The Minister responsible for Canada-U.S. Trade, Intergovernmental Affairs, Internal Trade and One Canadian Economy appearance in front of Standing Committee on International Trade (CIIT) on Free Trade within Canada

On this page

• Qatar partnership
• China – Bilateral relations and trade
• Responsible business conduct, including forced labour and the CORE
• USTR National Trade Estimates report
• CUSMA review

Qatar partnership

• Canada values its strategic partnership with Qatar grounded in mutual respect, close cooperation, and delivering practical results including deepening trade and investment and advancing security cooperation.
• Since the outset of the conflict, Canada has maintained consistent and high-level engagement with Qatari counterparts across all channels and Canada’s immediate focus is on supporting Qatar as it safeguards its security and defends its sovereign interests.
• Canada is pursuing deeper commercial ties with Qatar in sectors of shared interest, including mining, energy, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, and other innovative technologies. These sectors align both with Canadian expertise and with Qatar’s economic diversification agenda.

Supplementary messages

• Qatar has one of the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds, one of the highest GDPs per capita globally, and an ability to deploy capital into long-term revenue-generating projects.
• Despite the uncertainty brought about by the regional conflict and associated economic impacts, Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) continues to invest abroad. During his January 18^th visit, the Prime Minister thanked Qatar for its critical support to Canada during times of need, including during major consular and evacuation efforts (example, Afghanistan, Covid-19 repatriation).
• Canada is engaging Qatar on best practices and lessons learned from major international events, as Canada prepares to host FIFA World Cup 2026.
• Canada’s approach to travel facilitation is risk-based and grounded in security screening and admissibility requirements—Electronic Travel Authorization (eTA) eligibility for Qatari citizens is not a “free pass,” and travellers can be refused entry.

Supporting facts and figures

• Nearly 10,000 Canadians live and work in Qatar.
• Two-way merchandise trade exceeds $355 million; Québec accounts for nearly half of Canadian exports, driven by aerospace and advanced manufacturing.
• On January 18, 2026, the Prime Minister met the Amir of Qatar in Doha to advance cooperation on trade, investment, and security.
• Canada and Qatar agreed to elevate bilateral engagement through a Foreign Ministers-level Strategic Dialogue.
• Canada plans to establish a resident Defence Attaché in Doha to increase bilateral engagement and support defence-sector exports, building on existing defence and security cooperation with Qatar.
• Leaders agreed to conclude negotiations on a Canada–Qatar Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) by summer 2026.
• Canada and Qatar agreed to establish a Joint Canada–Qatar Commission on Economic, Commercial, and Technical Cooperation.
• Canada and Qatar agreed to begin negotiations on a new double-taxation agreement to facilitate two-way work and investment.
• Canada and Qatar agreed to launch negotiations on a defence and security framework and deepen cooperation in security-related areas.
• Canada and Qatar signed a Letter of Intent on Security Cooperation for the FIFA World Cup 2026, building on Qatar’s experience hosting FIFA 2022.
• Canada and Qatar affirmed their intention to expand air services under the Canada–Qatar Air Transport Agreement.
• Qatar affirmed its intent to make significant strategic investments in Canada’s nation-building projects; Canada is committed to bring a delegation of investors to Qatar to advance bilateral and joint investment opportunities.

Background

Qatar is one of the world’s largest exporters of liquefied natural gas (LNG), making the security of its energy infrastructure critical to global energy markets. Since the onset of the Iran, U.S. Israel conflict (February 28^th)  Qatar has been directly affected by the regional conflict, including repeated Iranian missile and drone attacks on its territory, among them attacks on Al Udeid Air Base—the largest U.S. military installation in the Middle East—and the Ras Laffan energy complex. Iran has framed its strikes as targeting U.S. military assets in response to U.S. actions in the region, bringing Qatar directly into the conflict due to its role as a host of U.S. forces. QatarEnergy halted LNG and related production following military strikes on facilities in Ras Laffan and Mesaieed. Qatar’s LNG exports are heavily dependent on maritime routes through the Strait of Hormuz, amplifying the impact of any disruption to regional shipping.

