Appearance at the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (FAAE) on Bill C-15, Budget Implementation Act, 2025 (Amendments to the EIPA) and Foreign Affairs Generally

Minister of Foreign Affairs
Tuesday, February 3, 2026

Table of contents

Committee context and remarks

• Scenario note
• FAAE members’ biographies

Hot issues

• Canada’s foreign policy approach
• Arctic - Foreign policy (including Greenland)
• United States-Venezuela
• Haiti
• Canada-United States relations
• United States National Security Strategy
• United States foreign policy approach
• Appointment of new Ambassador of Canada to the United States
• Situation in the West Bank and Gaza
• Iran – IRGC, nuclear program, human rights
• Situation in Sudan
• Canada’s support to Ukraine
• Ukraine peace plan
• Women Peace and Security – Elsie Initiative
• Africa Strategy
• Indo-Pacific Strategy review
• China – Bilateral relations and trade
• China – Taiwan
• China – Jimmy Lai
• Canada’s sanctions regime
• Asset seizure and forfeiture under SEMA

Export and import dontrols

• Overview of amendments to the EIPA
• Practical examples of amendments
• PT considerations of EIPA amendments
• Export controls – Military goods
• Arms exports to Israel
• Canada’s export controls compliance
• Defense Exports Strategy

Budget 2025

• Budget 2025
• Comprehensive Expenditure Review
• Overview of amendments to SEMA

Private Member’s Bills

• C-233
• C-219
• S-214
• C-228
• C-251

Additional notes

• Board of Peace
• Defending democracy
• Foreign interference
• Persecution of Christians in Nigeria
• US National Defence Strategy
• Canada-India trade
• Qatar partnership
• Canada-Somalia relations
• Critical ineral Strategy
• Cuba
• Recent developments in Syria
• Fiji Consulate

Minister of Foreign Affairs
3:30-4:30pm, Tuesday, February 3, 2026

Scenario for FAAE appearance

• Your one-hour appearance, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (FAAE), begins at 3:30 pm and is intended to focus on Bill C-15, the 2025 Budget Implementation Act, although Members may take the opportunity to ask questions on other matters within your mandate.
• The following officials will accompany you in-person and may be called upon to answer questions:
  • (TBC)
• Your appearance will begin with your up to five-minute opening remarks, followed by rounds of questions from Committee members:
  • First round of questions: 6 minutes each for the Conservative Party (CPC), Liberal Party (LPC), Bloc Québécois (BQ).
  • The second and subsequent rounds of questions afford 10 minutes each to the CPC and LPC and only 2.5 minutes for BQ questions, broken down as follows: CPC 5 minutes, LPC 5 minutes, BQ 2.5 minutes, CPC 5 minutes, LPC 5 minutes.

FAAE Committee context

• Please refer to the member bios section for information on the Committee members.

Your recent appearances at FAAE

• Your most recent appearance before FAAE was on November 27, 2025. Topics raised included the following: export controls on Canadian military goods; Canada’s engagement with partners such as the UAE and China in relation to human rights and feminist foreign policy objectives; foreign interference and the status of a foreign influence registry; and Canada’s response to the targeting of religious communities in Nigeria. Members also sought clarification on priorities in Supplementary Estimates (B), staffing and fiscal management, trade diversification and economic diplomacy, Arctic strategy and Canada’s northern presence, consular services for Canadians abroad, and accountability for results in international assistance programming. Additional areas of discussion included Canada’s responses to the situations in Ukraine, Haiti, and the Middle East; defence and NORAD modernization; climate commitments; and support for multilateral institutions.
• You also appeared before FAAE on October 30, 2025. Topics raised at that appearance included: foreign interference; Canada–China relations; the Foreign Influence Transparency Registry; energy exports; gender equality, women, peace & security; Arctic sovereignty; and human rights in Xinjiang (Uyghurs) and Tibet. So far, in the 45^th Parliament, FAAE has undertaken studies on the following topics: the detention of Jimmy Lai in Hong Kong; Gaza; the Situation in Haiti and Canada’s Response; Canada’s Arctic Strategy; Russian Incursion into Polish and Romanian Airspace; Canada's response to Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine with a particular focus on the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia; and Canada’s Africa Strategy.

Areas of interest by party

• CPC engagement has been framed around scrutinizing the government’s credibility on security, sovereignty, and international law, particularly where they argue Canada’s approach lacks clarity, coherence, or effectiveness. This scrutiny has been most evident in CPC criticism of the government’s handling of NATO and allied defence coordination, especially Canada’s role alongside the United States, Arctic sovereignty, sanctions against Russia, crisis responses in Ukraine, Haiti, and Sudan, and measures to counter Russia’s broader global influence. CPC members have also pressed the government on foreign interference, focusing on perceived delays and gaps in implementing a foreign influence transparency registry, and raising concerns about deterrence, enforcement, and accountability. The CPC have also raised questions on Canada’s policy and legal positions in the Israel–Palestine context, with CPC members seeking specificity on Palestinian borders, demilitarization requirements, timelines for democratic reform, and Canada’s posture on ICC arrest warrants. These exchanges have extended to Canada’s historical and current engagement with the Palestinian Authority, including its diplomatic presence in Ramallah, as well as the protection of religious minorities and freedom of religion abroad, framed within a broader emphasis on values-based foreign policy and international accountability.
• The BQ has asked about advancing economic sovereignty and security through critical mineral and infrastructure development in the Arctic, NATO cooperation, and effective humanitarian responses to international crises. The BQ often raises questions related to the application of feminist foreign policy principles and the protection of human rights, particularly women’s rights. Finally, BQ members have questioned Canada’s recognition of Palestine, including its alignment with international law, Canada’s sanctions policy toward Israeli officials., and Canada’s potential role in Gaza’s reconstruction and stabilization efforts

FAAE members’ biographies

Ahmed Hussen (Chair)

LPC – Ontario (Etobicoke – York South – Weston)

Election to the House of Commons

• First elected: 2015
• Re-elected: 2019, 2021, 2025

Professional background

• Studies: Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in History from York University, law degree from the University of Ottawa and is a licensed member of the Ontario Bar.
• Law: Practiced law, specializing in immigration and criminal law.
• Community engagement: Active in civil society, having served on the board of the Global Enrichment Foundation, which empowers women in East Africa by facilitating access to post-secondary education. Also served on the board of Journalists for Human Rights.

Offices and roles as a parliamentarian

• Minister of International Development (2023–2025)
• Minister of Housing and Diversity and Inclusion (2021–2023)
• Minister of Families, Children and Social Development (2019–2021)
• Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship (2017–2019)

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

• Chair: Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2025 – Present)

Relevant points of interest

Private Member’s Motion M-14: Canada’s International Development Assistance

• Introduced Private Member’s Motion M-14 on September 15, 2025, proposing to integrate economic considerations into Canada’s international assistance programs. The motion seeks to include opportunities for Canadian businesses and workers within aid initiatives, aligning poverty reduction abroad with economic benefits at home.
• Key elements include establishing a dedicated funding stream to support economic partnerships in sectors like clean energy, agriculture, digital technology, and education, and requiring the Minister of International Development to report annually to Parliament on Canadian involvement, partner outcomes, and domestic economic benefits.

Middle East: Israel and Gaza

• Canada’s humanitarian assistance investments.
• Concerns over Israeli parliamentary legislation affecting UNRWA operations. Has advocated for continued support to trusted international partners such as the World Food Programme, UNICEF, and WHO in Gaza.

Afghan refugees

• Supports humanitarian funding for flood recovery efforts and Afghan refugees, reinforcing Canada’s commitment to disaster response and refugee assistance in South Asia.

Haiti

• Outlined Government support for Haitian-led solutions to the political crisis during a FAAE Committee meeting on May 6, 2024, providing an overview of Canada’s humanitarian aid efforts in response to Haiti’s ongoing security and humanitarian challenges.

Michael D. Chong (Vice-Chair)

CPC – Ontario (Wellington – Halton Hills)

Critic

• Foreign affairs

Election to the House of Commons

• First elected: 2004
• Re-elected: 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2019, 2021, 2025

Professional background

• Studies: Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in Philosophy, Trinity College, University of Toronto.
• Private sector experience: Held roles in financial services and technology, including as Analyst at Barclays de Zoete Wedd (1994–1997) and Head of IT at Mackie Research Capital (1997–1999). Served as Assistant to the President at Canadian Tire Financial Services (1992–1994), and later as Senior Advisor at the Greater Toronto Airports Authority (2001–2004).
• Civic engagement: Co-founder of the Dominion Institute (now Historica Canada), and member of its Board of Directors since 1997.

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

• Vice-Chair:
• Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2023 - Present)
• Special Committee on the Canada–People’s Republic of China Relationship (2022 – 2025)
• Special Committee on Afghanistan (2021 – 2022)
• Member:
• Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2020 – Present)
• Special Committee on the Canada–People’s Republic of China Relationship (2020 – 2025)

Relevant points of interest

China: Human rights and foreign interference

• He and his family have been the target of online misinformation campaigns assessed to be linked to China, aimed at discrediting and intimidating them.
• Concerned about Chinese interference, surveillance activities, and the potential misuse of Canadian university research by the Chinese military, calling for a public inquiry and stronger diplomatic responses.

Energy exports and national security

• Emphasizes the strategic importance of increasing conventional energy exports, particularly LNG, to support Canada’s economy and strengthen defence.
• Advocates for reducing reliance on Qatari and Russian gas for partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.

Middle East: Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank

• Anti-Semitism in Canada: has advocated for designating Samidoun as a terrorist organization.
• Defends Israel’s right to self-defence, noting the absence of credible reports of alleged war crimes.

Arctic sovereignty

• Interest in implications of Russian-led undersea cable projects (e.g., Polar Express, Polar Connect) and Canada’s capacity to protect undersea cables from anchor damage or sabotage.
• Capabilities of Canada’s naval and diplomatic assets to deter unauthorized Arctic vessel transits.

Sudan: Sanctions

• Questioned enforcement of Canada’s sanctions and underscored GAC’s role in preventing circumvention.

Ukraine/Russia: Sanctions

• Submitted inquiries regarding waivers for Russian imports and raised concerns about civilian casualties in the context of Canada’s military support to Ukraine.
• Supports the Canada-Ukraine strategic security partnership agreement.

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe (Vice-Chair)

BQ – Québec (Lac-Saint-Jean)

Critic

• Foreign affairs, development and international cooperation
• Human rights
• Immigration, refugees and citizenship

Election to the House of Commons

• First elected: 2019
• Re-elected: 2021, 2025

Professional background

• Studies: Studied Art and Media Technology at Cégep de Jonquière.
• Cultural Sector: Worked for 20 years as a sound technician and pole vaulter on film sets in Montreal (2000-2020).
• Forestry Industry: Employed as a day labourer at Resolute Forest Products in Alma, Quebec (2018-2019).
• Political Involvement: Served as President of the Bloc Québécois Lac-Saint-Jean riding association (2017-2019).
• Son of former Bloc Leader Gilles Duceppe.

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

• Vice-Chair:
• Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2025 - Present)
• Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2020 - 2025)
• Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (2021 - Present)
• Special Committee on Afghanistan (2021 – 2025)
• Standing Committee on National Defence (2020 – 2021)

Relevant points of interest

China, human rights, and trade

• Concerned with human rights in China, particularly the treatment of Uyghurs and Tibetans, in the context of Canada–China Strategic Partnership.
• Monitors Canada–China trade trends, diaspora engagement, and supports Private Member’s Bill C-251 on forced and child labour.

Middle East: Recognition of Palestine and Humanitarian Policy

• Questioned how Canada’s recognition of Palestine aligns with international norms on state recognition and aid delivery.
• Asked about Canada’s criteria for a credible peace plan and the absence of sanctions on Israeli officials despite alleged war crimes.
• Inquired about Canada’s role in Gaza’s reconstruction, including demining and infrastructure, through greater UN engagement.

Haiti

• Raised concerns about links between Haitian gangs on Canadian soil, including money laundering and arms trafficking, and the impact of U.S. immigration decisions on Haitian migration.
• Questioned sustainability and governance of voluntary contribution to the Gang Suppression Force (GSF).

Human rights and international advocacy

• Opposed government invitations to leaders with controversial human rights records (e.g., Modi, bin Salman, bin Zayed) at the 2025 G7 Summit.
• Supports democracy and human rights in Hong Kong as Patron of Hong Kong Watch Canada, and introduced a motion recognizing Tibetans’ right to self-determination, unanimously adopted June 10, 2024.

Ziad Aboultaif

CPC – Alberta (Edmonton - Manning)

Election to the House of Commons

• First elected: 2015
• Re-elected: 2019, 2021, 2025

Professional background

• Business owner: Where andowned and co-managed Axxess Furniture Inc., an Edmonton-based furniture distribution business, for 12 years.

Notable political roles

• Critic: International Development (2017–2019)

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

• Member:
• Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2017 – Present)
• Subcommittee on International Human Rights (2022 – 2023)
• Standing Committee on International Trade (2020 – 2021)
• Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates (2020)

Relevant points of interest

Middle East: Palestinian authority and peace efforts

• Sought clarification on the Prime Minister’s pledge to “redouble efforts” toward peace, including whether it involves financial, human resource, or democratic reform support.

Export controls and arms transfers

• Raised concerns about the export of Canadian military goods, including reports of diversion to Sudan, and sought clarification on whether these issues were raised with partner countries such as the UAE, and how export control decisions align with Canada’s stated foreign policy values.

Arctic sovereignty

• Concerns about potential confrontations with unauthorized foreign vessels in Canadian Arctic waters and Canada’s defence preparedness, particularly through NORAD and NATO.

Russian incursions and NATO response

• Views Russia’s tactics as deliberate provocations aimed at distracting NATO.

Haiti

• Raised concerns regarding beneficiaries of Haiti’s gang crisis and potential foreign state support.

Export of LNG and energy infrastructure

• Critical of government support to the energy sector; favors a west-east pipeline to expand Alberta’s oil and gas access to key markets.

Canada’s approach to Africa

• Highlighted challenges across Africa, including rising costs, food insecurity, and ongoing conflicts, and emphasized maintaining Canada’s market share amid growing Chinese and Russian influence.

Shelby Kramp-Neuman

CPC – Ontario (Hastings – Lennox and Addington – Tyendinaga)

Critic

• Canada - US Trade

Election to the House of Commons 

• First elected: 2021 
• Re-elected: 2025 

Professional background 

• Studies: Bachelor of Arts degree in Communications and Political Science from the University of Ottawa.  
• Political and government experience: Served as the parliamentary assistant to the late Jim Prentice and was also a staff member for Senator Consiglio Di Nino. She also worked for Global Affairs Canada as a representative in Seattle, Washington.
• Educational and teaching career: Nearly six years of teaching experience with the Hastings and Prince Edward District School Board and Loyalist College.
• Municipal leadership: Served four years as Deputy Mayor on the Centre Hastings Municipal Council.

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

• Member: Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2025 – Present).

Relevant points of interest

Middle East: Palestinian statehood and Israel

• Questioned Palestinian Authority commitments and reforms, suspension of the “martyr fund,” demilitarization feasibility, and implications if elections are not held by 2027.

Ukraine and international defence

• Raised concerns regarding Canadian weapons reportedly used by Russian forces in Ukraine.

Arctic sovereignty

• Concerns about Russian and Chinese military activities in the Arctic and their strategic partnership.
• Concerned with the operational capacity of the Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic.

Haiti

• Raised concerns about CAF deployment capabilities and aid delivery in gang-controlled areas.
• Interest in Canada’s long-term plan for supporting governance, justice, and democratic development.

Russian incursions and NATO response

• Explored Canada’s counter-drone capabilities and Canadian Armed Forces’ readiness.
• Questioned how Canada balances deterrence efforts without escalating tensions.

Defense, NATO, and NORAD

• Supports Canadian leadership in international defense alliances, including NATO and NORAD.
• Active member of Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association and the Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association.

Trade and tariff policy

• Expressed concern over the government’s handling of Canada–U.S. trade negotiations, particularly tariffs and export performance.
• Advocated renegotiating CUSMA to reduce trade tensions and foster stability for Canadian workers and businesses.

Lianne Rood

CPC – Ontario (Middlesex – London)

Critic

• International development and federal economic development for Sourthern Ontario

Election to the House of Commons

• First elected: 2019 
• Re-elected: 2021, 2025 

Professional background

• Studies: Honours Bachelor’s Degree in Criminology and Sociology from the University of Windsor. 
• Career: Assistant to former Parliamentary Secretary for Agriculture and the Canadian Wheat Board, David Anderson. Later served as a Special Assistant to Gerry Ritz, former Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food. 
• Community Engagement: Maintains a strong local presence in her riding through regular attendance at community events such as hockey game puck drops, Diwali celebrations, and the Strathroy Santa Claus Parade.

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

• Member: Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2025 – Present)

Relevant points of interest

Protection of religious minorities and humanitarian response

• Sought information on Canada’s response to the targeting of Christian communities in Nigeria, including funding and actions on the ground, requests for measurable results, and the government’s position on recognizing these acts in the context of human rights and potential genocide.

Arctic sovereignty

• Interest in Canada’s coordinated sanctions efforts with likeminded countries to address Russian-Chinese strategic alignment in the Arctic.

Russian incursions and NATO response

• Inquired about Canada’s defence readiness and potential capability gaps exposed by recent Russian incursions into Polish and Romanian airspace in 2025.

International trade

• Advocated for removing internal trade barriers within Canada, framing reforms as essential to improving competitiveness for Canadian farmers and producers, in alignment with former CPC Leader Pierre Poilievre’s 2025 economic plan.
• Participated in a November 2024 NASCO meeting on North American competitiveness, emphasizing the importance of Canada–U.S.–Mexico trade relations and supporting efforts to strengthen supply chains.

Mona Fortier

LPC – Ontario (Ottawa—Vanier—Gloucester)

Election to the House of Commons 

• First elected: 2015
• Re-elected: 2019, 2021, 2025

Professional background 

• Studies: Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in Sociology and Masters in Business Administration from the University of Ottawa
• Communications/Marketing: Senior Director, Communications and Market Development, La Cité College (2011 – 2015); Principal, Executive Director at Equinox Inc. (2005 - 2008)
• Community Involvement: Board Member, Montfort Hospital; Member, Provincial Advisory Committee on Francophone Affairs (Ontario); Board Member, Shaw Centre
• Awards: Recipient of the Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal (2012) for community leadership 

Offices and roles as a parliamentarian

• Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (2025 – Present)
• Chief government whip (2024 – 2025)
• Deputy government whip (2024)
• President of the Treasury Board (2021 – 2023)
• Minister of Middle Class Prosperity (2019 – 2021)
• Associate Minister of Finance (2019 – 2021)

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

• Member:
• Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2025 – Present)
• Standing Committee on International Trade (2023 – 2025)

Relevant points of interest 

Haiti

• Asked about Canada’s leadership in the new Gang Suppression Force (GSF) and concrete actions to support Haiti and the Haitian diaspora in Canada.

