Canada has allocated $315 million in humanitarian international assistance to Gaza and the West Bank.

Israel’s stated objective is to eliminate Hamas and retrieve all hostages. It also seeks to neutralize Iran and its proxies to prevent future attacks. [REDACTED].

After months of negotiations, mediation by Egypt and Qatar, alongside bipartisan U.S. pressure on Israel brokered a ceasefire agreement in January. This breakthrough facilitated the release of hostages and enabled a substantial scale-up of humanitarian assistance. The ceasefire agreement collapsed in early March, when Israel blocked entry of all humanitarian assistance, cut off electricity, and resumed its military operations in Gaza in response to Hamas’s refusal to release the remaining 59 hostages—22 of whom are confirmed alive—unless Israel withdraws its troops and commits to a permanent cessation of hostilities. Food insecurity in Gaza remains a critical issue in Gaza, particularly since Israel began its blockade. On April 25, WFP reported having delivered the last remaining food stocks to the WFP-supported hot meal kitchens (on which many Gazans depend for food) and on April 30, the UN reported an 80% rise in the number of children receiving treatment for malnutrition in April compared to March. The UN also reported that 92% of infants aged 6 months to 2 years, along with their mothers, are deprived of the minimum essential nutritional needs, exposing them to serious long-term health risks.

At the Arab League Summit on March 4, Arab leaders adopted a plan to address the humanitarian crisis and rebuild Gaza, transfer the governance to the Palestinian Authority, and map out the creation of a Palestinian state. A pledging conference on reconstruction is scheduled to take place in Cairo, pending a renewed ceasefire. Israel has not endorsed this Arab reconstruction plan and opposes a return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza and any form of Palestinian statehood.

Israel-Hezbollah conflict 

The Israel-Hezbollah conflict is a long-standing confrontation rooted in historical grievances, territorial disputes, and regional power dynamics. Designated as a terrorist entity in Canada, Hezbollah emerged in the 1980s with direct support from Iran, following the Israel-Lebanon war of 1982. Initially created as a Shi’a resistance movement against Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon, it quickly grew into a powerful political and military force with deep ideological, financial, and operational ties to Iran. Key turning points in the conflict include the 2006 war, which ended in a United Nations-mediated ceasefire under UNSC Resolution 1701.

On October 8, 2023, Hezbollah launched rockets into northern Israel, declaring it’s support for Hamas. Israel retaliated with increasing airstrikes, electronic warfare targeting Hezbollah’s communications, and ground operations. A ceasefire agreement, brokered by the United States and France, was reached in November 2024, ending hostilities with Israel during which most of Hezbollah’s senior leadership and 4,000 people in Lebanon were killed, and 1.2 million displaced internally. Key provisions of the ceasefire include Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon, as well as Hezbollah's disarmament and retreat north of the Litani River. A monitoring mechanism, actively led by the United States, overseas the implementation, with the Lebanese Armed Forces and United Nations peacekeepers deployed to ensure compliance. [REDACTED]. Israel has withdrawn from most of South Lebanon but remains in 5 locations. The cost of Lebanon’s reconstruction has been estimated by the World Bank at US$11 billion. In northern Israel, where some 60,000 residents were evacuated, many have not yet returned due to damaged infrastructure and fears of resumption of hostilities.

In early 2025, a new reform-oriented government was elected in Lebanon after a 2-year deadlock. [REDACTED] and has authorized a $95 million aid package to the Lebanese Armed Forces despite its global freeze on international assistance. In 2025, the Government of Canada allocated a total of $43.7 million in humanitarian assistance funding for Lebanon.

Considerations

• [REDACTED]
• France and Saudi Arabia will host a conference in New York, June 17-19 on the 2-state solution. [REDACTED]
• [REDACTED]

Source: [REDACTED]

7. Canada’s 2025 G7 presidency 

Issue

• G7 Foreign Ministers remain active throughout the year and responsive to geopolitical events. Canada hosted a Foreign Ministers’ meeting on the margins of the Munich Security Conference on February 15 and a full ministerial on March 12 to 14, in Charlevoix, Quebec, where they adopted a Joint Statement and a Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity.

Background

The G7

The G7 is an informal consensus-based grouping established in 1975 that includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and the EU Council and Commission (Russia joined in 1997 and was suspended in 2014, after it invaded Crimea). It is underpinned by shared values and advances shared economic and foreign policy interests by raising awareness, coordinating positions and catalyzing action.

Recent Canadian G7 initiatives include the coordinated response to Russia’s war in Ukraine; COVID-19 vaccine delivery and investment in vaccine manufacturing capacity across developing world; and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) to mobilize US$600 billion by 2027 (2022).

Canada’s G7 Presidency

Canada holds the Presidency of the G7 in 2025, marking the 50th anniversary of the group. The Prime Minister’s Personal Representative (Sherpa) for the G7 and G20 Summits is Deputy Minister Cindy Termorshuizen.

Canada’s G7 agenda is currently focused on 3 priorities:

1. Making communities safe and the world secure, including fostering peace and security in Ukraine, countering foreign interference, addressing transnational crime, and fighting wildfires;
2. Promoting prosperity, including by driving energy security and the digital transition, including resilient critical mineral supply chains, tackling non-market policies and practices, promoting AI access and adoption and accelerating the development of quantum technologies; and
3. Investing in partnerships of the future, including by helping mobilize the private sector to support priorities like infrastructure development.

To deliver on this agenda, Canada will convene G7 Leaders in Kananaskis, Alberta on June 15-17, 2025. [REDACTED] It hosted the foreign ministers meeting from March 12-14 in Charlevoix and will host the finance ministers meeting from May 20-22 in Banff. [REDACTED]. Existing working groups, which provide in-depth technical analysis on key issues, will continue their collaboration at the technical level even if ministerial meetings are not planned.

Foreign Ministers’ Track

The Foreign Ministers’ track is largely driven by emerging geopolitical events and remains flexible and responsive throughout the year. In 2025, Ukraine and the Middle East continue to dominate the discussion, while attention is also given to the China-North Korea-Russia-Iran nexus, China-Russia strategic cooperation and regional issues such as Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, and Venezuela.

Thus far in its presidency, Canada hosted the G7 foreign ministers for a meeting on the margins of Munich Security Conference on February 15, where they were joined by Ukraine’s foreign minister, and for a G7 ministerial in Charlevoix, Quebec, from March 12 to 14. Both meetings led to joint statements that were a public display of G7 unity and resolve on major geopolitical issues.

In Charlevoix, Canada also successfully negotiated a Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity to support the leaders’ track work on economic security and prosperity. This Canadian-led initiative is the first thematic initiative on the foreign ministers’ track since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It provides a framework to address strategic contestation in the Red Sea, South China Sea and other waters; sanctions circumvention and shadow fleets, including through a Shadow Fleet Task Force with the Nordic-Baltic 8; and the protection of critical undersea infrastructure.

G7 Foreign Ministers also issue ad hoc responsive statements. So far under Canada’s presidency, they addressed Maduro’s presidential inauguration in Venezuela on January 10, the escalation of violence in the eastern DRC on February 1, China’s large-scale military drills around Taiwan on April 6, and the devastating war in Sudan on April 15.

Throughout the year, G7 foreign ministers are supported by G7 political directors, who are in constant contact, including through regular secure calls and the annual Political Directors retreat that took place in Vancouver from February 26 to 28. Over a dozen G7 working groups on geographic and functional themes also meet virtually and/or in person. In Charlevoix, foreign ministers discussed the need to strengthen the Sanctions Working Group and establishing a Hybrid Warfare and Sabotage Working Group and of a Latin America Working Group.

Considerations

International positions

[REDACTED]

Summit and ministerial guests

The Prime Minister may invite guests to the Summit, just as ministers may include outreach partners in ministerial meetings. To date, invitations to the Summit have been extended to the President of Ukraine, [REDACTED].

Foreign Ministers' Track

Per regular G7 practice, Canada is expected to convene foreign ministers on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly High Level Week in September and to host a second full foreign ministerial meeting in Canada later in the fall. Canada may also convene additional virtual or in person G7 Foreign Ministers’ meetings, as has been done in previous years. France will take over the G7 presidency in January 2026.

8. Consular assistance

Issue

• Increased international travel by Canadians, combined with several complex international crises in recent years, has led to more demand for consular services and emergency response.
• Canadians' expectations are not anticipated to abate, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs has a visible role in managing consular crises and demands for assistance.
• Consular assistance demands and precedents created over the years carry high financial costs - calibrating and managing expectations of service delivery may be warranted.

Background

The delivery of consular services to Canadians abroad is a critical responsibility for the Government of Canada and a core mandate of Global Affairs Canada (GAC). Consular services are delivered under the crown prerogative over foreign affairs, in line with practices of other Commonwealth countries. Authority to conduct all consular relations on behalf of Canada is assigned to the Minister of Foreign Affairs by the Department of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Development Act (DFATD Act). There is no specific Canadian law that governs the provision of consular services, nor one that expressly obliges the Government of Canada to provide consular assistance. This affords GAC a certain level of discretion to balance consular service delivery with other elements of Canada’s foreign policy. The discretionary power is, however, limited by the Canadian Constitution, including the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; relevant Canadian legislation, such as the Privacy Act; and international conventions and treaties to which Canada is party.

Canada’s consular and emergency response program has 3 main priorities:

• To provide Canadians with the knowledge they need to make informed decisions before travelling abroad.
• To provide timely assistance to Canadians abroad.
• To provide a range of large-scale emergency responses, including evacuation operations.

Consular responsibilities are exercised primarily by consular officials within a robust policy framework. Officials work closely with the Minister and staff to advance particularly complex consular cases, including various forms of outreach to international counterparts and to the families of Canadians.

Last fiscal year, GAC provided 271,340 routine consular services to Canadians abroad (e.g. passports, citizenship certificates, notarial services) and opened over 7,208 consular cases. Consular cases vary in complexity and are often influenced by external factors beyond GAC’s control, such as client vulnerability, local environment, and state of diplomatic relations. The growing number and complexity of cases place increasing pressure on existing consular staff in Canada and abroad.

Coordination role of GAC to respond to emergencies

When international emergencies occur, GAC leads the whole-of-government coordination, which includes various interdepartmental task forces, and cooperation with international partners and non-governmental entities. The 24/7 Emergency Watch and Response Centre (EWRC) is the main point of contact off-hours, and during an emergency. The EWRC responds to approximately 200,000 enquiries per year, in addition to crisis-specific operations and dedicated phone lines (nearly 10,000 calls for Haiti and for the Middle East in 2024). In the last year, GAC has assisted Canadians, permanent residents and immediate family members to depart from Haiti (700), Israel (1600), the West Bank (80), Gaza (900), Lebanon (1250) and New Caledonia (40).