Canada and Qatar have enjoyed positive relations for over five decades, supported by growing trade, investment, and people‑to‑people ties. Qatar has been an important partner to Canada, including through assistance during COVID, and evacuations from Afghanistan in 2021 and Gaza in 2023. Bilateral cooperation has deepened through a series of recent agreements concluded during Prime Minister Carney’s visit to Doha in January 2026, building on the 2021 Defence Cooperation Agreement and the 2024 MOU establishing annual political consultations.  In November 2025, Canada also introduced Electronic Travel Authorization (eTA) eligibility for Qatari citizens in place of the Temporary Resident Visa (TRV) requirement.

Qatar has and continues to support Canadian priorities internationally, including mediation efforts and assistance related to Ukraine. Leader‑level engagement—most notably His Highness the Amir visit to Canada in September 2024 and Prime Minister Carney’s visit to Doha in January 2026 - has reinforced momentum and highlighted growing opportunities for expanded cooperation. As Qatar broadens its diplomatic reach and advances economic diversification, Canada continues to deepen cooperation in areas of mutual interest, including mining, energy, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, and other innovative technologies.

In 2025, bilateral merchandise trade between the two countries totaled $355 million, reflecting steady economic engagement. Canada’s merchandise exports to Qatar in 2025 were valued at $142 million. Canada’s 2025 merchandise imports from Qatar totaled $213 million. As of 2024, Qatar’s foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in Canada reached nearly $300 million.

China – Bilateral relations and trade

• Following the January PM visit, we have seen bilateral engagements continue, indicated by the most recent visits by Minister Champagne and Minister Sidhu.
• Canada sees China as a strategic trading partner in its pursuit of trade diversification provided that there are guardrails in place to mitigate economic and national security risks.

Supplementary messages

• Canada is sparing no effort to move our economy from reliance to resilience via trade diversification initiatives, including markets like China and growing exportsacross the broader Indo-Pacific.
• While we secure theseadvances in our commercial relationship with our second biggest single-countrytrading partner, we areensuringwe have the right toolkit in place to counter and mitigateeconomic and national security risks.
• Canada also continues to underline to China that there is no tolerance for foreign interferenceon Canadian soil, including transnational repression, and malicious cyber activities.
• Having stable, open channels of communication better allows us to advance all issues, including human rights concerns, with the right interlocutors.

Update

Following Prime Minister Carney’s January visit to China, both the Canadian and Chinese governments have been cooperating in various areas in accordance with the Canada-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Roadmap along with the five MOUs. The Preliminary Joint Arrangement has resulted in China addressing some trade irritants targeting various Canadian agri-foods and seafood products while Canada continues to implement its quota for Chinese EVs. Although there are still ongoing outstanding trade irritants that affect Canadian products such as pork, canola oil, and certain seafood products, both countries are closely engaged in bilateral engagements, the most recent ones of which were visits by Minister Champagne and Minister Sidhu.

Supporting facts and figures

• Minister Champagne’s visit to China between April 1 and 4, during which he was joined by Bank of Canada Governor Tiff Macklem and Superintendent of Financial Institutions Peter Routledge, focused on strengthening cooperation in trade and finance and setting groundwork for the Financial Strategic Dialogue in fall 2026.
• Minister Sidhu visited China from April 12 to 14 to attend the China International Consumer Products Expo (CICPE) in Haikou, Hainan province, for which Canada received the guest country of honour designation. At the event, where there was a representation of 40 Canadian companies, he met with senior government officials including Vice Premier He Lifeng to advance bilateral engagement in trade and showcased Canada’s strengths in consumer goods, agri-food and nutraceuticals.
• Minister Sidhu also stopped in Guangzhou to meet with business leaders and investors in priority sectors, such as EVs, to promote new trade and investment opportunities and reinforce Canada’s role as a reliable partner.