Consular services

• Engages with Parliamentarians and facilitates briefings to enhance their understanding of consular services provided by GAC, helping MPs and Senators effectively respond to constituent concerns and inquiries.

Arctic sovereignty

• Infrastructure investments to improve mobility and logistics in the North.
• The benefits of integrating Indigenous knowledge into northern infrastructure and defence projects.
• Arctic security and NORAD modernization.

Environmental trade policy

• Contributed to the Standing Committee on International Trade (CIIT) study on protecting Canadian manufacturing sectors, including electric vehicles, aluminum, and steel, from related Chinese imports.

Steven Guilbeault

LPC – Québec (Laurier—Sainte-Marie)

Election to the House of Commons 

• First elected: 2015
• Re-elected: 2019, 2025

Professional background 

• Studies: Undergraduate studies in political science with a minor in theology at the Université de Montréal.
• Environmental Leadership / NGO: Co-founder of Équiterre in Quebec (1993). Director and Campaign Manager at Greenpeace (2008-2018).
• Private Sector / Advisory: Founding member of Cycle Capital Management (2009) and since has been a strategic consultant for the venture capital fund, which is dedicated to developing clean technologies. 

Offices and roles as a parliamentarian

• Minister of Canadian Identity and Culture (Dec 2025 – Present)
• Minister responsible for Official Languages (May 2025 – Nov 2025)
• Minister of Environment and Climate Change (2021 – March 2025)
• Minister of Canadian Heritage (2019 – 2021)

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

• Member: Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2026 – Present)

Relevant points of interest 

Climate diplomacy and multilateral environmental agreements

• Strong advocate for international climate action and Canada’s leadership in multilateral forums, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process and global biodiversity negotiations.
• Supports the use of diplomacy to advance emissions reduction, climate adaptation, and nature-based solutions, particularly with like-minded partners.

Climate, security, and stability

• How climate change exacerbates instability and security challenges in Africa
• Explored whether reductions in U.S. international assistance create opportunities for Canada to assume a greater leadership role in regions where climate impacts intersect with fragility and conflict.
• Examined the role of Canadian companies operating in climate-affected regions.

Climate finance and sustainable development

• Interested in Canada’s role in mobilizing climate finance for developing countries, including adaptation funding and loss-and-damage mechanisms.
• How blended finance and development finance tools can leverage private capital while advancing climate and development objectives.

International environmental governance and biodiversity

• Protecting biodiversity and advancing international cooperation on conservation.
• Supports aligning Canada’s foreign policy with global biodiversity frameworks and integrating environmental considerations into international development and trade discussions.

Trade, climate, and environmental standards

• Supports international cooperation to address carbon leakage, green industrial policy, and the environmental impacts of global supply chains.

Robert Oliphant

LPC – Ontario (Don Valley West)

Election to the House of Commons

• First elected: 2008
• Re-elected: 2011, 2015, 2019, 2021

Professional background

• Studies: Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in Commerce from Victoria College, University of Toronto; Master of Divinity (M. Div.) from the Vancouver School of Theology; Doctor of Ministry (D. Min.) from the Chicago Theological Seminary, University of Chicago.
• Religion: Minister at the Quyon United Church (1984 – 1986); Associate Minister at the Timothy Eaton Memorial Church (1984 – 1986); Interim Senior Minister at the Bloor Street United Church (1991 – 1993); Minister at the Whitehorse United Church (1991 – 1993); Minister at the Eglinton St. George's United Church (1999 – 2008).
• Management: President and CEO at the Asthma Society of Canada (2011 – 2015).

Political and parliamentary roles

• Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (2019 - Present)

Committee membership

• Member: Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2019 – Present); Special Committee on the Canada–People’s Republic of China Relationship (2022 – Present)
• Former Chair: Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (2017 – 2019); Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (2016 – 2017)
• Former Vice-Chair: Standing Committee on Veterans Affairs (2009 – 2010)

Relevant points of interest

Arctic sovereignty

• Examined the interrelationship between sovereignty, economic development, and environmental protection and sustainability in Arctic foreign policy.

Russian incursions and NATO response

• Concerned about the broader implications of Russian drone incursions, interest in diplomatic engagement with non-NATO countries to pressure Russia.

Haiti and Dominican Republic

• Inquired about Canada’s role in protecting aid workers in Haiti and collaboration with the Dominican Republic on border security.

Anita Vandenbeld

LPC – Ontario (Ottawa West – Nepean)

Election to the House of Commons

• First elected: 2015
• Re-elected: 2019, 2021, 2025

Professional background

• Studies: Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in History and Political Science from the University of Calgary, and M.A. in Political and Constitutional History from York University.
• Work in international development: for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the National Democratic Institute in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
• Recognition: In 2008, she was awarded the Canadian Peacekeeping Service Medal in recognition of her work in Kosovo.

Offices and roles as a parliamentarian

• Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of International Development (2021–2025)
• Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence (2019–2021)

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

• Member:
• Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2017-2019; 2025 – Present)
• Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2020-2025)
• Chair:
• Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2018-2019)

Relevant points of interest

Democracy and governance: Palestine

• Asked about opportunities for Canadian democracy and governance experts to support democratic institution-building in Gaza and across Palestine.

Arctic sovereignty

• Interest in the role of the Canadian Coast Guard and the Canadian Rangers in Arctic security, and how their utilization could be enhanced.
• Concerns about the impact that climate change and oceanic patterns have on Canada’s national security interests in the Arctic.
• Emphasized Canada’s leadership in incorporating Indigenous knowledge in Arctic multilateral forums and cooperation with Nordic countries.

Gender, peace, and governance

• Asked about Canada’s achievements under the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security.
• Explored Canada’s role in advancing democracy, gender equality, and the international rules-based order.
• Supports inclusive peace processes and strengthening international rules-based governance, particularly democracy promotion.

Canada’s foreign policy approach

• We are operating in a rapidly changing global economic and geopolitical environment. The government is therefore driving a new, more deliberate approach to foreign policy.
• In practice, this means strengthening Canada’s capacity to build strategic partnerships in key regions and markets, and defending Canadian sovereignty. It means pursuing strategic autonomy, economic resilience and trade diversification.
• My recent travel to Asia, the Gulf, and Europe – and the inauguration of Canada’s consulate in Nuuk, Greenland – all reflect this effort; these steps contribute to advancing our objectives, and are guided by the values that reinforce Canada’s credibility as a stable, predictable, and dependable economic and security partner.

Supplementary messages

• In this moment of economic stress for our country, Canada’s foreign policy rests on the actions we are taking at home to strengthen economic resilience and strategic autonomy.
• Our trade diversification strategy aspires to double Canada’s non-U.S. exports over the next decade. Accordingly, my department will focus on growing areas of key competitive advantage and engagement with the world’s fastest growing markets.
• Through economic diplomacy, I work to strengthen government to government relationships to open doors for Canadian industry and to attract investment into Canada. I leverage our network of diplomatic missions to provide economic insights and opportunities in support of our trade diversification strategy.
• Implementing Canada’s foreign policy will require adjusting the tools in our toolkit, including international assistance, to best serve Canadians.
• I recently visited China, where the Prime Minister met President Xi to advance a pragmatic recalibration of our relationship and expand commercial opportunities in energy, agriculture, agri‑food, and consumer markets.
• The Prime Minister and I have also recently returned from Qatar to unlock concrete opportunities for Canada to expand trade and attract investment.
• These are clear examples of how we are aligning the international agenda to advance prosperity for Canadians and reduce over-dependencies.
• If pressed: Our approach is pragmatic, which is why the Prime Minister and I engage more frequently and actively with new partners. This means balancing the benefits of engagement with important and dynamic economies while mitigating threats to the safety and security of Canadians. We can be pragmatic while still staying true to our values.

Background

In recent pronouncements, the Government has stressed the new world order, that Canada sees the world as it is, not how it would like it to be, and that it adopts a values-based realist approach. The Prime Minister has indicated publicly the Government’s intention to develop a national security strategy that is expected to incorporate a foreign policy component. Work to elaborate this component is in progress. While timelines remain subject to further validation, it is anticipated to be available for public release before summer.

Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy

• The Government is taking a stepped up and integrated approach to exercising Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic.
• This includes new defence investments outlined in Our North, Strong and Free, expanding our diplomatic presence in the Arctic, and deepening collaboration with Nordic Allies and NATO.
• I will be travelling to Greenland in early February with the Governor General to officially open our consulate in Nuuk, underscoring both Canada’s expanding Arctic presence and our support for Greenland and Denmark’s sovereignty.

Supplementary messages

• The sovereignty and territorial integrity of Denmark, including Greenland, must be respected in accordance with international law.
• The future of Greenland is for Greenland and Denmark to determine.
• Canada takes Arctic security seriously. We will continue to work within NORAD and with Allies and other partners to promote the security and resilience of the Arctic.

Background

The Arctic Foreign Policy (AFP) is a comprehensive diplomatic policy for Canada’s engagement in and on the Arctic. It is comprised of four foreign policy pillars: asserting Canada’s sovereignty; advancing Canada’s interests through pragmatic diplomacy; leadership on Arctic governance and multilateral challenges; and adopting a more inclusive approach to Arctic diplomacy.

Under the AFP, Canada is committed to:

• appoint an Arctic ambassador with an office in Canada’s North;
• open new consulates in Anchorage, Alaska and Nuuk, Greenland;
• initiate an informal Arctic security dialogue with foreign ministers of like-minded Arctic states;
• expand domestic information sharing on emerging international Arctic security trends;
• support domestic partners in taking into account a national security lens to foreign research in the Arctic;
• work toward resolution of Arctic boundary disputes including in the Beaufort Sea;
• increase funding for the Global Arctic Leadership Initiative; and,
• establish an Arctic and northern Indigenous youth internship program at Global Affairs Canada.

The AFP emphasizes North American Arctic cooperation, including with Greenland, reflecting strong cultural and economic ties. Canada’s decision to open a consulate in Nuuk, Greenland marks a significant deliverable under Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy and underscores our commitment to strengthening diplomatic engagement in the region. This initiative enhances Canada’s Arctic presence and deepens ties with Greenland and Denmark at a time of heightened geopolitical attention on the Arctic. The Governor General and Minister of Foreign Affairs will travel to Nuuk for the official opening of the consulate in early February 2026.

Implementation of the AFP is supported by the Global Arctic Leadership Initiative, with an annual budget of $8 million to strengthen Canada’s leadership at the Arctic Council and to support Indigenous and youth engagement in international Arctic affairs, among other areas.

The AFP is the product of months of meaningful engagement with relevant territorial and provincial governments and Indigenous Peoples. Global Affairs Canada is committed to continuing meaningful and distinctions-based engagements during the implementation phase.

United States-Venezuela

• Canada is closely monitoring the situation in Venezuela.
• We have noted the U.S. plans for a phased approach with steps corresponding to (i) stabilization; (ii) recovery; and (iii) transition.
• Canada supports a Venezuelan-led transition back to democracy and is willing to play a role in assisting with a return to democracy and respect for human rights.

Responsive if pressed about Canada’s stance on U.S. actions:

• Canada has not recognized the repressive regime in Venezuela since 2018.
• Canada has long supported a peaceful Venezuelan-led transition back to democracy.
• Canada has taken no part, directly or indirectly, in the U.S. actions in Venezuela.

Supplementary messages

• The most immediate concerns are the risk of widespread insecurity, which would further compound poverty and mass migration (which spreads instability regionally); the continued repression of Venezuelans under the de facto regime; and need for a credible Venezuelan-led path to transition to democracy.

Update

• Canada has not recognized de facto acting President Rodriguez as the legitimate leader of Venezuela. Canada has stated its intention to support a return to democracy in discussions with Venezuelan opposition, likeminded countries, G7 foreign ministers, and the U.S.
• There has been a suggestion that a significant ramp-up in Venezuelan oil production could depress oil prices worldwide to the detriment of Canada. However, given the dismal state of Venezuela’s oil infrastructure, it is not anticipated that this would happen for many years. Even then, international measures to influence oil supply, together with other future political, economic, and security factors, could equally impact future oil prices.

Supporting facts and figures

• Canada has imposed sanctions on a total of 139 Venezuelan officials “for their role in supporting human rights violations and the repression of protests following the illegitimate election of Nicolás Maduro.”
• In the Prime Minister’s January 3, 2026, statement, he also welcomed the "opportunity for freedom, democracy, peace, and prosperity" following the ouster of Maduro, and the statement called on all parties to respect international law and ensure a Venezuelan-led transition.
• On January 3, 2026, you issued a statement reiterating that Canada has refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Maduro regime since 2018 and has long opposed its repression of the Venezuelan people. The statement emphasized Canada’s commitment to the rule of law and democracy, calling on all parties to respect international law and exercise restraint.

Background

• Since the capture and arrest of Nicolas Maduro on January 3, 2026, Delcy Rodriguez has consolidated her authority as de facto acting President and is running the government under strong U.S. pressure.
• Secretary of State Marco Rubio has announced a three-point plan for a post-Maduro Venezuela: (i) a stabilization phase that effectively establishes U.S. control of oil resources and revenues, together with ensuring public order; (ii) an economic stabilization phase, where American companies invest to rehabilitate the oil sector and political prisoners are released; and (iii) a transition phase that aims to establish a democratic government once conditions are deemed appropriate.
• The U.S. does not support a change of government in favour of the opposition, stating that it wishes to maintain stability and that opposition leader Maria Corina Machado does not enjoy sufficient support to ensure control over the levers of power in the country.
• President Trump had a meeting by phone with Delcy Rodriguez on January 14 and in person with Maria Corina Machado on January 15, who presented him with her recently obtained Nobel Peace Prize. He praised both on his social media platform, further contributing to disquiet in Venezuela as to the uncertainty of who the U.S. is backing long-term for leadership. Trump’s January 15 meeting with Machado was not covered in Venezuelan media, and CIA Director John Ratcliffe reportedly met with Delcy Rodriguez in Caracas the same day.
• Plans are underway for the U.S. and Venezuela to reopen embassies in each other’s countries, and the de facto Rodriguez government has indicated a greater openness to diplomatic representation from European countries. Support for and opposition to the U.S. action is generally split along ideological lines in the Hemisphere.
• Canada is considering ways to engage with Venezuela. No decision has been made on what form this presence could take.
• The U.S. action in Venezuela has raised questions within the broader region on other plans the U.S. may have to operationalize its “Donroe Doctrine.” Outside of Venezuela, the most significant question mark in the region currently relates to potential U.S. action to destabilize the regime in Cuba. For the moment, this has been limited to cutting off the supply of Venezuelan oil to Cuba, pressuring other countries to reduce or eliminate their oil exports to Cuba, and issuing more general threats to the regime about the need for change.

Haiti - Recent developments

• Canada remains committed to supporting the efforts of the Haitian people to restore security and to exercise their constitutional right to choose their leaders through democratic means; we are closely monitoring the political and security situation as the mandate of the Transitional Presidential Council comes to its end on February 7^th.
• Canada is working closely with international partners to put in place a strengthened “Gang Suppression Force” as authorized by the UN Security Council in September.
• Canada has contributed over $450 million in international assistance to Haiti since 2022 and is the second-largest contributor to the Multinational Security Support Mission and the Gang Suppression Force with more than $125 million in commitments.

Supplementary messages

• Canada is actively advocating for additional support from other countries to ensure adequate funding and personnel contributions, which are essential to the success of the Gang Suppression Force (GSF).
• Canada’s most recent announcement of $60 million in new funding includes $40 million to support the transition from the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSSM) to the GSF and $20 million towards strengthened maritime security in the Caribbean to address the growing threat of drugs and arms trafficking.
• The ongoing gang violence in Haiti poses a significant obstacle to the organization of free and fair elections. Haiti’s future depends on restoring security, having a stable and democratically-elected government and improving socio-economic conditions.
• Canada continues to encourage Haitian-led and Haitian-owned solutions that prioritize the Haitian population and the accountability of the transitional authorities.
• Responsive: What results does the Government have to show from its support to Haiti?
• • Canada has helped prevent a full gang takeover, provide over 100,000 schoolchildren with a daily hot meal, document and investigate cases of corruption, provide critical health services, and enhance small farmers’ resilience, among other results.
  • Our humanitarian assistance continues to save lives by providing emergency food and nutrition, water, sanitation, protection, and health services to Haiti's most vulnerable.
  • We remain committed to working alongside Haitian and international partners to restore security and democratic rule and promote prosperity for all Haitians.

Background 

On September 30, 2025, the UN Security Council authorized the replacement of the MSSM by a more robust GSF of 5,500 that will be backed up by a UN Support Office for Haiti (UNSOH) in Port-au-Prince. As per the UNSC resolution, a Standing Group of Partners (SGP) was created to provide oversight and advocate for personnel and resources to support the GSF. The SGP is currently comprised of countries that have provided significant financial support and made personnel contributions to the MSSM: the United States, Canada, Guatemala, El Salvador, Kenya, Jamaica and the Bahamas. The resolution also called for increased coordination between the GSF, the UN, and the Organization of American States (OAS) on security matters in Haiti.

Canada hosted a Force Generation conference for the GSF in New York on December 9, 2025. The conference resulted in pledges of over 10,000 personnel to support the mission. Canada is also leading on the establishment of the Office of the GSF Special Representative and Secretariat and on international fundraising to increase voluntary funding for GSF operations. This is in addition to ongoing humanitarian and international assistance to address the drivers of insecurity in Haiti.

With respect to the Export and Import Permits Act, permits were issued in 2025 to export armored vehicles to Haiti, to be used by law enforcement entities, including the Haitian National Police and the MSSM/GSF. Given high levels of insecurity and armed gangs controlling many parts of Haiti, such exports are consistent with Canada’s position to support Haiti’s efforts of restoring security and democratic order. Destined for governmental entities or UN-authorized missions (MSSM/GSF), all exports are also in line with Canada’s obligations under the Haiti arms embargo.

Canada - United States relations

• We are working closely with the United States on areas of common interest, including on the border, on flows of illegal drugs, and on economic, energy and continental security.
• Restoring predictability in our trade relationship is essential for Canadian businesses and CUSMA is central to this goal.
• At the same time, our relationship with the United States is changing. As the PM has said, Canada’s approach to international affairs aims to be both principled and pragmatic.

Supplementary messages

• When President Trump declared that he was terminating trade discussions with Canada last October, much progress had been made in our discussions, and we are ready to build on that progress when the U.S. is ready to re-engage.
• The U.S. remains Canada’s largest trading partner and the most significant market for many Canadian businesses. At the same time, Canada is working to diversify our trade and has set a goal to double non-U.S. exports within the next decade.
• Geography matters. Our national security and defence require close cooperation with the U.S. for the defence of the continent, including through the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD).
• The Canada-U.S. border is among the most secure and efficient in the world, and everyday Canadian officials are working closely with their U.S. counterparts to ensure the border enables both our safety and prosperity.
• Canada will continue to work with the U.S. in areas where our foreign policy interests align to achieve shared objectives.

Update

You spoke with Secretary Rubio and other G7 Foreign Ministers on January 6 to discuss Venezuela.

Secretary Rubio is hosting a ministerial-level summit on critical minerals on February 4.

Supporting facts and figures

• Nearly 8 million U.S. jobs are supported by trade with Canada.
• Canada is the largest market for U.S. goods in the world. Canada buys more goods from the U.S. than China, Japan, France, and the UK combined.
• Canada is the top merchandise export market for 32 U.S. states.
• Canada is the #1 foreign supplier to the U.S. of all forms of energy.
• Trade with Canada supports manufacturing jobs in the United States. Over 70% of Canadian goods exported to the U.S. are used to manufacture higher-value U.S.-made goods.
• Canadians constitute a very small share of U.S. enforcement concerns: only several dozen Canadians are held in ICE detention at any given time, about 0.01% of the roughly 68,000 total detainees, and Canadian-origin fentanyl accounts for about one tenth of one percent of U.S. fentanyl seizures.

United States 2025 National Security Strategy

• We carefully reviewed the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS). Its content reiterates key positions outlined by the Trump administration over the past year. Canada and the U.S. have a deep and longstanding security and defence relationship.
• We continue to engage with the United States on issues that align with Canadian interests and priorities.

Supplementary messages

• Key areas of alignment with the U.S. NSS include reinforcing our energy and economic security, reducing dependencies, strengthening continental defence and border security, combatting transnational crime and all forms of trafficking, and addressing shared concerns related to China.
• Canada will continue to strengthen cooperation with the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere, the Indo-Pacific region, and in North America (including in the Arctic).

Background

On December 5, the White House published its National Security Strategy. The strategy brings together previous statements and positions on geopolitical issues made by senior members of the Administration into one consolidated document. The document applies “America First” principles and approaches to defence and security, economic dominance, leadership in emerging technologies, and the protection of “traditional” rights and values. It is one of four documents that shapes U.S. foreign and domestic policies, the others being the National Defence Strategy, the Cybersecurity Strategy, and the Counter-Terrorism policy that are all yet to be released.

The NSS does not explicitly mention Canada (outside of a list of countries whose trade policies vis-à-vis China it seeks to rebalance), nor does it explicitly mention NORAD or the Arctic. There are areas where the NSS aligns with Canadian interests, including on border security, combatting drugs and curbing illegal migration in the hemisphere, continental defence, China, economic security and potentially the Arctic.

United States foreign policy approach

• President Trump’s ‘America First’ foreign policy aims to prioritize a safer, stronger, more prosperous United States.
• To this end, the U.S. is adapting how it engages with the rest of the world, including in its bilateral relationships, its role within traditional alliances, and its participation in international organizations.
• Canada will pursue practical and constructive engagement with the U.S. on global issues of common concern. This includes support to bolster security and governance in Haiti, achieve peace in Ukraine, and advance the Gaza Peace Plan.

Supplementary messages

• The national and economic security risks facing Canada and the U.S. are serious and require a unified approach.
• Key areas of alignment with the U.S. include reinforcing our energy and economic security, reducing dependencies, strengthening continental defence and border security, combatting transnational crime and all forms of trafficking, and addressing shared concerns related to China. We share many of the U.S. objectives to end conflicts around the world and achieve lasting peace and prosperity, including in Asia, Middle East, and Africa.

Background

‘America First’ Policy Directive to the Secretary of State

This “Day 1” Executive order from President Trump seeks to change the entirety of the United States’ global engagement, including with Canada where the new administration is seeking to shift the relationship with Canada in a way that the U.S. is a net beneficiary across all areas of bilateral cooperation, seemingly without consideration to Canadian views or interests, or recognition of how Canada can help the U.S. achieve its interests. This approach is not specific to Canada; it applies to U.S. engagement with countries globally. However, given our geographic location and deep integration with the U.S., we are especially susceptible to America First Policy Directive. The directive has led to increasing transactionalism, a preference for bilateral or mini-lateral agreements perceived to be unconstrained by the usual rules and obligations, and the dismantling of core agencies such as USAID and the U.S. Agency for Global Media.

Published on December 5, the U.S. National Security Strategy is noted for its application of “America First” principles and approaches with regard to defence and security, economic dominance, energy security, leadership in emerging technologies, and the protection of “traditional” rights and values.

U.S. disengagement from international bodies

President Trump announced a review of U.S. membership in a broad range of international organizations through Executive Order 14199 on the first day of his second non-consecutive term. The U.S. subsequently disengaged from or pulled out of the Paris Accord, the World Health Organization and the UN Human Rights Council, among others. On January 7, President Trump signed a proclamation directing the U.S. to withdraw or defund 31 UN entities and 35 non-UN entities.

Appointment of new ambassador of Canada to the United States

• Wiseman brings immense experience, extensive contacts, and deep commitment to his new role.
• As Prime Minister Carney has said, Mr. Wiseman will help advance the interests of Canadian workers, businesses, and institutions, while building opportunities for both Canada and the United States.
• We thank Ambassador Hillman for her long record of dedicated service to all Canadians and her immense contributions to the Canada-U.S. relationship.

Supplementary messages

• Wiseman will be a core part of Canada’s negotiating team, which is led by Prime Minister Carney.

Background

Mark Wiseman biography

On December 22, 2025, Prime Minister Carney announced that Mark Wiseman will become the next Ambassador of Canada to the United States.

Mr. Wiseman has most recently served as Senior Advisor and Chairman of Lazard Canada, on the Board of Directors of NOVA Chemicals, as Chairman of the Board of Alter Domus, and as a senior advisor to the Boston Consulting Group. He also recently served as Chair of the Board of Directors of the Alberta Investment Management Corporation, from 2020 to 2023. Previously, he was Senior Managing Director at BlackRock, Global Head of Active Equities, Chairman of BlackRock’s alternatives business, and Chairman of its Global Investment Committee. He also served on BlackRock’s Global Executive Committee. Prior to this, Mr. Wiseman was President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, where he first served as Senior Vice-President, Private Investment, and then as Executive Vice-President, before becoming CEO.

He is a dedicated community leader who has served on the board of several nonprofit organisations, including Alpine Canada Alpin, Sinai Health System, the Capital Markets Institute, and the Dean’s Advisory Board at the University of Toronto’s Rotman School of Management. In 2012, he was awarded the Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal in recognition of his service.

Head of Mission process

Once a nomination for Head of Mission is approved by the Prime Minister, agrément from the country of accreditation is sought. Agrément secures the necessary host government approval to receive Canada’s representative. Following the receipt of agrément, an Order of Council (OIC) is signed in Canada, formally appointing the Head of Mission to their role. The OIC provides the accompanying letter of credence that enable Canada’s representative to assume their full duties as Head of Mission upon presentation of the letter of credence to the head of the host government.

Israel/Palestine – Gaza peace plan, West Bank

• Canada is relieved by the return of the last hostage’s remains from Gaza and welcomes the launch of Phase 2 of the Gaza peace plan, including the formation of a Palestinian-led technocratic committee.
• The Gaza peace plan’s full implementation - including demilitarization and reconstruction - is key to securing a peaceful future for the region.
• The full, meaningful engagement of Israelis and Palestinians alike will be key to the success of Phase 2.
• The humanitarian crisis in Gaza remains intolerable. We continue to urge the parties to facilitate unimpeded flows of aid delivered by the UN and its partners.
• Canada will continue to support humanitarian relief efforts and the Gaza peace plan’s implementation. Canada has committed over $400M in international assistance since October 2023.

Supplementary messages

Gaza

• Canadian personnel are actively engaged on the plan’s implementation, including at the Civil-Military Coordination Centre (CMCC) to manage humanitarian logistics.
• We are supporting the Palestinian Authority’s reform and capacity-building efforts, so it can reassume governance responsibilities in Gaza when conditions allow.
• Hamas must disarm and can play no role in Gaza’s future.
• As Phase 2 of the plan progresses, we are actively assessing areas where Canada can most effectively contribute to Gaza’s stabilization, recovery and reconstruction.
• Ultimately, these efforts must be geared towards laying the foundations for a two-state solution - the only viable path to long-term peace and security for Israel and Palestine.
• The UN, including UNRWA, and international NGOs play a key role in Gaza’s humanitarian response; Canada urges Israel to permit them to freely perform their lifesaving operations.

Responsive - Why was Canada uninvited from the Board of Peace?

• This was a U.S. decision. Our policy remains unchanged. Canada’s ongoing support to humanitarian efforts and other aspects of the Gaza peace plan will continue.

Responsive - Does Canada support disarming Hamas by force?

• We have long maintained that Hamas must disarm, and this is an obligation under the 20-point peace plan endorsed by the UN Security Council.
• Disarmament is crucial for the peace process to prevail. U.S.-led negotiations are ongoing.

Responsive - Will Canada contribute to the International Stabilization Force?

• Work on the ISF’s mandate and composition is ongoing. Canada is actively considering how best to support it, whether through financial, materiel or other forms of support.

West Bank

• Persistent settler violence, often leading to forced displacement, is deeply concerning.
• Canada calls on Israel to ensure the protection of civilians and hold perpetrators to account. This disturbing trend must stop.
• Canada has issued four rounds of sanctions related to extremist settler violence, including against Israeli ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich.
• Israeli settlements in the occupied territories are a violation of international law.

Responsive - Denial of entry/mistreatment of MP delegation to West Bank in December

• We regret Israel’s decision to deny the private delegation entry. GAC raised objections to any mistreatment of Canadians.

International law / courts

• Canada has been clear that the protection of civilians is a requirement under international humanitarian law, to which all parties, including Israel and Hamas, are bound.
• Canada is committed to upholding international law and the decisions of international judicial bodies. Canada supports the ICC’s critical role in pursuing accountability and the ICJ’s critical role in the peaceful settlement of disputes.
• Canada takes seriously any allegation of genocide and attaches great importance to the Genocide Convention.
• It is for the ICJ to make a final decision in the case brought by South Africa against Israel under the Genocide Convention, which it has not yet done. Canada continues to follow these proceedings very closely.

Responsive – Will Canada carry out ICC arrest warrants?

• Canada’s position remains that, as a State Party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, it must comply with its obligations under the Statute and international law.

Background

Gaza peace plan

On January 14, 2026, US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff announced the launch of Phase 2 of the peace plan. Phase 2 establishes the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) – a transitional Palestinian technocratic administration in Gaza. On January 16, President Trump delivered Board of Peace invitation letters to roughly 60 world leaders, including PM Carney. On January 22, President Trump revoked PM Carney’s invitation in a Truth Social announcement. The BoP is meant to be the overarching governance body of the US 20-point peace plan for Gaza, further to UNSC resolution 2803. [REDACTED]

Humanitarian situation

Humanitarian access has improved since the ceasefire but remains constrained by Israeli restrictions and aid deliveries remain well below needs. Following the December 31 re-registration deadline, key international NGOs, including Canadian-funded partners, have been told to cease operations in Palestine within 60 days, creating significant operational and planning uncertainty.

Iran

• Canada strongly condemns the horrific killing of protestors, arbitrary arrests, and intimidation tactics used by the Iranian regime against its own people. We demand that the human rights of the Iranian people be upheld.
• Canada maintains some of the world’s toughest sanctions to hold Iran accountable for its destabilizing activities and human rights violations.
• Canada supports a return to diplomacy, including U.S.-Iran talks, as the most sustainable path to address Iran’s nuclear program.

Supplementary messages

• Canada has pressured Iran and its proxies by listing the IRGC, the Houthis and Hizballah as terrorist organizations under the Criminal Code; imposing autonomous sanctions on 467 Iranian individuals, and; designating Iran as a foreign state supporter of terrorism under the State Immunity Act.
• We have designated the Government of Iran as a regime engaged in terrorism and systematic or gross human rights violations under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, rendering any senior official who served since June 23, 2003, inadmissible to Canada.
• Iran can never have a nuclear weapon and must resume safeguards cooperation with the IAEA and fully implement its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
• Canada continues to pursue accountability for the downing of Flight PS752, which killed 176 people, including 55 Canadians and 30 permanent residents.

Supporting facts and figures 

• Canada’s controlled engagement policy with Iran limits official contacts to nuclear, human rights, regional security, and consular issues.
• Canada has imposed sanctions on 467 Iranian individuals and entities for violations of international peace and security and human rights violations.
• In September 2012, Canada designated Iran as a state supporter of terrorism. This designation was renewed in December 2025.
• On November 14, 2022, tens of thousands of senior Iranian regime members, including many IRGC officials, were designated inadmissible to Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
• The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was listed as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code on June 19, 2024.
• Canada has contributed $23 million to International Atomic Energy Agency verification and monitoring activities in Iran since 2014.

Background 

Ongoing protests and Iranian regime repression

On December 28, 2025, protests against the dire economic situation started in Tehran, and quickly grew nationwide, with the Iranian population demanding the respect of their human rights. US President Trump indicated he would come to the support of the Iranian people, leading to concerns over renewed Iranian-US tensions, and the wider threat of regional instability. The Iranian regime has responded to protests with wide-scale repression resulting in reports of over 5,000 deaths, and over 22,000 arrests. Human rights organizations and Western countries have decried the Iranian regime’s use of violence to regain control through fear. To date, Canada has issued several tweets, as well as two statements with likeminded expressing concern about the situation and demanding for human rights to be upheld. Canada is working to impose additional sanctions measures against Iranian entities and individuals for violations of international peace and security and human rights violations.

UN resolution on the human rights situation in Iran

In December 2025, Canada successfully led the annual resolution on the human rights situation in Iran at the UN General Assembly’s Third Committee for the 23^rd year.

Support for proxy and terrorist groups

Iran backs armed non-state actors. Through the IRGC-Qods Force, it provides funding, weapons, and training to Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Iraqi Shia militias, and Yemen’s Houthis.

Support to Russia

Iran has reportedly provided drones, artillery shells, and short-range ballistic missiles to Russia for use in its illegal war against Ukraine.

Accountability for PS752

Flight PS752 was shot down by Iranian surface-to-air missiles on January 8, 2020, killing 176 people, including 55 Canadians and 30 permanent residents. Canada is working with international partners to hold Iran fully responsible and ensure transparency, reparations, and justice for families.

Iran alleges Canada violated its sovereign immunities

In June 2023 Iran filed a case against Canada at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), alleging Canada has violated its sovereign immunities through executive, legislative and judicial actions related to the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (JVTA). The case is ongoing. On December 30, 2025, Iran’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement designating the RCN a “terrorist organization” as a response to Canada’s June 2024 decision to list Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Sudan

• Concerned by catastrophic conditions across Sudan, including in El Fasher and Kordofan, where there are credible reports of mass killings, summary executions, and sexual violence that are inflicting egregious harm on civilians, particularly women and children.
• Call for a ceasefire, unimpeded humanitarian access and a transition to a civilian-led government.
• Welcome ongoing peace efforts, including those led by the Quad and by the Quintet, which includes the UN, the AU, and regional partners.

Supplementary messages

• Canada supports efforts to advance peace, security, human rights and resilience in Sudan, in line with the principles and priorities of its Africa Strategy.
• Canada is committed to ensuring its international assistance is helping those who need it the most in Sudan, in a way that does not fuel the conflict in Sudan.

Background

• On April 15, 2023, fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) sparked a humanitarian crisis, displacing more people than any conflict worldwide. Today, 64% of the population (33M) need aid, and over half face severe food insecurity. UN reports accuse all parties to the conflict of grave human rights violations and possible war crimes. Conditions are dire in El Fasher, where RSF’s October 2025 takeover brought mass executions, ethnically targeted killings, and sexual violence, leaving tens of thousands trapped without food or medical care. Conditions are similar in Kordofan and other areas.
• Since the outbreak of the conflict, Canada has provided $144 million in international assistance, including humanitarian, development, and peace and stabilization support, to address urgent needs such as food, water, sanitation, and emergency health services, while also contributing to the protection of civilians, combating conflict-related sexual violence, and supporting civilian-led peace efforts and transition to democratic civilian rule. Diplomatically, Canada has been active:
  • November 14: Canada signed a joint appeal for a UN Human Rights Council (HRC) special session on El Fasher and co-sponsored a resolution mandating the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) on Sudan to report on atrocities.
  • November 12: Canada ensured inclusion of Sudan in the final communique of the G7 Foreign Ministers Meeting
  • September 9: Canada delivered a national statement at the 60th UN HRC and co-sponsored the renewal of the FFM on Sudan.
  • In April 2025, marking two years of conflict, through Canadian leadership, the G7 foreign ministers issued a joint statement calling out the SAF and RSF for creating the world’s largest humanitarian and displacement crisis.
• Canada and likeminded condemn both the SAF and the RSF for their conduct in this conflict. Despite many efforts, peace processes have yet to succeed. On September 12, 2025, the US-led Quad (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, US) called for a humanitarian truce and civilian-led transition. On November 6, the RSF accepted the Quad’s roadmap, but the SAF rejected it due to the RSF’s refusal to leave occupied areas. Fighting continues in Darfur, North Kordofan, and other regions.
• Canada has imposed three rounds of sanctions since April 2024, listing 18 individuals and entities for directly or indirectly undermining peace, security, and stability in Sudan, and for human rights violations. Canada strictly enforces the UNSC arms embargo on Sudan and reviews all export and brokering permits on a case-by-case basis using strict criteria.
• Canada implements the UN arms embargo on Sudan under the Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolutions on Sudan. This prohibits any person in Canada, or any Canadian outside Canada, from knowingly exporting arms and related material, wherever situated, to Sudan or to any person in Sudan. Under the Special Economic Measures (Sudan) Regulations, persons in Canada or Canadians outside Canada are prohibited from dealing in the property of listed persons, facilitating transactions related to such dealings, making goods available to a listed person and from providing or transferring property to a listed person. These measures help reduce the likelihood of transactions with persons involved in procuring weapons in Sudan.

Canada’s support to Ukraine

• Canada’s support to Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and long-term security is unwavering.
• Whole of government assistance commitments since 2022 have totaled over $23.5 billion in multifaceted support, including financial, military, humanitarian, recovery and reconstruction, security, stabilization and immigration measures.
• Canada is working relentlessly with its allies and partners to secure a lasting peace for Ukraine. We must deter Russia and fortify Ukraine: with robust security guarantees and by ensuring it can rebuild, recover and create the foundations for true prosperity.

Supplementary messages

• Canada does not support legal recognition of territorial gains made by force and does not support premature easing of pressure on Russia.
• Only Ukraine can decide its future; Canada has joined Ukraine and its partners in calling for an immediate end to the fighting.
• Canada is leading global efforts to return Ukrainian prisoners of war, unlawfully detained civilians, and unlawfully transferred and deported Ukrainian children. Canada co-chairs the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children and funds initiatives for their return and reintegration.
• Canada supports Ukraine’s long-term recovery and reconstruction by addressing immediate humanitarian and security needs, while advancing reforms that strengthen Ukraine’s trade and investment climate and mobilizing private sector engagement in Ukraine’s reconstruction.
• Canada will contribute to security guarantees, a crucial part of ensuring lasting peace in Ukraine, alongside our partners in the Coalition of the Willing. We welcome the U.S. commitment to provide security guarantees to Ukraine.

