Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs appearance before the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC) on foreign election interference

Tuesday, February 3, 2026

Published: April 9, 2026 

Table of contents

Global Affairs Canada (GAC) notes

1. Scenario note for PROC appearance
2. Annex A – PROC members topics of interests during questioning
3. Annex B – PROC members topics of interests during questioning

Issue notes

3. GAC’s efforts to counter foreign interference, Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) and Transnational Repression (TNR)
4. Foreign interference versus influence
5. GAC’s actions in response to the public inquiry into foreign interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions (PIFI)
6. Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE)
7. Rapid Response Mechanism Canada (RRM)
8. GAC engagement with the diplomatic corps
9. Vienna conventions
10. Transnational repression operation targeting Joe Tay
11. Information operation on WeChat targeting the 45th general election
12. Russian and other foreign interference activities observed during GE45
13. Foreign interference by the People’s Republic of China
14. Canada–China bilateral relations

Scenario note for PROC appearance

• Your two-hour appearance, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC), begins at 11:00 am and is intended to focus on Foreign Election Interference, although Members may take the opportunity to ask questions on other matters within your mandate. 
• The appearance will begin with up to five-minute opening remarks, delivered by the Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council and National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, followed by rounds of questions from Committee members:
• First round of questions: 6 minutes each for the Conservative Party (CPC), Liberal Party (LPC), Bloc Québécois (BQ). 
• The second and subsequent rounds of questions afford 10 minutes each to the CPC and LPC and only 2.5 minutes for BQ questions, broken down as follows: CPC 5 minutes, LPC 5 minutes, BQ 2.5 minutes, CPC 5 minutes, LPC 5 minutes. 

PROC committee context

• Please refer to the member bios section for information on the Committee members. Annex A of this note also provides an overview of Committee members’ areas of interest during the last two sessions of its Foreign Interference (FI) study.
• The Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC) has invited members of the Critical Election Incident Protocol Panel (CEIPP) to testify as part of its study of Foreign Interference. You will appear with the Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council and National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, Nathalie Drouin, and the Deputy Minister of Public Safety, Tricia Geddes.
• The Committee adopted a motion in June 2025 to resume its FI study. This appearance will provide an opportunity to answer the Committee’s questions about reported instances of FI in relation to the recent general election (GE45), as presented in the Retrospective Report on the 45th General Election and the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE): threats to Canada's 45th General Election, after-action report. The Committee may ask any questions it deems relevant about the Government of Canada’s (GoC) ability to detect and counter FI.

Previous appearances at PROC

• In late 2025, the Committee held two meetings on its Foreign Interference study. On November 27, 2025, it heard from subject-matter experts from the academic and research communities studying FI, notably online information operations. On December 2, 2025, the Committee hosted GoC representatives from Public Safety, as well as Joe Tay, Former Federal Conservative Candidate for Don Valley North, and Marcus Kolga, Director of DisinfoWatch. Overviews of these meetings, as well as main themes raised, are contained in Annex B of this note. Transcripts are provided for your reference (Tab G).
• PROC’s FI study was initiated in November 2022 following unauthorized disclosures of classified information to the media, which raised concerns about potential FI activities in Canada’s democratic processes during GE43 in 2019 and GE44 in 2021. You and other GAC officials appeared in 2022 and 2023.
• The Secretariat for the CEIPP at the Privy Council Office Democratic Institutions’ Unit has prepared a set of briefing materials for all CEIPP members, such as high-level key messages, generic questions and answers and additional background documents, most of which are public (Tab B). Departmental officials have prepared specific GAC-focused issue notes and questions and answers, which were consulted with geographic and functional divisions (Tab C). 

Areas of interest by party 

• During the last meeting on this study (December 2), CPC focused heavily on foreign interference, with members pressing the government on the status and implementation of a foreign interference registry. CPC MPs also raised questions regarding accredited diplomats to Canada, interference during the last federal election, activities in Don Valley North, and the SITE task force’s reporting on interference attributed to Beijing. The tone from CPC members was at times adversarial, particularly on issues related to the registry and Chinese state linked interference. Overall, questioning across parties reflected sustained interest in foreign interference and institutional safeguards.