Background

Implementation of the Preliminary Agreement-In-Principle

The Preliminary Joint Arrangement addresses recent and long-standing trade irritants and establishes a track for major new investments into Canada. Pursuant to the arrangement, China made its final determination in its anti-dumping investigation against Canadian canola seed, lowering duties to 5.9% from provisional duties of 75.8%. China suspended its antidiscrimination tariffs on canola meal, peas, lobster and crab until the end of the year. Canada also secured the restoration of market access for Canadian beef and animal genetics to China. In exchange, Canada opened a country-specific import quota of 49,000 vehicles at 6.1% Most-Favoured-Nation rate to China and extended and expanded steel and aluminum remissions on select products until the end of the year.

There has been continuous engagement between OEM stakeholders regarding Canada's EV quota, which opened on March 1. The Canadian government recently launched a 4-week consultation period (April 7 to May 1) to engage stakeholders regarding the future allocation and administration of the quota beginning September 1.

Responsive - Forced Labour

• Canada unequivocally condemns forced labour, in all of its forms, everywhere.
• Canada has some of the most robust and rigorous provisions in place to address the risks of forced labour in supply chains, including through the Supply Chain Act.
• Minister Sidhu and Minister Champagne also raised this issue during their recent meetings with Vice Premier He Lifeng in China.

Responsible business conduct, including forced labour and the CORE

• The Government of Canada remains committed to promoting responsible business conduct by Canadian companies operating abroad.
• Canada’s approach to RBC includes advice to companies, legislation in select areas, and access to dispute resolution, including through the CORE.
• Forced labour undermines fair competition, and Canada has taken important action to address this practice in supply chains.

Supplementary messages

• The Government of Canada expects Canadian companies operating abroad to conduct their business responsibly and in line with international standards, such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on RBC and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
• Canada currently relies on distinct but complementary mechanisms to address forced labour in supply chains: an import prohibition in force since 2020 and supply‑chain transparency legislation, in force since 2024. These measures reinforce Canada’s reputation as a leader in responsible business conduct.
• Canada maintains two non-judicial RBC dispute resolution mechanisms - the National Contact Point (NCP) and the Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise (CORE) - providing accessible, voluntary pathways to raise concerns about Canadian companies abroad.
• While a decision on the future of the CORE will be taken in due course, the NCP remains fully operational and covers a wide range of issues under the OECD Guidelines, including forced labour.

Update

In March 2026, the U.S. initiated Section 301 investigations into the enforcement of forced labour measures by 60 trading partners, including Canada. On April 10, MINTUS accepted the U.S. offer to hold consultations on their investigation. Those consultations are expected to take place in May. Also in March, a UN Human Rights Committee report expressed concern about the prolonged vacancy of the CORE and called for the office’s independence and adequate resourcing.

Background

Trade Commissioner Service (TCS)

Canada’s TCS supports Canadian companies operating abroad, including in conflict-sensitive areas, by promoting RBC best practices and providing advice through a global network of more than 1,000 trade commissioners in over 160 offices in Canada and at missions abroad.

RBC Legislative Framework

Canada’s RBC approach includes legislation addressing key risks such as corruption, transparency, and forced labour, including the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, the Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act, and the Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act (SCA). The SCA promotes transparency, requires supply‑chain risk reporting, and extends the import ban to goods made with child labour. Canada introduced a forced labour import ban under the Customs Tariff in 2020 to meet CUSMA obligations and, along with the United States and Mexico remain the only countries with such a ban in force.

Non-judicial dispute mechanisms

Canada maintains two non-judicial mechanisms: the National Contact Point (NCP) which covers a broad range of issues across sectors, and the CORE which focuses on human rights in the garment, mining, and oil and gas sectors. The NCP Secretariat is housed within GAC and is supported by an interdepartmental committee, ensuring whole‑of‑government expertise.

CORE

Created in 2019 as a “special adviser” to the Minister for International Trade, the CORE began accepting complaints in March 2021. In January 2024, following a report tabled by the House of Commons Standing Committee on International Trade, the government announced a review of the CORE’s operations and effectiveness. The first Ombudsperson’s term ended on April 30, 2024. An “Interim CORE” was appointed for a one-year term and the position has been vacant since May 21, 2025. The CORE is currently under review, with its operations considered under the broader Comprehensive Expenditure Review (CER).

USTR National Trade Estimates report

• We are aware of the 2026 USTR National Trade Estimates report and are undertaking a careful assessment. It includes a mix of issues, some newly added, others removed, and many are longstanding matters Canada has been discussing with the United States for some time.
• This is a global report covering all countries and is informed by the views of U.S. stakeholders. As such, it reflects U.S. perspectives and priorities.
• I am in touch with my counterpart, USTR Ambassador Greer and Canada remains ready to engage constructively on U.S. concerns.
• Canada also has concerns with U.S. policies that negatively affect Canadian exports, and we will continue to raise these.

Supplementary messages

• Canada remains prepared to engage with the United States to address trade issues. I recently travelled to Washington and had a positive, constructive conversation with USTR Ambassador Greer.
• Discussions are focused on addressing trade irritants identified by Canada and the United States, including unjustified U.S. tariffs, and preparations for the 2026 CUSMA review.
• Canada continues to defend its interests and do what is best for Canadians and the Canadian economy.

Update

The 2026 National Trade Estimates Report, issued on March 31, includes 25 issues for Canada. Compared to the 2025 edition, the 2026 report includes 11 new issue areas and has removed 1 issue area (Québec Bill 96). New issues in 2026 are:

• Value-Added Taxes (VAT);
• Pharmaceutical pricing practices;
• Regulatory approval of aircraft;
• Cosmetics regulations;
• Risk management approach for per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS);
• Buy Canadian Policy;
• Provincial and territorial procurement measures;
• Sovereign Cloud Initiative;
• Discoverability of French-Language Cultural Content (Bill 109);
• Non-Market Policies and Practices; and
• Forced Labour.

Background

On March 31, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) released the 2026 National Trade Estimate (NTE) Report, an annual report on the status of foreign trade and investment barriers facing U.S. exports. USTR is statutorily required to publish and submit the report to the President and Congress each year by March 31. The report is based on data from USTR, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture, other U.S. Government agencies as well as U.S. Embassies. It is supplemented by comments provided by U.S. stakeholders in response to a Federal Register notice. This inventory of trade barriers is used by USTR, and other agencies, in U.S. trade negotiations and enforcement of U.S. trade laws.

CUSMA review

• We are ready to engage with our CUSMA partners to advance our shared economic prosperity and security in North America.
• As a trilateral agreement, CUSMA strengthens the whole North American region. It is in our common interest to ensure it continue to support our shared prosperity.
• Canada continues to defend its interests and do what is best of Canadians and the Canadian economy.

Supplementary messages

• I recently travelled to Washington and had a positive, constructive conversation with USTR Ambassador Greer.
• Discussions are focused on addressing trade irritants identified by Canada and the United States, including unjustified U.S. tariffs, and preparations for the 2026 CUSMA review.

Background

CUSMA review

Ambassador Greer reported to the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee on the operation of the USMCA on December 16 and 17, 2025. He identified, among others, rules of origin for non-automotive industrial goods, economic security, critical minerals and forced labour as potential subject of trilateral discussion for the review. The United States has also signaled some bilateral issues that it would like Canada to resolve, including dairy market access and Canada’s Online Streaming and Online News Acts. These issues were once again raised in USTR’s National Trade Estimate (NTE) report, published March 31, 2026.

On March 18, 2026, the United States and Mexico launched bilateral technical discussions in advance of the Review.

S.301 investigation on forced labour

On March 11, 2026, USTR announced the launch of a Section 301 investigation against 16 economies related to structural excess capacity and production in manufacturing sectors. Canada is not targeted. On March 12, 2026, USTR announced the launch of a Section 301 investigation against 60 economies – including Canada – related to forced labour. The investigation relates to acts, policies, and practices of several economies, including Canada, related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labour. On April 10, MINTUS accepted the U.S. offer to hold consultations on their investigation. Those consultations are expected to take place in May.