Update

The Prime Minister continues to participate in meetings of the Coalition of the Willing since its creation in the spring of 2025, including most recently in Paris on January 6, 2026, which culminated in the endorsement of the Paris Declaration, reaffirming partners’ commitment to developing robust security guarantees for Ukraine. On December 27, 2025, Prime Minister Carney welcomed President Zelenskyy in Halifax, where he announced an additional $2.5 billion commitment of economic support for Ukraine. Prime Minister Carney and President Zelenskyy also recently spoke via telephone conference on December 9 and 26, 2025.

On December 3, the UN General Assembly adopted a non-binding resolution calling for the immediate and unconditional return of forcibly transferred and deported Ukrainian children, co-facilitated by Ukraine, Canada and the EU delegation, by a vote of 91-12, with 57 abstentions.

Supporting facts and figures

• Canada is consistently among the top donors to Ukraine. Since 2022, Canada has committed nearly $23.5 billion in multi-faceted support, including financial, military, humanitarian, recovery and reconstruction, security and stabilization and immigration assistance:
• Over $12 billion in direct financial support;
• Additional economic support announced in December 2025 to back the International Monetary Fund program for Ukraine and support its recovery and reconstruction;
• $6.5 billion in military assistance;
• $702.1 million in recovery and reconstruction, including development assistance;
• $396.85 million in humanitarian assistance; and
• $230 million in security and stabilization assistance.
• Since 2014, Canada has imposed sanctions on over 3,300 individuals and entities in Russia, Belarus, Moldova, and occupied territories of Ukraine, targeting senior officials, parliamentarians, oligarchs, and entities in energy, defence, and finance sectors. Sanctions include asset freezes, entry bans, and dealings prohibitions.
• Canada has also sanctioned over 400 Russia-linked “Shadow Fleet” vessels involved in transporting oil, liquified natural gas, arms, and other goods benefiting Russia.
• On November 12, Canada announced new sanctions to further decrease Russian revenues and degrade its military capabilities. The package targeted liquefied natural gas companies, 100 additional shadow fleet vessels, banks, cryptocurrency entities, and drone and cyber actors.
• Under Operation UNIFIER, the Canadian Armed Forces have trained more than 47,000 Security Forces of Ukraine personnel since 2015.

Ukraine peace plan

• Unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. No territorial gain by force. Ukraine decides for Ukraine.
• Significant and sustained military, financial, and humanitarian assistance. Canada has committed over $23.5 billion since 2022.
• Canada is engaged in getting to a durable peace. We support the peace process. We are a member of the Coalition of the Willing. Global leadership role on the return of prisoners and children. Keeping economic and diplomatic pressure on Russia.

Supplementary messages

• Canada will continue to support Ukraine and is actively engaged in current efforts towards a negotiated agreement that ensures Ukraine’s long-term security and deters future Russian aggression.
• Canada welcomes the continued efforts of the United States to bring forward a lasting peace in Ukraine.
• Nothing about Ukraine can be decided without Ukraine; nothing about security in Europe can be decided without Europe.

Update

Ukraine continues to position itself in negotiations as the reasonable party seeking a peaceful outcome that preserves its sovereignty and prospects as a strong, prosperous nation. President Zelenskyy has demonstrated greater flexibility on questions of territory, military caps, NATO membership and holding elections – all of which have important domestic implications. There are five documents under negotiation between the U.S. and Ukraine: (1) a 20-Point Peace Plan; (2) a document outlining non-U.S. security guarantees for Ukraine; (3) a document outlining U.S. bilateral security guarantees for Ukraine; (4) a “prosperity document” relating to reconstruction; (5) and a document that would set out the sequence of the different elements, including with regards to events such as referendums and/or elections in Ukraine. Russia continues to stress its bottom line of full control of the Donbas, including areas it has failed to militarily seize.

Women, Peace and Security

• It is squarely in Canada’s interest to remain a world-renowned leader on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and to defend hard-won progress amidst growing global pushback.
• The Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations is just one example of Canadian leadership on WPS making an outsized, tangible impact.
• Since Canada launched the Elsie Initiative nearly ten years ago, the share of women serving in UN peacekeeping has more than doubled (from 5 to 10%).

Supplementary messages

• Canada is considering options related to an Ambassador for WPS.
• We have embedded expertise and a focus on WPS across the government, guided by our National Action Plan which is in place until 2029.
• Our Action Plan has ten federal partners and is one of the only (out of 115 in the world) to feature an official role for civil society.
• GAC is consolidating a report documenting progress implementing our National Action Plan, which we will provide to parliament in the coming months.
• Canada is deeply concerned about the rapidly increasing use of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) as a tactic of war, torture, terrorism, and political repression around the world.
• WPS has proven to strengthen Canada’s relationships with a diverse range of countries, including many non-traditional allies in strategically important regions.

Update

The UN Secretary General’s 2025 report on Women, Peace and Security highlights progress yet warns of stagnation or even regression across many areas (see facts and figures below). While the U.S. position continues to evolve under President Trump, it remains the only country to adopt a comprehensive law on WPS, implemented and signed into law by President Trump during his first administration. On October 6, 2025, 91 countries including Canada, affirmed support for WPS at the UN Security Council.

Supporting facts and figures

• Conflict-related sexual violence documented by the UN increased by 87% over the last two years.
• In 2024, women represented 7% of negotiators and 14% of mediators in peace processes worldwide – figures that remain low, and in line with earlier levels.
• When women participate meaningfully in peace negotiations, an agreement is more likely to be reached, and the probability of that agreement lasting two years increases by 20%, and of lasting 15 years, by 35%. 
• 115 countries now have National Action Plans on WPS, including all G7 members and nearly every member of NATO.
• The percentage of uniformed women in peacekeeping has more than doubled since 2018 (to approximately 10%) – progress the UN Secretary General credits in part to Canada’s Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations.

Africa Strategy

• Implementation of Canada's Africa’s Strategy is underway, in line with the priorities outlined in the PM mandate: increasing economic cooperation; developing mutually beneficial relationships with reliable partners; and safeguarding Canada’s security interests.
• Canada is collaborating with multilateral partners such as the African Union (AU) to support African leadership on economic and trade development as well as peace and security efforts.
• Canadian trade and development programming aims to generate mutual economic benefits for Canadians and Africans alike.

Supplementary messages

• The Africa Strategy strengthens and aligns Canada’s engagement with Africa toward greater economic cooperation, strengthened peace and security partnerships, enhanced engagement of African diaspora communities in Canada, and international assistance that supports economic development and youth employment.
• Africa’s role and importance on the world stage is growing. Canada is a reliable partner to achieve the AU’s vision Agenda 2063, and work towards our mutual prosperity and collective security.
• Africa was the largest recipient of Canadian international assistance in 2023-24 ($3.2B). Canada is increasingly pivoting towards a trade and development approach, while ongoing programming is focused on gender equality, global health, education, and climate action.
• Canada’s Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs) and Air Transport Agreements (ATAs), alongside support for the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) contribute to strengthening predictable two-way trade and investment.

Update

• On November 22-23, 2025, PM Carney and Foreign Minister Anand participated in the G20 Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa. This was the first G20 Summit held in Africa and under an African Chair.
• As announced in the Africa Strategy, PM Carney confirmed that Canada will open a FinDev office in Cape Town in 2026 expanding Canadian investment on the continent.

Supporting facts and figures 

• Diplomatic footprint: 22 Embassies and High Commissions; 5 diplomatic offices.
• 21 bilateral development programs; two regional development programs.
• In Canada, close to 1.4 million people are of African origin (2021 census).
• Once implemented, the AfCFTA will be the world’s largest free trade area and represent a market of 1.3 billion people.
• Africa holds 30% of the world's critical mineral reserves.
• 60% of Africa’s population is under the age of 25, making Africa the youngest continent in the world. By 2050, ¼ of humanity is projected to be African.
• Africa forms the largest voting bloc at the United Nations (54/193).

Background

Canada’s Africa Strategy: A Partnership for Shared Prosperity and Security (March 2025) involved consultations with more than 600 stakeholders. Its implementation makes use of existing resources. The Strategy’s focus on trade and development intends to create conditions for mutually beneficial commercial relationships.

Launched under the Africa Strategy, the Africa Trade Hub advances Canada’s economic diplomacy by facilitating trade and investment between Canadian and African businesses, supporting strategic partnerships, diversifying markets, enhancing supply chain resilience, and promoting growth aligned with the AU’s Agenda 2063, including support for AfCFTA implementation. Also under the Strategy, the Africa Trade and Development Program focuses on supporting AfCFTA implementation and promoting inclusive economic outcomes for African partners, such as employment creation, particularly for youth and women.

Africa represents about 1% of Canada’s global trade ($15.3 billion), up 15.6% since 2021. Canada’s top trading partners include South Africa, Nigeria, Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania.

Indo-Pacific Strategy update

• The world has changed significantly since the adoption of the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) in 2022. We have always recognized the need to adapt with evolving global conditions.
• The IPS needs to deliver Canada’s priorities in the region, in line with the Prime Minister’s mandate and directions outlined in Budget 2025.
• That said, the 17 departments with resources to advance IPS priorities that remain core priorities of this government, for example increased security partnerships, diversification, and consistent and enhanced presence – continue to deliver on our strategy for the region.

Supplementary messages

• The Indo-Pacific Strategy needs to reflect evolving government priorities and diplomatic relationships, ensuring our regional approach aligns with latest government direction amid a dynamic geopolitical landscape.
• This includes a greater focus on strengthening collaboration with reliable trading partners, protecting Canadian sovereignty and keeping Canadians safe.
• Diversifying trade is a top priority for this government. We are actively working to broaden Canada’s trade and economic partnerships, including by energy security.
• Canada is also deepening defence and security cooperation in the region through annual naval deployments, expanded capacity-building and cyber security. Greater efforts will also be deployed to enhance Canada’s defence trade with the region.

Update

Over 2023-2025, Canada concluded negotiations with Indonesia, advanced FTA negotiations with ASEAN, and chaired the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) Commission in 2024. Canada has also announced new FTA negotiations with Thailand and the Philippines, and negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with India. Since October 2023 Canada has embarked on Team Canada Trade Missions to Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Australia, Thailand, and Cambodia, facilitating over 4,000 business-to-business meetings, with an anticipated economic impact of over $251 million. New diplomatic and trade offices were opened in Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam and Fiji as well as the Indo-Pacific Agriculture and Agri-Food Office in the Philippines. The government has also undertaken several high-level trips to the region, including most recently a PM and Ministerial-level visit to China from January 14-17, 2026.

Supporting facts and figures

• The Indo-Pacific region is home to 65% of the world’s population and over one-third of global GDP; projected to exceed 50% by 2040.
• Canada’s 2024 two-way merchandise trade with the Indo-Pacific was valued at $261.4 billion (17.4% of total).
• Canada’s Shared Ocean Fund ($84.3 million) supports maritime cooperation and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing enforcement.
• Dark Vessel Detection (DVD) platform deployed in the Philippines and across Pacific Island countries.
• Over 200 scholarships awarded in Fall under the Canada-ASEAN Scholarships and Educational Exchanges for Development (SEED) Program.

Background

Canada’s IPS, launched in November 2022, is a 10 year, whole-of-government framework, backed by $2.3 billion over five years, for engagement in the region. It is built around 5 Strategic Objectives (SOs):

• Promote peace, resilience and security;
• Expand trade, investment and supply chain resilience;
• Invest in and connect people;
• Build a sustainable and green future; and
• Canada as an active and engaged partner to the Indo-Pacific.

Canada’s broadly approach aligns with similar strategies from key partners including Japan, the EU, Australia and ASEAN.

Canada’s Indo Pacific Strategy also supports ASEAN’s centrality in the regional architecture of Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific, and its active role in advancing security, diplomacy, and stability. There is strong alignment between the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy in promoting a rules-based order for regional security, prosperity, and multilateral cooperation.

Since the Strategy’s adoption in 2022, a number of external shifts and developments have provided new impetus to better align it with current global realities and the new government’s mandate priorities. This work is ongoing.

China – Bilateral relations and trade

• Given China’s influence and place in the world, it is essential for Canada to engage and open channels of communication in support of our national interests.
• Last month, I accompanied Prime Minister Carney to Beijing to deliver concrete outcomes for Canadians, as we recalibrate our relationship with China.
• We agreed to deepen our cooperation with China in a focussed set of mutually beneficial areas under a newly refocused Strategic Partnership.

Supplementary messages

• Canada is sparing no effort to move from reliance to resilience via trade diversification initiatives, including reopening markets in China and growing exports across the broader Indo-Pacific.
• While we worked to secure these advances in our commercial relationship with our second biggest single-country trading partner, we are ensuring we have the right toolkit in place to counter and mitigate any resulting economic and national security risks
• Canada also continues to underline to China that there is no tolerance for foreign interference on Canadian soil, including transnational repression, and malicious cyber activities.
• Having stable, open channels better allows us to advance all issues, including human rights concerns, with the right interlocutors.

Update

On January 14-17, you accompanied the Prime Minister in his first official visit to China, alongside the Minister of International Trade, the Minister of Industry, the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food, the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, the Prime Minister’s Parliamentary Secretary, and the MP for Markham—Unionville. A Joint Statement was published following the visit, and memorandums of understanding across several areas were signed as part of the PM’s visit, including on energy, combatting crime, modern wood construction, culture, and food safety and plant and animal health.

Supporting facts and figures

• The refocused Strategic Partnership is centered on the following cooperation areas: macroeconomic engagement, economic and trade cooperation, energy, finance, public security and safety, people-to-people ties and cultural exchanges, and multilateralism.
• As part of the Preliminary Agreement-In-Principle to Address Economic and Trade Issues between Canada and the People's Republic of China, Canada intends to provide China with an initial quota of 49,000 electric vehicles per year at a most-favoured-nation tariff rate of 6.1%.
• By March 1st, 2026, Canada expects that China will lower tariffs on Canadian canola seed to a combined rate of approximately 15% (from the current 84%), improving market access for $4 billion of Canadian canola seed exports to China annually. 
• Additional products—canola meal, lobsters, crabs, and peas—are expected to avoid anti‑discrimination tariffs, unlocking $2.7 billion in export opportunities.

Background

Addressing bilateral economic and trade concerns

The Preliminary Agreement-In-Principle to Address Economic and Trade Issues between Canada and the People's Republic of China aims to settle long-standing trade irritants and establishes a track for major new investments into Canada. There will be an opportunity to review the Preliminary Agreement-In-Principle's progress and implementation in three years to assess if benefits have materialised. In addition to commitments around tariffs on electric vehicles from China and on various agricultural and agri-food products from Canada, both countries committed to expanding two‑way investment across clean energy, technology, agri‑food, wood products, and other sectors to deepen economic ties. On steel and aluminium, Canada will extend its existing remission measures on Chinese steel and aluminum products in short supply through 2026, covering 66 product-specific and 59 company-specific tariff lines.

In terms of economic and trade engagement, both sides committed to revitalizing the Joint Economic and Trade Commission (JETC), led respectively by GAC and MOFCOM, and having the JETC continue to serve as the main channel for promoting economic and trade cooperation and resolving economic and trade differences between the two countries. The parties also agreed to reinvigorate the high-level Canada-China Economic and Financial Strategic Dialogue to discuss wide ranging related issues to strengthen bilateral economic relations.

Taiwan

• Canada continues to advance its interests and engagement with Taiwan in a manner consistent with Canada’s longstanding One China Policy.
• In concert with its G7 partners, Canada has steadfastly reinforced the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, in opposing unilateral attempts to forcibly change the status quo, and in continuing to call for the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.
• Canada is strengthening its economic relationship with Taiwan, which is a top five trade partner for Canada in the Indo-Pacific, through concrete collaboration in science, trade, investment, and supply chains resilience.

Supplementary messages

• Canada’s One China Policy recognizes the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China, taking note of—neither challenging nor endorsing—the Chinese government’s position on Taiwan.
• Canada opposes unilateral attempts to change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. Bilaterally, Canadian officials have communicated to PRC counterparts ongoing concerns over the situation in the region and publicly called on the PRC to cease its threatening and escalatory actions in the region.
• Canada has continued to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations where there is a practical imperative and where Taiwan’s absence would be detrimental to global interests.
• Taiwan is a critical gear of the global economy, notably its pivotal role in the manufacturing of semiconductors, and offers promising economic opportunities for Canadian business in tech, life sciences, aerospace, and Indigenous trade.
• Responsive – PRC drills around Taiwan: Canada has consistently spoken out on this issue, whether individually or in coordination with G7 partners. The Taiwan Strait is indispensable to the security and prosperity of the international community. Canada opposes unilateral attempts to change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. Canada encourages the peaceful resolution of issues through constructive dialogue.
• Responsive – Canadian parliamentarians’ visit to Taiwan, January 10-15: In line with the independence of Parliament, MPs have a longstanding practice of visiting Taiwan.On this occasion, some have opted to participate in only the people-to-people aspects of the trip to Taiwan to avoid any confusion that might have been perceived as a change in Canada’s One China policy by either the PRC or Taiwan. Canada remains committed to strengthening the economic partnership between Canada and Taiwan, as Canada builds sustainable and diverse trade partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, and with reliable trade partners around the world.
• Responsive – Trade Cooperation Framework Arrangement: Canada and Taiwan enjoy strong unofficial economic and people-to-people ties, consistent with Canada’s One China policy.

Supporting facts and figures

• In 2024, Taiwan ranked as Canada’s 15th largest global merchandise trading partner and 6th largest in Asia (5th if services trade were included). Two-way merchandise trade totaled $9.1bn. Over 30 Canadian companies operate in Taiwan, mainly in the transportation, aerospace/air services, fashion and consumer goods, ICT, clean energy, life sciences and environmental services sectors.
• An estimated 50,000 Canadians reside in Taiwan, and the market hosts Canada’s largest investment project in Asia: Northland Power Inc.’s offshore wind development, supported by Canadian pension funds.

Updates

Recent PRC drills

From December 29-30, 2025, the PRC conducted large-scale, multi-domain exercises around Taiwan. The drill, named “Justice Mission 2025”, occurred shortly after the U.S. announced its largest ever planned arms sale package to Taiwan.

Parliamentary delegation to Taiwan

From January 10-15, a delegation of Canadian parliamentarians visited Taiwan to discuss trade and cultural issues. Two delegates departed Taiwan ahead of the others, noting that their decision was based on “advice from the government” and the desire to “avoid confusion” about Canada’s foreign policy as the visit overlapped with the Prime Minister’s visit to the PRC.

Background

Taiwan Strait stability: Canada is committed to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and opposes unilateral actions that threaten the status quo. Along with the G7, Canada has consistently expressed our position. Canadian Armed Forces’ operations and activities reaffirm Canada’s commitment to maintaining the status quo across the Strait. The Canadian Armed Forces continues to operate in the Indo-Pacific, including in the Taiwan Strait, in full accordance with international law. Most recently, HMCS Ville de Quebec completed a joint transit of the Strait with the HMAS Brisbane (Australia) on September 6, 2025.

Taiwan’s International Participation: Canada and Taiwan cooperate at multilateral forums where both are represented (e.g. APEC, the WTO, and regional fisheries organizations). Canada is also a member of the Global Cooperation and Training Framework alongside Taiwan, the U.S., Japan and Australia to conduct capacity-building in the Indo-Pacific through the organization of international conferences.

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Jimmy Lai

• Canada supports media freedom and has called for the release of Jimmy Lai.
• Canada remains deeply concerned about the detention and prosecution of individuals under the National Security Law in Hong Kong.
• Canada will continue to work with international partners to promote and protect human rights globally.

Supplementary messages

• In public and in private, Canada has consistently called for the People's Republic of China to repeal its National Security Law in Hong Kong, which violates Hong Kong’s international obligations.
• Canada fundamentally stands up for human rights, democracy, freedom of expression and media freedom globally.
• Canada remains committed to ensuring that journalists and media workers can operate freely and safely, without fear of reprisal in any form, online and offline.
• We have discussed the situation of Jimmy Lai with the UK, as he is a UK citizen. Canada first and foremost takes responsibility for the safety and security of Canadian citizens and residents of Canada.

Update

Prime Minister Carney and a ministerial delegation visited Beijing from January 13 – 17^th and confirmed that Jimmy Lai’s case was raised with China as part of broader discussions. You also raised the case during your meeting with your counterpart Minister Wang Yi on January 15^th. Jimmy Lai was found guilty on December 15^th, 2024, and his sentencing is expected imminently.

Supporting facts and figures

• Canada’s approach to the Jimmy Lai case has been to focus on opposition to the NSL; emphasize Canada’s support for media freedom; to conduct quiet diplomacy with the PRC directly; and to support UK advocacy efforts.
• On December 15, Mr. Lai was found guilty of two counts of “collusion with foreign forces” under the National Security Law and one count of “conspiracy to publish seditious material.” In response, you made comments to Global News and released a social media post on X condemning Mr. Lai’s prosecution. A G7 statement calling for Jimmy Lai’s release was issued on December 17, 2025.
• Lai’s mitigation hearing took place from January 12 – 13, 2025, with the date of sentencing to be announced imminently. The mitigation hearing gave the prosecution and the defence the opportunity to submit factors that might influence the sentence, including age, health, length already served, past cases or legal precedents, etc. On October 16, 2025, Prime Minister Carney called for Jimmy Lai’s release on humanitarian grounds and in support of media freedom. You also raised Jimmy Lai during a bilateral meeting with your Chinese counterpart Wang Yi on October 17.
• Since Jimmy Lai’s arrest in 2019, Canada has issued several public statements, including referencing Jimmy Lai in ministerial and departmental statements in 2020 and 2021, and co-signing Media Freedom Coalition and Community of Democracies
• Hong Kong’s national security legislation is impacting the safety and security of Canadians living in Hong Kong and people in Canada with ties to Hong Kong. At least three Canadian citizens have been charged under the National Security Law and others have been detained for questioning. Given that an estimated 300,000 Canadians live in Hong Kong, it is likely that Canadian citizens will continue to be impacted.

Background

Jimmy Lai, a British and Chinese citizen, is the most high-profile pro-democracy activist charged under the National Security Law in Hong Kong. He is the founder of the now defunct popular Hong Kong newspaper, Apple Daily, and has significant familial and investment ties to Canada. He currently faces two charges under Hong Kong’s National Security Law – conspiring to collude with foreign forces and conspiring to publish “seditious” materials. Concerns have been raised about Mr. Lai’s advanced age (77 years) and history of chronic health conditions.

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Canada’s sanctions regimes

• Canada remains committed to playing a leadership role in the preservation and strengthening of an international rules-based order. Sanctions are a key component of this approach.
• Canada is judicious when it chooses to deploy sanctions and is committed to their effective and coordinated use.
• Canada has established a rigorous due diligence process to consider and evaluate possible cases of human rights violations, corruption or other circumstances that may warrant the use of sanctions.

Supplementary messages

• Canada considers its use of autonomous sanctions to be consistent with international law and uses humanitarian exemptions, when appropriate, to mitigate the unintended consequences of sanctions.
• Canada considers the broader political and international contexts when deciding whether sanctions or any other tools in Canada’s foreign policy toolbox may be an appropriate response.
• Responsive on Targeted Windfall Profit Charge and Mitigating Potential Financial Sector Risks from Sanctions: I would defer to the Minister of Finance as this pertains to proposed authorities under the Minister of Finance.

Update

On December 12, 2025, Canada sanctioned four individuals under the Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations for gross, systemic human rights violations. Sanctions continue to be a key tool considered in response to crises (e.g. Russia, extremist settler violence, Hamas terrorist attacks).

Supporting facts and figures

• Since 2022, global use of sanctions has increased significantly. Canada has sanctioned nearly 2,300 individuals and over 1,000 entities or vessels since 2022.
• In total, nearly 4,900 individuals and entities have been designated by Canada across its autonomous sanctions regimes.

Background 

The Special Economic Measures Act allows the government to impose sanctions in relation to a foreign state, as well as individuals and entities related to that foreign state. Sanctions can be imposed in response to:

• a grave breach of international peace and security that has or is likely to result in a serious international crisis;
• an international organization or association of states which Canada belongs to calls on members to take economic measures against a foreign state;
• gross and systematic human rights violations; and
• acts of significant corruption.

The Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act allows the government to sanction foreign nationals who are responsible for, or complicit in, specific cases of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights or acts of significant corruption committed in foreign states, independent of state-related sanctions.

The UNSC may also legally require member states to introduce the measures into domestic law, which is implemented in Canada through the United Nations Act.

Sanctions are implemented as regulations through the Governor-in-Council regulatory process. Measures vary and can include dealings bans, trade prohibitions, or financial restrictions. Sanctions restrict activities between Canadians or persons in Canada and sanctioned states, individuals or entities. Individuals subject to sanctions under all 3 laws are inadmissible to Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Status of seizure/Forfeiture proceedings for assets of sanctioned persons (Russia)

• Canada introduced a sanctions-based private asset seizure and forfeiture regime in 2022, signalling that impunity is not tolerated for those who have profited from Russia’s war in Ukraine.
• These authorities have been used: in December 2022, to restrain U.S. $26 million believed to be owned or controlled by Roman Abramovich; and in June 2023, to seize an Antonov aircraft grounded at Pearson airport believed to be owned or controlled by Volga-Dnepr Airlines and related entities.
• Canada is moving forward with the forfeiture of these assets; in March 2025, forfeiture proceedings for the aircraft were initiated.

Supplementary messages

• Canada’s sanctions-based asset seizure and forfeiture regime involves several steps in a legal process, respecting the principle of judicial fairness.
• Forfeiture is not a means to provide immediate financial support, but rather to hold Russia to account and support longer-term reconstruction and compensation.

Update

In accordance with the legislation, work is underway to address relevant applications and claims, and to consider the next steps regarding the potential forfeiture of both assets.

Supporting facts and figures

• On February 14, 2025, Canada updated the June 8, 2023, seizure order for the Antonov aircraft to include additional persons believed to have ownership interests in the aircraft.
• On March 18, 2025, the Attorney General of Canada sought the issuance of a Notice of Application for forfeiture of the aircraft from the Superior Court of Ontario. 

Background

In June 2022, Canada amended the Special Economic Measures Act and the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act, to allow the Government to seize, forfeit, dispose and redistribute property in Canada belonging to sanctioned persons listed under any of Canada’s autonomous sanctions’ regulations. In doing so, Canada became the first G7 member to implement a G7 commitment to find, restrain, freeze, and, where appropriate, seize, confiscate or forfeit the assets of individuals and entities that have been sanctioned by Canada. To date, these authorities have only been used in the context of Canada’s Russia sanctions.

Canada’s legislation specifies that funds resulting from asset forfeiture may be used for: the reconstruction of a foreign state adversely affected by a grave breach of international peace and security; the restoration of international peace and security; and the compensation of victims of a grave breach of international peace and security, gross and systematic human rights violations or acts of significant corruption.

Overview of amendments to the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA)

• Bill C-15 includes amendments to the EIPA to allow the government to control imports and exports of specific items for an economic security purpose.
• These powers could be used to respond to acts of other countries that damage the economic security of Canada, or to ensure that the supply and distribution of the article is consistent with Canada’s economic security interests.
• The Bill would not create new controls but would create new statutory authority to develop controls in the future.

Supplementary messages

• These amendments would give the government new tools to protect our economy from foreign actions and supply chain shocks that could harm Canadian jobs, supply chains, and access to essential goods.
• These changes would allow Canada to control imports or exports if needed to promote secure supply chains and to control exports to respond when another country tries to pressure us economically.
• These amendments are focused on mitigating risks and do not signal a change in trade policy or practice; it is important that Canada has the capacity to respond prudently and effectively when our economic security is at risk.

Background

Amendments in Bill C-15 were originally developed for inclusion in the implementation bill for the 2024 Fall Economic Statement but were not advanced at that time because the bill was not introduced. Events since 2024 have underscored the relevance of these amendments.

The amendments would allow the Governor in Council to control exports and imports for economic security reasons. These controls could take different forms, such as monitoring, a permit requirement, etc. In general, when a good or technology is listed on the Export Control List or a good on the Import Control List, exporters or importers must obtain a permit from the Minister and comply with any terms and conditions attached to that permit. This allows the government to apply a range of controls, from monitoring trade in certain goods, to limiting quantities, to, in exceptional cases, significantly limiting imports or exports. Controls could also be designed to apply only to particular import or export destinations. The flexibility of this approach could allow controls to be tailored to the specific risk or situation being addressed.

These authorities are being proposed on a proactive basis. At present, no new import or export controls are being considered, and the department has no plans to use these authorities in the near term. The purpose of the amendments is to ensure that Canada has the ability to act if needed, not to signal an immediate change in trade policy or practice.

Practical examples of possible controls

• It is expected that these authorities would be used only if required and to the extent required; export controls and import controls pursuant to these new authorities would vary from case to case.
• One possible use of these authorities would be to respond proportionately by limiting exports to a foreign country that has taken actions intended to pressure Canada economically.
• A second possible use of these authorities would be to ensure that essential products would be imported from and exported to trading partners with whom we have secure supply chains.

Supplementary messages

• These amendments would add to Canada’s economic security toolkit, giving Canada an extra layer of security where other tools may not get the job done.
• This would include the ability to monitor, limit, prevent and direct import and exports, or to collect information on select imports and exports where doing so helps to protect Canada from an economic security threat or address supply chain vulnerabilities.
• Any decision to advance a new trade control under these authorities would have to be grounded in a proper assessment of the risks and benefits and be fully consulted.

P/T considerations for possible controls 

• Any controls advanced under these new legislative authorities would need to be developed through a robust regulatory process, including meaningful consultation with provinces, territories, industry, and other affected parties.
• While national threats require national responses, the Government of Canada is highly attentive to the interests of provinces and territories; any measure that could prejudice their interests would be subject to a very high standard of engagement and analysis.
• This means that any proposed control would be carefully assessed – in consultation with provinces and territories – for its costs and benefits, impacts on competitiveness, and effects across sectors and regions.

Supplementary messages

• Under the EIPA, export and import controls can serve different purposes; a controlled good or technology is not necessarily prohibited to trade and may instead be subject to licensing, direction, or information-gathering requirements.
• Well-established regimes—such as those governing softwood lumber, log exports and certain food and agricultural products—demonstrate that federal export as well as import controls can coexist with provincial resource development and access to international markets, to the benefit of provinces and territories.
• Some provinces or territories may be concerned about the impact that any controls might have within their jurisdiction. Any concerns raised will be addressed by assuring them that provinces and territories would be consulted early and substantively before any regulatory action under these authorities is taken.

FPT engagement mechanisms

Within GAC, an intergovernmental relations division plays a coordinating role to ensure an effective two-way exchange of information with PTs. The department organises regular and ad hoc trade policy consultations, outreach, and FPT roundtables at the Minister, Deputy Minister, Assistant Deputy Minister, and working levels. These meetings are an opportunity to share information and cooperate on shared priorities.

Beyond the U.S., PTs are playing an increasingly influential role in helping shape and deliver Canada's foreign policy agenda. Several FPT working groups, conferences and meetings have been established to engage them on international files. These focus on: Trade Policy and Negotiations; Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); International Business Development; Indo-Pacific Strategy Implementation; China; and Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy.

Export control – Military goods

• Canada has one of the strongest export controls systems in the world, and respect for human rights is enshrined in our export controls legislation.
• All permit applications for controlled items are reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
• If there is substantial risk that the export would result in a serious violation of human rights, the permit will be denied.
• Exporting controlled goods or technology without a valid permit is a violation of Canadian law and may result in enforcement actions, including fines, seizure of goods, and potential criminal prosecution.

Supplementary messages

Responsive: Sudan - Alleged diversion of Canadian technology from UAE

• Canada strictly enforces the UNSC arms embargo on Sudan, which has been in place since 2004.
• All permit applications for controlled items are reviewed on a case-by-case basis under Canada's robust risk assessment framework.
• Canada has made no exceptions to this legal requirement.

Responsive: Russia - Alleged diversion of Canadian technology from Hong Kong

• Canada maintains its presumptive denial policy on the export and brokering of any controlled goods and technology to Russia.
• The Government will deny permits that are not in line with Canada’s domestic and international legal obligations, foreign policy, defence or security interests.

Responsive: Diversion of Canadian controlled goods or technology

• Exporting controlled goods or technology without a valid permit is a violation of Canadian law and Canada will take appropriate action regarding the misuse of any controlled Canadian good or technology.

Background – Hong Kong/Russia

Alleged diversion of Canadian technology to Russia from Hong Kong

 Canadian media and non-government groups have recently reported on allegations of diversion of Canadian-made Cadex rifles to Russia and used on the battlefield against Ukraine. Separately, human rights groups have alleged that Hong Kong shell companies have acted as intermediaries for the diversion of dual-use items to Russia. On July 7, 2020, Global Affairs Canada issued a Notice to Exporters which indicated that Canada will not permit the export of sensitive military items to Hong Kong, and this policy remains in effect. No export or brokering permit has been issued for Russia-destined items, apart from one permit issued for the Russian Federation in 2013. Cadex rifles in Russian hands were possibly acquired either via battlefield loss from Ukrainian forces who are being supplied with some Cadex rifles, or via illicit acquisition through third countries.

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Background – UAE/Sudan

Alleged diversion of Canadian technology from UAE to Sudan

Since 2004, Canada has enforced, and continues to enforce, a strict arms embargo on Sudan. Canada reviews all export and brokering permits on a case-by-case against Arms Trade Treaty criteria embedded in the Export and Import Permits Act. In April 2024, Canada adopted the Special Economic Measures (Sudan) Regulations, which impose strict restrictions, including asset freezes, on any individual listed under these regulations.

Media have reported on the use of Canadian-linked equipment by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, specifically armoured vehicles manufactured in the UAE (by Streit Group) and rifles produced in Canada by Sterling Cross Defense Systems. Streit Group, headquartered in the UAE (since 2007), owned by Canadian Guerman Goutorov and having an entity based in Canada (Streit Manufacturing), has been subject of allegations of misuse and breaching arms embargoes. The U.S. Department of Commerce fined Streit USA, Streit Group (UAE), and executives U.S. $3.5 million for unlicensed exports/re‑exports of armored vehicles to multiple countries in 2008-2009. Streit Group has denied responsibility for how its vehicles are modified or used after sale, stating that it complies with UAE export laws. The RCMP cannot confirm and/or deny whether there is any current investigation into Streit Group.

Arms exports to Israel

• Since January 8, 2024, the Government of Canada has not approved any new arms export permits to Israel that could be used in the current conflict in Gaza.
• In 2024, the government also suspended export permits for parts destined for Israel that could be incorporated into items used in Gaza; all of these permits suspended in 2024 remain suspended and cannot be used to export to Israel.

Supplementary messages

• Since January 8, 2024, processing of export permits for items destined to Israel has been effectively paused. Since then, Global Affairs Canada has approved two export permits in the broad category of “military goods” for parts for Israel’s Iron Dome defensive system.
• The government is in contact with those involved with a possible Foreign Military Sale of ammunition by the United States to ensure that it would adhere to Canada’s rigorous export permit regime and be consistent with its long-standing policy towards the United States.
• Canada’s Export Control List (ECL) identifies specific goods and technology that require export permits, using carefully selected technical parameters. These parameters are based on Canada’s international obligations as a signatory to multilateral or bilateral agreements and regimes.

Background

As a consequence of the humanitarian situation in Gaza resulting from the Israeli military operation that followed the October 7, 2023 attacks by Hamas, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly instructed that issuance of new export permits to Israel be suspended as of January 8, 2024. Following a more detailed review approximately 30 existing export permits were suspended after they were identified as potential inputs into items that could possibly be used in military operations by Israel. All of the permits suspended in 2024 remain suspended and cannot be used to export to Israel. In 2024 Canadian companies exported approximately $18.9 million of parts or components designed for use in military equipment, mostly for incorporation into items that would subsequently be exported from Israel. All of those exports were under permits issued before January 8, 2024 and not suspended (down from $30.6 million in 2023).

The Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA) allows for the broad authority to amend, suspend, cancel or reinstate any export permit including suspending for the purpose of further investigation of new credible and relevant information. The specific details of items exported under an export permit are protected commercial information.

On August 13, 2024, the U.S. Department of State announced approval of “a possible U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS)” to Israel involving General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems Inc. (GDOTS-C), located in Quebec. Items described under this potential FMS include 50,400 mortar cartridges (i.e. “120mm High Explosive Mortar Cartridges and related equipment”) which are controlled for export under Canada’s Export Control List. The government understands that the soonest delivery of any such items would be in 2026. Officials are in touch with the company to ensure that it adheres to Canada’s export permit regime.

Canada’s export controls compliance

• Canada has one of the strongest export controls systems in the world, with a high level of compliance by exporters, but there is always a risk of accidental or deliberate violation of export control requirements.
• To address that risk, the department and the Government of Canada as a whole have a spectrum of tools to correct mistakes and to punish wilful offenders, including fines and criminal prosecution.
• The department monitors all exporters in order to ensure that they adhere to high compliance standards via annual reviews, education and targeted outreach when necessary.

Supplementary messages

• In cases where individual exporters violate the EIPA, GAC can take actions such as: cancel an existing issued permit, suspend the review of any current application and/or suspend all permit application privileges.
• In more serious cases, the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) can issue fines and/or investigate, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) can investigate and/or prosecute.
• In addition to individual permitting decisions, the Minister has the power to address Canada’s foreign policy, defence and/or security interests in relation to particular countries (for example, the Minister can take a broad policy decision to generally deny permits to a particular destination, as is the case for Rwanda and Russia).

Supporting facts and figures

• Canada’s export controls system is designed to control the export and brokering of military, dual-use and strategic goods and technology in a lawful manner consistent with Canada's foreign and defence policies, security interests and international obligations.
• All permit applications for controlled items are reviewed on a case-by-case basis under Canada's robust risk assessment framework, including against the Arms Trade Treaty criteria which are enshrined in Canada's Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA) – this includes serious violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, use in terrorism or organized crime, and serious acts of gender-based violence or violence against women and children, as well as for risks pertaining to national security, regional peace and security, and diversion.
• GAC works closely with enforcement agencies to identify and provide technical advice on potential violations of the EIPA, which are then enforced by the CBSA and/or the RCMP. For example, in FY 2024/25, there were 280 detentions (import and export) made by the CBSA related to the EIPA. On average, GAC responds to 6-10 requests for investigation support annually related to the EIPA.
• The RCMP is responsible for investigations relating to EIPA contraventions, which can lead to formal charges and prosecution. To date, we are aware of three prosecutions under Canadian export control laws: De Jaray in 2009 (charges later dropped), Yadegari in 2010 (criminally convicted), and Guimont in 2015 (prosecution stayed for delay, but goods forfeited).

Legal recourse

• Penalties for contravention of the EIPA or its Regulations are set out in Section 19 of the Act. Penalties include, for an offence punishable on summary conviction - such as smuggling, fines of up to $250K and/or imprisonment for up to 12 months or both; and for an indictable offence, a maximum fine set by the court and/or imprisonment up to 10 years, or both.
• The RCMP is responsible for investigations relating to EIPA contraventions, which can lead to formal charges and prosecution.
• The CBSA plays a frontline role at the border by inspecting shipments, verifying documentation, imposing monetary penalties and detaining or seizing goods where offences are suspected.

Defence Export Strategy

• Evolving geopolitical threats mean Canada must have a strong and resilient domestic defence industrial base to meet our security needs.
• Without export markets, Canadian firms will struggle to achieve production at a scale needed to achieve this goal.
• The Defence Export Strategy sets out a coordinated framework to diversify and increase defence exports and attract greater foreign direct investment.

Supplementary messages

• The Department of National Defence is developing a Defence Industrial Strategy aimed at strengthening Canada’s sovereignty, strategic autonomy, and economic growth.
• Increasing and diversifying Canada’s defence exports and attracting more foreign direct investment in this sector will form a key part of that strategy.
• A strong and diversified export market depends on robust export controls; the Defence Export Strategy will be supported by Global Affairs Canada’s export controls, widely regarded as among the strongest in the world.

Update

Budget 2025 announced $6.6 billion over five years to strengthen Canada's defence industry through a Defence Industrial Strategy, which will be released publicly very soon. The supporting Defence Export Strategy (DES) should be released shortly thereafter. Early actions taken consistent with the DES include the establishment of new Defence Exports Division within Global Affairs Canada, and the negotiation of Canada’s participation to SAFE, the EU’s defence procurement financing instrument.

Supporting facts and figures

• Canada’s defence sector is relatively small, but technologically advanced and highly export focused.
• Even with greater spending in coming years, Canada’s domestic market is too small to support an industrial base that meets Canada’s defence needs.
• Revenues from exports will be needed to scale up production such that Canada’s industry can supply the needs of the Canadian Armed Forces.
• For the 2024 calendar year, the value of Canadian exports of controlled military goods and technology to non-U.S. destinations amounted to approximately $2.5 billion, compared to a value of $2.1 billion in 2023 and $2.1 billion in 2022.

Background

Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS)

The DIS aims to build up a robust Canadian defence industry that provides technological and operational advantage to the Canadian Armed Forces and its security partners in their mission to defend Canada, and maximizes growth, job creation, and economic benefits for all Canadians. The DIS’ core objective is to strengthen Canada’s defence industrial base, ensuring that Canada has reliable access to capabilities and materials necessary to protect national sovereignty and counter current and future threats. It aims to grow world-class firms in sovereign capability areas, establish Canada as a global leader in technologies with defence applications, strengthen and secure the resilience of Canada’s supply chains and establish enduring partnerships with both industry and allies. It will also ensure Canada’s procurement is timely, cost-effective, and resilient, and that Canadian companies are provided with strong export support. Overall, it will bolster the relationship between government and industry, support the defence industrial ecosystem, and leverage our network of domestic and international partners.

Canada’s Defence Export Strategy (DES)

The DES recognizes that Canadian defence firms need revenues from exports to augment production and effectively meet the supply needs of the Canadian Armed Forces. Early actions under the strategy include standing up a dedicated Defence Exports Division within Global Affairs Canada and establishing a whole-of-government Defence Trade Committee that brings together all key federal organizations and concluding negotiations with the EU regarding Canada’s participation in SAFE. Future actions will include deploying new Trade Commissioners in Europe dedicated to the defence sector, enhancing Canada’s presence at international defence and aerospace trade shows, and implementing Defence Export Deal Teams to support Canadian bids for major international contracts.

Budget 2025 – GAC elements of Budget 2025

• Budget 2025 focuses on resilience, domestic investment, and economic transformation in response to global trade disruptions and rising protectionism.
• Canada’s foreign policy approach reflects these priorities by emphasizing economic resilience, strategic autonomy, and multilateral cooperation, guided by Canada’s core values.
• Working closely with the Minister of International Trade, my department is leading trade diversification efforts to double non-U.S. exports, strengthen alliances, and help Canadian businesses seize opportunities in high-growth markets by leveraging our competitive strengths.
• The Budget supports Ukraine’s reconstruction through a new concessional trade finance envelope and introduces reductions to the International Assistance Envelope in order to return funding to pre-pandemic levels.

Supplementary messages

• Budget 2025 launched a Trade Diversification Strategy to generate $300 billion in new trade by doubling non-U.S. exports over a decade.
• The Budget also directed the repurposing of $35 million to NATO’s Ukraine Comprehensive Assistance Package, supporting security and interoperability with allies.
• Budget 2025 set a direction for savings across more than 100 federal organizations through a government-wide Comprehensive Expenditure Review. For GAC, this included reductions to Canada’s international assistance funding and operations, finding efficiencies across Canada’s mission network, revamping emergency preparedness and modernising consular services.
  • Responsive: There have been no announced decisions regarding changes to Canada’s mission network. Options are being examined to identify potential efficiencies, consistent with the overall direction set out in Budget 2025.
• The International Assistance Envelope reductions total $2.7 billion over four years and span a number of development programs. Going forward, Canada’s international assistance will remain closely aligned with the government’s broader economic and security priorities and will focus on advancing mutual interests with partner countries.
  • Responsive: As we adapt our approach to international assistance, the government will continue supporting many of the activities we have previously undertaken, but on a different scale.

Supporting facts and figures

• For GAC, Budget 2025 proposes to allocate a total of $104.5M over 4 years, towards trade diversification. Investments range from expanding existing successful programs, like CanExport, to creating opportunities through new trade agreements.
• The average U.S. tariff on Canadian goods is 5.4% and continues to disrupt Canadian exports, curbing investment, and straining supply chains.
• Canada retains the lowest net debt-to-GDP ratio in the G7, and the International Monetary Fund predicts we will have the second fastest annual growth in the G7 in both 2026 and 2027.
• The Budget authorized that $35M be re-purposed from the defunct NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund (ANATF) to Ukraine Comprehensive Assistance Package (UCAP).
• Total amounts in the International Assistance Envelope were $8.8B in 2023-24. Figures for 2024-25 and 2025-26 are still being finalized due to ongoing technical adjustments.

Background

Under the overarching themes of “meeting the moment, building Canada strong”, “build, protect and empower Canada” and “spending less to invest more”, Budget 2025 proposes a long-term strategy to strengthen Canada's economy through investments in infrastructure, productivity and competitiveness, defence and security, and housing.

Budget 2025 features a commitment to tabling fall budgets in future years and introduces the Capital Budgeting Framework.

Bill C-15 was tabled in November 2025 and is currently under review by both the House Finance Committee and Senate Finance Committee.

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Background

• Decisions regarding funding to maintain programs set to expire on March 31, 2026 (i.e., sunsetters) will be taken at a later date.

Comprehensive Expenditure Review (CER)

• Our goal is for a leaner, more agile department that is responsive to emerging challenges and priorities. GAC’s core focus is to deliver results aligned with the Government’s 7 missions, with an emphasis on:
  • A new economic and security relationship with US;
  • Collaborating with reliable trading partners and allies;
  • Protecting sovereignty and keeping Canadians safe; and
  • Spending less on government operations.
• We are preserving the tools, services and international footprint that allow us to deliver trade diversification in support of economic growth, and support Canada’s strategic autonomy. This means that internally, we will reorient some work towards economic diplomacy.
• We will keep our capacity to act with others to strengthen global stability, defend and upgrade international rules. We will also refocus international assistance.
• To achieve savings targets in support of Canada’s fiscal objectives, GAC will cease activities that are of lesser value to current interests and priorities and continue to streamline and modernize operations, including finding efficiencies in Canada’s mission network.

Supplementary messages

• In the face of global uncertainty, Canada is focused on what it can control.
• We are focusing our efforts where Canada can make the most difference while advancing Canadian security and prosperity interests strategically.
• Canada will be better positioned to respond quickly to emerging challenges while maintaining its influence in priority areas.

Update

On November 4, the Government presented Budget 2025. The Budget was adopted in the House of Commons during the week of November 17 and has now been referred to the Senate for review.

Background

• More specifically, per Budget 2025, GAC will generate $1.1B in annual savings by 2028-29, totaling $4.7B over five years by refocusing Canada's international presence in the areas of advocacy, security, and development, as well as implementing targeted reforms across its trade and investment portfolio to better align with current strategic priorities and the geo-political context.
• As part of these adjustments, there will be reductions in development funding to global health, some international financial institutions, and bilateral development programs. Together, these changes are expected to re-baseline the International Assistance Envelope to pre-COVID levels.
• GAC is committed to lowering administrative overhead, focusing its efforts on high-impact services for Canadian businesses as well as finding efficiencies across Canada’s mission network through strategies such of revamping emergency preparedness, modernizing consular services and consolidating its real property portfolio.

Overview of SEMA amendments

• The proposed amendments to the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA) would require the Minister of Foreign Affairs to consult the Minister of Finance when sanctioning systemically important financial institutions to mitigate the risk of unintended consequences on Canada’s own financial sector.
• Additionally, to help ensure financial institutions do not unduly profit from their sanctions obligations, the proposed amendments authorize a targeted charge on the windfall profits federally regulated financial institutions earn from holding immobilized assets.
• I am pleased to take your general questions on SEMA. I defer to my colleague, the Minister of Finance, to speak to these proposed new authorities.

Supplementary messages

• The amendment to consult the Minister of Finance will formalize collaboration and ensure financial stability considerations are integrated into decision-making.
• Consultation would be required when sanctioning the following entities: globally systemically important banks; foreign banks authorized to operate in Canada; foreign payment service providers operating in Canada; foreign central banks; and foreign entities operating as a stock exchange and/or clearing and settlement system.
• In addition to ensuring financial institutions do not unduly profit from their sanctions obligations, the targeted windfall profit charge would demonstrate solidarity with European partners who have introduced a similar initiative. (Example: To avoid undue profits to Euroclear, and to support Ukraine’s financing needs, the European Union introduced a “windfall profit mechanism” on certain financial institutions holding Russian sovereign assets.)
• Any revenues received from the charge would be paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund. The Government could rely on this fiscal room to support aid to Ukraine, or advance other priorities.

Update

Officials from Finance Canada and Global Affairs Canada appeared before the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (AEFA) on December 10, 2025, as part of a pre-study on this division.

Supporting facts and figures

• As of December 2024, the RCMP reports that approximatively $185 million in assets have been immobilized under SEMA’s Russia Regulations. In addition, approximately $0.2 million has been immobilized under SEMA's Belarus and Iran Regulations.

Background

Sanctions measures include the seizing or freezing of property situated in Canada and restricting financial transactions or other economic activity with listed persons (defined as individuals or entities). Sanctions must be respected by persons in Canada or Canadian persons outside of Canada.

While frozen, assets held in financial institutions can generate interest or be leveraged, creating unintended profits for asset holders. For example, immobilized bank deposits represent a funding source that may be leveraged to provide loans and support other profit generating activities.

Financial sanctions prohibit the provision of financial services or conducting financial transactions with, or on behalf of, or at the direction of, listed persons, or in relation to certain prohibited goods. Given the integrated nature of the global financial system, sanctioning financial institutions with strong links to Canada’s financial system could pose domestic financial stability risks.

Private Members Bill C-233

• Human rights are important to Canada and to Canadians.
• Canada has one of the strongest export controls systems in the world.
• Permit applications are reviewed on a case-by-case basis against the criteria drawn from Arms Trade Treaty which are embedded in Canadian law through the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA).

Supplementary messages

• Canada acceded to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2019.
• To be eligible for accession, Canada made considerable changes to its export control legislation and framework and went beyond the ATT requirements.
• Canada continues to participate actively in this treaty and to engage with civil society to ensure our regime remains on par with those of our allies.

Update

During the first hour of second reading debate of Bill C-233 (An Act to amend the Export and Import Permits Act) that took place on November 19, 2025, Parliamentary Secretaries Robert Oliphant and Mona Fortier advised that the government would not support the Bill as currently written. The Bill, which was introduced by MP Jenny Kwan (NDP), proposes several changes to the Export and Import Permits Act and Canada’s long-standing export control regime. The second hour of second reading is expected to take place on February 26, 2026.

Supporting facts and figures

• Canada acceded to the Arms Trade Treaty in 2019 further to amendments to the Export and Import Permits Act, its regulations and policies and practices.
• Canada went beyond the ATT requirements by embedding the ATT criteria and risk test in domestic legislation.
• Canada applies the ATT criteria to more than the full system conventional arms captured in Article 2 of the ATT, to include parts and components.

Private Members Bill C-219

• Our Government recently indicated during Second Reading debate the intention to support Bill C-219. However, we consider that elements of the bill could be improved.
• I have concerns that some of the specific elements of this bill could put the safety and security of human rights defenders – including Canadians – at risk.
• Other elements are problematic as they would require government organizations to come to conclusions outside their areas of expertise, pose machinery of government issues, increase red tape and more.

Update

Private Members’ Bill C-219 was introduced in the House of Commons on September 16, 2025 by Conservative Party of Canad MP James Bezan. The bill received first hour of Second Reading debate on November 26.

Supporting facts and figures

• The Government takes a decentralized approach to supporting human rights defenders, anchored in Voices at Risk: Canada’s Guidelines on Supporting Human Rights Defenders. Canadian officials across our global diplomatic network actively engage in outreach, support and advocacy to identify and support important cases of concern in their country/countries of accreditation. The best support is often provided in concert with state and CSO partners through quiet diplomacy.
• Since 2017, Canada has imposed sanctions on over 520 individuals and entities in response to human rights violations and acts of significant corruption under both the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA) and Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law) (JVCFOA).
• Under s. 35.1 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, a foreign national is inadmissible to Canada if they are listed under either of Canada’s autonomous sanctions laws. Under s. 42(1)(b), accompanying family members of sanctioned individuals are also inadmissible.
• Canada’s sanctions asset seizure and forfeiture regime have procedural safeguards in place. Statutory recourse mechanisms and legal processes may be launched by parties, impacting the timelines for forfeiture.
• GAC’s Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM Canada) is active in detecting digital transnational repression globally using open-source research and data analytics. It leverages a full suite of diplomatic tools to respond to detected threats.

Background

Bill C-219 seeks to amend four laws – the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act, SEMA, JVCFOA as well as the Broadcasting Act.

Bill C-219 aims to strengthen Canada’s sanctions and human rights frameworks by requiring the development of an annual report on human rights, which requires a detailed listing of human rights defenders detained abroad – referred to as prisoners of conscience in the bill – whose release the Government is actively seeking, and seeking to align Canadian legislation with likeminded countries through the imposition of economic measures and visa bans. Among a suite of proposed amendments, it also seeks to change the title of SEMA, expand the legislation’s sanctions triggers, and provide a mechanism to remove broadcast licences from sanctioned entities.

A few elements of Bill C-219 are very similar to Bill C-281 from the previous parliament, namely the human rights reporting provisions, a requirement for the Minister to respond to parliamentary recommendations for Magnitsky Law sanctions under the JVCFOA, and Broadcasting Act provisions. Bill C-281 passed through the House unanimously and was awaiting committee study in the Senate before the dissolution of the 44^th Parliament. Whereas C-281 sought amendments to JVCFOA only, C-219 seeks to amend both SEMA and JVCFOA.

Senate Public Bill S-214

• The bill aims to facilitate the forfeiture of foreign state assets and ultimately to provide the proceeds of their disposal to the affected state.
• Canada’s existing asset seizure and forfeiture regime is exhaustive. It enables the Government to seize (or restrain), forfeit (by judicial order), dispose and redistribute assets in Canada belonging to sanctioned individuals and entities.

Update

Senate Public Bill S-214 was introduced in the Senate on May 28, 2025, by Senator Donna Dasko and is currently awaiting the start of second reading debate. No date has yet been confirmed.

Background

Bill S-214 seeks to amend the Special Economic Measures Act to allow for the disposal of a foreign state’s assets seized under the Act without needing a judicial order.

Bill S-214 is identical to former Bill S-278 that was introduced in the previous Parliament in October 2023. Bill S-278 was originally sponsored by former Senator Ratna Omidvar. Senators Omidvar, Housakos, and Patterson spoke in support of the bill during second reading debates on four occasions between October 17, 2023 and October 22, 2024. However, Bill S-278 expired before completing second reading upon the prorogation and dissolution of Parliament in March 2025.

Private Members Bill C-228

• While we share the principles underlying Bill C-228, we believe that it risks undermining the agility and flexibility required to advance Canadian interests on the world stage, without significantly enhancing transparency.
• The current Policy on the Tabling of Treaties in Parliament, which calls for the tabling of all treaties for a period of twenty-one sitting days, and in place since 2008, affords a high degree of transparency by the Government to parliamentarians.

Supplementary messages

• The amendments contemplated in the Bill have the potential to cause significant delays in the treaty-making process, especially regarding the process for parliamentary committee review of “major treaties”, which has implications of costs in time, resources, and flexibility imposed by legally requiring a parliamentary committee to consider most treaties for a potentially indeterminate length of time.
• The flexibility built in the current Policy would be replaced by legislated requirements that could delay or impede ratification by making it illegal for the Government to continue the treaty-making process without “advice” of the House of Commons and thus hindering the delivery of results for Canadians and Canadian business.
• The current Policy provides parliamentarians with opportunities for enhanced participation, notably in the case of tabling requirements prior to commencing negotiations for Free Trade Agreements, with debates in Parliament and discussions in Committee, where implementation legislation is required, and during the usual tabling period for all treaties, where Members of Parliament may initiate a debate.