Annex A – PROC members topics of interests during questioning 

Annex B – PROC members topics of interests during questioning 

GAC’s efforts to counter foreign interference, Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) and Transnational Repression (TNR)

• Global Affairs Canada has several measures available to respond to foreign interference, which includes raising concern through normal diplomatic channels, public attribution of hostile activities, issuing démarches, cancelling high-level visits, closing missions abroad, and declarations of persona non grata.
• Other measures include improving platform engagement, increasing proactive public communications about the measures to protect Canadian institutions from foreign interference, and strengthening intelligence flows related to foreign interference by engaging SITE members.
• Global Affairs Canada’s most salient efforts to counter FIMI and TNR include the Rapid Response Mechanism Canada (RRM Canada), which serves as permanent secretariat to the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (G7 RRM).

Supplementary messages

• GAC responsible for ensuring Canada meets obligations under Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular relations, and can recommend actions if a foreign country engages in activities contrary to these.
• GAC works internationally to address foreign interference with our foreign partners, while supporting domestic departments as required.
• During its 2025 G7 Presidency, Canada showed leadership in addressing this threat by shedding light on malign activities and showing unity with partners.
• This effort included the first-ever G7 Leaders' Statement on TNR in June 2025, as well as G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) statements condemning TNR ops by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Iran.
• GAC’s toolkit must be considered alongside the whole suite of GoC tools in terms of most effective or appropriate; taking into consideration Canada’s long-term goals and the objectives Canada aims to achieve by taking any action.

Background

Efforts by Global Affairs Canada to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) is carried out by Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) Canada, which monitors the digital information environment for state-sponsored information manipulation and leads on Canada’s response. In 2025, RRM Canada disclosed one FIMI incident: 

• Rapid Response Mechanism Canada detects second ‘Spamouflage’ campaign targeting Canada-based Chinese-language commentators and their families (March 6, 2025)

RRM Canada serves as permanent secretariat for the G7 RRM. Since its inception in 2018, the G7 RRM has focused on countering information threats and TNR. The G7 RRM includes all G7 partners, including the EU, with five associate members: the NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and Sweden. In 2025, the G7 RRM issued three joint statements:

• G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) Statement on Iranian Transnational Repression and Other Malign Activities (September 12, 2025)
• G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) Statement on Hong Kong Arrest Warrants (August 8, 2025)
• G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) statement on Russian Influence Campaign (January 17, 2025)

As part of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force, RRM Canada supported Canada’s electoral integrity in the 45th General Election (GE45). SITE disclosed three incidents during GE45, and the LPC Leadership Race in 2025.

• Update on Canada’s Actions to Protect General Election 45 (April 21, 2025)
• Update on Canada’s Actions to Protect General Election 45 (April 7, 2025)
• Rapid Response Mechanism Canada detects information operation targeting Liberal Party of Canada (February 7, 2025)

Foreign interference versus influence

• Foreign influence activities are open and transparent activities conducted by foreign states to advocate their interests within the accepted norms of international relations.
• Foreign interference is distinct; activities cross into foreign interference when they are purposefully clandestine, deceptive, attempt to manipulate, intimidate or harass individuals in Canada and have negative impacts on democratic processes and public confidence.
• Global Affairs Canada’s work to counter foreign interference is proactive and multifaceted. It includes keeping a clear and transparent dialogue with foreign diplomats, and working in close collaboration with national security agencies and international partners.

Supplementary messages

• GAC’s toolkit to address foreign interference is part of a broader Government of Canada toolkit that includes domestic national security agencies.
• GAC’s authorities enable the department to respond to foreign interference by managing Canada’s diplomatic and consular relations with foreign states.
• GAC has public tools such as public statements, sanctions and, in extreme cases, declaring diplomats persona non grata (PNG). Quiet diplomacy is also used, such as proactive bilateral engagement and démarches at various levels.
• I briefed the diplomatic corps in November 2024 about expectations for acceptable diplomatic practices during Canada’s electoral period, and my department sent two notices to remind them of their obligations. These may have resulted in diminished activity that could be perceived as foreign interference among foreign diplomats.

Background

The topic of foreign influence versus foreign interference was covered in previous reports, notably the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency’s Review of the dissemination of intelligence on People’s Republic of China political foreign interference, 2018-2023, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians’ Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada's Democratic Processes and Institutions, and the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions (PIFI).

These three reports presented how political foreign interference often operates in a “grey zone” between legitimate, overt political/diplomatic activities and covert, clandestine interference. They showcased misalignments between GAC and the security and intelligence community. GAC officials leveraged the public testimony during PIFI to clearly explain the distinction between influence and interference.

Following a commitment made at PIFI, you hosted a briefing with the foreign diplomatic corps posted in Canada on November 21, 2024. The purpose was to raise awareness of the shifting context for diplomatic engagement in Canada and remind them about appropriate diplomatic engagement practices. Specifically, it provided some context about sensitivities related to foreign interference in Canada, and examples of acceptable and unacceptable diplomatic behaviours in Canada.

GAC’s actions in response to the public inquiry into foreign interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions (PIFI)

• The Commission’s work was vital to bolster efforts to safeguard the security and integrity of Canada’s democratic processes. My department undertook concrete and prompt actions to address PIFI recommendations within GAC’s remit.
• We engaged in clear and transparent communications with foreign diplomats in Canada about acceptable and unacceptable diplomatic behaviours in Canada.
• We bolstered GAC’s Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) capacity to monitor and strengthen defenses of the Canadian open-source information ecosystem and to keep Canadians informed of possible foreign interference during the election.

Supplementary messages

• Following a commitment made during my public testimony at the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference (PIFI), I hosted a briefing with the foreign diplomatic corps posted in Canada in November 2024 to explain sensitivities related to foreign interference in Canada, and examples of acceptable and unacceptable diplomatic behaviours in Canada.
• When the election period began, my department sent a notice to foreign diplomatic missions in Canada, reminding them, and their consular posts, of their obligations under the Vienna Convention and expectations for acceptable diplomatic practices during Canada’s election period. A second reminder notice was sent midway through the election period.
• RRM Canada received $5.95 million over two years, starting in 2024-25 to monitor the digital information environment for foreign state-sponsored foreign information manipulation and interference activities. This funding temporarily augmented the capacity of RRM Canada to monitor the 45th General Election as part of Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force.
• To respond to recommendations from PIFI, the Government increased the cyber and digital resilience of GE45 by strengthening security and intelligence governance mechanisms, increasing public communications and engaging with social media platforms.

Background

On January 28, 2025, the final report on the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions (PIFI) was published. PIFI found that, while there were some concerning incidents in the 2019 and 2021 general elections, there were no acts of foreign interference that undermined the outcomes in any ridings. Justice Hogue express the view “that misinformation and disinformation pose an even greater threat to democracy.” Only two recommendations identified GAC as the lead:

• Recommendation no. 33 to engage directly with foreign consulates in Canada to ensure that the line between legitimate diplomatic activity and foreign interference is well understood by consulate staff.
• Recommendation no. 34 to engage with like-minded countries to determine the feasibility of developing a broadly-based, non-binding definition of foreign interference

GAC is supporting members of Canada’s national security and intelligence community to address other PIFI recommendations, notably:

• the creation “of a government entity to monitor the domestic open-source online information environment for misinformation and disinformation that could impact Canadian democratic processes” (recommendation no. 11);
• the future of SITE (recommendation no. 16), and;
• communications with other stakeholders such as Parliamentarians to develop training to address appropriate and inappropriate interactions with foreign diplomats and officials (recommendations no. 22 and 23).

Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE)

• The role of the SITE Task Force is to ensure that the Government of Canada is well coordinated in its efforts to prevent covert, clandestine or criminal activities from influencing or interfering in the Canadian electoral process.
• SITE members build awareness of foreign threats to Canada’s electoral process and support the Government in assessing and responding to threats.
• GAC participates in the SITE Task Force along with CSE, CSIS and the RCMP; each member works within their respective mandate to monitor and address threats to elections.