Communications 

The department provides information to Canadians about safety and security risks abroad via online Travel Advice and Advisories, to help Canadians to make informed choices for international travel to 230 destinations globally. Risk indicators range from ‘take normal security precautions’ to ‘avoid all travel.’ The travel advice is updated in real time, 24/7/365 and is one of the most visited Government of Canada websites with nearly 30 million visits annually.

The consular program receives a considerable proportion (~40%) of the department’s media inquiries. Out of the 3,358 inquiries received in 2024, 947 enquiries (28%) specifically concerned consular cases and issues. The department adopts a proactive communications approach during international emergencies. Media coverage of consular cases tends to be critical.

Source: Custom tabulation, Consular Data & Analytics, Global Affairs Canada

Source: Custom tabulation, Consular Data & Analytics, Global Affairs Canada

Note: Methodological changes to notarial services reporting began in FY 2023–2024. Earlier data may not be directly comparable.

Considerations

Consular services in a changing world

While the primary focus of support remains on Canadian citizens, GAC is increasingly asked to support permanent residents and their immediate family members in exceptional circumstances, reflecting expectations for a more expansive approach to consular services.

The government’s ability to provide assistance is often constrained, particularly in the case of natural disasters or in countries or regions where the potential for violence or political instability is high. The ability to provide services may also be hindered by the laws and regulations of other countries, in particular when it comes to dual citizens.

Increased travel, diversity of Canada’s population, geopolitical instability, war and civil unrest, earthquakes and climate-related events are all factors that have upped the volume, complexity and resource demands of consular work. Risks of litigation have also increased.

Policy leadership

In response to evolving threats including arbitrary detention for diplomatic leverage and hostage-taking, GAC has bolstered its policy leadership through efforts such as the Arbitrary Detention Initiative (ADI), which was launched in 2021 to rally the international community to address the growing threat of arbitrary detention in state-to-state relations. As part of the ADI, GAC is developing and implementing a strategy focused on deterrence, international norm building, collective response, and operational readiness. GAC also created the Senior Official for Hostage Affairs designation, which was added to the title of the Assistant Deputy Minister for Emergency Management, Legal and Consular Affairs, to bolster GAC’s international convening power on hostage issues, to ensure GAC has a seat at the table during hostage negotiations, and to enhance support to families and victims.

Consular Costs

The DFATD Act specifies that consular fees are to be commensurate with the costs to deliver the consular program. Revenues generated from the $25 Consular Services Fee that is charged on all adult passports have not been commensurate with the cost of delivering consular services since 2013. The gap between revenues and costs continues to widen year over year, which places a strain on departmental resources, in part because the fee was not adjusted with the introduction of the 10-year passport. GAC is unable to cover the costs of larger, prolonged crises, funding gaps for services delivered on behalf of other government departments, or to absorb the mounting legal settlement pressures. GAC has had to make requests for incremental funding to reimburse funds spent by the department for multiple large scale assisted departure exercises (e.g. helping Canadians leave Sudan, Haiti, Lebanon, Gaza.), GAC is developing a plan to ensure sustainable crisis funding.

Emergency Response Costs

In fiscal year 2024-2025, GAC costs related to the Haiti response amounted to nearly $10 million, with another $40 million to support readiness and emergency operations in Lebanon and the broader Middle East. Such costs are not within GAC reference levels and require exceptional funding.

9. Multilateral engagement 

Issue

• Canada works through multilateral fora (e.g. United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], the World Trade Organization [WTO]) to advance its foreign policy, trade and development priorities and the security and prosperity interests of Canadians.
• The multilateral system is under strain, with players such as China and Russia seeking to re-frame or undermine it.
• The new U.S. administration is conducting a drastic realignment of its multilateral engagement, including new policy positions, withdrawals and funding reductions, [REDACTED]

Background

Canada’s security and prosperity have benefited over several decades from an international system which has grown and functioned, if imperfectly, through the Cold War and the period since. In recent years, the system has faced increased strains due to unilateral actions by major powers, geopolitical competition, selective adhesion to established norms, and critiques from developing countries about perceived inequalities in the global order. These strains, as well as critiques of the system’s effectiveness, have undermined trust and cooperation in some forums, including at the WTO and the UN Security Council (UNSC). However, most institutions, particularly more technical ones, such as UN Specialized Agencies and International Financial Institutions such as the World Bank, continue to fulfill their mandates and have proven resilient and adaptable.

Canada’s ability to achieve its preferred outcomes in many institutions is under pressure as non-likeminded voices and states have been growing in strength.

The roles of Russia and China

[REDACTED]

The role of the United States

The United States was the lead architect of the multilateral system and remains its leading funder, providing an average of more than 20% of funds for most key institutions. However, U.S. policy changes, recent withdrawals, massive cuts to international aid and an approach more focused on direct security and prosperity interests complicate cooperation on multiple issues, [REDACTED]. The coming period could see further consequential U.S. funding reductions, withdrawals or disengagement from forums, wholesale policy changes, and approaches to trade that prioritize economic security at the expense of agreed rules, creating normative vacuums and [REDACTED].

Key institutions

Canada participates in dozens of multilateral forums, providing more than $4.6 billion annually, in both assessed (mandatory) and voluntary contributions, most of which is the delivery of international assistance via multilateral mechanisms. Many of these forums fall under the mandate of departments other than Global Affairs Canada and implicate provincial and territorial jurisdictions and private stakeholders. Not all forums are equal in terms of advancing Canada’s prosperity and security. [REDACTED]

Top priority

• The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (see Annex A).
• The UN (see Annex B).
• The G7 is the most important multilateral forum for Canada, facilitating close cooperation with key allies and acting as a force multiplier for Canada’s influence (see separate note on G7).

Economic cooperation and development

• The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is responsible for fostering global monetary cooperation and securing international financial stability, which benefits Canada’s economy.
• The World Bank and regional multilateral development banks (MDBs) are the most important international bodies for advancing Canada’s interests in development and poverty reduction, providing funding and expertise for low- and middle-income countries.
• The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an intergovernmental organization which regulates and facilitates global trade; WTO rules underpin Canada’s trade agreements and govern trade with countries where no agreements are in place.
• The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) helps Canada and its 37 other members shape policies promoting growth through open markets and good governance.

Regional

• The Arctic Council is the key forum for advancing Canada’s Arctic interests, focusing on sustainable socio-economic development and environmental protection. It comprises 8 Arctic states and 6 international Indigenous Peoples organizations.
• The Organization of American States (OAS) is the primary multilateral forum in the Americas, where Canada can advance democracy, human rights, security, and development.
• Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the pre-eminent economic and trade forum in the Asia-Pacific region, facilitates Canadian economic cooperation with key partners in the region.

Cross-cutting

• The G20 is the primary forum to coordinate responses to interconnected global challenges with the world’s leading developed and emerging economies.
• The Commonwealth is an association of 56 countries within which Canada engages on diverse issues, including human rights, democracy, governance, education, social and economic sustainable development and climate resiliency. Neither United States, Russia nor China are members.
• L’Organisation internationale de la Francophonie facilitates engagement with its 93 members and observers in promoting and defending the French language, as well as supporting its members’ development in improved democracy, human rights, gender equality and sustainable development. Neither the United States, Russia nor China are members. Four Canadian provinces are also members (QC, NB, ON, NS) and francophone communities in minority context have a strong attachment to the organisation.

Annex A – NATO

Issue

• The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains the primary forum for transatlantic consultation and cooperation on Euro-Atlantic security challenges.
• The principle of collective defence among NATO Allies, enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, ensures that Allies will come to Canada’s aid should Canadian sovereignty and security be threatened. In turn, Canada is committed to the defence of NATO Allies.
• The threat to Alliance security is higher now than at any time since the end of the Cold War due to the return of major war to Europe with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Consequently, the United States and others are calling for further increases in defence spending including up to 5% of GDP.
• President Trump’s messaging that throws doubt on American commitment to NATO has raised concerns among Allies, including Canada. Strong U.S. leadership of and commitment to NATO is in the collective interest of all Allies.

Background

NATO has been a cornerstone of Canada’s international defence and security policy for the past 75 years. As a political-military Alliance, decisions are made by consensus, which gives Canada a voice and a veto on issues related to Euro-Atlantic security. NATO also provides Canada a key venue to engage, influence, strengthen its relationships and build inter-operability with its closest Allies. Canada is a founding member of NATO and one of the first countries to propose the idea of a transatlantic defensive alliance. Canada’s advocacy led to the adoption of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, effectively integrating political and economic dimensions into NATO’s mission, which ultimately gave the alliance greater resilience and purpose. Today, Canada’s efforts have paid off, as NATO stands not only as a military alliance but as a crucial political partnership during this critical time. More recently at NATO, Canada has been a leader on climate change and security, as well as on women, peace and security. Canada has been an active Ally, contributing to the Alliance’s core tasks and missions and continues to make significant contributions to NATO missions, operations and activities. Canada currently:

• Leads NATO’s Multinational Battlegroup Latvia as Framework Nation;
• Hosts the NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (CCASCOE), in Montréal;
• Hosts the North American Regional Office of the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), located in Halifax;
• Deploys a frigate on a continual basis to Standing NATO Maritime Groups to patrol Allied waters;
• Deploys personnel to Kosovo Force and NATO Mission Iraq, having led the latter at its inception.

Burden Sharing

NATO burden sharing is expressed in the Defence Investment Pledge, which maintains the balance between cash, capabilities, and contributions: Cash, captured in the commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence; Capabilities, fulfilled through the NATO Defence Planning Process targets and a commitment to spend at least 20% on major equipment, including research and development; and, Contributions, whereby Allies provide forces to NATO operations, missions, and other activities.

Annex B – THE UN

Issue

• The UN has served for decades as a principal forum for Canada’s efforts to advance its interests internationally. However, the organization has long faced serious challenges to its ability to fulfill its mandate, compounded by Chinese and Russian attempts to reshape the UN to fit their worldview and the new U.S. administration’s announced recalibration of its engagement in the organization.

Background

The UN at a Crossroads 

Growing global polarization is reflected in the deliberations of the UN’s many bodies, making it more difficult to reach consensus and address pressing global challenges. The UN’s reputation and effectiveness have frequently been hampered by much-publicized gridlock in the Security Council (UNSC) and the use or threat of the veto, sparking increased calls for UN reform, including the new UN80 initiative launched by the UN Secretary General in March. To date, reform efforts have been slow, hampered by deepening geopolitical rivalry, accusations of double standards against the West particularly in the wake of the Gaza conflict, organized attempts by Russia, China and other countries to erode existing norms and reshape the UN in line with their worldview, and now the new U.S. administration’s reshaping of its multilateral engagement and international relations.