Background

In addition to requiring by law the tabling of all treaties in Parliament for 21 sitting days, Bill C-228 would also require the Minister of Foreign Affairs to obtain the advice of the House on “major treaties” through a parliamentary committee which must submit a report for this purpose “as soon as feasible” (a term not defined), prior to the Government taking further actions to make the treaty binding on Canada. This has the potential to delay the ratification by Canada of major treaties (which would include all trade and defence related treaties, as well as a broad category of other bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral treaties) by at least 12-24 months. Under the Bill, exemptions from tabling can only be granted under “exceptional circumstances” by the Governor in Council by order and the reasons must be tabled. Currently, exemptions from the tabling commitments found in the Policy can be granted by the Prime Minister or Cabinet. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke to the bill during Second Reading debate in the House of Commons on October 21. The Bloc Québécois argued for greater involvement from legislators and argued that other jurisdictions, citing countries in the European Union (France, Germany, Denmark and Italy) and the U.S., have more transparent approaches to treaty-making. The Conservative Party expressed concern that involving the House and committee review of nearly all treaties would constitute an undue burden on Parliament. During Second Reading debates on Bill C-13 (implementing legislation for the Accession of the United Kingdom to the CPTPP), the BQ referenced Bill C-228 while reiterating the need for further transparency around treaties, notably citing the desire to require by law the tabling of treaties in Parliament. Bill C-13 had been introduced 15 sitting days after the tabling of the treaty, rather than 21 sitting days.

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Private Members Bill C-251

• Forced labour is a serious violation of human rights that targets the most vulnerable groups across the globe.
• To prevent and address labour exploitation in global supply chains and to promote responsible business conduct abroad, Canada implemented the forced labour import prohibition and the Supply Chains Act.
• The Government recognizes and welcomes the interest of members in this important issue. The Government remains committed to working with Canadians and international partners to end forced labour in global supply chains.

Update

Consideration of Bill C-251 in Parliament is unlikely given its current low position on the House of Commons Order of Precedence (#169 as of January 2026). Should consideration of this bill be moved up to a timeframe in the foreseeable future, additional information and analysis could be provided to Ministers offices to inform a decision with respect to the position of the Government of Canada.

Background

In July 2020, Canada introduced an import prohibition on goods mined, manufactured, or produced wholly or in part by forced labour further to its obligations under the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA). The import ban is administered and enforced by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA). Determinations are made on a case-by-case basis for each specific shipment, based on available evidence and analysis. Establishing that goods have been produced by forced labour is a labour-intensive undertaking that requires significant research and analysis and supporting information. Separately, Parliament enacted Bill S-211, the Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act (Supply Chains Act) in January 2024, introducing mandatory forced labour supply chain reporting requirements for businesses.

On October 21, 2025, Bloc Québécois MP Simon-Pierre Savard Tremblay (vice chair of the Standing Committee on International Trade (CIIT)) introduced Private Members Bill (PMB) C-251 entitled, “An Act to amend the Customs Act and the Customs Tariff (forced labour and child labour).”

Bill C-251 would amend the Customs Act and the Customs Tariff with the effect of increasing requirements on Canadian customs officers and importers related to goods at risk of having been made with forced labour or child labour. It would require customs officers to detain goods that come from a country, region, area, or a specific entity that the Governor in Council has designated as being associated with the use of forced or child labour. For goods from these designated jurisdictions or entities, the bill creates a “rebuttable presumption” that they were mined, manufactured, or produced wholly or in part using forced or child labour – effectively shifting the burden of proof from the Government to the importer. These goods would be treated as prohibited imports by default unless and until the Canadian importer can rebut the presumption by meeting prescribed supply-chain tracing, certification, and due-diligence requirements and by satisfying the customs officer that the goods were not made with forced or child labour.

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Board of Peace

• Canada welcomes the announcement of Phase 2 of the Peace Plan, and the establishment of a transitional governance architecture, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2803.
• Canada is working with its international partners to advance the peace plan and we are ready to work with the bodies tasked with overseeing implementation.
• Canada will continue to advocate for a two-state solution, Hamas disarmament, unimpeded humanitarian assistance, and support for PA reforms and Palestinian-led governance.

Supplementary messages

• Canada remains committed to the provision of urgent humanitarian assistance that reaches civilians in Gaza at scale. Unimpeded humanitarian access is a necessary precondition for any future early recovery and reconstruction efforts.
• As Phase 2 of the plan progresses, we are actively assessing where Canada’s expertise – such as demining, health, and institutional rebuilding – can most effectively contribute to Gaza’s stabilization, recovery and reconstruction.
• Canada is engaged with partners in discussions to support Gaza’s recovery, achieve lasting peace, and advance a two-state solution in which Israelis and Palestinians live side by side in security and dignity.
• Responsive - Why was Canada uninvited from the Board of Peace?
• This was a U.S. decision. Our policy remains unchanged. Canada’s ongoing support to humanitarian efforts and other aspects of the Gaza peace plan will continue.

Background

On January 14, 2026, US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff announced the launch of Phase 2 of the peace plan. Phase 2 establishes the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) – a transitional Palestinian technocratic administration in Gaza that will operate under Board of Peace (BoP) oversight. On January 16, President Trump delivered BoP invitation letters to roughly 60 world leaders, including PM Carney. On January 22, President Trump rescinded PM Carney’s invitation in a Truth Social announcement. The BoP is meant to be the overarching governance body of the US 20-point peace plan for Gaza, further to UNSC resolution 2803. However, its Charter does not reference Gaza, suggesting the mandate of the institution is envisioned as being broader in scope – potentially challenging the UN’s authority.

Defending democracy

• Canada affirms that democracy is essential to protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, and provides the predictable conditions needed for stability and economic prosperity.
• Democracy is increasingly under threat from rising political polarization and organized anti‑gender and anti‑rights movements, compounded by new technologies that lower the barrier of entry for adversaries.
• In a context of continued democratic decline globally, and a rise in authoritarian regimes, protecting democracy is a shared and urgent challenge for countries, requiring joint action and visible leadership globally.

Supplementary messages

• Canada reinforces democratic resilience by supporting vibrant civic spaces where civil society, journalists, and human rights defenders can participate freely and safely, strengthening collective capacity to resist pressures that aim to erode democratic norms.
• Canada supports free and fair elections by deploying Canadian observers to multilateral election observation missions, helping strengthen transparency and credibility in electoral processes.

Supporting facts and figures

• In FY 2023-2024, Global Affairs Canada disbursed $376 million in Inclusive Democratic Governance programming. This represented 7% of GAC’s international assistance.
• International indices track a concerning decline in in the political rights and liberties that comprise democratic governance. The Global State of Democracy 2025 report notes that 94 countries (54 percent of all countries assessed) suffered a decline in at least one factor of democratic performance, compared to their own performance five years ago, while only 55 countries (32 percent) advanced.
• According to the V-Dem Institute’s Democracy Report 2025:
  • Clean elections declined in 25 countries and rule of law in 18 in 2024.
  • In 2024, Freedom of Expression deteriorated in 44 countries; this includes declines in various aspects of media freedom, safety of journalists, freedom of citizens to discuss political issues, as well as freedom of academic and cul­tural expression.
  • Governments in 41 countries were increasingly repressive of civil society organizations, compared to a decade ago (in 2014).
• More broadly, Freedom House (prominent American NGO focused on democratic governance) tracks a 19-year global decline in freedom and democracy.

Background

Current geopolitical dynamics—including rising authoritarianism, fragmented approaches among traditional allies, and increasing pressure on international norms—are making it more difficult to advance Canadian interests and uphold shared values. These challenges are compounded by funding constraints, trust deficits between states, and growing threats to human rights and democratic institutions. In this context, Canada’s defense of key norms requires deeper, targeted engagement with partners that share Canadian values, both bilaterally and through multilateral fora.

Through Canada’s Promoting and Protecting Democracy (ProDem) program, valued at $10M annually (sunsetting in 2028‑2029), Canada provides international assistance to strengthen democratic institutions and safeguard electoral processes — including election monitoring, countering foreign interference, and reinforcing resilience against threats to democratic governance.

It also addresses the weaponization of information by advancing information integrity and supporting journalists, human rights defenders, and civil society to counter disinformation, defend digital rights, and prevent online and offline harassment and repression.

In addition to engaging bilaterally and through civil society partnerships, Canada is a member of several international and multilateral forums striving to promote and protect democracy, including the UN Democracy Fund, International IDEA, the Community of Democracies, the Media Freedom Coalition, and the Freedom Online Coalition.

Foreign interference (General)

• Foreign interference continues to pose a significant threat to Canada’s social cohesion, values, sovereignty and national security. Transnational repression is one of the most harmful forms of foreign interference.
• The Government of Canada has put strong measures in place to reinforce our capacity to detect, deter, and respond to foreign interference. We are actively working to make Canadians aware of the threat and ensure they have the information they need to build resilience.
• Canada regularly underlines through diplomatic engagement with foreign partners that there is no tolerance for foreign interference, including transnational repression, targeting Canadians or individuals on Canadian soil.

Supplementary messages

• Countering foreign interference is a Government of Canada priority. These efforts span multiple domains by strengthening intelligence coordination, enhancing transparency mechanisms, and deepening engagement with civil society and diaspora communities.
• One of our best defenses against these threats is to continue building societal resilience and trust with vulnerable communities and key partners, in close collaboration and engagement with our provincial and territorial partners.
• My department is supporting members of Canada’s national security and intelligence community to address recommendations made by review bodies and the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions (PIFI).

Background

The Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC) initiated its foreign interference (FI) study in November 2022 following unauthorized disclosures of classified information to the media, which raised concerns about potential FI activities in Canada’s democratic processes during GE43 in 2019 and GE44 in 2021.

Since then, the Committee held over 30 meetings and included over 70 witnesses. Other reviews included: the Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency’s Review of the dissemination of intelligence on People’s Republic of China political foreign interference, 2018-2023, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians’ Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada's Democratic Processes and Institutions, and PIFI. In total, PIFI made over 50 recommendations to the Government of Canada, which are being addressed by the Government.

Alleged persecution of Christians in Nigeria

• Canada is aware of the allegations of violence against Christian communities in Nigeria.
• We closely monitor instances of hatred and intolerance affecting faith and belief communities worldwide, and oppose all religious hatred, discrimination, and xenophobia where it occurs.
• Canada supports efforts to address the root causes and impacts of violence and insecurity in Nigeria through its peace and security, development and humanitarian programs.

Supporting facts and figures

• Since 2020-21, Canada has invested over $24.2 million in West and Central Africa through its Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program, including support to Nigeria to address violent extremism, strengthen resilience against radicalization, and strengthen judicial capacity for terrorism prosecutions.
• Through the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program, Canada supports ~$2M in projects in Nigeria to curb small arms flows, research on reintegration of ex-combatants, and advance the Women, Peace and Security agenda.
• Under the Weapons Threat Reduction Program, Canada has allocated over $9.5M since 2014 to counter chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear proliferation and terrorism threats in Nigeria.
• Canada’s bilateral development program ($16.5M in 2023–24) focuses on poverty reduction, inclusive economic growth, health access, and women and youth empowerment, including resilience-building in conflict affected northern regions.

Background

On December 25, 2025 (with Nigeria’s consent), the U.S. launched an airstrike against the Lakurawa terrorist organization in the Muslim-majority state of Sokoto. U.S. strikes have allegedly sought to protect Christians from ISIS-backed militants, with the Trump administration framing the actions as both counterterrorism and religious-protection. This followed on several months of heightened rhetoric in the United States on alleged Christian persecution in Nigeria, including designating the country a Country of Particular Concern on October 31, 2025. U.S.–Nigeria engagement had been intensifying since the designation: meetings in November led to commitments on intelligence sharing, defence equipment sales, the creation of a Joint Working Group, further equipment deliveries, and expanded counterterrorism coordination. The Joint Working Group, led by Under Secretary Allison Hooker, held its first meeting on January 22, 2026, where both sides reaffirmed commitments to deepen operational cooperation, technology access, anti–money laundering, counterterrorist financing, and law enforcement capacity building

Analysts suggest the U.S policy moves reflect, in part, lobbying by conservative Christian groups in the U.S. and the influence of domestic political considerations, which have become more pronounced against a backdrop of already tense bilateral relations with Nigeria over trade, visa, and deportation issues. While attacks on Christians are real, analysts argue that the U.S. claims overlook Nigeria’s complex insecurity situation. Many victims are Muslim or from other religious or ethnic communities, and much of the violence varies by region and is driven by other factors, including terrorism, ethnic tensions, conflicts over land and resources, and criminality and weak governance, rather than purely religious motives.

Reports frequently cited by media and used by conservative Christians lobby groups, such as Open Doors and ORFA, have been criticized for methodological limitations. Moreover, many recent mass abductions, including those involving Catholic schools, appear primarily motivated by the opportunity to extort ransom.

Nigeria, a country of over 200 million people, is split roughly between Christians in the south and Muslims in the north, with constitutional guarantees of religious freedom. Sharia law is implemented in 12 predominantly Muslim northern Nigerian states as a parallel legal system alongside Nigeria's federal constitution.

The Nigerian government rejects allegations of religious targeting, attributing violence to structural factors. It nevertheless declared a nationwide security emergency on November 26, 2025, supported creating state level police forces, increased defence spending to $3.7 billion in the 2026 budget, and has called for an end to “open grazing,” widely seen as exacerbating farmer–herder conflicts which are a significant source of instability. The government plans to order mass recruitment of police and military personnel, acquire new equipment, and classify any armed group or gun-wielding non-state actors operating outside state authority as terrorist.

However, these new measures appear to have been largely in response to U.S pressures, and it remains to be seen if this will result in concrete changes and if the Nigerian government will maintain these efforts over time. The situation has been allowed to worsen for years, and Nigeria continues to face major challenges in addressing violence and insecurity, including corruption and weak governance, poor inter-agency coordination, limited capacity to address widespread violence, and unresolved structural drivers such as poverty, unemployment and environmental degradation.

U.S. National Defense Strategy

• The Government of Canada is carefully reviewing the newly released U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS). Its content reiterates key positions outlined by the Trump Administration over the past year, and the objectives and orientation described in the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS).
• Canada and the U.S. have a deep and longstanding security and defence relationship.
• We continue to engage with the United States on issues that align with Canadian interests and priorities.

Supplementary messages

• Key areas of alignment with the U.S. NDS include reinforcing our energy and economic security, reducing dependencies, strengthening continental defence and border security, combatting transnational crime and all forms of trafficking, and addressing shared concerns related to China while maintaining productive relations.
• Canada will continue to strengthen cooperation with the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere, the Indo-Pacific region, and in North America (including in the Arctic) when it is in our benefit to do so.

Background

Aligned with the NSS, the NDS outlines the global security environment and U.S. strategic approaches to addressing them, focusing on Western Hemisphere, China, Russia, Iran, and the DPRK. It describes the “Simultaneity Problem”, whereby adversaries could coordinate military action in multiple theatres at the same time, as the rationale for U.S. insistence on greater allied burden-sharing. NDS’ Strategic Approaches include:

• defending the U.S. Homeland;
• deterring China in the Indo‑Pacific through strength, not confrontation;
• increase burden‑sharing with U.S. allies and partners; and
• supercharging the U.S. Defence Industrial Base.

Canada-India CEPA negotiations

• Prime Minister Carney and Prime Minister Modi announced the launch of negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership (CEPA) Agreement on November 23.
• Minister Sidhu tabled a Notice of Intent in Parliament on November 24, which marked the beginning of a 90-day period after which Canada and India will be able to formally begin negotiations (end of February).
• Negotiations will address goods, services, investment, agriculture and agri-food, digital trade, mobility and sustainable development.
• Through the Canada-India Joint Statement co-signed in October with my Indian counterpart, we reaffirmed our intention to deepen collaboration across key industries for Canada and India.
• Strengthening Canada’s relationship with India is key to achieving the Prime Minister’s goal of doubling exports to non-U.S. markets over the next 10 years and creating diverse export markets for Canadian products.

Supporting facts and figures

• As the world’s fifth-largest economy, India is an important partner as Canada strengthens its economic links to the Indo-Pacific under a comprehensive strategy for the region.
• In 2024, Canada and India’s two-way trade reached $30.9 billion. Canada’s goods exports to India totaled $5.4 billion and service exports reached $16.1 billion.
• In 2024, Indian foreign direct investment in Canada stood at $7.8 billion and Canada’s investment in India was $5.6 billion.
• In 2023, Indian multinational companies operating in Canada employed nearly 36,000 Canadians.

Background

• Officials will continue to hold discussions with key industry stakeholders and chapter leads, including in the agriculture and processed foods sector, in coming weeks to exchanges views on current trade priorities and challenges to inform negotiation interests.
• Public consultations on the Canada-India CEPA took place from December 13, 2025, to January 27, 2026. Global Affairs Canada has reached out to industry stakeholders in the private sector and civil society, including Indigenous partners, directly to invite submissions that will speak to the specific commercial interests of Canadians to inform negotiations.

Qatar partnership

• Canada’s partnership with Qatar is focused on practical results for Canadians, deepening trade and investment, and advancing security cooperation.
• Canada is pursuing deeper commercial ties with Qatar in sectors of shared interest, including mining, energy, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, and other innovative technologies. These sectors align both with Canadian expertise and with Qatar’s economic diversification agenda.
• On defence and security cooperation, Canada is engaging with Qatar in a targeted and responsible manner, focused on dialogue, regional stability and opportunities for enhanced coordination. All engagement reflects Canada’s rigorous standards and obligations.

Supplementary messages

• Qatar has one of the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds, one of the highest GDPs per capita globally, and an ability to deploy capital into long-term revenue-generating projects.
• During his January 18^th visit, the Prime Minister thanked Qatar for its critical support to Canada during times of need, including during major consular and evacuation efforts (ex. Afghanistan, Covid-19 repatriation).
• Canada is engaging Qatar on practical security lessons learned from major international events, as Canada prepares to host FIFA World Cup 2026.
• Canada’s approach to travel facilitation is risk-based and grounded in security screening and admissibility requirements—Electronic Travel Authorization (eTA) eligibility for Qatari citizens is not a “free pass,” and travellers can be refused entry.