Supplementary messages

• The SITE Task Force was first stood up in 2019 as part of the Protecting Democracy Plan, a whole-of-government approach to safeguard Canada’s elections and democratic institutions against interference.
• The SITE TF is Canada’s principal mechanism to monitor the threat from hostile state interference during federal election cycles, which include general elections, by-elections, and leadership contests.
• Assessments conducted by the SITE Task Force are based on analysis, reporting and observations—from both classified and unclassified sources.
• The Rapid Response Mechanism Canada is GAC’s representative to SITE, where it monitors the online information environment for signs of foreign state-sponsored interference using open-source methodologies.

Background

Since its creation, the SITE TF has been stood up three times to provide enhanced monitoring of threats to general elections. It has monitored 12 federal by-elections, as well as the 2025 Liberal Party of Canada (LPC) leadership race. During the 45^th General Election (GE45), SITE conducted active monitoring from March 24 to May 5, 2025.

SITE produced 31 classified daily Situational Reports which were shared with the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol. Throughout the election period, the SITE Chair also briefed representatives from political parties on possible threats to GE45, providing them with non-partisan insights and information to help protect their campaigns.

For the first time during a federal general election, and in direct response to recommendations from PIFI, the SITE TF provided weekly technical briefings to media during the caretaker period. These were a means to help sensitize and educate Canadians via the media about threats that could impact the electoral process.

Government of Canada representatives from the SITE TF held five technical briefings for media during the election period where they addressed observed incidents and the threat environment; provided reminders and recommendations for the public and the media pre-election day; and highlighted ongoing work to safeguard the election. On October 28, 2025, SITE issued a public version of its After-Action Report on threats to a general election for the first time.

Rapid Response Mechanism Canada

• RRM Canada, housed at GAC, monitors the digital information environment for foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) activity targeting Canadian interests.
• RRM Canada supports our international engagement to counter foreign interference more broadly. It leads the collaboration with G7 partners and other countries who are equally concerned and targeted by these threats. This coordination strengthens collective efforts to counter foreign threats to democracy.
• Canada is leveraging the G7 RRM to deliver on commitments to counter Transnational Repression (TNR) made by G7 leaders during Canada’s 2025 G7 Presidency.

Supplementary messages 

• Using open-source research and analysis, RRM Canada monitored the information environment for instances of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) during the 45^thGeneral Election as part of SITE.
• Canada leveraged its leadership of the Mechanism to deliver on G7 priorities related to countering transnational repression, including an academy aimed at detecting threats online and a fund to protect targeted individuals.

Background

As part of the SITE Task Force, RRM Canada monitored the information environment for instances of foreign information manipulation and interference in the leadup to the 45^th General Election. This work built on earlier efforts, which included the monitoring of the 2019 and 2021 general elections, federal by-elections, and the leadership race of the Liberal Party of Canada. RRM Canada has open-source research and analytics capacity, with dedicated units that monitor foreign information manipulation and interference from Russia, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East and North Africa region. It provides open-source research and analytics about foreign information threats and produces regular reporting.

The G7 RRM is a public-facing multilateral platform aimed at countering foreign threats. In recognition of their harmful impact, the G7 RRM has focused on countering information threats and TNR. Established at the G7 Summit in Charlevoix in 2018, the G7 RRM comprises members of the G7 and five associate members:

• Australia,
• New Zealand,
• NATO,
• the Netherlands, and
• Sweden.

Canada leads the mechanism on an ongoing basis through a Secretariat. The mechanism’s value added derives from its public-facing nature, the political weight associated with the G7 and active engagement of its Indo-Pacific members. The G7 RRM aims to counter foreign interference by coordinating multilateral responses, building international norms, and raising awareness about threats. Information shared via the mechanism supports national responses to individual incidents, shapes policy development, and contributes to alignment of diplomatic approaches.

GAC engagement with the diplomatic corps

• In November 2024, I hosted a briefing in Ottawa for heads of diplomatic missions (i.e. high commissioners and ambassadors) of countries with a presence in Canada.
• The briefing provided clear direction on acceptable and unacceptable diplomatic engagement practices in Canada, especially during a general election period.
• As per past general elections, my department sent a notice to foreign diplomatic missions in Canada, reminding them, of their obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and expectations for acceptable diplomatic practices during Canada’s election period.

Supplementary messages 

• Managing adversarial relationships is the essence of diplomacy. Canada must attempt to engage with countries even if we do not agree with their values or ideologies.
• Proactively addressing foreign representatives deters attempts at interference and maintains mutual respect and understanding between Canada and foreign nations represented in Canada.
• We are committed to working with international partners to stop the spread of foreign interference that undermines democratic institutions.

Supporting facts and figures 

• Canada hosts close to 3,500 accredited foreign representatives (7,750 with family members), working at 188 embassies and high commissions (135 resident missions + 53 non-resident ones), 450 consular posts and 25 international organizations.
• Only bilateral Heads of Missions were invited to the briefing (not international organizations).

Background 

Following a commitment made at the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs hosted a briefing with heads of diplomatic missions in Canada on November 21, 2024. The purpose was to raise awareness of the shifting context for diplomatic engagement in Canada and remind them about appropriate diplomatic/consular engagement practices. The briefing provided clear direction on acceptable and unacceptable diplomatic/consular engagement practices in Canada, especially during a general election period. Specifically, it provided some context about sensitivities related to foreign interference in Canada, examples of acceptable and unacceptable diplomatic behaviours in Canada, as well as the difference between influence and interference. A presentation was circulated following the session.

When the election period began, GAC sent a notice to foreign diplomatic missions in Canada, reminding them, and their consular posts, of their obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and expectations for acceptable diplomatic practices during Canada’s election period.

The Panel determined that issuing a formal reminder on April 15, 2025 to foreign diplomatic missions a prudent and necessary step. It restated the Government’s expectation that foreign governments respect Canada’s sovereignty and the integrity of Canada’s electoral process. The reminder highlighted efforts in this election to promote transparency and remind foreign representatives of our expectations.

Vienna conventions

• The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations respectively outline the rules of diplomatic and consular law.
• The conventions provide for the expulsion of a foreign representative (diplomat or consular officer) by declaring them persona non grata.
• This declaration is made in the exercise of the Crown prerogative by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Supplementary messages

• Canada has a number of diplomatic measures at our disposal to monitor, detect and respond to FI activities, including:
  • raising concern through normal diplomatic channels;
  • public attribution of hostile activities;
  • issuing démarches;
  • cancelling high-level visits;
  • closing or downgrading missions abroad; and,
  • declarations of persona non grata
• Both Vienna Conventions provide that, in declaring a foreign representative persona non grata, the receiving State (Canada) does not have to explain its decision to the sending State. To protect this prerogative, certain details are deemed confidential.

Supporting facts and figures 

• Diplomatic corps hosted by Canada:
  • close to 3,500 accredited foreign representatives (7,750 with family members),
  • working at 188 embassies and high commissions (135 resident missions and 53 non-resident ones),
  • 450 consular posts, and
  • 25 international organizations.
• If a foreign country wants to establish a new mission or consular post in Canada, or increase its foreign personnel, it must seek Canada’s approval. If the request presents concerns, including from a security or foreign interference standpoint, the request can be denied.
• Foreign representatives coming to Canada on posting are subject to varying levels of scrutiny. Some will not be accepted due to security or other considerations.
• Other diplomatic positions in Canada, as of January 2026:
  • United States (287),
  • People’s Republic of China (195),
  • France (113),
  • Japan (83),
  • Russia (61),
  • India (55),
  • the UK (53), and
  • Australia (23).

Background

Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations states:

1. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State.
2. All official business with the receiving State entrusted to the mission by the sending State shall be conducted with or through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the receiving State or such other ministry as may be agreed.
3. The premises of the mission must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of the mission as laid down in the present Convention or by other rules of general international law or by any special agreements in force between the sending and the receiving State.

Transnational repression operation targeting Joe Tay

• In late April 2025, the Panel directed that the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force provide Canadians with information about a digital transnational repression operation targeting Mr. Joe Tay, a Conservative Party candidate in the 45^th General Election.
• We made sure that actions were taken to support the integrity of the Don Valley North election, including by engaging with the Conservative Party and with social media platforms.
• Canada raised its strong concerns directly with both the Chinese government and with Hong Kong authorities over the targeting of Mr. Tay.

Supplementary messages 

• The Panel was briefed on six occasions during the GE45 reporting period on reporting related to Mr. Tay; the Panel undertook extensive deliberations to determine appropriate mitigation.
• Mitigation measures included SITE briefing cleared representatives of the Conservative Party twice on this transnational repression campaign.

Supporting facts and figures

• Joseph Tay, a former actor, co-founded Canada-based Cantonese-language YouTube Channel and online pro-democracy radio station, “HongKonger Station”.
• HongKonger Station is popular among Hong Kong youth that had fled the territory following the imposition of the 2020 National Security Law.
• Throughout 2024, Mr. Tay used HongKonger Station to campaign for the Conservative Party nomination for the federal riding of Markham-Unionville.
• In December 2024, Hong Kong Police issued international arrest warrants and bounties against six pro-democracy activists living overseas, including Mr. Tay.

Background

In March 2025, Mr. Tay was confirmed as the Conservative candidate for the federal riding of Don Valley North, where he placed second. Due to credible threats to life, Mr. Tay was forced to stop in-person campaigning and accept 24-hour RCMP surveillance on his home. Members of Mr. Tay’s family in Hong Kong have been called in for questioning by HK police authorities on several occasions and some of his former colleagues in Hong Kong have reportedly faced interrogation. A total of three Canadian citizens, including Mr. Tay, have been targeted with Hong Kong bounties, as well as several other Hong Kongers who now reside in Canada. Officials were instructed to publicly discuss the incident and make attribution to the PRC at the technical briefing planned for April 7, 2025.

Canada has publicly spoken out against these bounties, as well the intimidation and harassment that individuals have experienced because of their pro-democracy views. A statement by Minister Anand and Minister Anandasangaree was issued condemning the latest round of bounties in July 2025. Canada also led on a joint G7 RRM statement released on August 8, 2025. Canadian diplomats in Hong Kong and Ottawa have requested Hong Kong and PRC authorities to rescind the bounties on Canadian citizens and those in Canada as the bounties encourage those in Canada to break Canadian law by taking actions such as stalking, intimidation or attempting to apprehend the bounty targets. Mr. Tay appeared before PROC December 2, 2025.

Information operation on WeChat targeting the 45th general election

• In March 2025, SITE detected a campaign targeting Mark Carney on WeChat’s most popular public account -- Youli-Youmian.
• Intelligence reporting linked the Youli-Youmianaccount to the Communist Party of China’s Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (CPLAC), of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
• The Youli-Youmianentity was also responsible for targeting former LPC leadership candidate Chrystia Freeland in late January 2025, and Michael Chong, the MP for then Wellington-Halton Hills North, in May 2023.
• The Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (CEIPP or the Panel) assessed that the detected March 2025 incident did not have a material impact on the election.

Supplementary messages 

• Incidents unfolding during GE45, were largely consistent with the pre-election assessment of the potential for foreign interference.
• Briefings, including classified briefings, were provided to political parties to support responses to potential foreign interference.
• At no time did the Panel determine that an incident or combination of incidents rose to the threshold that would impact Canada’s ability to hold a free and fair election, thereby requiring a Panel-level announcement.

Update

The Youli-Youmian WeChat account remains active but has largely focused on U.S. President Donald J Trump, following the completion of GE45.

Supporting facts and figures 

• Youli-Youmian, an anonymous blog is WeChat’s most popular news account.
• Malign behaviour from this account also targeted Mr. Michael Chong, CPC MP for Wellington-Halton Hills North with false narratives in May 2023.
• The campaign on WeChat targeting Mr. Carney on March 10 and 25, 2025 received very high levels of user engagement and views, with amplified articles about Mr. Carney receiving between 85,000 and 130,000 interactions, and an estimate of 1 to 3 million views.
• This level of engagement on WeChat was high when compared with popular state media outlets (i.e. People’s Daily) that average 30,000 interactions / post.
• Articles posted on the Youli-Youmianaccount on WeChat March 10th and 25th were amplified in a coordinated and inauthentic way by a group of 30 smaller WeChat accounts that boosted the discoverability of the posts.
• Engagement with Youli-Youmian was entirely artificial, not organic, and was likely an attempt to manipulate the algorithm so content about Mr. Carney appeared more often in Canadian WeChat user’s news feeds.

Background

The PRC Government-linked WeChat account initially spread positive narratives about Mr. Carney (possibly to sway Chinese-Canadian opinion in his favour). On March 25, the narratives shifted to criticism of Mr. Carney. When the Panel was informed of contrasting narratives with high levels of engagement, officials were instructed to publicly discuss the incident and make attribution to the PRC at the technical briefing planned for April 7, 2025. This aligned with previous actions, when information was released on a campaign targeting Chrystia Freeland, undertaken by the same WeChat account before the LPC leadership vote in March 2025. The news release and backgrounder were published in English, French, Traditional Chinese and Simplified Chinese to increase the reach to affected diaspora communities.

Russian and other foreign interference activities observed during GE45

• The foreign interference activities observed during the GE45 were small in scale, difficult to attribute, and had no impact on the result of the election.
• The Security Intelligence Threats to Election Task Force (SITE) did observe information manipulation efforts by Russia, but these were deemed unlikely to have reached Canadians.
• SITE also actively monitored for potential foreign interference activities related to India and Pakistan throughout the electoral campaign.

Supplementary messages

• Ahead of GE45, SITE assessed that it was possible Russia would continue to use its online networks to opportunistically conduct foreign information manipulation and interference operations directed at Canadians.
• Russian efforts during GE45 consisted of a network of websites that launder and amplify Russian government-controlled narratives about Canadian candidates and the election, mostly focusing on Mark Carney.
• Prior to GE45, SITE assessed that Indian and Pakistan had the intent and capabilities to interfere in Canadian democratic processes to assert their respective strategic interests.
• SITE received several reports on incidents where politicians’ names and likeness, including of LPC leader Mark Carney and New Democratic Party leader Jagmeet Singh, were used to promote cryptocurrency and financial scams. These schemes were not attributed to any foreign states.

Supporting facts and figures

• During GE45, the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol Panel was briefed on three occasions about Russia foreign information manipulation and interference tactics.
• Several scams were briefed to the Panel and actions were taken under existing authorities, such as issuing a takedown request for impersonation of a crown asset and informing the victims of impersonation or brand infringement.
• In its public After-Action Report on GE45 issued in October, the Panel assessed that none of the incidents detected impacted Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election.

Foreign interference by the People’s Republic of China

• While Canada seeks to recalibrate the bilateral relationship in order to find areas of mutual interest for pragmatic cooperation, we are doing so with national and economic security considerations at the core of our approach.
• Canada continues to underline to China that there is no tolerance for foreign interference on Canadian soil, including election interference, transnational repression, malicious cyber activities, and information manipulation.

Supplementary messages 

• Canada has identified PRC state-sponsored information operations targeting the 45th general election, in addition to ongoing operations that continue to target groups such as human rights defenders.
• We continue to work closely with our security and intelligence partners, including our allies, to counter foreign interference, including transnational repression, to safeguard our national interests, and to lessen its impact on Canadians.
• Canada strongly condemns efforts by China to conduct transnational repression abroad, including by issuing international bounties against Canadian citizens or those located in Canada.

Supporting facts and figures 

• The 2024 Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference’s initial report described China as the most persistent and sophisticated foreign interference threat to Canada.
• In 2025, RRM Canada detected a second Spamouflage campaign targeting Canada-based Chinese language commentators, marking the first known instance where a Spamouflage campaign used sexually explicit deepfake photos to target an individual in Canada.
• In 2025, the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force detected an information operation targeting the 45th General Election on WeChat, by an account likely linked to the PRC.
• In 2025, SITE also detected PRC-linked digital transnational repression operation targeting Hong Kong pro-democracy activists, including Joseph Tay, the then Conservative Party candidate for Don Valley North.
• In 2025, RRM Canada, as permanent chair to the G7 RRM, issued a G7 RRM joint statement condemning a PRC-linked information operation campaign targeting Hong Kong pro-democracy activists in G7 countries and elsewhere.
• Three Canadian citizens (Joseph Tay, Victor Ho and [REDACTED]) and others located in Canada have been targeted by international warrants and bounties issued by Hong Kong authorities for their pro-democracy views.
• Canada’s 2025-2026 National Cyber Threat Assessment names China as the most comprehensive cyber security threat facing Canada today.

Background 

The PRC, including Mainland China and Hong Kong, uses a variety of tactics to carry out foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), and transnational repression (TNR) activities, and dedicates enormous resources to silencing dissent abroad. It exploits PRC-based family members to pressure those in Canada to cease certain activities the PRC views as hostile, or to return to the PRC. It also threatens PRC-based family members with a range of potential coercive actions, including detention or financial penalties. The PRC also leverages overseas actors to monitor, surveil, and report on others in Canada.

Canada has publicized several information operations that we assess with high confidence were backed by the government of the PRC. The operations targeted members of Parliament, critics of the Chinese Communist Party, pro-democracy activists, and family members of the activists.

Canada-China bilateral relations

• Canada must act ambitiously and quickly to diversify our trade and open channels of communication in support of our national interests.
• Guided by this approach, this government began to recalibrate our relationship with China, and during Prime Minister Carney’s visit to Beijing last month, we agreed to deepen our cooperation with China in a set of mutually beneficial areas under a newly refocused Strategic Partnership.
• Canada will engage purposefully to make progress on Canadian priorities where we are aligned with China while continuing to manage risks and raise outstanding concerns.

Supplementary messages 

• Canada’s approach to revitalizing its relationship with China is focused on pragmatic and constructive recalibration and engagement that is realistic and respectful.
• This is an updated Strategic Partnership. Unlike in 2017-2018, it is narrower: no plan to negotiate an FTA; no military-military or Arctic engagement objectives.
• The Prime Minister was clear that the outcomes of his visit to Beijing set the stage for a more reliable and predictable partnership with China.
• Canada and China do not agree on everything. Having stable, open channels better allows us to advance all issues, including human rights concerns.
• Canada also continues to underline to China that there is no tolerance for foreign interference on Canadian soil, including transnational repression, and malicious cyber activities.

Update

On January 14-17, the Prime Minister led his first official visit to China alongside the Minister of International Trade, the Minister of Industry, the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food, the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, the Prime Minister’s Parliamentary Secretary, and the MP for Markham—Unionville. A Joint Statement was published following the visit, and memorandums of understanding across several areas were signed as part of the PM’s visit, including on energy, combatting crime, modern wood construction, culture, food safety, plant and animal health, and pet food.

Supporting facts and figures

• The refocused Strategic Partnership is centered on the following cooperation areas: macroeconomic engagement, economic and trade cooperation, energy, finance, public security and safety, people-to-people ties and cultural exchanges, and multilateralism.
• As part of the Preliminary Agreement-In-Principle to Address Economic and Trade Issues between Canada and the People's Republic of China, Canada intends to provide China with an initial quota of 49,000 electric vehicles per year at a most-favoured-nation tariff rate of 6.1%.
• By March 1st, 2026, Canada expects that China will lower tariffs on Canadian canola seed to a combined rate of approximately 15% (from the current 84%), improving market access for $4 billion of Canadian canola seed exports to China annually. 
• Additional products—canola meal, lobsters, crabs, and peas—are expected to avoid anti‑discrimination tariffs, unlocking $2.7billion in export opportunities.

Background 

Canada’s approach to China emphasizes realistic and pragmatic engagement. Canada will look to work with China where interests align while being clear-eyed about areas of disagreement and concern. This approach prioritizes Canada’s national interests and values while also safeguarding its economic security and national security interests. While Canada’s approach to China has shifted, its assessment of the associated risks has not. Long-standing trade irritants, economic coercion, concerning commercial behaviors (incl. IP theft, non-market policies and practices, etc.) persist as does China’s stance on issues related to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea. China also shows no evidence of relenting on its cyber-attacks, foreign interference or transnational repression on Canadian soil.