Compounding these challenges is the UN’s critical liquidity crisis, due to arrears in assessed contributions (mainly from the United States and China), a lack of sustainable and predictable voluntary funding, and zero nominal growth policies supported by major donors, including Canada, restricting the UN’s ability to fulfill an ever-expanding mandate. The liquidity crisis is expected to worsen given the U.S. administration’s stated intent to reduce spending and its current status as the UN’s largest donor (US$13 billion in 2023), prompting painful cuts to programs, pressure on other donors, and a realignment of priorities across the UN.

Canada and the UN 

Canada is one of the UN’s founding members and largest contributors. As a middle power, Canada has long relied on the UN’s level playing field to strengthen partnerships and advance priorities and interests across a range of issues. Based on the latest available statistics (2023), Canada was the 7th largest UN donor, in both assessed (US$360 million) and voluntary (US$1.2 billion) contributions. Canada is also a UN host State, welcoming the headquarters of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, and the Secretariat for the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol.

Norms and standards developed in UN bodies often underpin Canadian legislation, directives and practices, directly affecting the daily lives of Canadians, from food safety (Food and Agriculture Organization - FAO), air navigation security (ICAO) and maritime transport (International Maritime Organization - IMO), to telecommunications (International Telecommunications Union - ITU) and postal services (Universal Postal Union - UPU).

U.S. Realignment 

The new U.S. administration has made clear that it will reshape the U.S. approach to the UN through reduced and recalibrated engagement, in line with U.S. interests. In its first week, the Administration announced decisions to withdraw from the World Health Organization and Paris Agreement on climate change, disengage from the UN Human Rights Council, pause all international assistance, review support for agreed language on issues such as gender equality, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and human rights, and launch a wholesale review of its engagement across all international organizations (expected to conclude in Fall 2025). At the same time, the Administration has noted the importance of certain UN technical bodies (ICAO, ITU, World Intellectual Property Organization), and of countering Chinese influence and Russian disruption.

China has begun capitalizing, at least in its discourse, on the fear of a new era of unpredictability [REDACTED], to bolster its image as a reliable, principled partner for countries in the Global South and beyond. [REDACTED].

D. Select tools and instruments

1. International assistance 

Issue

• International assistance supports the social and economic welfare of developing countries, responds to humanitarian needs as a result of conflict or natural disasters, and supports peace, security and governance efforts globally. It is an instrument of soft power, and forms part of the government’s suite of tools to engage with the world and address its challenges.
• Internationally, the purposes and uses of international development assistance are likely to continue to shift in coming years, as many donor countries, chiefly but not limited to the United States, significantly reduce their funding and adjust their approaches in more overt pursuit of national interests.
• As one of the co-managers of the International Assistance Envelope (which is the government’s current main fiscal planning tool for international assistance), the Minister of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the management and allocation of certain international assistance resources. The Minister of International Development and the Minister of Finance are also co-managers of the envelope.

Background

International assistance helps to address global issues such as economic crises, war and conflict, climate change and natural disasters, income inequality, and diseases. In doing so, it contributes to global security, prosperity, poverty reduction, and well-being.

After 3 decades of development progress across a number of indicators, the compounding effects of conflicts, climate change, low economic growth, and the COVID-19 pandemic have stalled or reversed gains. Fiscal constraints and changing priorities have led to budget reductions for many traditional donors, who are also rethinking how they deploy their international development assistance to better support their national interests.

How the government currently delivers international assistance

International assistance includes all financial resources provided by Canadian governments at all levels to support development in other (primarily developing) countries. Currently, most of Canada’s international assistance is composed of Official Development Assistance (ODA), however it also includes non-official development assistance flows in support of global peace and security programs. ODA is an internationally agreed class of funding that seeks, as its main objective, to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries. In 2023, Canada was the 6th largest OECD-DAC donor in terms of volume. In 2023, the United States was by far the world’s largest provider of ODA, providing US$64.7 billion (though this will diminish radically for 2025), compared to Germany who ranked second with US$37.9 billion.

Source: OECD-DAC

The International Assistance Envelope (IAE) is the government’s ring-fenced funding and main fiscal planning tool to support its international assistance objectives. It is channeled to federal departments and agencies. While Global Affairs Canada is allocated the majority share, other departments and Crown corporations also receive allocations. Based on preliminary data, the Envelope totaled $7.89 billion in 2024-25, of which $6.24 billion was allocated to Global Affairs Canada. The majority of International Assistance Envelope spending qualifies as ODA. Currently, the government’s primary channels for delivering its international assistance are bilateral, and multilateral programming, with 3 types of partners: multilateral, Canadian organizations and foreign or international organizations. In 2023-24, 65% of Global Affairs Canada’s total international development assistance was provided through multilateral organizations; Canadian organizations delivered 20%; and the remainder was delivered through foreign organizations (other governments, private sector actors, international non-governmental organizations). The choice of delivery partner is driven by factors such as partner capacity to manage funds, achieve results, and reach targeted areas, as well as their areas of expertise.

Funding mechanisms are the methods Canada uses to transfer funds to partners. The department’s current international assistance portfolio is a mix of: voluntary and assessed contributions to multilateral bodies; grants and contributions to third parties; some contracts; and blended (i.e., private-public) vehicles including loans, investments and guarantees.

Within multilateral entities, Canada’s donor ranking/contribution, (e.g., being a top 10 donor), or Canada being a large shareholder, provides a seat at the table and ability to advance priorities in governing bodies. These also provide opportunity for influence, for example within international financial institutions. More broadly, Canada’s status as a G7 member can also afford it certain levels of influence in different forums.

Source : Statistiques, DPF

Where funds are currently targeted 

Cumulatively, over the last five years, the top recipients of Canada’s international assistance have been Ukraine (mostly loans provided through the Department of Finance), Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Tanzania.

Programs within the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ Remit

The Minister of Foreign Affairs is responsible for discrete programs that foster peace and stability, counter global security threats, address geopolitical crises, and support democracy and human rights.

The Canada Fund for Local Initiatives, administered by Canada’s missions abroad, supports small-scale projects designed by local organizations to advance Canada’s international assistance priorities, with a special emphasis on advancing democracy and human rights. It funds over 700 projects in over 120 ODA-eligible countries annually, using financial authorities delegated to Heads of Missions ($26.7 million annually).

Peace and security programs are often used to respond to emerging priorities through special allocations and are under increasing pressure given the changing global order. These programs include:

• The Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program and the Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program enhance the capacity of beneficiary states to prevent and respond to threats posed by international crime and terrorism before they reach Canada. Reference levels in 2024-25 were $54.6 million.
• The Democratic Resilience Program encompasses the Promoting and Protecting Democracy Fund and the Inclusion, Diversity and Human Rights Fund. It combats threats to democracies such as the weaponization of information and foreign interference, challenges to democratic values, threats to human rights defenders, and risks to human rights. Its annual budget in 2024-25 was $21.4 million.
• The Deployments Programs consists of 2 mechanisms: the Canadian Police Arrangement deploys Canadian police to peacekeeping operations and conducts capacity building. This arrangement is co-managed in partnership with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Public Safety Canada with funding of $44.5 million annually (concludes March 2026; new agreement expected until 2029). The Civilian Deployments Platform deploys Canadian government experts in support of political and security objectives with an annual budget of $3.6 million in 2024-25.
• The Peace and Stabilization Operations Program delivers programming focused on preventing and responding to violent conflict and state fragility. Current reference levels are $105 million per year.
• The Weapons Threat Reduction Program addresses international security threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related weapons. It also supports the universalization of conventional arms control treaties such as the Ottawa Convention on Landmines and the Arms Trade Treaty. Reference levels in 2024-25 were $65.8 million.

Considerations

Since 2017, a Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) has guided the delivery of Canada’s international development assistance. Specific targets under the policy prescribe how international development assistance funds are directed, including: targets to direct 95% of bilateral international development assistance to initiatives that integrate gender equality, of which 15% has gender equality as its main objective, and 50% to Sub-Saharan Africa. Major funding commitments also prescribe how funds are directed, such as climate finance ($5.3 billion over 5 years, reference the annex on climate finance below for more details), and global health ($1.4 billion annually with $700 million for sexual and reproductive health and rights).

On January 20, 2025, the U.S. issued an executive order to reevaluate and realign U.S. foreign aid to better match its new foreign policy priorities. The United States has since announced that it will severely reduce its international development assistance. The U.S. administration plans to propose legislation to formally abolish the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as an independent agency. A review of U.S. foreign aid policy and architecture has been extended to late May with final decisions remaining in flux. Dramatic cuts already implemented are having profound impacts on countries and regions that have long relied on U.S. aid. These decisions will also affect how Canada and other donors provide their international development assistance and engage in key multilateral forums over the next few years. Other donors (i.e. United Kingdom, Germany, France, Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands) are also implementing significant reductions in aid budgets or adjusting strategic priorities, leading to significant gaps and uncertainties for developing countries.

Annex: Climate Change

Issue

• Wildfires, droughts, floods, pollution, and biodiversity loss decrease GDP, increase insurance and disaster response costs, threaten human health, undermine local economies and cause food insecurity around the world.
• Many developed countries treat climate change as a cross-cutting issue that is integrated into their foreign, trade and development policies. The ministers of International Development, Foreign Affairs, and Environment and Climate Change have led the government’s international engagement on climate change to date.
• The United States has been a lead donor in this area (e.g., American climate-related aid commitments were US$4.3 billion in 2022; OECD-DAC). Its withdrawal is expected to create a major funding gap. China intends to fill the vacuum in clean tech investments – a pillar of its economic development strategy.

Background

International Fora and Negotiations 

For 40 years, the government has actively engaged in global environmental negotiations, shaping agreements that benefit Canadians and the global community – from tackling acid rain, to safeguarding the ozone layer, to addressing climate change and biodiversity loss. Dating back to 1992, under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, reinforced in the Paris Agreement (2015), participating countries are required to act at home and developed countries are required to provide finance to enable developing countries to reach global targets. The government has used international development assistance budgets to fulfill its donor funding commitments under global environmental treaties.

Climate financing 

The government has provided over $9.15 billion in dedicated funding for international climate action since 2010: $1.2 billion (2010-13), $2.65 billion (2015-21), and $5.3 billion (2021-26). Thematic areas of focus have been clean energy transition and coal phase-out, agriculture and food systems, nature-based solutions, biodiversity, and climate governance. The government works with multilateral partners (e.g. multilateral development banks) and vertical climate funds (e.g. Green Climate Fund), as well as Canadian and international civil society and Indigenous organizations. Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) represents the government in international negotiations and ECCC and Global Affairs Canada implement programming (over 95% is implemented by Global Affairs Canada).

The government’s climate finance is expected to reduce or avoid over 286 mega-tons of greenhouse gas emissions (equivalent to the energy use from 65 million homes for a year) between 2021 and 2050, and to help 4.6 million people become more resilient to the effects of climate change (e.g., by restoring coastal mangrove forests to protect against sea-level-rise). Since 2022, Canada has mobilized $1.19 of private sector investment for every $1 of public finance disbursed.

Considerations

Future directions 

The government’s international climate and biodiversity finance envelopes sunset in March 2026. The government will have the opportunity to determine next steps in these areas.

Enhancing Coherence on Climate Engagement 

Many developed countries have begun to integrate climate change considerations into their development, foreign and trade policies. Climate change is increasingly being raised in various streams of work under the G7, G20, NATO, Arctic Council, UN Security Council, and World Trade Organization.

COP30 (climate, November 2025) 

At COP29 in 2024, further to growing financial costs of climate impacts, governments agreed on a new collective climate finance target to support developing countries of at least US$300 billion/year by 2035 (triple the preceding goal). To meet this target, governments will need to mobilize capital from all sources, including the private sector and philanthropy. At COP30, developed countries will face intense pressure from developing countries to demonstrate tangible progress towards the $300 billion annual climate finance goal by 2035.

2. International assistance envelope 

Issue

• The International Assistance Envelope is the Government of Canada’s main funding instrument to for the federal government’s work in support of the social and economic welfare of developing countries, multilateral and regional organizations, and peace, security and governance efforts globally.
• The International Assistance Envelope is governed by a Cabinet-approved Management Framework, which provides clear eligibility criteria and guidance on the use of International Assistance Envelope resources.
• The Minister of Foreign Affairs is one of 3 co-managing ministers of the International Assistance Envelope, along with the Minister for International Development and the Minister of Finance.

Background

The International Assistance Envelope accounts for programs and initiatives delivered through federal government departments and agencies. While Global Affairs Canada is allocated the majority share of the International Assistance Envelope, other government departments including Finance Canada, Environment and Climate Change Canada, Public Safety, the RCMP, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada and Natural Resources Canada and Crown corporations, including the International Development Research Centre and FinDev Canada, receive International Assistance Envelope allocations.

The International Assistance Envelope supports both official development assistance and non-development assistance. Non-official development assistance activities funded by the International Assistance Envelope include non-lethal peace and security activities, such as peacebuilding and conflict prevention, counterterrorism and anti-crime activities. The International Assistance Envelope does not support militaries or lethal assistance.

The envelope is divided among 6 distinct thematic pools. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance, and the Minister for International Development have authorities to implement initiatives and programs under pools as shown below.

The objective and value of each pool is reflected below:

Core Development ($4.691 billion allocated in 2024-25): focuses on programs that support longer-term sustainable development and poverty reduction efforts, with most funding channelled towards low- and middle-income countries.

International Humanitarian Assistance ($759 million allocated in 2024-25): provides support based on urgent needs in line with humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and independence.

Peace, Security and Governance ($573 million allocated in 2024-25): supports Canadian and global peace, security and resilience responses to a range of potential threats. Funding from this pool is not limited to low- and middle-income countries.

International Financial Institutions ($1.464 billion allocated in 2024-25): contributes core funding to several International Financial Institutions (IFIs) which provide financial support, policy advice and capacity development to developing countries, to leverage new sources of financing for low- and middle-income countries, and to maintain Canada’s influence of the governance of IFIs. Canada is a shareholder in these institutions.

Crisis Pool ($200 million annual allocation): designed to provide timely and short-term responses to unforeseen international crises without disrupting investments in existing long-term programming. Allocations from this pool require a recommendation from the Ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs and International Development and approval of the Minister of Finance and Prime Minister.

Strategic Priorities Fund ($200 million annual allocation): a reserve allocated at the discretion of the Prime Minister to promote government leadership on issues of global and Canadian concern through development, humanitarian, security and stabilization, foreign policy and economic prosperity initiatives.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs leads the Peace, Security and Governance pool, while the Minister for International Development leads the Core Development and International Humanitarian Assistance pools. The International Financial Institutions pool is a shared responsibility of the ministers responsible for Finance and International Development. The Crisis pool can be accessed based on a joint request by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for International Development and requires the approval of the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. The Strategic Priorities und can be accessed by any minister provided that proposals to use resources meet the eligibility criteria of the fund. Access to the fund requires the approval of the minister of finance and the Prime Minister.

For 2024-25, the total International Assistance Envelope is forecasted at $7.89 billion and includes $6.24 billion that is allocated to Global Affairs Canada. The allocations for 2024-25 for each of these pools are shown below.

The International Assistance Envelope ministers are responsible for an annual report to Parliament on the government’s assistance activities, as a legislative requirement under the Official Development Assistance Accountability Act.

Considerations

In recent years, the International Assistance Envelope has allocated resources in response to the COVID-19 global pandemic and Ukraine. Outside of these resource allocations, the International Assistance Envelope shows an upward trajectory since 2015-16, growing from $4.63 billion to an estimated $7.89 billion in 2024-25 [REDACTED]

3. Strategic export controls

Issue

• Canada’s strategic export controls framework balances the importance of supporting Canadian trade of controlled items (military and dual-use goods and technologies) while appropriately considering Canada’s political, foreign and defence policies and national security interests.
• Strategic export permit applications are assessed in the context of evolving international developments and can become at times a bilateral irritant.
• An effective export controls system facilitates Canadian participation in military and dual use supply chains through predictable and speedy scrutiny. It is a legal requirement that contributes to regional and international security and stability by denying inappropriate exports. It also promotes transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of military and dual-use goods and technologies.

Background

As of March 14, 2025, the Minister of International Trade became legally responsible for the administration of the Export and Import Permits Act that governs export and import controls. Previously, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was the designated Minister, but the Minister of International Trade was delegated responsibility for non-strategic trade items. The Act gives the Minister, or officials acting under their authority, broad discretion to grant or deny permits, including those based on foreign and defence policy, and national security interests.

Export control regimes

Most strategic items controlled for export derive from Canada’s commitments to partner countries that participate in the following multilateral export control regimes: the Wassenaar Arrangement (military and dual-use items); the Nuclear Suppliers Group; the Missile Technology Control Regime; and the Australia Group (chemical and biological weapons).

Arms Trade Treaty 

In 2019, the Act was amended to reflect the requirements of the Arms Trade Treaty. Under the amended Act, the Minister must deny a permit if there is sufficient evidence of certain potential negative results, such as human rights abuses or violations of international humanitarian law.

Permit Process and Consultations

All permit applications for controlled goods and technologies are received and processed through an online export controls system. Permits are assessed on a case-by-case basis through a risk assessment framework, regardless of the country of destination. Assessments evaluate the risks and implications of the proposed exports with respect to mandatory assessment criteria and specific country policies.

Depending on the nature of the goods and technology, and the context of the export transaction, consultations may be conducted within Global Affairs Canada, Canada’s network of missions abroad, or other government departments. In 2024, approximately 5,000 permits were issued for military, dual-use and strategic items. It is not possible to determine the total value of actual exports of controlled goods and technology per year, but the 2024 State of Canada’s Defence Industry Report indicates that total defence industry exports from Canada for 2022 were $7.04 billion.

Annual Reporting to Parliament

The Minister tables two reports annually on the administration of the export controls system: the Annual Report to Parliament on the Administration of the Export and Import Permits Act and the Report on Exports of Military Goods.

Considerations

Increased public scrutiny

Canada’s export controls policy is under sustained and intense scrutiny by Parliamentarians, industry, civil society, and the media. Concerns have focused on the possible use of controlled goods and technologies in certain countries to commit human rights abuses or serious violations of international humanitarian law. Public scrutiny has been heightened by various judicial reviews.

United States

As part of the America First Trade Policy Executive Order, the U.S. is conducting a review of its export control system. [REDACTED].

Israel/Gaza

[REDACTED]

Russia and Belarus

[REDACTED]. Canada has also imposed sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

China

In December 2024, China implemented new export control regulations that introduced a unified control system, simplified licensing processes, and stricter oversight of high-tech sectors. In February 2025, China imposed additional controls on the export of certain critical minerals that are used to produce semiconductors and batteries as well as dual-use and military technologies. On April 4, 2025, China imposed export controls on certain rare earth elements as a response to U.S. tariffs. Those measures will also impact supply chains to other countries, including Canada.

Concerns from Industry

While engagement with exporters is generally positive, [REDACTED].

4. Sanctions 

Issue

• Sanctions are a foreign policy tool to help maintain and restore international peace and security, combat corruption, and respond to human rights violations. 
• Since 2022, global use of sanctions has increased significantly. Sanctions have been a primary response tool for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and other crises, including Iran, Haiti, Myanmar, Sudan, Venezuela, the Hamas terrorist attacks, and human rights violations by China.

Background

Canada has 3 laws authorizing the imposition of sanctions, implemented through regulations:

Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA)

Enacted in 1992, SEMA allows the government to impose sanctions in relation to a foreign state, as well as individuals and entities related to that foreign state.

Sanctions can be imposed in response to: (1) a grave breach of international peace and security that has or is likely to result in a serious international crisis; (2) an international organization or association of states which Canada belongs to calls on members to take economic measures against a foreign state; (3) gross and systematic human rights violations; and (4) acts of significant corruption.

SEMA sanctions are imposed in relation to 18 countries, including China, Iran, Haiti, Myanmar, North Korea, and Russia, and in response to Hamas terrorist attacks and extremist settler violence in the West Bank.

Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (JVCFOA)

Enacted in 2017, JVCFOA allows the government to sanction foreign nationals who are responsible for, or complicit in, specific cases of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights or acts of significant corruption committed in foreign states, independent of state-related sanctions. There are 80 individuals from 7 jurisdictions sanctioned under the JVCFOA.

United Nations Act (UNA)

The UN Security Council may decide on measures to restore or maintain international peace and security. UN member states are legally obliged to introduce the measures into domestic law. There are 12 countries subject to UN sanctions. Canada also implements UN sanctions associated with terrorist activities through 2 UNA regulations and the Criminal Code.

Sanctions Measures

Sanctions restrict activities permissible between Canadians and foreign states, individuals, and/or entities that are subject to sanctions. Sanctions are implemented through the Governor-in-Council regulatory process. Measures can include a dealings ban (effectively an asset freeze), trade restrictions or prohibitions, financial transactions or other economic activity, and restrictions on activities of ships or aircraft in Canada. These measures restrict persons in Canada or any Canadian outside of Canada from engaging in these activities.

Individuals subject to sanctions under all 3 laws are inadmissible to Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Under SEMA and JVCFOA, the government has authorities to seize and pursue forfeiture of property in Canada that is owned, held or controlled by individuals and entities sanctioned by Canada.

Considerations

Responsibilities of the Minister of Foreign Affairs

In addition to recommending new sanctions to the Governor-in-Council, the Minister is responsible for considering applications from persons who want to be removed (or “delisted”) from SEMA or JVCFOA, and those seeking a permit/certificate authorizing activities or transactions that are otherwise prohibited by Canadian sanctions. The number of such applications has increased significantly over the past 3 years, reflecting the increase in sanctions measures imposed over the same period.

The delisting process is integral to Canada’s sanctions framework and supports the fair and transparent application of sanctions. Similarly, permits are essential to an effective sanctions regime and can align with Canada's national interest, fulfill humanitarian purposes, and mitigate unintended consequences. Such applications are considered on a case-by-case basis, and their assessment requires rigorous due diligence and consultations. Decisions on these applications can be challenged in court.

The Minister is also responsible for recommending to the Governor-in-Council assets that can be seized/restrained under the SEMA and the JVCFOA.

Departmental responsibilities

Global Affairs Canada coordinates a whole-of-government approach to sanctions, including listings and delistings, permitting, litigation, policy development, addressing circumvention, domestic outreach, and international engagement.

Other key implicated departments include: Justice Canada for legal advice and litigation matters; the Treasury Board Secretariat and Privy Council Office for the Governor-in-Council regulatory process; and the RCMP, Canada Border Services Agency, Finance Canada and the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre for monitoring and enforcement.

As Canada announces new sanctions and measures expand in scope and complexity, associated administrative and legal responsibilities, as well as required resources for an effective regulatory program, continue to increase. Impacts on Canadians will also continue, necessitating enhanced stakeholder outreach and guidance on sanctions and related obligations.

Ministerial decisions (e.g. on delistings), as well as the failure of the minister to make a decision within a reasonable time, can be judicially reviewed by the Federal Court of Canada. Judicial reviews usually raise complex and case-specific legal issues, and require intensive collaboration between Global Affairs Canada and the Department of Justice. Decisions rendered by the Court can be appealed [REDACTED].

Coordination with partners

Wherever possible, sanctions are coordinated closely with like-minded governments to maximize their effectiveness. However, each government imposes its own measures within the constraints of their domestic legal frameworks and a context of differing interests and priorities. The government of Canada collaborates regularly with G7 and other governments to discuss measures and timing, compare best practices, and identify opportunities to coordinate.

Use of sanctions

E. Additional issues    

1. Indo-Pacific 

Issue

• The Indo-Pacific region is a key driver of global economic growth and geopolitical influence, home to over four billion people.
• The Indo-Pacific is Canada’s second-largest regional export market after the United States, with strong and expanding trade relationships. Canada's top 10 export markets are China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, Indonesia, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam, accounting for 92.2% of the total export to the region (2024).
• Shifting power dynamics and security challenges, including regional tensions and economic competition, continue to shape the Indo-Pacific, with growing influence from major global players, including China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea and regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).
• The Indo-Pacific is experiencing increasing competition over critical supply chains, technological advancements, and access to natural resources, all of which influence regional stability and economic resilience.

Background

The Indo-Pacific region is the world’s fastest-growing economic region. It represents more than one-third of global economic activity and is home to 3 of the world’s top 5 economies: Japan, India and China. The region will account for more than half of global GDP by 2040 and is projected to be home to two-thirds of the global middle class by 2030.

The Indo-Pacific is also home to some of the world’s most critical supply chains, including semiconductors, rare earth minerals, and advanced manufacturing hubs. As economies in the region strengthen their economic ties, regional groups and agreements such as ASEAN, APEC, and the CPTPP play an increasing role in shaping trade and investment dynamics.

Security and stability in the Indo-Pacific are directly linked to economic and geopolitical interests. The region hosts maritime corridors that are critical to the global economy and is home to many of the world’s most tense hotspots, such as in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Korean Peninsula, all of which have global implications for international security and global economic stability.

The Indo-Pacific represents significant opportunities for Canada’s economy. The region’s economic dynamism and population growth are driving demand for sectors where Canada excels, such as education, health services, food, agriculture, fisheries, natural resources, critical minerals, energy, financial services, advanced manufacturing, and green infrastructure. In the infrastructure sector alone, there is an estimated $2.1 trillion opportunity for strategic investments and partnerships. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of Canadians live in the region while fully half of new Canadians come from the region and Canada’s largest diasporas are of Indo-Pacific origin.

The reinforcement of Canada’s presence in the region has occurred under the 10-year Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) launched in November 2022. The Strategy, which has five interconnected strategic

objectives, coordinates 17 departments and agencies across 24 initiatives, backed by $2.3 billion over five years:

1. Promoting peace, resilience, and security;
2. Expanding trade, investment, and supply chain resilience;
3. Investing in and connecting people;
4. Building a sustainable and green future.
5. Canada as an active, engaged, and reliable partner in the Indo-Pacific.

The IPS aims to deepen our regional partnerships, strengthen Canada’s role as a credible and engaged stakeholder, improve and diversify Canada’s regional trading position, and reinforce a free, open, inclusive, and rules-based Indo-Pacific.

Considerations

The Indo-Pacific region's economic growth and trade prospects offer a substantial opportunity to boost Canada's future prosperity for the next half-century. Geopolitical tensions among major powers impact regional stability, necessitating Canadian participation in regional diplomacy to advance our strategic interests. Organizations like ASEAN enhance diplomatic and economic cooperation, highlighting the need for Canada to build robust multilateral relationships. The region values Canada's development and humanitarian commitments over the years. Indo-Pacific countries seek Canada's partnership in addressing energy security and energy transition, mitigation of climate-driven disruptions, food security, and sustainable infrastructure. Additionally, Canada's expertise in disaster risk and resilience, and our capacity building to address over-fishing, is highly valued.

Bilateral and regional multilateral engagement

To seize opportunities and defend Canadian priorities across a wide range of developing interests, the Government of Canada has invested in enhanced strategic engagement with countries across the Indo-Pacific region. This engagement is supported with trade diversification and access negotiations: building off the CPTPP and Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the Republic of Korea, Canada just concluded FTA negotiations with Indonesia, and is negotiating with ASEAN, India and the Philippines.

Canada has traditionally focused its security investments in the North Pacific, including by enforcing UN sanctions against North Korea and partnering with Coast Guards of Japan and the Republic of Korea. Canada is a long-standing member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and supports ASEAN centrality, while also advancing our interests through membership in APEC, and engagement with the Pacific Islands Forum and the Mekong River Commission. These platforms support trade, regional security, and sustainable growth and also align with Canada's broader strategic interests in maintaining regional stability and navigating geopolitical dynamics by reinforcing international law and institutions. Canada has also contributed to bridging of NATO with the region (AP4), while supporting entrants from the region as they prepare to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Canada’s participation at Expo 2025 Osaka (April 13 - October 13, 2025) was announced in January 2022. This partnership with host, Japan, has just opened, showcasing Canada and its strengths to the region.

Trade, investment and economic cooperation 

Central to the Government of Canada’s economic diversification efforts, bilateral trade with the region reached $249 billion in 2023-2024. China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Vietnam, and India remain top trading partners.

In addition to trade negotiations mentioned above, through the CPTPP Canada has gained FTA access with Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. Canada also has strengthened investment ties through Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement Arrangements (FIPAs) with six Indo-Pacific economies: China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Mongolia, Philippines, Thailand. Canada is a member of the Indigenous People’s Economic and Trade Cooperation Arrangement (IPETCA) alongside Australia, New Zealand, and Chinese Taipei.

Since 2023, the Government has completed seven Team Canada Trade Missions (TCTM) to Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, Republic of Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines and Australia. A TCTM to Thailand and Cambodia is planned for May 2025.

With rising GDP and a rapidly expanding middle class, the Indo-Pacific offers significant opportunities for Canadian trade and investment and remains a key source of Foreign Direct Investments to Australia, Singapore, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

International development context and Canadian international development assistance 

In recent years, Canada has doubled down on longstanding international development assistance partnerships with countries rapidly evolving toward middle-income economy status such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Their development towards lower middle-income status, with growing middle classes, presents long-term economic opportunities of mutual interest. The Government of Canada also delivers significant bilateral development programming in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Pakistan, along with regional Pan-Asia programming in smaller economies.

Consular

As of April 02, 2025, there are 340 known Canadians detained in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2024-25, a total of 1,554 new consular cases were opened the region, dealing primarily with deaths, arrests and detentions. The death penalty is actively used in the region for both violent and non-violent offences (e.g. serious drug crimes). The Government has continued to advocate for clemency for all Canadians sentenced to death. Despite advocacy efforts, four Canadians were executed in China in March 2025.

Annex A: Regional Footprint

Source: Mission Network Map

Annex B: Regional Trade

2. Europe

Issue

• Europe is a highly integrated region, with 27 Member States within the European Union (EU), 9 candidate countries and extensive political and economic ties with non-EU neighbours (e.g. the United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland).
• The EU Single Market is Canada’s second largest goods and services export market after the United States. The EU’s largest trading partners are the United States, which ranks first, and China, which ranks second. The EU has established itself as a global leader in norm-setting, with its comprehensive rules and regulations often shaping policies and standards far beyond its borders. In recent years, there has been a push from within the EU to bolster its ambitions as a global actor and strengthen its defence capacities. This has been reinforced by Russia’s belligerent posture towards Ukraine and recent U.S. policy shifts.
• The United Kingdom was Canada’s third largest goods and services export market after the United States and the EU in 2024. Five years after Brexit, the EU market continues to be of paramount importance to the United Kingdom, serving as a crucial destination for British exports and a significant source of investment.

Background

Europe represents a population of over 700 million across 49 countries, including 450 million within the EU. As of 2023, the EU’s nominal GDP was approximately US$18.35 trillion. The United Kingdom's nominal GDP for the same year was around US$3.38 trillion.

Canada's relationship with the EU is deep-rooted and governed by two treaties: the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, which provide a legal framework and institutionalise our engagement on a broad range of topics. In addition to its robust partnership with the EU, Canada has strong bilateral relations with several European countries. This includes G7 members and NATO Allies France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, all of which are essential partners in responding to international crises and addressing global challenges. The relationship between the EU and United Kingdom is positive but complex, marked by ongoing negotiations and efforts to redefine cooperation in areas such as trade, security, and environmental initiatives. President Macron and Prime Minister Starmer have taken leadership roles in engaging with the United States and leading the Coalition of the Willing by convening leaders from 30 countries to coordinate military support and planning for Ukraine's long-term security.

Poland holds the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU from January through June 2025, to be followed by Denmark as of July 1st. The Canadian Armed Forces lead the NATO Multinational Brigade in Latvia.

In 2022, Canada expanded its diplomatic presence and capacity in Central and Eastern Europe with the opening of embassies in Slovakia, Lithuania and Estonia, followed by Armenia in 2023, and the strengthening of our presence in Latvia.

The last Canada-EU Summit was held in St. John’s, Newfoundland in November 2023. Canadian and EU leaders will need to decide on the next summit date, which should take place in 2025 (location tbc).

Considerations

Bilateral and regional multilateral engagement

[REDACTED]

Trade, investment and economic cooperation

Canada’s trade and investment relationships with European partners is underpinned by four trade agreements: the CETA (27 member states; provisionally entered into force in 2017), the Canada-U.K. Trade Continuity Agreement (TCA) (in force since 2021 after the United Kingdom left the EU), the Canada-European Free Trade Association Agreement (EFTA) (goods only agreement with Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland; 2009) and the Canada-Ukraine FTA (modernized in 2023). Together, these agreements provide Canadian exporters with preferential access to most European markets. European companies are an important source of inbound Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Canada and employ more than 672,000 Canadians in their affiliate operations, as well as providing links to European value chains in sectors such as advanced manufacturing, aerospace, and life sciences.

International development context and Canadian international assistance

Several European countries and the EU itself are major international development assistance donors. The EU and its Member States represented about 42% of all Official Development Assistance (ODA) contributions in 2023, compared to almost 31% for the United States. In February 2025, the United Kingdom announced that it would decrease ODA contributions to fund an increase in defence budget, though the United Kingdom is expected to remain among the most significant donors. France and Germany have also announced significant cuts to ODA in 2025 as part of broader austerity measures. Most of Canada’s international assistance in Europe goes to Ukraine ($2.1 billion for 23/24), with small amounts going to other countries in eastern Europe, mostly through the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI).

Consular

In the 2023-24 fiscal year, a total of 1,676 new consular cases were opened in 49 countries in Europe, dealing primarily with natural deaths, accidents and medical assistance, and financial assistance. As of February 2025, there are 84 known cases of Canadians detained in Europe.

Annex A: Regional Footprint

Source: Mission Network Map

Annex B: Regional Trade 

Source: Statistics Canada Tables 12-10-0171-01 (Merchandise Trade), 36-10-0007-01 (Service Trade), and 36-10-0008-01 (Direct Investment Stock).

3. North America

Issue

• Canada, the United States and Mexico have fostered strong trilateral trade relations for decades through a long history of tripartite agreements that culminated in NAFTA in 1994, followed by CUSMA in 2020, generating economic growth and helping to raise the standard of living across the three countries. Uncertainty around U.S. trade policy is a challenge and the future of CUSMA is unclear at present (see separate note). Political relations between the three countries are governed principally by the North American Leaders’ Summits (NALS) which have allowed collaboration to advance on a broad range of issues of mutual interest including border management, regional security, health emergency responses, and environmental protection. The North American Leaders’ Summit process is currently paused.
• Canada-U.S. relations, historically strong and mutually beneficial, have become strained under President Trump’s administration. The imposition of punitive tariffs, protectionist policies and rhetoric threatening Canada’s sovereignty have put in question the reliability of this partnership. Mexico is also navigating a more complex and unpredictable relationship with the United States, amid tariffs and threats of mass deportations.
• Although the Canada-Mexico relationship experienced periods of tension over the past months, the two countries can count on enduring bilateral trade, investment, people-to-people ties and cultural connections to engage on priority areas. Canada benefits from cooperating with Mexico, including on its response to U.S. tariffs and trade diversification. Preserving a trilateral negotiating dynamic, whether in the context of a CUSMA review or renegotiation is of interest to Canada and Mexico.

Background

Responding to U.S. tariff challenges and preserving key elements of the long-lasting trading relationship will be key priorities for Canada and Mexico in the coming months/years. On April 2, the U.S. administration excluded Canada and Mexico from reciprocal tariffs but both countries remain subject to U.S. tariffs on steel, aluminum, automobiles and non-CUSMA compliant goods. Mexico has indicated it will not respond with retaliatory tariffs, and its stated top priority is to negotiate with the United States to have the tariffs removed or significantly reduced by mid-May. Mexico is also focused on promoting the country’s domestic production.

The NALS is the trilateral summit between the prime minister, the president of Mexico, and the president of the United States. The summits were initially held as part of the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North America, a continent-level dialogue between the three countries established in 2005, and continued after SPP became inactive in 2009. The summits are usually held every year, but there are no fixed dates and in some years a summit has not been held.

Canada was scheduled to host the XI edition of NALS in 2024 after Mexico in 2023, but plans were delayed until after the Mexican and the U.S. elections. During the first administration of Donald Trump from 2017 to 2021, no official summits were held. The leaders of the three countries continued to meet at other events, such as the signing of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement during the 2018 G20 Buenos Aires summit.

Mexico is a bilateral ally, a trilateral partner in the North American context, and an influential player with the United States and in the hemisphere. Mexico is well connected to Latin and Caribbean countries of the Americas, and to North American supply chains. Its strong manufacturing sector, relatively low labour costs, and its proximity to the United States and Canada are some of the economic advantages that attract foreign businesses and investors.

Canadian and U.S. stakeholders have expressed concerns over Chinese investment in Mexico, particularly in the automotive sector, as well as the possibility that Chinese companies could circumvent CUSMA tariffs by producing in Mexico or transshipping through the country. [REDACTED].

In 2024, Mexico was Canada's third-largest merchandise trading partner, after the United States and China, and has potential for Canadian export diversification, particularly in certain raw materials and agricultural products. Canada is a significant investor in Mexico, notably in the mining, energy, and manufacturing sectors. Mexico is committed to global trade liberalization, as evidenced by its 14 free trade agreements including 52 countries. Mexico and Canada are parties to the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

People-to-people ties are strong. In 2023, over 59,500 temporary Mexican workers came to Canada, with over 26,500 arriving through the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP), contributing to Canada’s food security and returning $1.25 billion in remittances to Mexico. In 2024, over 2.6 million Canadians visited Mexico, the second largest source of foreign tourists after the United States. The number of Mexicans visiting Canada is also increasing, with 590,000 Mexicans travellers to Canada in 2023.

Considerations

While trilateral mechanisms exist under NALS to address common priorities such as combatting synthetic drugs, addressing irregular migration, energy security, critical minerals and cross-border water management, the Trump administration may see the NALS process as a legacy of the previous administration.

The Fédération International de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup will be co-hosted by Canada, Mexico, and the United States in 2026. This event will mark the first time a FIFA Men’s World Cup has been hosted by three countries and the first to be organized under a human rights framework. World Cup 2026 will be the largest FIFA Men’s tournament to date and will include 48 countries competing in 104 matches across the three host nations. A total of 13 games will be played in Canada in the host cities of Toronto and Vancouver between June 11 and July 19, 2026. The successful delivery of this event requires the three host countries to work alongside and coordinate on issues such as visas for athletes and teams, border management, cybersecurity, anti-crime and corruption, etc.

[REDACTED]. In February 2025, Canada designated 7 criminal organizations, 5 of which were Mexican cartels, as terrorist entities under the Criminal Code. This action followed a similar move by the United States.

To combat illegal drugs, Canada has cooperated with Mexico and the United States, including on the Trilateral Fentanyl Committee, the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, the North American Drug Dialogue, and the Canada-U.S. Opioids Action Plan. Canada is set to chair the NADD and host the TFC in 2025. While collaboration in these fora has faltered, under the current U.S. administration, there is interest in re-engaging at the technical and working level.

Annex A: Regional Footprint

Source: Mission Network Map

4. Latin America and the Caribbean 

Issue

• Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), excluding Mexico, is made up of 32 mostly middle-income countries, with Haiti being the only low-income country. The region has the second highest income inequality in the world but is also the third most democratic (after Europe and North America).
• Canadian trade with LAC continues to grow. Roughly half of all Canadian mining assets abroad are in LAC, worth $102 billion in 2023.
• The Government of Canada’s total international development assistance to LAC (excluding Mexico) amounted to $1.2 billion in 2023-24, or 10% of Canada’s overall international development assistance.
• Key challenges in LAC include significant levels of irregular migration, the spread of transnational organized crime, and declining support for democracy and human rights. The new U.S. administration is focused strongly on these issues in the region.

Background

The LAC region (excluding Mexico) is home to 520 million people. The region is rich in natural resources, containing almost 20% of the world’s oil reserves, significant reserves of critical minerals (more than half of lithium reserves), and over 30% of the world’s virgin forest area. Canada maintains a robust and growing trade relationship with LAC countries, with 7 free trade agreements currently in force. The region's vast deposits of critical minerals are essential for Canada’s value chains and energy transition. The extractive industry remains an important sector for Canadian investment, and this is expected to continue to expand with increasing demand for critical minerals.

There are over 23 million forcibly displaced people in LAC, not including the millions of economic and other migrants who have left their homes for various reasons. Venezuela, Haiti, Ecuador, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua are key source countries of irregular migration. The new U.S. administration has increased pressure on countries to accept deportation flights of their nationals and has also made agreements with several LAC countries to take migrants of other nationalities. LAC has historically been a hotspot for transnational organized crime and its associated violence. Transnational organized crime is becoming increasingly interconnected with significant growth in synthetic drug trafficking, particularly affecting North America. Some governments have suspended rights, restricted civil society and taken legislative steps which undermine the rule of law in the name of combatting crime.

Democratic institutions are under threat in many countries in the Americas, due in part to corruption, political violence, human rights violations, political polarization and persistent inequality. Ongoing crises in Venezuela and Haiti continue to be important concerns in the region. Under the Maduro regime, Venezuela has become an authoritarian state and a major source of geopolitical instability because of its permissive environment for violent non-state actors, its migration outflows, and systemic human rights violations. The security situation in Haiti is deteriorating. Gang violence has displaced over 1 million people in the country, worsened the already dire humanitarian situation, and has contributed to irregular migration flows. Political transition in Haiti remains extremely fragile.

Despite the progress the region has made in reducing poverty over the last few decades, countries in LAC exhibit higher income inequality than those in other regions with similar development levels. Food security is also a significant concern. According to the UN, nearly a third of the LAC population experienced food insecurity in 2023. LAC is the second-most exposed region in the world to extreme weather events.

The department manages 28 missions in the region including 18 full embassies or high commissions. This includes the Permanent Mission of Canada to the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington, D.C. The department also manages an embassy and missions in Mexico.

Considerations

Bilateral and regional multilateral engagement 

The OAS is the primary multilateral forum through which Canada engages in hemispheric dialogue and cooperation. Canada also works closely with Caribbean countries, including through its Strategic Partnership with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and is an active participant in the triannual Summit of the Americas. The Canadian government has pursued various avenues to denounce Maduro’s illegal inauguration in Venezuela in January 2025 and the regime’s increasing human rights violations, including through multilateral channels such as the G7 and the OAS. The Government of Canada has also played a leadership role through its significant commitment to security, development and humanitarian assistance and diplomatic efforts in Haiti, working closely with the United States. The Government of Canada has contributed more than $400 million in international assistance to Haiti since 2022 and is the largest financial donor to the UN Trust Fund supporting the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSSM) with $86.2 million, while the United States is the largest in-kind contributor. Through international consultations, advocacy and high-level meetings, including as President of the G7 and chair of the G7 Working Group on Haiti, the Government of Canada has helped maintain global momentum on Haiti and mobilized enhanced international engagement and contributions to the MSSM and to the Haitian National Police.

The significant growth of China’s economic engagement in the region in recent years and the potential political influence derived from it is a major concern. Russia’s level of engagement in the region has also increased over the last decade, although much less extensive and multifaceted than China’s, focusing primarily on its traditional allies such as Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua.

Trade, investment and economic cooperation 

Canada’s trading relationship with LAC countries has strengthened over recent years, with two-way merchandise trade (excluding Mexico) increasing by approximately 58.4% from 2018 to 2024 (from $25 billion in 2018 to $39 billion in 2024). The region accounted for 1.3% of Canada’s global merchandise exports and 3.8% of global merchandise imports in 2024. The region accounted for roughly 11% of Canadian direct investment abroad in 2023 ($199 billion), including roughly half of Canada’s foreign investment in mining. Canada’s largest LAC trading relationships are with Brazil, Peru, and Chile.

Canada has Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, and Peru, and is part of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), along with Mexico, Peru and Chile. Negotiations for an FTA with Ecuador were concluded in January 2025. Canada has eight Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements with countries of the region. Growing interest and competition over critical minerals have led to exploratory dialogues and early agreements between Canada and several LAC countries.

International development context and Canadian international development assistance 

Canada’s international development assistance in LAC has focused on addressing irregular migration, climate change, inclusive growth, the protection and promotion of democracy and human rights, advancing gender equality, and promoting peace and security. In 2023-2024, Haiti was the 3^rd largest recipient of Canadian international development assistance (behind Ukraine and Ethiopia). Among Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries, Canada is the sixth largest donor to the region. Global Affairs Canada’s bilateral and regional assistance to LAC (excluding Mexico) was $949 million in 2023-24.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funding reductions in LAC have resulted in the closing of U.S.-funded migrant reception centers, straining local institutions managing returnees and in-transit migrants. In addition, U.S. foreign aid cuts have meant: a significant reduction in support for democracy, rule of law, and human rights initiatives; cuts to programs addressing HIV/AIDS and malaria; and funding gaps affecting 2SLGBTQI+ organizations, Indigenous empowerment programs, and media freedom.

Consular

In the 2023-24 fiscal year, a total of 1,192 new consular cases were opened in 41 countries and territories in the region (excluding Mexico). The LAC region is a popular destination for Canadian tourists, businesspeople and long-term expatriates. The Dominican Republic is the most common destination for Canadian travellers to the region. The most common types of Canadian consular cases in the region include accidents and medical assistance, financial assistance, natural deaths abroad, arrest and detention cases, and victims of crime. As of March 2025, there are 32 known cases of Canadians detained in the region.

Annex A: Regional Footprint

Source: Mission Network Map

Annex B: Regional Trade 

Annex C: International Assistance

Source: CFO Stats DevData Dashboard (for 2023-24, from all sources)

5. Middle East

Issue

• The Middle East is home to one of the world’s youngest populations with 60 percent under the age of 30.
• Countries range from advanced economies like Israel and oil-rich Gulf states, to impoverished, conflict-ridden states like Yemen and Syria.
• Since October 7, 2023, the region has faced conflicts between Israel-Hamas and Israel-Hezbollah, heightened Israel-Iran tensions, attacks by Yemen’s Houthis on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria.

Background

The Middle East (Egypt, Israel, West Bank/Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Iran) is home to over 450 million people. Gulf countries are top suppliers of oil and natural gas to the European Union, China, India and Japan; and global powers such as China, Russia and India have deepened their partnerships in the region. Gulf countries are emerging as key mediators and conveners between the West and Russia/China on Middle East issues and on extra-regional crises such as Russia-Ukraine.

The region remains unstable following the unprecedented Hamas-led terrorist attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and full-scale Israeli military incursion into Gaza. Ceasefires between Israel and Lebanon in November 2024 and Israel and Hamas in January 2025 [REDACTED].

While the conflict in Gaza continues, tensions in the West Bank are rising with Israeli military operations, [REDACTED].

Although weakened by Israeli operations against Hamas and Hezbollah, and the fall of the Assad regime, Iran continues its destabilizing regional influence with its proxies, including armed terrorist groups. It expands its nuclear program and has proliferated weapons to its regional proxies. President Trump has threatened military action if Iran rejects a new nuclear deal. Despite the first Trump administration’s success in securing the 2020 Abraham Accords (normalization between Israel, U.A.E., Bahrain and Morocco), regional partners, such as Saudi Arabia, have stated that normalization efforts between them and Israel hinge on a clear path to Palestinian statehood.

Considerations

Bilateral and regional multilateral engagement 

Canada maintains diplomatic relations through its network of 11 missions in Egypt, the West Bank, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar [REDACTED].

Since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 the Government of Canada is cautiously engaging with the new Syrian leadership, has named a non-resident Ambassador to Syria and eased its economic sanctions to provide relief to the Syrian people. On Iran, the Government of Canada has increased sanctions, listed the IRGC as a terrorist entity and has a controlled engagement policy, severely limiting bilateral relations.

Trade, investment and economic cooperation 

In 2024, Canada’s two-way merchandise trade with the Middle East was $12.1 billion ($6.9 billion in exports; $5.2 billion in imports). Canada’s top import from the region was petroleum products while top exports were light-armored vehicles, automobiles, agriculture and aircraft. In 2023, foreign direct investment from the region was officially $17.9 billion and Canadian Direct Investment Abroad was $2.8 billion. Canada has free trade agreements with Israel and Jordan, and Foreign Investment Protection Agreements (FIPA) with Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. There are ongoing FIPA negotiations with the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Gulf states, eager to increase economic engagement with Canada, aim to deploy capital from their Sovereign Wealth Funds (more than $6 trillion) over the next five - ten years to diversify their economies away from oil and gas.

Canadian International Assistance 

The conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria have increased regional international assistance needs.

Canada provides humanitarian assistance via the U.N., Red Cross and NGO partners to facilitate lifesaving assistance in the region, enabling food, protection, shelter and health support. Canada ranks among the top ten donors to humanitarian assistance in the region. Canadian development assistance programming focuses on education and skills development; health services; economic development; women's rights and empowerment; good governance; environmental protection and water management; food security and agriculture; and early recovery.

Canada’s Peace and Stabilization Operations Program advances efforts to strengthen security sector, local-level peacebuilding initiatives, mine action activities, social cohesion, justice and accountability, and women’s engagement in peace negotiations and decision-making processes.

Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program provides support to prevent the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, disrupt terrorist financing, counter violent extremist narratives, and enhance the capabilities of law enforcement through the provision of non-lethal equipment, infrastructure, and training.

Consular  

In 2024-25, more than 550 consular cases were opened in the Middle East. In 2021, Cabinet adopted a Policy Framework guiding the provision of consular assistance to Canadians in Northeast Syria, including repatriation. [REDACTED].

Gaza Exits 

Since November 2023, the Government of Canada has assisted 871 Canadians, permanent residents or immediate family members to leave Gaza. Currently, Global Affairs Canada offers assistance to the 48 Canadians, permanent residents and family members who remain in Gaza.

Annex A: Regional Footprint

 Source: Mission Network Map.

Annex B: Regional Trade 

Source: Statistics Canada Tables 12-10-0171-01 (Merchandise Trade), 36-10-0007-01 (Service Trade), and 36-10-0008-01 (Direct Investment Stock). 

*Note: Data for some countries is only available in aggregate and is grouped into an “Other Countries” group for the region. A blank entry does not necessarily mean that Canada does not have trade with the country. 

Annex C: International Assistance

Source: CFO Stats DevData Dashboard (for 2023-24, from all sources)

6. Africa

Issue

• By 2050, more than 25% of the world’s population will live in Africa, and once fully implemented, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) will be the largest free trade area in the world by participating countries and population.
• Competition is growing in Africa among China, Russia, middle powers and allies for political influence and access to resources.
• Poverty, and peace and security challenges remain persistent across Africa.

Background

Africa is a dynamic continent, spanning 54 countries, with a rapidly growing workforce and very young population. Africa is endowed with significant natural resources – 30% of the world’s critical minerals, 60% of its solar energy potential and 25% of global biodiversity – which, if managed well, have the potential to contribute to more resilient and sustainable economic growth. Africa has become a focal point of intensifying geostrategic competition, as global superpowers including the United States, China, and Russia, seek to expand political influence and secure access to critical resources. This intensifying contest reflects not only Africa’s vast economic potential and demographic growth, but also its pivotal role in shaping future global supply chains, security alignments, and diplomatic blocs.

Canada has a diplomatic footprint in the region that includes 27 missions (e.g. embassies or high commissions) in 24 countries. Canada’s Permanent Observer Mission to the African Union is embedded in the Canadian Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Development, trade and diplomatic assets support efforts to expand Canada-Africa co-operation, particularly in the economic and trade spheres, and advance mutual priorities through expanded partnerships.

Poverty levels in much of Africa are significant – with nearly 60% of the population living in poverty, more than 85% experiencing severe or moderate food insecurity, over 600 million lacking access to energy, and more than 25% of youth facing unemployment. International development assistance to Africa contributes to poverty reduction through programming in health, climate change, food security, education and skills training, and trade and development.

Africa faces ongoing and persistent peace and security challenges. Key conflict hotspots include Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Somalia in Eastern Africa, and the Sahel and Coastal West Africa. The state fragility associated with these conflicts is both contributing to and the result of geopolitical tensions and growing authoritarianism, which contributes to undermining respect for human rights. Peace and security challenges also include significant terrorism and organized crime, biological threats, [REDACTED].

The Government of Canada collaborates with African countries and partners, as well as with the international community to promote political and economic security, and stability. This is done in part through humanitarian, peace and security, and development assistance to conflict zones, counter terrorism capacity building and deployments of Canadian Armed Forces and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping Missions. 

Considerations

Refocused Engagement with Africa

In March 2025, the Government of Canada announced its intention to refocus its engagement with Africa towards greater economic cooperation, strengthened partnerships to protect shared security interests, better engagement of African diaspora communities in Canada, and international development assistance that supports economic growth and youth employment. Canada’s Africa Strategy: A Partnership for Shared Prosperity and Security, which supports these objectives, was launched by the government on March 6, 2025.

Bilateral and regional multilateral engagement

Africa represents the largest voting bloc at the United Nations (54/193), with a significant presence in La Francophonie (29/88) and the Commonwealth (19/53). Canada was the first to invite African leaders to its G7 (then G8) Summit in 2002. Since then, Africa has been featured on the G7 Agenda.

The Government of Canada and the African Union Commission (AUC) have held two High Level Dialogues, in October 2022 and November 2024, to advance shared objectives related to trade, development, peace and security. The Government of Canada and the AUC signed a memorandum of understanding at the 2024 High Level Dialogue, which further institutionalized the relationship. Canada is a founding member of the African Development Bank, currently its fourth largest non-regional shareholder and is currently ninth largest overall.

Trade, investment and economic cooperation 

Canada’s two-way merchandise trade with Africa totalled $15.2 billion in 2024 ($5.7 billion exports; $9.4 billion imports) – up 29% since 2020, representing about 1% of Canada’s total merchandise trade. Exports of services to Africa more than doubled from $2.7 billion in 2019 to $6 billion in 2023, representing 1.9% of Canada’s two-way services trade, a share that has been slowly increasing since 2019. Canada currently has no Free Trade Agreements (FTA) in Africa but does have 8 Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs) and 23 Air Transport Agreements in place.

Canadian Direct Investment Abroad (CDIA) in Africa reached $12 billion in 2023, growing 4.3% from 2018 to 2023. Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction sectors make up 45.3% of CDIA. Africa represents the second-largest value of Canadian mining assets globally, after the Americas, representing 18% of Canada’s total mining assets abroad in 2023.

The impact of U.S. global tariffs vary widely among African countries, depending on the exposure to the American market. While a significant number of countries have low exposure, South Africa, Lesotho and Liberia rely heavily on trade with the United States and will feel the impact more significantly [REDACTED]. In response to the tariffs, some African nations are advocating for greater export diversification and focusing on strengthening intra-African trade, notably through initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

International development context and Canadian international assistance 

The Government of Canada provided $4.1 billion in bilateral development assistance to Africa in fiscal year 2022/23, and $3.2 billion in fiscal-year 2023/24 (representing 44.7% of Canada’s bilateral development assistance). Given the protracted nature, scale and impact of many conflicts in Africa, a significant proportion (41%) of Canada’s humanitarian assistance in 2023/24 was allocated to Africa.

In 2023, the United States was the largest global donor, channelling approximately 40% of which was invested in Africa – particularly in the health sector. [REDACTED].

Consular 

In 2023-24, a total of 592 new consular cases were opened in 37 countries across Africa. The most common types of Canadian consular cases include financial assistance, children and family, and wellbeing and whereabouts. As of March 2025, there are 6 known cases of Canadians detained in Africa. [REDACTED].

Annex A: Regional Footprint

Source: Mission Network Map

Annex B: Regional Trade

Source: Source: Statistics Canada Tables 12-10-0171-01 (Merchandise Trade), 36-10-0007-01 (Service Trade), and 36-10-0008-01 (Direct Investment Stock). 

Annex C: International Assistance

Source: CFO Stats DevData Dashboard (for 2023-24, from all sources)

7. Efforts to counter foreign information manipulation and interference

Issue

• Foreign interference continues to evolve against the backdrop of geopolitical tensions and technological advances, including generative artificial intelligence.
• Efforts by Global Affairs Canada to counter foreign information manipulation and interference is carried out by Rapid Response Mechanism Canada, which monitors the digital information environment for state-sponsored disinformation and leads on Canada’s response. Global Affairs Canada also serves as permanent secretariat for the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism. As part of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force, Rapid Response Mechanism Canada will continue to support also supported Canada’s electoral integrity in the leadup to the upcoming 45th General Election.

Background

Foreign interference is deliberate and covert activity undertaken by a foreign state to advance its interests, often their own strategic objectives to the detriment of Canada's national interests. It is distinct from normal diplomatic conduct or acceptable foreign state lobbying; it is purposely covert, malign, and deceptive. Foreign information manipulation and interference is a form of foreign interference and refers to the intentional and coordinated efforts by state or non-state actors in order to alter information to achieve political, security or other strategic objectives.

Malign foreign actors attack the integrity of information by exploiting state-controlled information channels, social media and other digital platforms, and manipulating emerging technologies such as generative artificial intelligence. As demonstrated by the findings in the recent Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference report, foreign information manipulation and interference destabilizes national and international security. The main foreign information manipulation and interference actors in Canada are Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Iran.

When foreign interference takes the form of a malicious cyber act that endangers the security or economic interests of Canada and/or a partner country, Global Affairs Canada leads Canada’s attribution framework, which is used to determine if the Government of Canada should formally attribute the incident. The minister of foreign affairs is responsible for determining Canada’s response based on a collective recommendation from multiple government departments.

Countering foreign information manipulation and interference is a whole-of-government effort and requires collaboration with various partners, including industry, civil society organizations, and the media. Global Affairs Canada’s most salient efforts to counter foreign information manipulation and interference include Rapid Response Mechanism Canada (RRM Canada), which serves as permanent secretariat to the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (G7 RRM). RRM Canada houses Global Affairs Canada’s monitoring and response capacity, which uses open-source data and tools. It also drives multilateral cooperation with G7 members and a key group of partner observers to increase the cost to foreign information manipulation and interference actors and ultimately disrupt global operations.

RRM Canada

Located at Global Affairs Canada, RRM Canada monitors the digital information environment for foreign information manipulation and interference activity, supports Canada’s international engagement to counter foreign state-sponsored information operations, and bolsters Canada’s electoral integrity as part of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force. The Task Force is a whole-of-government working group including experts from Global Affairs Canada, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Communications Security Establishment Canada and the RCMP. RRM Canada has open-source intelligence and data analytics capacity, with dedicated units that monitor foreign information manipulation and interference from Russia, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East and North Africa region. It provides open-source data analytics about threats to democratic institutions and produces regular reporting.

G7 RRM

The G7 RRM was announced at the 2018 G7 Summit in Charlevoix and is comprised of all G7 countries as members, and 5 observers: Australia, New Zealand, the NATO Public Diplomacy Division, the Netherlands, and Sweden. The G7 RRM is mandated to strengthen G7 coordination to counter foreign threats to democracy through open-source data analytics. Since its inception, this mechanism has focused primarily on countering foreign information manipulation and interference but also addresses other threats, including transnational repression (i.e. an aggressive form of foreign interference whereby governments reach across borders to intimidate and silence their opponents, often within diaspora communities) interference. Adversaries are increasingly leveraging digital technologies, including generative artificial intelligence, to perpetrate transnational repression more effectively. This tactic is referred to as digital transnational repression. The findings of the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference indicated that any effective response to foreign interference must consider the realities of transnational repression.

Considerations

Countering foreign information manipulation and interference through strategic and pragmatic engagement with key partners and regions

Since the inception of the G7 RRM, the United States has been a steadfast partner government in countering foreign information manipulation and interference. Until it was disbanded in December 2024, the U.S.’ Global Engagement Center (an interagency entity housed at the State Department to coordinate U.S. counter-foreign information manipulation and interference efforts) was Global Affairs Canada’s counterpart in the G7 RRM. The United States is currently exploring different options for countering foreign information manipulation and interference, [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] The government may wish to continue prioritizing collaboration with likeminded partners, [REDACTED] including the EU and the United Kingdom, as well as with non-traditional partners in the Indo-Pacific, Americas, and Africa.

8. International trade

Issue 

• Success in international trade is fundamental to Canadian prosperity.
• Canada has developed a comprehensive suite of tools to support Canadian businesses to trade and attract investment, which includes free trade agreements, foreign investment promotion and protection agreements, the Trade Commissioner Service (TCS) and crown corporations like Export Development Canada and the Canadian Commercial Corporation.
• As a result of heightened geopolitical competition and increasing politicization of international economics and trade, the international trading system is facing significant challenges, including rising protectionism, escalating trade tensions, and the increasing use of non-market policies and practices, such as excessive subsidies and intentional overcapacity.

Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act

As set out in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act (2013), the Minister of Foreign Affairs' responsibilities include helping to expand Canada’s international trade and commerce. This includes developing programs to help enhance international trade and commerce with the support of the Minister of International Trade. Many international trade duties are delegated to the Minister for International Trade, while the Minister of Foreign Affairs administers certain economic and security functions, including sanctions.

Canada is a Trading Nation

Canada is a trading nation. In 2024, Canada exported almost $998 billion and imported more than $1 trillion worth of goods and services. Although merchandise trade accounts for the majority Canada’s international trade, services trade is growing faster than merchandise trade and accounted for $414.4 billion of Canada’s total trade in 2023. The total stock of foreign direct investment in Canada reached $1.4 trillion. Canada’s largest trading partners are the United States, China, the European Union, Mexico, the United Kingdom and Japan.

Trade is equivalent to two-thirds of Canada’s GDP, and exports alone support 1 in 6 Canadian jobs. Canada’s 15 in-force free trade agreements (FTAs) cover 51 countries, which represent nearly two-thirds of global GDP and some 1.5 billion potential consumers worldwide. Key Canadian FTAs include the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which covers 18% of global GDP, the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which covers 15% of global GDP, and the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), which covers 27% of global GDP. Since each FTA’s entry into force, Canadian trade with the relevant markets has grown by over 30%. In December 2024, Canada also signed a free trade agreement with Indonesia, which is Canada’s largest export and second-largest investment destination in Southeast Asia.

The Department’s TCS helps Canadian businesses unlock international opportunities. The TCS provides tailored export advice and contacts, funding, accelerator programs and other support mechanisms through its global network in nearly 150 international locations. In fiscal year 2023-2024, the TCS facilitated 1,474 commercial agreements with an estimated value of $5.7 billion; and supported 184 research and innovation partnerships and 134 new or expanded forms of foreign direct investment into Canada with an estimated value of over $27.1 billion these investments are expected to create approximately 9,600 new jobs. In 2023-2024, the TCS also delivered 118 FTA promotion initiatives across its domestic and international networks.

International Trading System

The international trading system is based on a framework of rules that govern global commerce. As a trading nation, Canada participates in a global trade regime that is underpinned by the WTO, which contributes to openness, predictability and transparency in global trade. However, this framework is facing several challenges that are placing significant strain on many economies. It is also ill-equipped to deal with emerging challenges like the use of non-market policies and practices, and tariffs as a tool of economic coercion. Canada has long relied on strong multilateral rules to help ensure a level playing field and provide stability for international commerce.

Export Drivers and Economic Security

While Canada’s trade is highly concentrated with the United States, it also relies on strong trading relationships with other key partners, including the European Union (6% of goods and services exports and 10% of imports), the United Kingdom, Japan, Mexico, and the Republic of Korea. Building on these relationships and seeking out new opportunities in new markets will be important to maintaining predictability and stability for Canadian exporters. Canada is committed to diversifying trade in priority sectors and continues to expand access to global markets through trade agreements - including innovative models- and trade and investment promotion initiatives. In this context, promoting responsible business conduct among Canadian exporters is crucial for maintaining a strong national brand, enhancing competitiveness in global markets, mitigating operational and investment risk, such as the use of forced labour, and ensuring the long-term security and sustainability of supply chains.

Canada has been taking steps to bolster its economic resilience by continuing to promote established international systems and norms, and adapting responses to economic vulnerabilities, intellectual property, sensitive research, and technology. Central to the issues facing the international trade environment has been the rise of non-market policies and practices, such as excessive subsidies and intentional overcapacity. These erode the level playing field and can lead to the weaponization of economic dependencies.