Supporting facts and figures

• Nearly 10,000 Canadians live and work in Qatar.
• Two-way merchandise trade exceeds $325 million; Québec accounts for nearly half of Canadian exports, driven by aerospace and advanced manufacturing.
• On January 18, 2026, the Prime Minister met the Amir of Qatar in Doha to advance cooperation on trade, investment, and security.
• Canada and Qatar agreed to elevate bilateral engagement through a Foreign Ministers-level Strategic Dialogue.
• Canada plans to establish a resident Defence Attaché in Doha to increase bilateral engagement and support defence-sector exports.
• Leaders agreed to conclude negotiations on a Canada–Qatar Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) by summer 2026.
• Canada and Qatar agreed to establish a Joint Canada–Qatar Commission on Economic, Commercial, and Technical Cooperation.
• Canada and Qatar agreed to begin negotiations on a new double-taxation agreement to facilitate two-way work and investment.
• Canada and Qatar agreed to launch negotiations on a defence and security framework and deepen cooperation in security-related areas.
• Canada and Qatar signed a Letter of Intent on Security Cooperation for the FIFA World Cup 2026, building on Qatar’s experience hosting FIFA 2022.
• Canada and Qatar affirmed their intention to expand air services under the Canada–Qatar Air Transport Agreement.
• Qatar affirmed its intent to make significant strategic investments in Canada’s nation-building projects; Canada is committed to bring a delegation of investors to Qatar to advance bilateral and joint investment opportunities.

Background

Canada and Qatar have enjoyed positive relations for over five decades, supported by growing trade, investment, and people‑to‑people ties. Qatar has been an important partner to Canada, including through assistance during COVID, and evacuations from Afghanistan in 2021 and Gaza in 2023. Bilateral cooperation has deepened through a series of recent agreements concluded during Prime Minister Carney’s visit to Doha in January 2026, building on the 2021 Defence Cooperation Agreement and the 2024 MOU establishing annual political consultations. In November 2025, Canada also introduced Electronic Travel Authorization (eTA) eligibility for Qatari citizens in place of the Temporary Resident Visa (TRV) requirement.

Qatar has and continues to support Canadian priorities internationally, including mediation efforts and assistance related to Ukraine. Leader‑level engagement—most notably His Highness the Amir visit to Canada in September 2024 and Prime Minister Carney’s visit to Doha in January 2026 - has reinforced momentum and highlighted growing opportunities for expanded cooperation. As Qatar broadens its diplomatic reach and advances economic diversification, Canada continues to deepen cooperation in areas of mutual interest.

Canada-Somalia relations

• Canada supports Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and encourages dialogue to prevent further destabilization.
• Canada is committed to mitigating regional security threats on land and at sea.
• In 2025, Canada provided nearly $24M in humanitarian assistance. Since 2018, Canada has invested approximately $8M annually through Somalia’s bilateral development program, in addition to $14M in counter-terrorism capacity building programming in Somalia and Kenya since 2020.

Supplementary messages

• We are monitoring regional tensions, including recent developments related to Somaliland.
• Responsive - Canada does not recognize Somaliland’s declaration of independence and supports dialogue within Somalia’s constitutional framework, consistent with AU and UN positions.

Supporting facts and figures

• Canada established diplomatic relations with Somalia in 1968, suspended them in 1991, and re-engaged in 2013 after the federal government was formed. We are accredited to Somalia through our High Commission in Nairobi.
• In 2023–24, Canada provided $56M in total assistance, through humanitarian and multilateral channels, making it a top 10 donor.
• In 2024, Canada exported approximately $7M in goods to Somalia and imported approximately $443K.

Background

Canada hosts a large Somali diaspora community whose leadership strengthens bilateral ties and informs our engagement. Somalia faces sustained security threats from Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia, which target civilians, state institutions, and economic infrastructure, affecting global maritime trade routes and regional security.

The AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), launched in January 2025 as a successor to earlier AU missions, supports stabilization and the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to Somali forces. There is persistent concern about its sustainability. Canada supports stabilization efforts through assessed contributions valued at US$6.8M in 2025-2026 to the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), which supports AUSSOM and provides targeted counter-terrorism capacity building ($14.1M since 2020).

The Federal Government is advancing electoral reforms and constitutional amendments ahead of the 2026 elections, although these efforts are contested by the federal states of Puntland and Jubaland as well as opposition groups.

The semi-autonomous state of Somaliland continues to seek international recognition as an independent republic. To date, Israel is the only country to have recognized Somaliland’s declaration of independence (Dec 2025). This development prompted strong condemnation from the federal government of Somalia, AU, UN and other multilateral organizations, the EU, Egypt, Türkiye, and several Gulf states.

In January 2026, Somalia annulled agreements with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), over maritime access. The UAE is expected to continue cooperation with Somaliland, while Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are playing increasingly influential roles in Somalia’s security sector by sending troops and supplying training and weapons, as well as investing in port infrastructure and offshore oil and gas exploration.

Sanctions

UN sanctions on Somalia target Al-Shabaab and other actors undermining peace and security in Somalia. Sanctions impose arms restrictions on Al-Shabaab and authorize asset freezes, travel bans, and prohibitions on components used to manufacture improvised explosive devices. Canada implements these measures through domestic law. Somalia supports sanctions targeting terrorist groups and has secured exemptions that enable continued delivery of supplies to its federal security institutions.

International assistance

Canada’s bilateral development assistance supports strengthened healthcare systems, human rights, gender equality, climate adaptation, and institutional capacity in Somalia. Humanitarian assistance provides life-saving food and treatment for malnutrition, healthcare, water and sanitation, shelter, and protection services. Insecurity and drought-related crises are expected to leave an estimated 4.8 million people across Somalia in need of humanitarian assistance in 2026. GAC is currently assessing the contributions for 2026.

Canada’s Export Strategy - Critical minerals

• Canada’s critical minerals endowments and sectoral expertise represent an extraordinary opportunity to promote security of supply for Canada and its key partners and allies, while supporting Canada’s economic prosperity.
• Canada continues to work with partners around the world to strengthen critical mineral security and the resilience of global supply chains.
• Canada has been bolstering its economic security toolkit to ensure it has the means to protect its mining industry and resources.
• Canada has also been taking stock of critical minerals in its value chain, including capacity to refine and to contribute to a resilient and traceable supply chain.

Supporting facts and figures

• As of September 2025, $792M from $3.8 billion has been announced for 127 projects under the Critical Minerals Strategy to develop critical mineral value chain.
• G7 funding allocated $80.3 million in total for critical mineral supply chains; $50.3 million for innovation to secure global critical minerals supply chains, $20 million for Resilient and Inclusive Supply-Chain Enhancement partnership (RISE) and $10 million for emerging markets capacity building.
• In 2022 and 2024, Canada issued Investment Canada Act (ICA) policy statements to strengthen national security oversight concerning foreign investments in Canada’s critical minerals sector and modernized the ICA in 2024.
• In August, Prime Minister Carney travelled to Germany where agreements between several Canadian and German companies on co-operation to secure critical mineral supply chains from Canada.
• Canada continues to attract foreign direct investment in the critical minerals sector, aligning with its national interests.

Background

The growing concentration of critical mineral supply chains under Chinese control leaves Canada and its allies increasingly vulnerable to supply chain disruptions. Most recently, on October 9, China announced one of its most far-reaching sets of export controls targeting rare earth elements (REEs) and related products. Another concern is that China uses mining acquisitions to secure access over key infrastructure, such as ports, airstrips, and radar stations.

The G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan has a goal of building a standards-based market to reflect the cost of responsible mining, mobilizing capital and investing in partnerships and promoting innovation. France has signalled its intent to follow Canada’s trajectory and advanced an agenda on mineral resources centred on four strategic areas, namely:

• Strengthening supply chain resiliency through partnerships;
• Accelerating transparency and traceability systems;
• Fostering a more predictable, attractive and market environment to support investment; and,
• Moving forward on circular economy and resource efficiency.

The US is pursuing an aggressive America First critical minerals strategy to secure supply chains and go after the resources it needs globally to reduce dependencies on China. While they are working within the G7 process, the US is still threatening to place national security 232 tariffs on critical minerals (including potash and uranium).

Most recently, the U.S. briefed G7+ finance ministers on its critical minerals price floor concept on critical minerals, aimed at countering China’s pricing practices. The proposal is being led by USTR and seeks to create a preferential trade zone with coordinated measures to prevent imports below an agreed minimum price. U.S. has also convened a meeting of Foreign Ministers on February 4 to discuss critical minerals.

Cuba – Fuel situation

• The Government is monitoring the situation in Cuba closely, with a focus on the safety and security of Canadian citizens on the ground.
• The Government is actively engaging with Cuban authorities and Canadian tourism stakeholders to ensure timely and effective responses should conditions deteriorate, including due to diesel or fuel shortages.
• The Government is also concerned by Cuba’s deepening economic crisis and the potential for a serious humanitarian situation to emerge.

Supplementary messages

• On January 15, Global Affairs Canada updated the Travel Advice and Advisories for Cuba to align the risk level for resort areas with that of rest of the country: “Exercise a high degree of caution”. More information was added on shortages and power outages, including their possible impacts on resorts.
• Cuba remains a popular destination for Canadians. We continue to closely monitor developments in Cuba especially as it relates to resort and tourism areas, and to our embassy operations.
• Canada is opposed to the Helms-Burton Act based on principles of international law and our long-standing objection to extraterritorial application of laws.
• Canada has measures in place under its Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (FEMA) to help protect Canadian businesses operating legitimately in Cuba.

Supporting facts and figures

• Canada remains Cuba’s largest source of foreign tourists, with over 700,000 Canadian tourists visiting Cuba in 2025.
• Global Affairs Canada estimates that approximately 25,000/week Canadians are on the ground during peak tourist season (winter months through March Break).
• In 2023–24, Canada provided $6.8 million in international assistance to Cuba, including support for the renewable energy sector.
• Canada provided $3.05 million in humanitarian assistance to Cuba following Hurricane Melissa in October 2025. This assistance focused on providing food and medical supplies.
• Cuba is Canada’s largest bilateral trading partner in the Caribbean, with two-way merchandise trade totaling $909.8 million in 2024.
• According to Cuban officials, Canada is Cuba’s second-largest source of direct investment, after Spain, with significant investments in mining, power, oil and gas, banking, and tourism.

Background

Situation in Cuba

Cuba is currently facing a number of acute crises that threaten the country’s overall stability. Cuba continues to suffer severe energy and fuel shortages, causing widespread planned and unplanned blackouts. This, along with crumbling infrastructure, shortages of essential goods (food, medicine and healthcare supplies, etc.) and significant pressure from the United States (both via the longstanding U.S. embargo and increasing political pressure from the Trump Administration), leaves Cuba extremely vulnerable.

Oil and fuel supplies

Cuba was reliant on Venezuelan oil for roughly 30% of its energy demand. Mexico was Cuba’s top oil supplier in 2025, but its ability to supply oil (even well below Cuba’s energy needs) is uncertain in a context of increased pressure by the U.S. to stop fuel deliveries including an Executive Order issued January 29^th threatening tariffs on countries which export oil directly or indirectly to Cuba.

Consular

The Embassy in Havana and the two Consulates in Varadero and Guardalavaca provide consular services to Canadian citizens. Should a departure from the island be necessary, this would be coordinated by the Canadian operators and airlines with Global Affairs Canada’s support as required. The department is in close contact with airlines and tour operators.

Canada-Cuba relations

Canada-Cuba diplomatic relations are based on a commitment to open dialogue, cooperation, and the advancement of trade and investment, while recognizing that there are several areas where our positions do not align, particularly related to human rights, democracy and Cuba’s alignment with actors such as China, Russia, Nicaragua, Iran and Venezuela.

International assistance

Canada is among the island’s top western donors ($6.8M in 2023-24), and its international assistance focuses on energy transition, climate resilience, food security, economic empowerment and gender-based violence. Canada is monitoring the impact of the current energy crisis on operational international assistance projects.

Recent developments in Syria

• Canada welcomes efforts by the Syrian Transitional Government to achieve a stable political and economic transition.
• Canada is concerned by the recent escalation between the Syrian Transitional Government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and urges all parties to uphold the ceasefire and continue dialogue towards an agreement.
• Canada calls on the Syrian Transitional Government to ensure the protection of civilians, including religious and ethnic groups.

Supplementary messages

• Canada has removed Syria from its List of Foreign State Supporters of Terrorism under the State Immunity Act (SIA) and removed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) from the List of Terrorist Entities under the Canadian Criminal Code.
• Canada remains a top ten humanitarian donor in Syria, allocating more than $842 million in humanitarian assistance to Syria since 2017, including $106.3 million in 2025.
• Canada recognizes the importance of sanctions relief to Syria’s economic recovery and, on August 27, 2025, renewed the General Permit for 6 months, which facilitates further humanitarian activities and stabilization efforts in Syria.
• Responsive – What is Canada doing for Canadians detained in Syria? Canadian consular officials remain actively engaged with national governments, international organizations operating in the region, as well as civil society groups for information on, and assistance to, Canadian citizens in custody. Due to privacy and operational security considerations, we cannot comment on specific cases.
• Responsive – What is Canada doing to address human rights violations against the Kurdish community? Canada continues to call for the protection of all ethnic and religious minorities in Syria, including the Kurdish community. Canada will continue to work with all relevant partners and is actively monitoring the evolving situation.
• Responsive – Is the international community/ Canada abandoning the Kurds in NE Syria? Canada values its cooperation with all partners in North East Syria. We call on the Syrian Transitional Government and the Syrian Democratic Forces to uphold the ceasefire, continue to work towards a negotiated solution, and ensure the protection of all civilians, including minority groups.
• Responsive – Is ISIS a renewed threat due to recent prison breakouts? Canada is monitoring the situation in Syria closely and will continue working with partners and bodies like the Global Coalition Against Da’esh (ISIS) to advance counterterrorism efforts and ensure the security of ISIS detainees.

Supporting facts and figures

• Since 2015, Canada has welcomed more than 100,000 Syrian refugees.
• Since 2016, allocated more than $4.7 billion in funding for Syria and the region.
• Since 2017, Canada allocated more than $842 million in humanitarian assistance to Syria, including $106.3 million in 2025.

Background

Ahmed al-Sharaa, former-leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), assumed the position of interim President of the Syrian Transitional Government (STG) after overthrowing the Assad regime in December 2024. The STG is advancing efforts towards a stable political and economic transition, including through drafting a temporary constitution, forming a new cabinet, and holding parliamentary elections in October 2025. Syria is also actively engaging with international regional partners on common interests including counterterrorism, transitional justice, and regional stability. In November 2025, Syria joined the US-led Global Coalition Against Da’esh (ISIS).

Escalation in Northeast Syria (NES)

The Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) and its military branch, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), previously maintained control of NES, including prisons and camps detaining alleged ISIS combatants.

In March 2025, the Syrian Transitional Government and the SDF signed an agreement to integrate the SDF into Syria’s newly reconfigured military institutions by the end of 2025, though it was not effectively implemented. In December 2025, clashes erupted between the STG and the SDF, which escalated in January 2026 when government forces seized SDF territory, including some prisons and camps. Canada is aware of Canadians detained in these prisons, and their whereabouts are being reconfirmed. On January 19, 2026, it was reported that roughly 200 ISIS detainees escaped from a NES prison during clashes, of which at least 81 have been recaptured. Negotiations are ongoing, with a U.S.-brokered ceasefire in place until February 9, 2026. On January 21, 2026, the U.S. military announced the intent to move up to 7,000 prisoners from prisons in Northeast Syria to government-run correctional facilities in Iraq, with at least 150 detainees having now been relocated.

Government of Canada presence in Suva, Fiji

• Through Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, in 2022, Canada committed to opening a High Commission in Suva, Fiji, its first in a Pacific Island Country.
• The opening of the High Commission is part of our effort to strengthen economic and security ties with Pacific Island Countries, building on Canada’s long history of cooperation in the region.
• Establishing a new presence in a country or region does incur costs; but efforts were made to maximize efficiencies and minimize costs, for example through co-location agreements with Five-Eye partners.
• Canada’s new High Commissioner to Fiji is now established and actively engaged in advancing Canada’s interests with regional partners.

Supplementary messages

• Canada’s High Commission in Fiji is co-located in the British High Commission at Victoria House, 47 Gladstone Road, Suva, Fiji.
• Canada has multi-faceted ties to Fiji and the region, including development assistance programs, defence cooperation and trade.
• Global Affairs Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy commits Canada to continuing close collaboration with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), the principal multilateral governmental organization in the Pacific Islands. The Secretariat of the Pacific Islands Forum is located in Suva, Fiji. Canada is proud to be a founding Dialogue Partner of the PIF, since 1989. Canada’s High Commissioner in Fiji also serves as Canada’s representative to the Pacific Islands Forum.
• The opening of the High Commission in Suva aligns with the Government of Canada’s foreign policy priorities. An expanded Canadian presence in the Pacific Islands builds Canada’s influence in the region and supports the government’s international assistance, security and defence, as well as trade policy objectives.

Responsive – Expenses for Canadian High Commission and Honourary Consul in Suva.

• From February 2022 to January 2025, Canada’s mission in Fiji was co-located in the premises of the High Commission of Australia in Suva, Fiji, located at 37 Princes Road, Tamavua, Suva, Fiji.
• Since February 2025, Canada’s High Commission has been co-located in the premises of the High Commission of the United Kingdom at Victoria House, 47 Gladstone Road, Suva, Fiji.
• Co-location of diplomatic premises with allies is governed by mutual agreement and the sharing of costs.
• Between April 1, 2022, and March 31, 2025, Canada incurred the following costs related to its High Commission in Fiji:
  • Approximately $161,000 in Property-related expenses, such as rent, utilities and maintenance
  • Approximately $33,000 for logistics related to mission operations, such as telecommunications, security and transportation
  • Approximately $56,000 in program operational costs
  • Approximately $524,000 in salary and related expenses
• For a limited transitional period, until the end of fiscal year 2025/26, in addition to the High Commission, Canada is represented in Fiji by an Honourary Consul, Mr. Tomasi Tuitoga. The Honourary Consul’s Office is located at 12 Vesi Street, Flagstaff, Suva. For the period April 1, 2022 to March 31, 2025, the Honourary Consul received a total honorarium of $15,000 ($5000 per year), in addition to limited telephone expenses. The supervising mission of the Honourary Consul is the Canadian High Commission in Wellington, New Zealand.

Background

Canada and Fiji established diplomatic relations on October 10, 1970. Canada’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy committed the government to strengthen engagement with the PICs by opening Canada’s first mission to Fiji and committing to increased ministerial-level representation at the meetings of the Pacific Islands Forum. Canada’s first resident diplomat in Fiji arrived in 2022.

Currently, Canada has two diplomats living in Suva: the Head of Cooperation for the Pacific, David Fournier, arrived in May 2024, and Jennifer Lalonde, Canada’s first resident High Commissioner to Fiji, arrived and received her credentials in October 2025. HC Lalonde is also Canada’s representative to the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), which is also headquartered in Suva, and serves as Canada’s non-resident HC designate to Tuvalu and Kiribati.

Secretary of State for International Development, Randeep Sarai visited Fiji from January 14-17, 2026. During this visit, Secretary of State Sarai met with the Prime Minister of Fiji, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and External Trade and the Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum.