Language selection

Search

Audit of U.S. Mission Network

November 2025

Published: January 30, 2026

Table of Contents

Acronyms and Symbols

CBS
Canada-Based Staff
CSDP
Common Service Delivery Point
GAC
Global Affairs Canada
HQ
Headquarters
HR
Human Resources
LES
Locally Engaged Staff
ATNTA
Atlanta mission
BOSTN
Boston mission
CHCGO
Chicago mission
CNGNY
New York mission
DALAS
Dallas mission
DENVR
Denver mission
DTROT
Detroit mission
LNGLS
Los Angeles mission
MIAMI
Miami mission
MNPLS
Minneapolis mission
SEATL
Seattle mission
SFRAN
San Francisco mission
WSHDC
Washington D.C. Embassy

Executive Summary

In accordance with Global Affairs Canada’s approved 2023-25 Risk-based Audit Plan, the Office of the Chief Audit Executive and Special Investigations conducted an audit of the United States (U.S.) Mission Network.

Background

The U.S. network consists of an embassy, 12 consulate generals and three trade offices, which host 486 employees. The audit was initiated in response to risks identified concerning the scope and scale of the network’s operations, as well as the broader operating environment. Additionally, no U.S. mission had previously undergone a mission audit, further highlighting the need to initiate this work.

Objective and Scope

The objective of the audit was to provide assurance that sound management practices and effective controls are in place to ensure good stewardship of resources at missions in the U.S. Network in support of the achievement of Global Affairs Canada objectives. The audit assessed governance, procurement, asset management, human resources, and security and emergency preparedness. The audit included on-site visits to higher-risk missions and remote assessments for others.

Key Findings

The network generally demonstrated strong governance, effective communication, and good operational practices. Governance at the mission level and communication channels across the network were well-established. A few missions, however, expressed a desire for greater staff engagement through varied forums. While procurement practices were largely compliant, issues were noted regarding documentation gaps, unclear contract terms, and payment conditions. Crown properties were effectively managed overall, though minor improvements were needed in tracking attractive goods and IT inventory. Performance agreements were not consistently completed on time or for all staff, despite efforts to align with the departmental cycle. Security and emergency management measures were adequate overall; however, certain missions needed to update their emergency plans and ensure they were accessible to all staff.

Several network-wide challenges were identified during the audit. Program managers reported workload pressures, particularly when fulfilling dual responsibilities as Mission Security Officers without sufficient technical expertise. Some missions also indicated limited support for day-to-day IT needs. Staffing delays in combination with a competitive job market, affected the timely recruitment of qualified local personnel. Additionally, Canada Based Staff consistently raised concerns about the administrative burden relating to their medical insurance provider and finding suitable housing in a predominately private-lease model. Both of these concerns pose challenges to postings in the U.S.

The audit team debriefed each mission of detailed findings and provided a Summary of Results report. Recommendations and/or considerations were made in each report and a Management Action Plan was developed, where warranted.

Introduction

See About the Audit for details surrounding the engagement objective, scope, criteria, approach and methodology.

The Audit of the United States Mission Network is a series of audits that were included within Global Affairs Canada’s (GAC) 2023–25 Risk-Based Audit Plan. Canada’s relationship with the United States (U.S.) is important across multiple fronts, including foreign policy, security, commerce, defence, and the environment. For this reason, Canada maintains a large mission footprint in the U.S. requiring considerable effort and expenditures. In addition, multiple U.S. missions operate in environments with security and emergency management risks due to natural disasters and crime. Given the scope and scale of the network, the fact that U.S. missions had not been previously audited, and the risks present in the operating environment, an audit of the U.S. Mission Network was initiated.

As the largest country network, it comprises the largest embassy in Washington, D.C (WSHDC), 12 consulate generals and 3 trade offices located in major U.S. cities. These missions deliver a broad range of services and programs, including consular support, trade promotion, foreign policy and diplomacy, and general administration.

The network consists of approximately 486Footnote 1 GAC employees (130 Canadian Based Staff and 356 Locally engaged Staff) across the various program areas, including trade, consular, common services, policy, and multilateral work. In addition, approximately 254 employees work for partner departments and co-locators (such as Department of National Defence, Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada, and provincial co-locators like Alberta and Ontario) in the U.S. missions. The map below depicts the staff complement at each mission.

Text version

Overall Map Layout:

Locations and Details:

The real property landscape consists of 33 crowned owned and 46 crowned leased properties as well as 259 privately leased staff quarters. The network also maintains a fleet of 42 vehicles to support diplomatic and operational needs. Also, mission expenditures have steadily increased from $117 million in 2022–23 to $132 million in 2024–25.

The U.S. network operates under a decentralized governance model. Unlike other country networks, U.S. consulate generals report directly to the Americas Branch (NGM) rather than WSHDC; which allows each mission to retain a high degree of operational autonomy. The U.S. missions receive financial, contracting and procurement support from the Common Service Delivery Point in Mexico City, and Human resource (HR) support from the Common Services Program at WSHDC.

Findings

Larger U.S. missions and those assessed as having higher levels of operational or security risks were selected for on-site fieldwork while others were audited remotely. The audit assessed governance, oversight, procurement practices, financial and asset management, human resources, and security and emergency preparedness. The observations were assessed using the following rating scale.

RatingDefinitions
SatisfactoryNo issues or few minor issues noted. Controls are adequately designed, consistently well implemented, and effective to provide reasonable assurance that the objectives will be met.
Needs Minor ImprovementMultiple minor issues noted. Controls are adequately designed, generally well implemented, but a number of issues were identified that may present a moderate risk to the achievement of the objectives.
Needs Significant ImprovementOne or few significant issues noted. Controls have some weaknesses in design or operating effectiveness such that, until they are addressed, there is not yet reasonable assurance that the objectives are likely to be met.
UnsatisfactoryMultiple significant and/or material issues noted. Controls are not adequately designed and/or are not generally effective. The nature of these issues is such that the achievement of objectives is seriously compromised.
Not AssessedArea not scoped into the audit work
Not ApplicableAudit work not required in this area given mission’s profile.

The audit team debriefed each mission of detailed findings and provided a Summary of Results report. Recommendations and/or considerations were made in each report and a Management Action Plan was developed, where warranted, as shown in Annex A. These management actions will be subject to follow-up by the Office of the Chief Audit Executive and Special Investigations. Furthermore, a consolidated summary of results is presented in Annex B.

The observations in this report pertain to the mandate of three branches - International Platform, People and Corporate Management, and Emergency Management, Legal and Consular Affairs. As a result, this report has been shared with them for their awareness and consideration.

1. Governance

ATNTABOSTNCHCGOCNGNYDALASDENVRDTROTLNGLSMIAMIMNPLSSEATLSFRAN
SatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementNot Assessed*Needs Minor ImprovementSatisfactory

*This area was excluded from the scope of the audit since it was reviewed by GAC’s Office of the Well-Being Ombud and Inspector General through an inspection in November 2024.

Missions were assessed to determine whether adequate governance was in place to support good stewardship of mission resources. More specifically, the functioning of key management committees, senior management engagement with staff, collaboration between programs, clarity of roles and responsibilities, and communication were assessed. Observations are based on interviews with key staff and a review of terms of reference and meeting minutes of various committees.

Governance at the mission level

Overall, governance practices across the network were found to be well-established and functioning effectively. Key committees such as the Committee on Mission Management, the Operations Committee, and the Locally Engaged Staff Management Consultative Board (LESMCB) were in place in most missions and operating as intended.

Senior management engagement varied slightly between missions, but generally consisted of all-staff meetings, town halls, and bilateral discussions. A few missions, however, expressed a desire for greater staff engagement through varied forums.

Roles and responsibilities were typically well-defined and clearly communicated to staff. Employees demonstrated an understanding of their day-to-day duties and were generally provided with adequate guidance and training to perform their tasks effectively.

Inter-program collaboration within missions was also found to be in place. Teams worked together on shared initiatives through various means, including debriefing key initiatives at committee meetings (e.g., Committee on Mission Management), cross-attendance at team meetings by program assistants and officers, and regular bilateral or informal discussions. This collaboration was particularly evident between the Trade and Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Service groups across the network. This cooperation is essential for aligning Canada’s economic and diplomatic interests abroad, ensuring consistent messaging, informing decision-making, and coordinating use of resources.

Governance at the network level

Given that the 12 U.S. consulate generals report directly to headquarters rather than through the Embassy of Canada in Washington, D.C., effective network-wide communication mechanisms are essential to foster collaboration, alignment, and consistent guidance.

The audit identified the following channels that supported effective communication across the network:

Additionally, multiple HOMs in the network noted that since the 2024 U.S. Presidential election, consulate generals have been receiving timely updates from WSHDC. These updates—covering status updates and key talking points on priority issues—have enhanced coordination and responsiveness across the network.

2. Procurement

ATNTABOSTNCHCGOCNGNYDALASDENVRDTROTLNGLSMIAMIMNPLSSEATLSFRAN
Needs Minor ImprovementSatisfactorySatisfactoryNeeds Significant ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Significant ImprovementSatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor Improvement

Mission practices were assessed to determine whether the procurement and payment of goods and services complied with applicable legislative requirements and departmental policies, while also demonstrating prudent stewardship of resources. The audit team employed a combination of data analytics, process walkthroughs, and risk-based transaction testing across missions. Data analytics was conducted on all procurement transactions processed in the U.S. network over a 5-year period. Based on the analysis, approximately 400 transactions were reviewed as a result of elevated risk indicators such as materiality, direct invoicing, and non-competitive contracting. Of those, 147 transactions were selected for follow up with the respective missions, for which the results are described below.

The audit work found that procurement practices across missions generally aligned with departmental policies. The most common network-wide issue related to the management of procurement files, which were often missing key documentation, including approvals from the Regional Contract Review Board and Non-Competitive Contract Justification forms. Retention of key documentation is important to demonstrate transparency, accountability, and effective oversight. Proper documentation also helps maintain operational continuity and informs future decision-making.

Some less frequent compliance issues were noted, such as contracts that lacked clearly defined deliverables. In addition, there were instances where payment terms were inappropriate—such as contracts being paid in full upon signing rather than based on service completion or the achievement of milestones. Missions had already begun addressing this issue by negotiating reasonable payment terms, where feasible. Additionally, minor issues were observed relating to hospitality events not being properly reported.

To reinforce policy compliance and oversight effectiveness, missions were recommended to implement stronger information management controls, including a centralized repository for procurement documentation. Refresher training and renewed emphasis on procurement procedures were also proposed to enhance consistency and minimize administrative errors.

3. Asset Management

The management of assets at mission were assessed to determine whether effective controls were in place, and management was in compliance with applicable legislative requirements and policies. This included Crown property (where applicable), vehicle fleet, inventory of goods (office furniture and equipment, IT inventory), fine art, alcohol and consular documents.

ATNTABOSTNCHCGOCNGNYDALASDENVRDTROTLNGLSMIAMIMNPLSSEATLSFRAN
Not ApplicableSatisfactorySatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementNot ApplicableNot ApplicableNot ApplicableSatisfactoryNot ApplicableNot ApplicableNot ApplicableSatisfactory

The property portfolios within the U.S. consulate general network consist primarily of leased assets. The department does not own any chancery properties, and only five of 12 consulate generals have retained a Crown owned Official Residence. All U.S. missions are on a private lease model for staff quarters, aside for the New York mission (CNGNY), which has a mixed portfolio of Crown owned, Crown leased, and private leased.

Crown owned assets were assessed to determine whether these properties were being appropriately managed and maintained. Missions are responsible for the day-to-day maintenance and management of these properties and infrastructure as per life cycle needs, while HQ is responsible for capital reinvestment, such as large renovation projects or infrastructure upgrades. The missions in Los Angeles (LNGLS), San Francisco (SFRAN), Boston (BOSTN), and Chicago (CHCGO) each manage a Crown owned Official Residence, while CNGNY manages 3 Crown owned Official Residences, 22 Crown owned and 24 Crown leased staff quarters. These U.S. cities are complex environments in which to own and manage property given elevated property maintenance costs, strict property and zoning bylaws, and high demand for reliable contractors.

Overall, Crown properties across the network were found to be effectively managed and maintained by missions, in alignment with occupant turnover and property lifecycle needs. However, due to the scale and complexity of the portfolio managed by CNGNY, the audit recommended certain improvements to property planning.

Inventory Management

ATNTABOSTNCHCGOCNGNYDALASDENVRDTROTLNGLSMIAMIMNPLSSEATLSFRAN
SatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementSatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementSatisfactorySatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementSatisfactorySatisfactoryNeeds Minor Improvement

Missions’ inventory practices were assessed for adequacy (i.e., whether inventory mechanisms were in place) and effectiveness (i.e., whether inventories were accurate). Effectiveness could only be evaluated at missions where site visits allowed for inventory reconciliation. The type of inventory reviewed included IT assets, fine art, equipment, alcohol, appliances, furniture, and consular documents.

Overall, inventory management across the network was found to be adequate. Missions used various tracking tools to manage material and sensitive items. A recurring gap was noted in the management of attractive goods (equipment, appliances, furniture) at chanceries, where inventory lists were often absent or outdated.

There is a departmental IT inventory tracking system, Remedy, that can only be edited by IT staff. Since certain missions were not staffed with IT professionals, updates to Remedy were dependent on the prioritization of tasks by visiting IT professionals from HQ. As a result, missions often created their own local IT inventory spreadsheets to accurately track items on a day-to-day basis. Although no IT assets were found to be missing, Remedy did not reflect an accurate picture of existing IT inventory at certain missions.

Alcohol inventories were generally well managed. However, a few missions reported expired stock resulting from purchases made during the COVID-19 pandemic. During the audit period, HQ updated and streamlined procedures for disposing of expired alcohol to improve clarity and reduce administrative burden.

Fleet Management

ATNTABOSTNCHCGOCNGNYDALASDENVRDTROTLNGLSMIAMIMNPLSSEATLSFRAN
SatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementSatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementSatisfactory

Mission fleet management practices were reviewed to assess whether vehicle maintenance, fuel expenditures, and usage were effectively tracked and aligned with departmental guidelines.

Overall, vehicles were well managed. Missions tracked usage through manual logs and used internal tools like Outlook for vehicle bookings. Fuel purchases were consistently managed across the network using a standardized fuel card system, which provided monthly reports for verification.

Most missions had clear transportation policies outlining proper fleet use. However, a few needed to clarify guidance related to specific scenarios such as the acceptable use of vehicles after work hours. Additionally, while fleet sizes were generally appropriate, some missions could benefit from reviewing their fleet needs, as certain vehicles were underutilized.

4. Human Resources

ATNTABOSTNCHCGOCNGNYDALASDENVRDTROTLNGLSMIAMIMNPLSSEATLSFRAN
Needs Minor ImprovementSatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementSatisfactorySatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementNot Assessed*Needs Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor Improvement

*This area was excluded from the scope of the audit since it was reviewed by GAC’s Office of the Well-Being Ombud and Inspector General through an inspection in November 2024.

The audit planned to review key HR processes - staffing and performance management. Early in the audit, it was determined that staffing actions were centrally managed by the HR unit at the WSHDC, presenting a lower risk of non-compliance. As a result, the review of HR practices at missions focused primarily on the completion of performance assessments.

Across the network, performance management was commonly identified as an area for improvement. While many staff had performance agreements in place, they were not always completed in line with the departmental cycle. Missions reported providing informal feedback and coaching, but formal assessments were applied inconsistently. The department is in the process of launching a corporate system to manage LES performance, which will replace the current manual process. This new application will facilitate monitoring of completion rates, which should prompt greater compliance with the departmental cycle. Central monitoring of completion rates for Canadian Based Staff (CBS) had already begun in 2024-25.

Recruitment of LES was also a challenge, particularly in competitive labour markets. Missions indicated that salaries were often not competitive enough to attract qualified candidates, and that the departmental staffing process was sometimes inefficient, leading to delays in hiring and onboarding.

Regarding workplace arrangements, most missions adhered to the Working Off Mission Premises (WOMP) model. Under this approach, LES typically worked on-site three or four days per week, while the majority of CBS maintained a full-time on-site presence.

5. Security and Emergency Management

Missions were assessed to determine whether effective security and emergency management structures and practices were in place. For missions selected for site visits, this included inspections of physical and information security elements. For all missions, the audit team reviewed processes for managing day-to-day security matters and mitigating security risks. In terms of emergency management, the audit team verified whether missions had key program elements in place.

Readiness Governance

ATNTABOSTNCHCGOCNGNYDALASDENVRDTROTLNGLSMIAMIMNPLSSEATLSFRAN
SatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactory

*This area was excluded from the scope of the audit since it was reviewed by GAC’s Office of the Well-Being Ombud and Inspector General through an inspection in November 2024.

Missions were assessed to determine whether essential security and emergency management roles and responsibilities had been clearly allocated to mission management and staff, and whether critical issues were regularly discussed around the management table.

Missions were performing well in this area by establishing Emergency Response Team (ERT) structures and assigning security officer roles. Managers and staff indicated that roles were clear and understood, and security and emergency management issues received significant attention at management committees. In addition, all missions had Local Standing Security Orders to guide operations and emergency responses.

Physical and Information Security

ATNTABOSTNCHCGOCNGNYDALASDENVRDTROTLNGLSMIAMIMNPLSSEATLSFRAN
Not AssessedNot AssessedNot AssessedSatisfactoryNot AssessedNot AssessedNot AssessedNeeds Minor ImprovementSatisfactoryNot AssessedSatisfactorySatisfactory

Overall, the five missions assessed had adequate physical and information security measures in place at the chancery and the Official Residences. These elements were assessed through on-site mission visits where auditors examined the perimeter and physical access security, as well as information security equipment. In addition, the audit team obtained relevant security-related information from key stakeholders at HQ. Only LNGLS had physical security concerns that required improvement and remedial actions are being reviewed by HQ.

Emergency Management

ATNTABOSTNCHCGOCNGNYDALASDENVRDTROTLNGLSMIAMIMNPLSSEATLSFRAN
Needs Significant ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementSatisfactorySatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementSatisfactoryNeeds Significant ImprovementSatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementNot Assessed*SatisfactorySatisfactory

*This area was excluded from the scope of the audit since it was reviewed by GAC’s Office of the Well-Being Ombud and Inspector General through an inspection in November 2024.

Missions were assessed to determine whether essential emergency management program elements were in place.

Overall, emergency management elements were found to be adequate across the network. All missions had a Mission Emergency Plan in place, though some required updates to specific sections and to Standard Operating Procedures. Since the Mission Emergency Plan is created and stored on a centralized IT platform called ORBIS, not all staff have access to its contents.

As a result, many missions developed a Mission Emergency Plan Handbook (i.e. Mini- Mission Emergency Plan) containing essential emergency information that was made accessible to all staff.

Most missions had an Alternate Command Post that served as a backup operational site in case the chancery became inaccessible, as part of their emergency preparedness framework. Alternate Command Posts are typically stocked with emergency supplies to support continuity of operations. In some cases, emergency supplies were stored at the chancery itself, which could compromise emergency response effectiveness. Some missions were re-evaluating their Alternate Command Post strategies due to limited substitute locations. For example, one mission was exploring the use of a virtual Alternate Command Post supported by a fully remote team.

Training

ATNTABOSTNCHCGOCNGNYDALASDENVRDTROTLNGLSMIAMIMNPLSSEATLSFRAN
SatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactoryNeeds Significant ImprovementSatisfactoryNot Assessed*SatisfactorySatisfactory

*This area was excluded from the scope of the audit since it was reviewed by GAC’s Office of the Well-Being Ombud and Inspector General through an inspection in November 2024.

Security and emergency management training at missions was reviewed to determine whether drills and exercises were conducted regularly and aligned with each mission’s threat profile to support crisis readiness.

Most missions conducted a range of exercises, including tabletop simulations, full-scale emergency management drills, and security exercises. Training also covered key areas such as communications, evacuation procedures, and the use of security equipment. These activities were typically carried out in consultation with headquarters and local authorities. Following each exercise, missions documented lessons learned to improve future preparedness.

Overall, missions demonstrated a consistent approach to conducting and documenting emergency-related situational training.

U.S. Network Wide Observations

While each individual mission was audited separately, the following network level insights and observations were collected over the course of the engagement.

Operational Challenges

Common Service Delivery Point transition and Human Resources staffing support

In 2024, the Common Service Delivery Point (CSDP) in WSHDC was closed as part of HQ’s broader initiative to consolidate CSDPs. As a result, finance and procurement support for U.S. missions was transferred to CSDP Mexico, while HR support was absorbed by the Common Services Program within WSHDC.

During the initial phase of this transition, both procurement and finance support are provided by the same locally engaged staff (LES), who are physically located in WSHDC but reporting to CSDP Mexico. Throughout the audit, U.S. consulate generals did not report any significant changes in the quality or timeliness of procurement and finance support, and operations continued without disruption.

Several missions raised concerns regarding the HR administrative support provided by WSHDC. The primary issue was the timeliness of mission staffing processes. While guidance from the HR unit was helpful, delays in completing staffing actions led to some missions losing key candidates in a competitive job market.

Audit team discussions with Mission Operation, Policies and Innovation directorate (AFS) revealed that these challenges were partly due to HR and staffing issues within the WSHDC unit, which affected its ability to deliver consistent and timely services. Another contributing factor was limited process knowledge and delays on the part of hiring managers, who are responsible for various steps in the staffing process.

To address these growing concerns, AFS conducted an assessment to identify root causes and developed a set of short, medium, and long-term solutions. As of August 2025, the WSHDC HR unit had reached full staffing capacity, improving its ability to manage workload effectively.

In parallel, initiatives were launched to enhance hiring managers’ understanding of the staffing process. These included clarifying roles and responsibilities, offering training, standardizing documentation, and creating templates to support better outcomes in areas under their control.

AFS reported that these measures had already led to improvements in the timeliness and effectiveness of staffing actions across the U.S. network. If the division continues this proactive approach, missions can expect continued benefits over time.

Readiness Program Coverage

Certain U.S. missions are located in areas with elevated risks of natural disasters. Additionally, major U.S. cities present security risks related to street crime, protests, the widespread presence of firearms, and broader social crises such as substance abuse and mental health issues. These factors make security and emergency management a critical component of day-to-day mission operations.

Except for CNGNY, U.S. consulate generals are not staffed with personnel dedicated solely to security and emergency management. As a result, Readiness Program responsibilities are assigned to staff who hold other substantive program roles. Each mission requires a CBS to serve as the Mission Security Officer in addition to their regular duties, which often falls onto MCOs, otherwise FPDS or Trade program managers. Many missions reported that this dual responsibility created a significant workload burden, and some program managers noted a lack of sufficient advance training to effectively carry out the sensitive and technical tasks required by the Readiness Program.

To support missions, WSHDC Readiness staff and Regional Emergency Management Officers (REMO) from HQ conduct site visits and lead emergency training exercises. These sessions allow staff to practice their roles within the Emergency Response Team and prepare for various emergency scenarios. Feedback is provided after each visit to help missions strengthen their response capabilities. While most missions received regular REMO visits, some reported that training was infrequent, limiting staff participation and benefit.

Despite the challenges mentioned above, duties relating to the Readiness Program were adequately carried out across the U.S. mission network. There is an opportunity, however, for the Security and Readiness Bureau (CSD) along with WSHDC’s Readiness team to work directly with U.S. consulate generals to identify where targeted assistance is needed so that staff efforts are as effective as possible.

Information Technology

To support much of the U.S. Network’s IT needs, Field Support Information Technology Professionals (FSITPs) from HQ are assigned to oversee multiple U.S. missions. FSITPs conduct quarterly in-person visits to provide support to missions who are not staffed with an IT professional. These visits typically last five days and are coordinated to align with mission availability and operational needs. The planning process includes the establishment of a visit task list in advance, which are mainly submitted as service desk tickets. While on site, FSITPs prioritize these tasks, and conduct activities such as equipment disposals, cyclical replacement of hardware, and upkeep of secure zone equipment. FSITPs are also responsible for updating the IT asset inventory in Remedy. However, as already mentioned in the asset management section, Remedy was not always kept up to date due to this task often categorized as low priority in comparison to tasks that impacted operations.

For many missions without a dedicated local on-site IT support, troubleshooting and minor technical support tasks were often carried out by an LES with some basic knowledge. While this has helped bridged the gap on minor issues, missions indicated a more consistent IT presence would aid in operating more efficiently.

Given the challenges experienced by some U.S. missions, there is an opportunity for the International Platform Branch (ACM) to review the current IT support model - periodic HQ support vs frequent regional support using existing U.S. IT resources. Using IT support within the U.S. Network could improve cost effectiveness by increasing responsiveness and reducing travel costs.

Challenges related to U.S. postings

Medical Insurance Provider

For CBS posted to the United States, all medical expense reimbursement claims must be submitted to MSH International, which serves as a subcontractor responsible for Canada Life’s international components—specifically emergency travel assistance and comprehensive coverage. Numerous CBS reported significant and recurring issues when dealing with MSH, such as excessive delays in claim processing, frequent errors in claims, and lack of responsiveness. CBS also noted that many U.S. medical providers do not provide them sufficiently detailed documentation to meet MSH’s claim requirements, which forces staff into prolonged follow-up efforts with the providers to obtain detailed invoices, often taking weeks to resolve.

The department provides support to CBS through greater access to repayable medical advances (FSD 42) to pay for services given MSH is unable to pay providers directly. Some CBS reported needing to rely heavily on advances (over $100K in one instance) or credit card debt to carry medical costs. Given the high cost of healthcare in the U.S., these challenges can result in substantial financial strain on CBS.

Private Leasing and Rent Ceilings

The U.S. consulate general network relies heavily on the private lease model for CBS residences under which they are responsible for independently securing their accommodations through private lease agreements with landlords. While this approach provides flexibility to select housing that meets their personal needs, challenges had been noted across the network related to rent ceilings. These ceilings represent the maximum rent the department will cover based on CBS family configuration and annual salary. They are established annually based on detailed market data provided by Mercer LLP and presented to a multi-departmental oversight committee for approval. The methodology, however, doesn’t make adjustments for specific CBS needs, such as proximity to school, local security considerations, or real time market fluctuations in property supply. When these conditions limit property selection within rent ceilings, exemptions may be requested. Rents exceeding the ceiling by more than 10% are reviewed by a director-level committee at HQ, with exceptions granted as appropriate and tracked systematically. CBS may also choose to personally top up rents beyond the approved ceiling.

A review of rent transactions over the course of the audit found that 65% of active leases in the network exceeded the rent limits. CBS across the network reported that rent ceilings were misaligned with the local real estate markets since finding reasonable housing within the ceiling was extremely difficult. Certain missions such as LNGLS, BSTON, and MNPLS had frequent exceptions to the rent ceiling due to compounding factors such as low inventory, geographic limitation, or security issues. CBS also expressed concerns related to the stress and time pressures associated with securing suitable housing in competitive markets. In response, some missions have established real estate broker support services to assist incoming CBS with their house hunting trips.

Given the high rate of rental costs exceeding rent ceilings across the network, and the constant need to seek exemptions, there is an opportunity to review the various factors in the U.S. mission network rental markets and the impact on rent ceiling alignment to those markets. This area will be further examined as part of a planned 2025-26 audit of housing policy compliance.

Conclusion

The audit concluded that missions across the U.S. Network generally maintained good oversight and communication mechanisms that promote transparency and foster collaboration among programs. Many missions demonstrated effective practices in key operational areas, including procurement, asset and inventory management, emergency and security preparedness, and HR administration. Several missions were particularly commendable for their efforts in readiness training and for maintaining robust controls over both physical and information security.

Several recurring issues were identified, which included inconsistent retention of procurement documentation, gaps in staff performance management, and uneven application of emergency preparedness procedures. Additional improvements are needed in tracking attractive assets, and refining mission transportation policies. Addressing these areas will contribute to greater operational efficiency, improved accountability, and stronger cohesion across missions, thereby supporting the department’s broader objectives.

About the Audit

Statement of Conformance

The audit was conducted in conformance with the Institute of Internal Auditors' Global Internal Audit Standards and with the Treasury Board Policy and Directive on Internal Audit, as supported by the results of the quality assurance and improvement program.

Objective

The objective of the audit was to provide assurance that sound management practices and effective controls are in place to ensure good stewardship of resources at missions in the U.S. Network in support of the achievement of Global Affairs Canada objectives.

Scope

All missions in the U.S. network except the Embassy in Washington D.C. were audited. The scope of the audit included a review of those management practices and controls in place to support U.S. mission operations. Specifically, the following areas were examined:

Criteria

The criteria were developed following the completion of a detailed risk assessment.

  1. The missions have adequate governance in place to support good stewardship of mission resources.
  2. Procurement and payment of goods and services comply with applicable legislative requirements and policies while demonstrating prudent stewardship of resources.
  3. The mission put effective controls in place to manage assets (cash and non-cash) in compliance with applicable legislative requirements and policies.
  4. Human resources processes and practices comply with applicable legislative requirements and policies.
  5. Effective security and emergency management structures and practices are in place at missions.

Approach and Methodology

The audit methodology included, but was not limited to, the following:

Annex A: Recommendations and Management Response and Action Plan

Mission ResponsibleAudit Recommendation / ConsiderationManagement Action Plan with Expected Completion Date
ATNTA

Recommendation 1

The Head of Mission should ensure that:

  • all sections of the MEP are complete;
  • a MEP Handbook is developed and made available to staff; and
  • SOPs are developed for various emergency scenarios.

Completion of the MEP

All sections of the Mission Emergency Plan (MEP) have been completed, including section F on Business Continuity and Recovery, which was shared with the Security Committee.

MEP Handbook
A detailed MEP Handbook has been prepared and shared with the Security Committee. It will be distributed to all staff in September 2025 as an added tool in their red emergency backpacks.

Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
SOPs for various emergency scenarios have been integrated into the MEP Handbook and reviewed by the Security Committee. Managers will further review these procedures with their teams, and the MEP and associated SOPs will be discussed at an All Staff Meeting in September 2025.

Expected Completion Date October 2025

CNGNY

Recommendation 1

The Head of Mission should strengthen property-related procurement and management of mission properties by:

  • communicating to property staff modified procurement practices to address gaps between departmental procurement regulations and mission practices;
  • monitoring activities to ensure adherence; and
  • developing a cyclical plan for repairs and maintenance.

The mission will strengthen property-related procurement and management through the following actions:

Procurement practices

  • Communicating the following new practices to property section staff:
  • New overall streamlined property procurement approach that focuses on bulk purchases, direct billing for regular services, and standing offers wherever possible;
  • New digital document retention plan that leverages SharePoint and is aligned with the department’s IM modernization approach; and
  • Storing key property documents in a filing cabinet that is accessible to property section staff.

Monitoring

  • Once the above practices are established, regular monitoring will take place by:
  • MCO’s weekly meetings with property team and bi-weekly meetings with finance team to discuss property activities, projects, and challenges; and
  • HOM and DHOM joining operational meetings to provide oversight and engagement with operational issues.

Planning

  • Develop a plan for cyclical replacement and maintenance of mission properties, supported by a collaborative approach within the property team.

Expected Completion Date September 2025

DTROT

Recommendation 1

The Head of Mission should ensure that the DTROT’s Mission Transportation policy is:

  • updated and validated by the Mission Operation, Policies and Innovation (AFS) group to align with departmental expectations and guidance; and
  • communicated to all staff.

Mission will consult with the Mission Operation, Policies and Innovation (AFS) group for clarification and guidance on the department’s Mission Transportation Operating Guidelines, specifically on managing the use of fleet.

This guidance will be used to review and update DTROT’s Mission Vehicle Use Policy and Procedures document to ensure alignment with departmental expectations, while meeting operational requirements and taking into account the operating environment of a border mission.

The updated document will be circulated to staff.

Expected Completion Date June 2025

Recommendation 2

The Head of Mission should ensure that:

  • the Mission Emergency Plan is updated to include a recovery strategy with the mission’s maximum allowable downtime;
  • standard operating procedures for emergencies are developed; and
  • emergency supplies and equipment are relocated.

The mission will update the emergency plan to include a recovery strategy and standard operating procedures.

Additionally, emergency supplies and equipment will be relocated from the Mission to the Alternative Command Post (ACP) location.

Expected Completion Date June 2025

LNGLS

Recommendation 1

The Head of Mission should ensure that:

  • Mission management undergo refresher training on procurement and expenditure accountabilities, and procurement process; and
  • A mission procedure is developed to have a procurement plan for large-scale activities so that processes are initiated early to develop cost-effective options and comply with relevant policies.

Management agrees with the recommendation, while noting that procurement concerns were raised in a December 2023 Management Letter and subsequently addressed. Common Services developed event planning tools and provided training to guide programs to initiate event-related procurement as soon as MoUs are signed (with a guideline of 3 months before the event date) and to enable better compliance with departmental policies and procedures, prudent use of funds, and due diligence. Mission management will continue to monitor program compliance and use of new tools.

  • The Head of Mission, Trade & FPDS program managers, and MCO will complete Authority Delegation Training, Practicing Responsible Procurement (COR451) and any other mandatory expenditure accountability and procurement training.

Expected Completion Date December 2024

  • In addition to the tools developed for event-related procurement as described above, a procurement plan will be developed to better manage high value purchase of goods and services.

Expected Completion Date March 2025

Recommendation 2

The Head of Mission should ensure the mission undertakes full Emergency Response Team training exercises as soon as possible, with scenarios aligned to the mission threat profile.

An ERT tabletop exercise (developed by CET and WSHDC) is scheduled for November 1, 2024, focussed on U.S. Elections and Security. Regional Emergency Management Officer (REMO) has requested to visit mission in Q4 and will deliver another exercise at that time.

Expected Completion Date March 2025

MIAMI

Recommendation 1

The Head of Mission should ensure performance agreements are assessed as per the departmental cycle.

The MIAMI management team will strengthen its implementation and oversight of performance agreements by:

  • Providing timely and constructive feedback to staff on their performance according to the departmental cycle; and
  • Developing a performance agreement completion tracker to be aware of deadlines and completion rates.

Expected Completion Date October 2025

SFRAN

Recommendation 1

The Head of Mission should ensure that appropriate tracking of attractive goods, including wine, is established.

Mission will be taking inventory of all attractive goods, including wine, and recording them so that appropriate tracking can take place.

Expected Completion Date January 2025

Recommendation 2

The Head of Mission should ensure performance agreements for all staff are established and assessed as per the departmental cycle.

Mission will establish performance agreements for all staff and assess them as per the departmental cycle.

Expected Completion Date April 2025

Annex B: Summary of Mission Results

CriteriaATNTABOSTNCHCGOCNGNYDALASDENVRDTROTLNGLSMIAMIMNPLSSEATLSFRAN
GovernanceSatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementNot Assessed*Needs Minor ImprovementSatisfactory
ProcurementNeeds Minor ImprovementSatisfactorySatisfactoryNeeds Significant ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Significant ImprovementSatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor Improvement
Assets – Crown PropertyNot ApplicableSatisfactorySatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementNot ApplicableNot ApplicableNot ApplicableSatisfactoryNot ApplicableNot ApplicableNot ApplicableSatisfactory
Assets - InventorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementSatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementSatisfactorySatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementSatisfactorySatisfactoryNeeds Minor Improvement
Assets - FleetSatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementSatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementSatisfactory
Human Resources – Performance AgreementsNeeds Minor ImprovementSatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementSatisfactorySatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementNot Assessed*Needs Minor ImprovementNeeds Minor Improvement
Readiness governanceSatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactoryNot Assessed*SatisfactorySatisfactory
Physical SecurityNot AssessedNot AssessedNot AssessedNot AssessedNot AssessedNot AssessedNeeds Minor ImprovementSatisfactoryNot AssessedSatisfactorySatisfactory
Emergency ManagementNeeds Significant ImprovementNeeds Minor ImprovementSatisfactorySatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementSatisfactoryNeeds Significant ImprovementSatisfactoryNeeds Minor ImprovementNot Assessed*SatisfactorySatisfactory
Readiness TrainingSatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactoryNeeds Significant ImprovementSatisfactoryNot Assessed*SatisfactorySatisfactory

*This area was excluded from the scope of the audit since it was reviewed by GAC’s Office of the Well-Being Ombud and Inspector General through an inspection in November 2024.

Date modified: