Appearance at AEFA and Foreign Affairs and International Development (FAAE) on Global Affairs Canada’s budget, Supplementary Estimates B, and on foreign affairs generally

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Thursday, November 27, 2025

Table of Contents

1. Hot Issues
   1. Canada’s Foreign Policy Approach
      • Indo-Pacific Strategy update
      • Canada’s foreign policy approach
   2. Israel – Palestine
      • Palestinian statehood recognition and peace plan
      • Gaza - Humanitarian aid, ICC and ICJ rulings
      • Arms exports to Israel
   3. China
      • Bilateral relations and trade
      • Taiwan
      • Canada’s surtaxes on electric vehicles (EVs), steel and aluminum imports from China
   4. India
      • Canada-India CEPA negotiations
      • Bilateral relations, including diplomatic presence
   5. Russia-Ukraine
      • Russian aggression
      • Ukraine/Russia peace negotiations
   6. Sudan
   7. Canada - U.S. relations
      • U.S. tariffs and negotiations
      • Canada-U.S. defence relations
   8. Central and South America
      • Haiti
      • United States - Venezuela
   9. Transnational repression and foreign interference
   10. Financials
       • GAC elements of Budget 2025
       • BIA – Strengthening the Export and Import Permits Act (Economic Security)
       • Supps B – Overview and expected results
       • Supps B – Climate and innovative finance
   11. Comprehensive Expenditure Review (CER)
       • General
       • Workforce adjustments
       • Mission closures
2. Arctic
   12. Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy
   13. Threats to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty
   14. Arctic Infrastructure
       • Accelerating Major Projects in the North
       • National Defence
3. United States and the Americas
   15. Canada-Mexico relations
   16. Canadians in ICE detentions
   17. Great Lakes Fishery Commission
   18. El Salvador and U.S. cooperation on mass deportations of alleged gang members, and detentions in CECOT prison
4. Europe and Eurasia
   19. Canada’s support to Ukraine
   20. Canada’s support for reconstruction efforts in Ukraine
   21. Canada’s support to return Ukrainian children
   22. Russian assets in Canada
5. Middle East
   23. West Bank and extremist settler violence
   24. Canada supports Lebanese stability
   25. Canada’s diplomatic engagement in Syria
   26. Iran’s nuclear program
6. Africa
   27. Africa Strategy
   28. Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda
   29. Eritrea and Ethiopia
   30. Alleged persecution of Christians in Nigeria
7. Indo-Pacific region
   31. Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan
   32. China - Uyghur
   33. High profile China consular cases
   34. Consular - Jacob Le
8. International issues
   35. Canada’s export strategy - Critical minerals
   36. Export controls – Military goods
   37. Canada’s sanctions regime
   38. Canada’s fulfillment of NATO commitments
   39. Canada-EU Security and Defence Partnership
   40. Non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament
   41. Canada and la Francophonie
   42. Women, Peace and Security
   43. Feminist Foreign Policy
   44. Canada’s support for peacekeeping efforts
   45. Canada’s international humanitarian assistance
   46. Canada’s support to the Global Fund
9. Finance
   47. Supplementary Estimates (B) - Final Page Proofs
   48. Canada’s international assistance commitments
   49. GAC workforce at a glance
   50. Mission footprint and networks
10. Private Member’s Bills
    51. Bill C-219
    52. Bill S-214
    53. Bill C-228 and Quebec
    54. Bill C-233
    55. Bill C-251 – Forced Labour

Appearances before AEFA and FAAE

November 27, 2025

• AEFA: 10:30 – 11:30 AM
• FAAE: 3:30 – 4:30 PM

Prepared for the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Indo-Pacific Strategy update

• The world has changed significantly since the adoption of the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) in 2022. We have always recognized the need to adapt the Strategy with evolving global conditions.
• We will be updating the Strategy to ensure we can deliver Canada’s priorities in the region, in line with the Prime Minister mandate missions and the directions outlined in Budget 2025.

Supplementary messages

• We need to accelerate the shift toward more diversified trade relations. Updating the Strategy will ensure we can exploit new commercial and partnership opportunities in the region.
• Budget 2025 provides new means to develop Canada’s potential as a stable energy provider and reliable economic partner, which is what our regional partners are looking for.
• Recalibrating our relations with China and re-setting our relations with India are important elements of updating the Strategy. However, we must concurrently deepen our cooperation with key partners, such as South Korea, Japan and Australia.
• We will also align our development assistance to support inclusive growth in priority countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

Responsive – China

• The Government recognizes the impact of China within the Indo-Pacific, and the influence it has globally.
• We are in a period of “pragmatic recalibration”; this means purposeful engagement to make progress on areas of mutual interest, while strengthening Canada’s position over time.
• Our Government is seized with finding a path forward with China in a way that mitigates any economic or national security risks to Canada.
• As part of our approach, we will maintain open channels of communication at all levels. A number of bilateral mechanisms have been dormant since 2018, and we are working to reestablish those that remain in our interest, and to launch new ones where appropriate.
• China, and the Indo-Pacific as a whole, also plays a key part in our trade diversification efforts, but we also remain clear-eyed about the unique risks that China poses to our interests.
• Recalibrating a secure and stable relationship with China will take time. We are advancing these efforts at every opportunity, and we want to be sure we are pursuing the best path forward for Canadians.

Update

Over 2023-2025, Canada concluded negotiations with Indonesia, advanced FTA negotiations with ASEAN, and chaired the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) Commission. Canada has also recently announced new FTA negotiations with Thailand and the Philippines. Since October 2023 Canada has embarked on Team Canada Trade Missions to Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Australia, Thailand, and Cambodia, facilitating over 4,000 business-to-business meetings, with an anticipated economic impact of over $251 million. New diplomatic and trade offices were opened in Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Canada launched the $360 million Canadian Climate and Nature Fund for the Private Sector in Asia and opened the Indo-Pacific Agriculture and Agri-Food Office in the Philippines.

Supporting facts and figures

• The Indo-Pacific region is home to 65% of the world’s population and over one-third of global GDP; projected to exceed 50% by 2040.
• Canada’s Shared Ocean Fund ($84.3 million) supports maritime cooperation and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing enforcement.
• Dark Vessel Detection (DVD) platform deployed in the Philippines and across Pacific Island countries.
• 190 scholarships awarded in 2024-2025 under the Canada-ASEAN Scholarships and Educational Exchanges for Development (SEED) Program.
• China faces a rapidly aging population with a shrinking workforce due to decades of low fertility, while Southeast Asia and India remain relatively youthful and still benefits from a demographic dividend, though aging is gradually increasing.

Background

Canada’s IPS, launched in November 2022, is a whole-of-government framework for engagement in the region. It is built around five strategic objectives and involves 23 initiatives across 17 departments and agencies. Canada’s approach aligns with similar strategies from key partners including Australia, Japan, the U.S., India, the EU, and ASEAN. The IPS is designed with a 10-year horizon and includes a built-in review process. Canada’s presence in the region is expanding through diplomatic, trade, development, and defence channels.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has called for an IPS Update to align with evolving mandate priorities, including trade diversification, and strategic autonomy.

Canada’s foreign policy approach

• The world has changed, and Canada will focus its efforts on global partnerships to meet the moment with urgency and resolve.
• Canada’s foreign policy has three pillars:
  • strengthening defence and security,
  • building economic resilience, and
  • relying on core values as a guiding principle.
• I have been leveraging diplomatic relationships and working through multilateral fora to advance our economic and security interests, including through travel to Europe and the Indo-Pacific and my recent hosting of G7 counterparts.

Supplementary messages

• In this hinge moment, Canada’s foreign policy rests on the actions we are taking at home to strengthen Canada’s economic resilience and strategic autonomy.
• Measures announced or confirmed in the Budget will build a stronger economy with nation-building projects, a new trade infrastructure strategy, and a Major Project Office, to help unlock Canada’s energy and critical minerals offer to the world.
• Our trade diversification strategy aspires to double Canada’s non-U.S. exports over the next decade. Accordingly, my department will focus on growing areas of key competitive advantage and engagement with the world’s fastest growing markets.
• Through economic diplomacy, I will work to strengthen government to government relationships to open doors for Canadian industry and to attract investment into Canada. I will leverage our network of diplomatic missions to provide economic insights and opportunities in support of our trade diversification strategy.
• This is a clear example of how we are aligning the international agenda to advance prosperity for Canadians and reduce over-dependencies.
• Implementing Canada’s foreign policy will require adjusting the tools in our toolkit, including international assistance, to best serve Canadians.
• I recently hosted my G7 colleagues in Niagara. We advanced shared approaches to urgent conflict situations in Russia-Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan and Haiti. With seven outreach partners, we discussed common global priorities, namely maritime security and economic resilience including critical minerals.
• If pressed: Our approach is pragmatic, which is why the Prime Minister and I engage more frequently and actively with non-traditional partners. This means balancing the benefits of engagement with important and dynamic economies while mitigating threats to the safety and security of Canadians.

Background

Canada’s foreign policy is guided by the seven priorities outlined in the Prime Minister’s mandate letter. The Prime Minister and Ministers’ international travel, announcements and remarks are illustrations of putting foreign policy priorities into practice. At the G7 FMM Niagara (Nov 11-12), outreach guests were Brazil, India, KSA, Mexico, ROK, South Africa and Ukraine.

Palestinian statehood recognition and peace plan

• Canada has long been committed to a two-state solution – an independent, viable, and sovereign Palestinian State living side by side with the State of Israel in peace and security.
• Canada recognized the State of Palestine as a necessary step to preserve the prospect of a two-state solution, in the face of ongoing efforts to undermine it.
• Canada welcomes the announcement of a U.S.-brokered peace deal between Israel and Hamas and the adoption by the UN Security Council of a resolution endorsing the US plan to end the war in Gaza. Canada will continue to coordinate closely with international partners and will support all efforts to turn this positive step into lasting peace for Israelis and Palestinians.

Supplementary messages

• Canada remains firmly committed to Israel’s right to exist in peace and security, while recognizing that lasting peace also requires a viable, stable Palestinian state that fully acknowledges Israel’s inalienable right to security and peace.
• Canada will increase its support to the Palestinian Authority’s reform and capacity-building efforts, enabling it to reassume governance of Gaza when conditions allow.
• Recognition is not a reward for Hamas. It is a strategic intervention to marginalize violent extremism and restore hope in diplomacy.
• Hamas must disarm and play no role in the future governance of a demilitarized Gaza.
• There must be no displacement of the Palestinian people.
• Canadian civilian and military personnel are actively engaged in the region, including at the U.S.-led Civil-Military Coordination Centre (CMCC) in Israel, which is tasked with monitoring the ceasefire and facilitating the flow of humanitarian assistance, logistics and security assistance into Gaza.
• As a transitional measure, Canada supports the deployment of an International Stabilization Force to ensure Hamas’ disarmament, facilitate the IDF’s withdrawal and protect civilians.
• Responsive – What do other middle east countries do in the peace plan/ what are their roles?
• Qatar, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Jordan, and Türkiye have expressed their public support for the UN Security Council Resolution drafted by the US.
• Several Middle East countries have expressed their willingness to support the Peace plan, including by participating in the ISF, by providing financial support, humanitarian assistance, or taking on a role in the reconstruction of Gaza.

Supporting facts and figures

• Canada has committed more than $400 million in international assistance to support efforts in the West Bank and Gaza since the outset of the conflict. This includes $87.5 million in development assistance to support the Palestinian Authority, including social recovery and job creation, democratic governance, accountability, and access to justice, and to support the economic resilience of women and youth in the West Bank.
• As of November 17, 2025, 25 deceased Israeli hostages’ remains have been returned. The remains of 3 hostages are believed to still be in Gaza.
• The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have withdrawn to an agreed initial ceasefire line and remain in control of approximately 53% of Gaza.

Background

On September 21, 2025, Canada formally recognized the State of Palestine. In coordination with Australian, UK, and French counterparts, Canada has engaged the Palestinian Foreign Minister to advance reforms in democratic renewal, education, and social payment systems, and will continue to support this process. On advancing peace efforts, Canada has endorsed the New York Declaration, an outcome document outlining a roadmap to end the war and establish a sovereign Palestinian state alongside Israel. Canada welcomed President Trump’s peace plan as the most viable option to achieving an immediate end to the war in Gaza, the release of hostages, and a sustained influx in UN-led humanitarian aid. It also creates the conditions for negotiations towards a political solution to the conflict.

President Trump’s 20-point Peace plan includes the creation of a “Board of Peace” (BoP) as a central element of postwar governance and reconstruction in Gaza, with a Gaza Administrative Committee operating to support day-to-day governance and an International Stabilization Force (ISF), a multinational security mission tasked with maintaining and overseeing the transition to civilian governance in post-conflict Gaza.

To establish the legal basis for the Peace Plan—including the creation of the BoP and the deployment of the ISF—the United States drafted a UN Security Council Resolution, which was adopted on November 17. The Resolution authorizes a two-year mandate for the ISF and a transitional governance framework for Gaza, along with a donor-funded reconstruction trust fund. The Resolution also mentions “a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood” once the Palestinian Authority has carried out a reform program and Gaza's redevelopment has advanced.

Gaza – Humanitarian aid, ICC and ICJ rulings

• Canada is horrified by the catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Gaza and continues to call for full adherence to international law. We have responded with over $400 million in international assistance, delivered through United Nations and INGO partners.
• Canada is actively engaged with international partners on the U.S.-led peace plan for Gaza, including on advocacy for a scaled-up humanitarian response.
• We are currently assessing areas where Canada can contribute to Gaza’s stabilization, recovery and reconstruction, with a view to laying the foundations for lasting peace through a two-state solution.
• We are supporting the Palestinian Authority’s reform and capacity-building efforts, to ensure it can play a central role in Gaza’s future.

Supplementary messages

• Canada has always been clear that the protection of civilians is paramount and a requirement under international humanitarian law. All parties must adhere to international humanitarian law.
• Canada is committed to upholding international law and the decisions of international judicial bodies. Canada supports the ICC’s critical role in pursuing accountability and its work as an important multilateral institution, and key pillar of the international rules-based order.
• Canada supports the ICJ’s critical role in the peaceful settlement of disputes and its role in upholding the international rules-based order.
• Canada takes seriously any allegation of genocide and attaches great importance to the Genocide Convention. International courts and tribunals, including the International Court of Justice, play a central role in the legal determination of whether a situation constitutes genocide.
• It is for the International Court of Justice to make a final decision in the case brought by South Africa against Israel under the Genocide Convention, which it has not yet done. Canada continues to follow these proceedings very closely.
• Responsive – will Canada carry out ICC arrest warrants?
  • Canada’s position remains that, as a State Party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, it must comply with its obligations under the Statute and under international law.
• Responsive – why has Canada intervened in The Gambia v Myanmar, but not South Africa v Israel?
  • No decision has yet been made with respect to whether to intervene in this case. However, Canada intervened in The Gambia v Myanmar to set forth its views on the interpretation of the Genocide Convention. Those views are not limited to the facts in that specific case.
• Responsive – How is Canada responding to the risk of complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes?
  • Under international law, a State may be held responsible for aiding or assisting in the internationally wrongful acts of another State. To be complicit, States must knowingly and intentionally aid or assist in those acts. Canada continually engages in considerations to ensure that it is not aiding or assisting in violations of international law.
• Canada has long maintained that Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, including the recently approved E1 settlement plan, are a violation of international law.

Supporting facts and figures

• Since the conflict began, Canada’s has committed over $400 million in international assistance to Palestine including $270 million in humanitarian assistance to support the provision of life-saving assistance, including food, protection and shelter.
• In June 2025, along with Australia, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom, Canada imposed sanctions on Israeli Ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich for inciting violence against Palestinians in the West Bank.

Background

Palestine humanitarian situation and international humanitarian law

The conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza has left over 69,000 Palestinians dead and over 170,000 wounded, including over 42,000 with life-altering injuries. Humanitarian access has improved since the ceasefire but remains constrained by Israeli restrictions and aid deliveries remain well below needs. Throughout the course of the conflict, Canada has consistently stressed that Israel is obligated under international humanitarian law to allow the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief. During the same period, there has been an escalation of violence towards civilians in the West Bank: more than 1,000 Palestinians have been killed, and over 10,000 have been injured.

International Court of Justice (ICJ)

On October 22, 2025, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion saying that Israel is obliged to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip by the United Nations, including UNRWA, to ensure the basic needs of the Palestinian civilians are met. On December 29, 2023, South Africa initiated proceedings against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning alleged violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) in relation to the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip. In January, March, and May 2024, the ICJ indicated provisional measures ordering Israel to prevent the commission of acts falling within the scope of the Genocide Convention and to enable the unhindered provision of humanitarian assistance to Palestinians throughout Gaza. On October 28, 2024, South Africa submitted its Memorial to the ICJ, and Israel has until March 2026 to file its Counter-Memorial, which is also the deadline for States to file declarations of intervention in the proceedings. [REDACTED]

UN Commission of Inquiry

On September 16, 2025, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory released a report concluding that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Israeli authorities have committed genocide against the Palestinians in Gaza. The Commission of Inquiry is not a court with jurisdiction to make a binding legal determination that an individual or State has committed genocide. [REDACTED]

International Criminal Court (ICC)

On 21 November 2024, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Yoav Gallant, and Benyamin Netanyahu. The basis for the warrants are reasonable grounds to believe they bear responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity for actions in Gaza, such as depriving civilians of essentials, blocking aid, using starvation as warfare, and targeting civilians. Separately, the Court had also issued arrest warrants for three Hamas leaders, Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, and Ismail Haniyeh. All have since been confirmed dead and the Court has formally terminated all legal proceedings concerning them.

Senator Woo’s motion pertaining to the situation in Gaza

The following motion has been brought in the Senate by Senator Yuen Pau Woo (Independent, B.C.) : That, in light of findings and orders from the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court on the situation in Gaza, the Senate call on the Government to examine the risk to Canada and Canadians of complicity in violations of international humanitarian law, including war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, and to report on its findings within three months of the adoption of this motion.

Arms exports to Israel

• Since January 8th, 2024, the Government of Canada has not approved any new arms export permits to Israel that could be used in the current conflict in Gaza.
• In 2024, the government also suspended export permits for parts destined for Israel that could be incorporated into items used in Gaza; all of these permits suspended in 2024 remain suspended and cannot be used to export to Israel.

Supplementary messages

• Since January 8, 2024, processing of export permits for items destined to Israel has been effectively paused; only two export permits have been approved in the broad category of “military goods”, which were for parts for Israel’s Iron Dome defensive system.
• The government is in contact with those involved with the possible Foreign Military Sale by the United States to ensure that it would adhere to Canada’s rigorous export permit regime and be consistent with its long-standing policy towards the United States.
• Canada’s Export Control List (ECL) identifies specific goods and technology that require export permits, using carefully selected technical parameters. These parameters are based on Canada’s international obligations as a signatory to multilateral or bilateral agreements and regimes.

Background

As a consequence of the humanitarian situation in Gaza resulting from the Israeli military operation that followed the October 7, 2023 attacks by Hamas, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly instructed that issuance of new export permits to Israel be suspended as of January 8, 2024. Following a more detailed review approximately 30 existing export permits were suspended after they were identified as potential inputs into items that could possibly be used in military operations by Israel. All of the permits suspended in 2024 remain suspended and cannot be used to export to Israel. In 2024 prior to the pause of export permits, Canadian companies exported approximately $18.9 million of strategic goods and technologies to Israel (down from $30.6 million in 2023).

The Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA) allows for the broad authority to amend, suspend, cancel or reinstate any export permit including suspending for the purpose of further investigation of new credible and relevant information. The specific details of items exported under an export permit are protected commercial information.

On August 13, 2024, the U.S. Department of State announced approval of “a possible U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS)” to Israel involving General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems Inc. (GDOTS-C), located in Quebec. Items described under this potential FMS include 50,400 mortar cartridges (i.e. “120mm High Explosive Mortar Cartridges and related equipment”) which are controlled for export under Canada’s Export Control List. The government understands that the soonest delivery of any such items would be in 2026. Officials are in touch with the company to ensure that it adheres to Canada’s export permit regime.

China – Bilateral relations and trade

• Canada is taking a step-by-step approach to engagement with China to recalibrate the bilateral relationship, in order to seek avenues for pragmatic and constructive cooperation to advance Canadian interests.
• In line with this approach, the Prime Minister, the Minister of International Trade, the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food, and I have had productive interactions with our respective counterparts.
• It takes two to make this work and China’s leadership has changed their settings, indicating their interest in restarting relevant channels of engagement at all levels.
• A healthy bilateral relationship manages differences through open channels and frank exchanges. Canada continues to underline to China that there is no tolerance for foreign interference, including transnational repression, targeting Canadians or individuals on Canadian soil.

Supplementary messages

• Canada is interested in engaging with China on trade, where beneficial to Canadians and Canadian industry, and where it is safe for Canadians to do so.
• Pragmatic engagement with China must be balanced against the need to ensure that we have the right toolkit to counter and mitigate resulting economic and national security risks, as well as continued trade diversification efforts to build resilience in criticasupply chains.
• Canada remains actively engaged with China at all levels to find a path forward to address our trade irritants.
• We continue to work closely with our security and intelligence partners, including our allies, to counter foreign interference, including transnational repression, to safeguard our national interests, and protect our economic security.

Supporting facts and figures

• On the margins of the 2025 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, the PM met with President Xi Jinping on October 31, 2025, to discuss the need to advance the bilateral relationship and find a path forward on existing trade irritants. Both leaders directed their officials to move quickly to resolve outstanding trade irritants. In addition, leaders discussed a framework to deepen trade cooperation across a range of sectors including clean and conventional energy, agriculture, manufacturing, climate change, and international finance. Following this meeting, on November 3, China reinstated Canada’s status as an approved destination for group travel, thereby allowing Chinese tour group travel to Canada to resume, which had been blocked since 2020.
• On August 26, the Canada-China Joint Economic and Trade Commission (JETC) convened in Ottawa to discuss pathways for progress in the bilateral trade relationship. The meeting provided an important opportunity for dialogue where both sides agreed to develop a trade ‘action plan’ and showed a willingness to seek a path forward to address trade irritants.
• You last spoke with your counterpart, Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi, on November 10, 2025. You also met him, on October 17, 2025, in Beijing
• The Prime Minister met with President Xi Jinping on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in South Korea on October 31, 2025. He also met with Premier Li Qiang on the margins of UNGA, on September 23, 2025.
• The Minister of International Trade last met with his counterpart, Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao, on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum from October 28 to November 1, 2025.

Background

There is momentum with the Canada-China relationship and mutual interest in recalibrating the relationship. Canada seeks to further increase its economic relations with China while protecting its economic security and national security interests, first and foremost. There are clear opportunities; our interests can benefit from stable, constructive engagement with China, even when we disagree, including with regards to several ongoing friction points. These include the PRC’s foreign interference activities, concerns over China’s human rights record, its stance on issues related to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea, its economic coercion, non-market policies and practices and a number of trade irritants, including tariffs on certain agricultural and seafood products, and anti-dumping duties on canola seeds.

Taiwan

• Canada continues to advance its interests and engagement with Taiwan in a manner consistent with its longstanding One China Policy.
• In concert with its G7 partners, Canada has been steadfast in reinforcing the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and continues to call for the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.
• Canada is strengthening its economic relationship with Taiwan, which is a top five trade partner for Canada in the Indo-Pacific, through concrete collaboration in science, trade, investment, and supply chains resilience.

Supplementary messages

• Established in 1970, Canada’s One China Policy recognizes the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China, taking note of—neither challenging nor endorsing—the Chinese government’s position on Taiwan. This policy forms the basis of Canada’s diplomatic relations with the PRC and unofficial ties with Taiwan. For over five decades, Canada has maintained and advanced unofficial but valuable economic, cultural and people-to-people ties with Taiwan.
• Canada opposes unilateral attempts to change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.
• Bilaterally, Canadian officials have communicated to PRC counterparts ongoing concerns over the situation in the region and publicly called on the PRC to cease its threatening and escalatory actions, which risk increasing tensions and destabilizing the region.
• In recent years, Canada has expanded its defence and security engagement in the Indo-Pacific, including through an enhanced naval presence and increased defence and security engagement with key partners. The Canadian Armed Forces continue to maintain a near-persistent presence in the Indo-Pacific, in full accordance with international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
• Canada remains engaged in the region through its longstanding partnership in the Five Eyes as well as its involvement in regional multilateral organizations like the ASEAN Regional Forum.
• Canada has continued to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations where there is a practical imperative and where Taiwan’s absence would be detrimental to global interests.
• Taiwan is important to the global economy, notably its pivotal role in the manufacturing of semiconductors, and with promising economic opportunities for Canadian business in tech, life sciences, aerospace, and Indigenous trade.
• Every mission of the Global Affairs Canada network has a Mission Emergency Plan as part of a systemic preparedness. The Government of Canada’s assessment remains that the likelihood of events triggering a mass departure of Canadians from Taiwan is very low.
• Responsive – Trade Cooperation Framework Arrangement:
  • Canada and Taiwan enjoy strong unofficial economic and people-to-people ties, consistent with Canada’s One China policy.

Supporting facts and figures

• In 2024, Taiwan ranked as Canada’s 15th largest global merchandise trading partner and 6th largest in Asia (5th if services trade were included). Two-way merchandise trade totaled $9.1bn, a 9.9% decrease from $10.1 billion in 2023. Exports to Taiwan in 2024 were $2.02bn, up slightly from 2023 ($2bn). Imports from Taiwan totaled $7.1bn, down 11.46% from 2023 ($8,1bn).
• Over 30 Canadian companies operate in Taiwan, mainly in the transportation, aerospace/air services, fashion and consumer goods, ICT, clean energy, life sciences and environmental services sectors.
• An estimated 50,000 Canadians reside in Taiwan, and the market hosts Canada’s largest investment project in Asia: Northland Power Inc.’s offshore wind development, supported by Canadian pension funds.

Background

Cross-Strait tensions

Canada is committed to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and opposes unilateral actions that threaten the status quo. Along with the G7, Canada has consistently expressed our position, most recently through a joint foreign ministers’ statement issued at their Niagara meeting.

Security and cooperation

The Taiwan Strait is indispensable to the security and prosperity of the international community, and Canadian Armed Forces’ operations and activities reaffirm Canada’s commitment to maintaining the status quo across the Strait. The Canadian Armed Forces continues to operate in the Indo-Pacific, including in the Taiwan Strait, in full accordance with international law. Most recently, HMCS Ville de Quebec completed a joint transit of the Strait with the HMAS Brisbane (Australia) on September 6, 2025.

Taiwan’s international participation

Canada continues to find ways to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations where there is a practical imperative, and where Taiwan’s absence would be detrimental to global interests. Canada and Taiwan cooperate at multilateral forums where both are represented (e.g. APEC, the WTO, and regional fisheries organizations). Canada, as Chair of the Safer Skies Consultative Committee, invited Taiwan (as “Chinese Taipei”) to participate in the Safer Skies Forum in 2020 and 2022. Canada is also a member of the Global Cooperation and Training Framework alongside Taiwan, the U.S., Japan and Australia to conduct capacity-building in the Indo-Pacific through the organization of international conferences.

Science, technology, and innovation arrangement

Signed on April 15, 2024, this Arrangement enables opportunities for business-led co-innovation partnerships in high tech sectors under the Canadian International Innovation Program as well as expanded research collaborations across the Canadian and Taiwanese ecosystems

Foreign investment promotion and protection arrangement

On December 22, 2023, Canada and Taiwan completed signatures of a non-legally binding Arrangement. This instrument offers protection to Canadian investments in Taiwan and enables Taiwanese foreign investment in Canada.

Collaborative framework on supply chains resilience

On December 6, 2023, Canada and Taiwan endorsed the Framework, which aims to build sustainable and diverse trade among reliable partners to mitigate supply chain disruptions and increase resiliency.

Contingency planning for Canadian citizens

All Canadian Government Offices abroad maintain detailed emergency plans to address a broad range of emergency situations, ranging from natural disasters to civil unrest. The Canadian Trade Office in Taipei has detailed emergency plans and resources in place to respond to events.

 [REDACTED]

Canada’s surtaxes on electric vehicles (EVs), steel and aluminum imports from China

• Concerned with China’s non-market policies and practices, including pervasive subsidization, and insufficient labour and environmental standards.
• These measures artificially lower production costs and have created significant overcapacity in Chinese production that poses a threat to Canadian production.
• In October 2024, Canada imposed surtaxes on imports of electric vehicles (EVs), steel and aluminum from China as an exceptional response to the specific challenges posed by China’s unfair trade practices. Additional measures were implemented in summer of 2025 to apply surtaxes to certain imports from other countries containing Chinese steel and aluminum.

Supplementary messages 

If asked about the Department of Finance’s review of the surtaxes

• When surtaxes were imposed on imports of electric vehicles, steel and aluminum from China in October 2024, the government committed to review these surtaxes within a year.
• Work is underway to complete this review. The review will assess whether there have been developments with respect to China’s non-market policies and practices that led to Canada’s surtaxes, as well whether the scope and design of the surtaxes remain appropriate.

Supporting facts and figures 

• Between 2020 and 2023, China’s global exports of EVs increased by more than 1,100%, from C$4.7 billion to C$58.6 billion.
• In 2023, Canada imported C$2.3 billion in EVs from China, a 1,700% increase over 2022.
• Canada is the 16th largest steel producer in the world. The Canadian steel industry produces about 12 million metric tonnes (mmt) per year, which is just slightly below Canadian demand of 13 mmt. Canada’s annual steelmaking capacity has remained stable at 16 mmt in recent years, after slowly declining from 18 mmt in 2010.
• Canada is the fourth largest primary aluminum producer in the world with an annual capacity of roughly 3.3 mmt and operating at full capacity. Nearly 90% of Canada’s aluminum production is exported to the United States.
• The OECD estimates steel excess capacity (the capacity to produce steel above the global demand) at 602 million metric tons in 2024. China’s non-market practices account for approximately 40% of this excess capacity. Excess capacity creates cheap imports that undercut Canadian market-rate steel production, threatening jobs and the viability of our industry.

Background

On October 1, 2024, Canada imposed a 100% surtax on imports of EVs from China, and on October 22, 2024, Canada imposed 25% surtaxes on certain steel and aluminum products from China. Earlier in 2024, the U.S. also imposed tariffs on imports of EVs (100%), steel and aluminum (25%) from China. The Government of Canada noted it would review the surtaxes within a period of one year from their entry into force, and that they may be supplemented by additional measures, as appropriate. The Department of Finance is leading the ongoing review.

In retaliation, China applied 100% tariffs on Canadian canola oil, canola meal, and peas, and 25% tariffs on certain pork and fish and seafood products on March 20, 2025. In addition, in September 2024, China launched an anti-dumping investigation on imports of Canadian canola seed, and effective August 14, 2025, applied a 75.8% preliminary duty.

On August 1, 2025, Canada implemented surtaxes of 25% on certain imports of steel and aluminum products from all countries (excluding the U.S.) which contain steel melted and poured, or aluminum smelted and cast, in China.

Canada-India CEPA negotiations

• Prime Minister Carney and Prime Minister Modi announced the launch of negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership (CEPA) Agreement on November 23.
• Minister Sidhu tabled a Notice of Intent in Parliament [on November 24] and will launch a consultation process shortly.
• Important opportunity. The negotiations will address goods, services, investment, agriculture and agri-food, digital trade, mobility, and sustainable development.

Supporting facts and figures

• PMs expressed confidence that the CEPA will serve as a powerful economic anchor and help more than double two-way trade to $70 billion.

Background

Canada has held trade negotiations with India on and off since 2010. Most recently, Canada and India paused trade negotiations in August 2023.

India - Bilateral relations, including diplomatic presence

• Global trade norms are being completely reordered. India is too large of a country to not proactively engage. Canada is engaging in a way that first and foremost protects our security and sovereignty while advancing our economic interests.
• By engaging with India on key sectors in a consistent and sustained manner, there is potential to generate trade diversification and economic returns at scale. This would contribute to doubling Canada’s non-U.S. trade over the next decade.
• PMs Carney and Modi held a successful meeting at the G20 Summit in South Africa, during which they agreed to launch negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. This builds on our country's appointment of high commissioners and agreement on new roadmap for Canada-India relations. Public safety and security concerns of Canada are a top priority in Canada’s engagement with India.

Supplementary messages

• Canada and India have had diplomatic relations for over 75 years. This has benefited families, students and businesses in both our countries.
• We have taken action to address concerns regarding activities by agents linked to the Indian government: 7 Indian officials were expelled, arrests were made in both Canada and the US in connection with criminal activities, judicial process underway in BC, new measures were implemented to ensure our democracy is better protected from foreign interference.
• In addition, Indian law enforcement officials are actively collaborating with Canadian officials to ensure that coordination and dialogue is proceeding.

Supporting facts and figures

• On November 23, 2025, Canada and India agreed to launch negotiations for an ambitious Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. This will enable more effective trade, that can scale to more than double current levels, to $70 billion, by 2030.
• On November 22, 2025, Canada agreed to a new trilateral technology and innovation partnership with Australia and India that will draw on the natural strengths of our three countries, emphasize green energy innovation, build resilient supply chains, including in critical minerals, and examine the mass adoption of AI.
• Minister Sidhu concluded a successful visit to India in November, which included the renewal of the Canada-India Ministerial Dialogue on Trade and Investment, co-chaired with Minister Goyal, India’s Minister of Commerce and Industry.
• You met with External Affairs Minister Jaishankar on November 11, 2025, at the G7 Foreign Minister’s Meeting.
• On October 13, 2025, you met with Prime Minister Modi, Commerce Minister Goyal, and External Affairs Minister Jaishankar. Following these meetings, Canada and India issued a substantive Joint Statement, announcing the new roadmap and renewing momentum toward a stronger partnership.
• On September 15, 2025, DCNSIA Drouin met with NSA Doval in India, and discussed our respective security concerns and committed to non-interference including refraining from transnational repression.
• On May 25, 2025, you held an introductory call with External Affairs Minister Jaishankar. Last in-person meeting between Foreign Ministers was October 13, 2025, in Delhi.
• Last travel to India by a Canadian Foreign Minister was in October 2025. Last travel to Canada by an Indian Foreign Minister was 2019.
• In 2024, India was Canada’s seventh-largest goods and services trading partner, with two-way trade valued at $30.9 billion. Canada’s two-way goods trade with India was $13.3 billion ($5.3 billion in exports; $8.0 billion in imports).
• In 2024, Canadian foreign direct investment in India reached $5.6 billion. Canadian pension funds and private equity firms report exposure of $108 billion across India.
• As of December 2024, there were 392,810 Indian international students in Canada.

Background

NSIA and her counterpart discussed Canada and India’s respective security concerns and committed to non-interference including refraining from transnational repression. They also agreed on the importance of reciprocal exchange of information and mutual responsiveness.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs and Global Affairs Canada held pre-Foreign Office Consultations in New Delhi on September 19, 2025.

To support the strong people-to-people linkages, and expanding economic opportunities between India and Canada, both sides also decided to constructively address capacity-related issues at their respective Missions and Consulates.

Russian aggression

• Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its disregard for international law, human rights, and the sovereignty of neighboring states.
• Canada, its allies and the international community have strongly condemned Russia’s actions and taken concrete steps to hold it to account.
• Canada has done so by adopting comprehensive sanctions; working with likeminded countries to isolate Russia diplomatically and commercially; strengthening NATO’s Eastern Flank to deter further aggression; and supporting Ukraine in its right to self-defence and through the provision of substantial assistance.

Supplementary messages

• The Government of Canada has a policy of limited engagement with Russia.
• Canada, its allies, and the international community strongly condemn Russia’s actions which undermine the rules-based international order.
• The unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine is not an isolated incident; it is part of a broader pattern of destabilization, disinformation, and coercion that threatens peace and security across Europe and beyond.
• Canada, its allies, and the international community also condemn the repressive measures Russia has taken domestically that further crack down on civil liberties and silence dissent, including those suppressing any criticism of the war in Ukraine.

Background

The war of aggression against Ukraine is part of a broader pattern of unacceptable behaviour which demonstrates Russia’s blatant disrespect for national borders and international norms. Russia continues to use cyberattacks, propaganda, and energy blackmail to weaken democratic institutions and sow division within the EU and NATO and beyond. Furthermore, Moscow continues to prop up and collaborate with repressive regimes, including in Belarus, where democratic freedoms are suppressed and opposition voices silenced. From targeting civilians in Ukraine to persecuting dissenters at home, Russia’s actions reflect a systemic disregard for human dignity and freedom.

Since the start of the war against Ukraine in 2022, Russia has further intensified its crackdown on civil liberties domestically, targeting dissenters and opposition figures with harsh measures. The death of opposition leader Alexei Navalny in prison in 2024, under suspicious circumstances, exemplifies the regime's ruthless approach to silencing critics. Authorities have expanded repressive laws, labeling individuals and organizations as “foreign agents,” “undesirable,” or “extremist,” often leading to heavy fines or long prison sentences. The United Nations has condemned Russia’s use of national security laws to imprison thousands on politically motivated charges, including children and the elderly.

Canada has curtailed its trade with Russia significantly, largely in response to the sanction measures in place. Canada’s bilateral goods trade is down 95% since 2021, totalling $135 million in 2024. Canadian exports to Russia have dropped 92% from $659 million in 2021 to $51 million in 2024. Canadian direct investment has dropped from $4.4 billion in 2022 to $129 million in 2024 and services trade fell from $797 million in 2022 to $159 million.

Ukraine/Russia peace negotiations

• Canada welcomes the continued engagement of the U.S. on seeking a path to peace in Ukraine. We share the U.S.’ desire to see an end to this war.
• Talks in Geneva between the U.S., Ukraine and National Security Advisors were constructive. Several elements were revised, though work remains on sensitive aspects. We are coordinating with partners, in particular with EU countries, to steer the proposed peace Plan toward outcomes that achieve a just and lasting peace for Ukraine.
• Now is the moment to ramp up pressure on Russia.

Supplementary messages

• Canada’s position has not changed: for any peace to be just and sustainable, it must be Ukrainian-led. This is core to respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty.
• A just peace is in everyone’s interest – it's about the ongoing precedents of upholding the UN Charter and its principles of territorial integrity and the rule of law.
• Canada will continue to support Ukraine, and will continue to collaborate with key partners towards a sustainable and just peace.
• It is imperative that the human dimension is at the center of any peace deal. For a durable peace, Ukrainian children must be returned, and civilian detainees and prisoners of war must be released – these are humanitarian imperatives and legal obligations.

Update

On November 19, the draft 28-point peace plan was leaked to media, leading to a flurry of diplomatic engagement. To date, no official plan has been released. However, during talks in Geneva on November 22-23, Ukrainian and U.S. delegations refined the leaked plan, and indicated they will leave more sensitive issues to be resolved by Presidents Trump and Zelenskyy. Furthermore, the Europeans have formulated a counterproposal to the initial plan, but Moscow rejected this as “unconstructive.”.

President Trump signalled his willingness to re-engage President Putin on the plan. The Kremlin confirmed U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff will visit Moscow the first week of December to meet President Putin, accompanied by other Trump administration officials. President Zelenskyy said he was seeking to meet President Trump “as soon as possible,” possibly by November 26, to finalize a joint agreement. However, President Trump said the visit would depend on completing the peace deal, noting “good talks” with Russia and progress toward ending the war. President Zelenskyy suggested European leaders join his meeting with President Trump to reinforce a united front. French President Emmanuel Macron suggested that French, UK, and Turkish troops could deploy as a “reassurance force” immediately after a peace deal is signed. Canadian senior officials remain fully engaged in supporting Ukraine and coordinating with partners.

PM Carney held a bilateral call with President Zelenskyy on November 23 and participated in a virtual Leader-level meeting of the Coalition of the Willing (CotW) on November 25. At the CotW meeting, Leaders underscored the Coalition’s readiness to provide robust security guarantees for Ukraine and reaffirmed the need for continued pressure on Russia, including through economic measures. The Coalition also emphasised that decisions on transatlantic security must be discussed with, and agreed upon, by all those involved.

Sudan

• Gravely concerned by the situation in El Fasher following the Rapid Support Forces’ takeover.
• Since the conflict began, Canada has provided $144 million in humanitarian, development, and peace and stabilization assistance.
• We continue to call for a ceasefire, unimpeded humanitarian access, and transition to a civilian-led government.
• Canada welcomes the U.S.-led Quad statement and urges its full implementation.
• Canada has imposed three rounds of sanctions on 18 individuals and entities, and strictly enforces the UNSC arms embargo on Sudan, reviewing all export and brokering permits on a case-by-case basis.

Supplementary messages

• Sudan is the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, it impacts regional and international security, including Canada’s security interests, fuelling instability in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, the Red Sea and the Middle East.
• As outlined in Canada’s Africa Strategy, strengthening Canada’s national security includes enhancing peace and security while promoting local benefits in Africa.

Background

• On April 15, 2023, fighting between Sudan’s Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) sparked a humanitarian crisis, displacing more people than any conflict worldwide. Today, 64% of the population (30.4M) need aid, and over half face severe food insecurity. UN reports accuse all sides of grave human rights abuses and possible war crimes. Conditions are dire in El Fasher, where RSF’s October 2025 takeover brought mass executions, ethnically driven killings, and sexual violence, leaving tens of thousands trapped without food or medical care.

• Since the outbreak of the conflict, Canada has provided $144 million in humanitarian assistance to address urgent needs such as food, water, sanitation, and emergency health services, while also protecting civilians, combating conflict-related sexual violence, and supporting civilian-led peace efforts. Diplomatically, Canada has been active in key multilateral forums:
  • November 14: Canada signed a joint appeal for a UN Human Rights Council (HRC) special session on El Fasher and co-sponsored a resolution mandating the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) on Sudan to report on atrocities.
  • November 12: Canada ensured inclusion of Sudan in the final communique of the G7 Foreign Ministers Meeting
  • November 10: Canada joined a donor statement condemning violations of international humanitarian law in Sudan.
  • September 9: Canada delivered a national statement at the 60th UN HRC and co-sponsored the renewal of the FFM on Sudan.
  • In April 2025, marking two years of conflict, Canada issued a G7 foreign ministers’ statement to maintain international attention on Sudan.
• Canada and likeminded condemn both the SAF and the RSF. Despite repeated efforts, peace processes have yet to succeed. On September 12, 2025, the US-led Quad (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, US) called for humanitarian truce and a civilian-led transition. On November 6, the RSF accepted the Quad’s roadmap, while the SAF rejected it, insisting on RSF withdrawal from occupied areas, a demand the RSF refuses. Despite RSF’s stated commitment to a truce, fighting continues in Darfur, North Kordofan, and other regions.

  [REDACTED]

U.S. tariffs and negotiations

• Canada and the U.S. share the world’s most integrated and mutually beneficial trade partnership, exchanging nearly $3.6 billion in goods and services daily.
• Nearly 8 million U.S. jobs depend on trade with Canada, while 2.6 million Canadian jobs depend on exports to the U.S.
• We stand ready to resume discussions on reshaping our economic and security partnership when the U.S. is prepared to re-engage.
• Canada is prepared to defend its interests and do what is best for Canadians and the Canadian economy. We will take the time to negotiate a good deal for Canada.
• We will continue working to preserve CUSMA benefits, protect Canadian market access from future tariff risks, diversify trade, and strengthen domestic capacity to adapt to global shifts and ensure long-term-resilience.

Supporting facts and figures

• Every day, approximately 386,000 people and 3.6 billion in goods and services cross the Canada-U.S. border. This amounts to $1.3 trillion per year.
• Canada is the largest market for U.S. goods in the world. Canada buys more goods from the U.S. than China, Japan, France, and the UK combined.
• Canada is the top merchandise export market for 32 U.S. states and ranks among the top three for 45 states.
• Canadian-owned businesses in the U.S. employ about 900,000 American workers, with nearly 8 million U.S. jobs tied to trade with Canada.
• Canada has invested more in the United States than the other way around, in 2024, U.S. FDI in Canada stood at $762.7 billion, while Canadian FDI in the U.S. stood at $1.3 trillion.

Background

Canada and the United States share one of the world’s most integrated and beneficial bilateral economic relationships, shaped most recently the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA)*, in force since July 2020. Canada remains strongly committed to preserving and strengthening this trilateral framework with Mexico and the United States as the foundation for North American economic competitiveness. Despite CUSMA’s success, the current U.S. administration’s shift toward more assertive and protectionist trade policies, has strained bilateral relations and introduced significant risks to Canada’s economy. Since taking office for his second term, President Trump has taken several unilateral tariff actions against Canada on national security ground out of concerns related to fentanyl/border and to protect U.S. sectors from alleged unfair trade practices (s. 232). As a result, Canada and the U.S. are currently in the process of redefining their economic relationship with growing attention on strategic sectors and supply chain resilience. In August 2025, the United States reaffirmed a core commitment under the CUSMA by maintaining the CUSMA-compliant exemption for Canadian exports to the United States from U.S. tariffs imposed under its International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). As a result of this exemption, apart from goods facing U.S. sectoral tariffs (e.g. steel, aluminum, autos and auto parts, copper, wood products), most Canadian exports to the U.S. enter duty-free.

Effective September 1, Canada removed its counter-tariffs on certain U.S. imports, but counter tariffs on steel, aluminum, and autos remain in place. A key focus of Canadian engagement with the U.S. administration is to reach agreements to reduce U.S. tariffs that impede market access for Canadian exports, including s. 232 sectoral tariffs on steel, aluminium, autos, copper, and wood products.

On October 23, 2025, President Trump announced a halt to all trade negotiations with Canada, citing a controversial Ontario-sponsored ad featuring Ronald Reagan - the second disruption in trade talks this year. In June, negotiations were paused in response to Canada’s Digital Services Tax, which the U.S. alleged targeted U.S. tech firms. Talks resumed after Canada suspended the tax’s implementation. These incidents highlight the fragility of current bilateral trade engagement.

The upcoming mandated review of CUSMA in 2026 is an opportunity to reaffirm the agreement's success and ensure it remains fit for purpose. Canada launched a second round of public consultations (September 20-November 3) to identify sensitivities and strategic opportunities ahead of the joint review, to ensure CUSMA continues to reflect Canada’s national interests and deliver real benefits to Canadians.

Despite the growing challenges in the bilateral trade relationship, Canadian firms are expected to continue prioritizing the U.S. market due to geographic proximity and cultural ties.

* Referred to as USMCA in the U.S. and T-MEC in Mexico.

Canada-U.S. defence relations

• Canada will protect its sovereignty and security. We will collaborate with the United States where it is in Canada’s interest.
• Geography matters: The defence partnership between Canada and the United States is integral to continental security, including in the Arctic.
• Canada is committed to detecting, deterring, and defeating threats to North America in partnership with the United States.
• As directed by the Prime Minister in March of this year, Canada is reviewing its procurement of the F-35 aircraft to ensure that it continues to be the best choice for Canada.

Supplementary messages

• Decisions about military and defence partnerships are made primarily through the lens of Canadian national security.
• The U.S. is Canada’s primary partner in the Arctic, and our approach to Arctic security and defence is largely aligned. The relationship is critical to the collective defence of North America.
• Given our level of integration through NORAD, we have signalled Canada’s interest in collaborating on an Integrated Air and Missile Defence architecture for North America. This will build on significant work already underway to modernize NORAD capabilities to defend our continent against rapidly changing threats.
• Responsive: If asked about Canada –U.S. intelligence- sharing to combat drug trafficking
  • Canada continues to actively share intelligence and cooperate with the U.S. on counter narcotics operations. There has been no change to our information-sharing framework.
  • Canada shares information on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with Canadian and international law. The information sharing relationship with all of our allies, including the U.S., is governed by policies and procedures all aimed at ensuring the respect of our legal and international obligations.
• Responsive: If asked about the legality of U.S. actions in the southern Caribbean and eastern Pacific
  • Canada is committed to upholding international law.
  • It is for each country to ensure it complies with international law.

On the F35 acquisition and review

• In 2023, the Government of Canada announced that we would acquire the F-35 as Canada’s Future Fighter Jet, representing the most significant investment in the Royal Canadian Air Force.
• The review of the F-35 remains ongoing, addressing operational needs, industrial benefits, strategic partnerships, and potential alternatives along with their associated delivery timelines.
• The review seeks to ensure that the F-35 continues to represent value for money for Canada in light of evolving geopolitics.

F35 procurement and review: Quick facts

• The acquisition budget of $27.7 billion includes 88 F-35A jets, associated equipment, sustainment set-up and services, and the construction of Fighter Squadron Facilities.
• The initial eight aircraft will be delivered in 2026-2027 to Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, for the training of Canadian pilots.
• First Aircraft Arrival in Canada: 2028 to Canadian Forces Base Cold Lake
• Initial Operational Capability in 2029 and full Operational Capability in 2033
• Canada’s current fighter fleet, the CF-18 Hornet, has already begun its retirement and will be entirely removed from service by 2032. This means that the replacement capability must be in place and fully operational by 2032 to avoid a critical capability gap. The planned F-35 acquisition delivery schedule has been coordinated with the phased retirement of the CF-18 to minimize operational impacts during the transition.
• As a partner in the F-35 program, Canada has access to industrial participation in production of the aircraft.
• Currently, 37 Canadian companies have F-35 contracts, including Magellan Aerospace in Manitoba (horizontal tail assembly), GasTops in Ontario (engine sensors), and Heroux-Devtek in Quebec (landing gear components).
• Each F-35 aircraft coming out of the production line contains approximately $3.2 million dollars of Canadian-made components.
• The acquisition and initial sustainment of the F-35 project has the potential to contribute over $425 million annually to Canada’s gross domestic product and maintain 3,300 jobs annually for Canadian industry and value chain partners (direct and indirect).

Background

The Canada-U.S. defence partnership spans the full spectrum of cooperation, including shared defence of the continent through NORAD, NATO, the Five Eyes intelligence sharing partnership, and defence materiel cooperation. The defence relationship includes a high degree of military-to-military cooperation and policy dialogue in several thematic and geographic areas, overlaid with regular strategic-level engagements by Ministers and Chiefs of Defence.

There are approximately 670 CAF personnel serving in the U.S. at any given time, including some in command positions. About 90 U.S Armed Forces personnel are in exchange positions with the CAF in Canada. Geography matters, and Canada and the U.S. have the same top priority: the defence of North America. Canada takes seriously its commitment to continental defence and is making significant investments to modernize NORAD. Canada is following developments related to Golden Dome and has signalled interest in aligning plans to develop an Integrated Air and Missile Defence architecture for North America. The Trump Administration is increasingly focused on Arctic security, particularly in the context of its strategic competition with China. The U.S. is Canada’s primary partner in the Arctic, and the relationship is essential to deter and defend against increasingly sophisticated threats to the continent, including from Northern approaches.

Canada has Arctic assets and capabilities that the U.S. does not, including Arctic offshore patrol ships and a significantly larger fleet of icebreakers. Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy includes a greater focus on strengthening partnerships with Arctic Allies (the U.S. and Nordic countries) and commits to opening new consulates in Alaska and Greenland. Canada’s defence policy, Our North, Strong and Free, includes significant funding investments for initiatives in the Arctic, including a) new Northern Operational Support Hubs; b) airborne early warning aircraft; and c) specialized maritime sensors. On April 9, the U.S. published an Executive Order “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance,” which directs U.S. agencies to develop a strategy to “ensure the security and leadership of Arctic waterways”, a component of a broader Maritime Action Plan intended by the Administration to strengthen U.S. shipbuilding.

On southern Caribbean/eastern Pacific

As of November 21, the U.S. conducted at least 21 strikes against vessels in the area, resulting in the deaths of 83 people. The U.S. Administration's justification for these strikes is to curb the flow of narcotics into the U.S.

Haiti

• On September 23, Canada announced new funding of $60 million to support multilateral efforts aimed at stabilizing the situation in Haiti.
• The Government of Canada remains extremely concerned about the humanitarian and security situation in Haiti, and the risk that this crisis spills over to the region.
• Canada’s efforts in Haiti look to restore security through the Gang Suppression Force, and capacity building of Haitian institutions, including the Haitian National Police.

Supplementary messages

• Canada welcomes the UN Security Council’s resolution to establish a strengthened security mission (Gang Suppression Force) backed by a robust UN Support Office.
• We are actively advocating for additional support from other countries to ensure adequate funding and personnel contributions, which are essential to the success of the Gang Suppression Force.
• Canada’s new funding of $60 million includes $40 million to support the transition from the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSSM) to the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) and $20 million towards strengthened maritime security in the Caribbean to address the growing threat of transnational organized crime.
• Canada has contributed over $450 million in international assistance to Haiti since 2022 and is the second-largest contributor to the MSSM/GSF (after the U.S.) with more than $125 million in commitments.
• The ongoing gang violence in Haiti undermines the organization of free and fair elections. Haiti’s future depends on restoring security, having a stable and democratically elected government and improving socioeconomic conditions.
• Canada continues to encourage Haitian-led and Haitian-owned solutions that prioritize the Haitian population and the accountability of the transitional authorities.
• Responsive: What results does the Government have to show from its support to Haiti?
  • Canada has helped prevent a full gang takeover, provide over 100,000 schoolchildren with a daily hot meal, document and investigate cases of corruption, provide critical health services, and enhance small farmers’ resilience, among other results.
  • Our humanitarian assistance continues to save lives by providing emergency food and nutrition, water, sanitation, protection, and health services to Haiti's most vulnerable.
  • We provided training to more than 200 Haitian National Police through the RCMP and local partners and designed and delivered tactical operations training to 330 CARICOM personnel to support their participation in the MSSM.
  • We remain committed to working alongside Haitian and international partners to restore security and democratic rule and promote prosperity for all Haitians.

Supporting facts and figures 

• Gangs control about 90% of Port-au-Prince.
• MSSM/GSF currently includes 986 personnel from Kenya, Jamaica, Guatemala, the Bahamas, and El Salvador - well below the target of 2,500. The recent UNSC resolution authorizes an expanded mission of up to 5,500.
• Total U.S. contributions to the MSSM are estimated at U.S. $1.2 billion.
• Canada has sanctioned 34 Haitian political and economic elites and gang leaders.

Background 

On September 30, the UN Security Council authorized the replacement of the MSSM by a Gang Suppression Force (GSF) by a newly established UN Support Office for Haiti (UNSOH) in Port-au-Prince. The GSF will operate for an initial 12-month period, and the UNSOH will provide logistical and operational support, funded through assessed contributions. Troop contributions and stipends will continue to rely on voluntary contributions. China, Russia and Pakistan abstained on the vote.

As per the UNSC resolution, a Standing Group of Partners (SGP) was created to provide oversight and advocate for personnel and resources to support the GSF. The SGP is currently comprised of countries that have provided significant financial support and made personnel contributions to the MSSM: Canada, Guatemala, El Salvador, Kenya, Jamaica, the United States, and The Bahamas. The resolution provides for coordination between the GSF, the UN, and the Organization of American States (OAS) on security matters in Haiti.

United States-Venezuela

• Canada is aware of U.S. military actions in the Caribbean Sea and its implications for Venezuela. Canada has no involvement in these actions.
• Canada condemns the repression of the Venezuelan people perpetrated by the illegitimate Maduro regime.
• Canada supports a peaceful, negotiated resolution of the crisis in Venezuela, a return to democracy, and the rule of law.
• Responsive if asked about OP CARIBBE
• The Canadian Armed Forces have provided support to Operation CARIBBE since 2006, a contribution to U.S. Enhanced Counternarcotics Operations under Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South).
• The Canadian Armed Forces remains committed to working with our multinational partners to disrupt illicit drug trafficking, in support of law enforcement efforts and in line with international law.
• At this time, there are no planned changes to Canada’s Operation CARIBBE engagements.
• The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces continuously review operational engagements to ensure they remain consistent with Canada’s legal obligations and strategic interests.

Supplementary messages

• Under Maduro, Venezuela has become a repressive authoritarian state and a source of regional instability. Without change, Venezuela will continue to be unstable, forcing Venezuelans to seek safety and opportunities abroad.
• Canada has consistently and explicitly denounced Nicolás Maduro as an illegitimate and repressive ruler, both before and after Venezuela’s disputed 2024 presidential election, signaling the Maduro regime as responsible for widespread human rights abuses, democratic breakdown, and humanitarian suffering.

Update

Since late August 2025, the U.S. has significantly hardened its posture towards Venezuela, including through the deployment of warships and F-35 fighter aircraft off the coast of Venezuela. As of November 12, the U.S. had conducted at least nine lethal strikes reportedly in Caribbean high waters against boats allegedly linked to Venezuelan drug cartels, and 10 others in the Pacific, killing 76. On October 8, President Trump called off efforts to reach a diplomatic agreement with Venezuela, and, on October 15, he confirmed that he had authorized the CIA to conduct covert actions in Venezuela. On October 23, President Trump indicated that land strikes were being considered. On November 13, the U.S. announced “Operation Southern Spear”, which will target “narco-terrorists” and shield “[the American] homeland from the drugs that are killing people.” Colombia, Brazil and Chile have denounced U.S. military actions as a threat to the peace in the region. On November 9, the EU called for respect for international law. On November 12, France condemned the lethal strikes for violating international law.

Supporting facts and figures

• Canada has imposed sanctions on a total of 139 Venezuelan officials “for their role in supporting human rights violations and the repression of protests following the illegitimate election of Nicolás Maduro.”
• In January 2025, the first G7 statement under the Canadian presidency denounced Maduro’s inauguration as a “continued and repressive grasp at power,” condemning arbitrary arrests and abuses under his rule.

Background

• On October 31, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk stated that airstrikes by the U.S. on boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific – allegedly linked to drug trafficking – violate international human rights law.
• Since late August, the U.S. has deployed nine warships supporting the deployment of 10,000 service members, including 2,400 combat-ready marines, to the Southern Caribbean Sea. In Puerto Rico, the U.S. has deployed 10 F-35 fighter jets and at least three MQ-9 Reaper drones, transforming the island into a key logistics and surveillance hub for operations in the region. On November 15, the USS Gerald R. Ford, the U.S.’s largest aircraft carrier, and a strike group arrived in the region carrying more than 4,000 sailors and dozens of tactical aircraft.
• In late September, President Trump sent a notice to Congress notifying that the U.S. is engaged in a ‘‘non-international armed conflict” with cartels it views as ‘‘non state armed groups’’ and whose actions constitute an armed attack against the U.S.
• In July 2025, the U.S. designated the Cartel de los Soles as a terrorist organization, with de facto President Maduro named as its head and claiming that the cartel is one of the organizations responsible for American fentanyl deaths.

[REDACTED] Since 2006, through Operation CARIBBE, Canada has contributed to U.S.-led Operation MARTILLO, a multinational and interagency counternarcotics campaign. Operation CARIBBE is separate from the recent U.S. military activities being undertaken in the vicinity of Venezuela, and Canada’s participation in Operation CARIBBE reflects Canada’s enduring commitment to international cooperation in combating transnational crime, particularly narcotics trafficking, which undermines regional security and governance.

Transnational repression and foreign interference

• Foreign interference continues to pose a significant threat to Canada’s social cohesion, values, sovereignty and national security. Transnational repression is one of the most harmful forms of foreign interference.
• The Government of Canada has put strong measures in place to reinforce our capacity to detect, deter, and respond to foreign interference. We are actively working to make Canadians aware of the threat and ensure they have the information they need to build resilience.
• Canada regularly underlines through diplomatic engagement with foreign partners that there is no tolerance for foreign interference, including transnational repression, targeting Canadians or individuals on Canadian soil.

Supplementary messages

• GAC works closely with the department of Public Safety, who leads the Government efforts to counter foreign interference and transnational repression.
• We support our security agencies in differentiating legitimate diplomatic activities from foreign interference and ensuring appropriate responses.
• The June 2025 G7 leaders' statement on transnational repression, as well as the G7 RRM statements issued this year condemning Transnational Repression (TNR) shows Canada’s leadership to address this threat, keep communities safe, to defend human rights, and to safeguard our sovereignty.

Background

Transnational Repression (TNR) is one of the most harmful manifestations of foreign interference (FI). The PRC is the most active perpetrator of FI in Canada, followed by India, Russia, Pakistan (on opportunistic issues) and Iran. GAC – via RRM Canada - Chairs of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), which strengthens G7 coordination to identify and respond specifically to FI threats in the digital information ecosystem, including digital TNR (DTNR). The G7 RRM includes G7 countries as well as Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Sweden, and NATO as associate members.

• China: The PRC, including Hong Kong, operates the world’s most extensive and sophisticated system of TNR. It uses overt and covert methods to conduct FI and TNR abroad, including digital and cyber TNR, legal threats and coercion, sanctions, the issuance of international arrest warrants and bounties, abuse of the international system, exploitation of PRC-based family members and leveraging overseas proxies to monitor, intimidate and harass people in Canada. GAC’s RRM Canada has publicized several state-sponsored information operations by the PRC, targeting members of Parliament, critics of the Chinese Communist Party, and pro-democracy activists.
• India: During the Public Inquiry into FI, India was identified as a known actor for espionage and repression activities targeting diaspora communities in Canada, particularly in relation to Canada-based support for the pro-Khalistan movement. In 2023, PM Trudeau indicated there were credible allegations of a potential link between agents of the Government of India to the killing of a Canadian citizen, Hardeep Singh Nijjar. The RCMP later uncovered ties between agents linked to the Indian government, clandestine information collection, and violent acts in Canada, prompting multiple diplomatic expulsions. Law enforcement collaboration has since improved.

GAC’s efforts to counter FI and TNR include the following G7 Leaders initiatives. In October 2025, GAC’s RRM Canada hosted the G7 RRM DTNR Detection Academy in Toronto. The Academy is a leader-level initiative under Canada’s G7 Presidency, as announced in the G7 Leaders’ Statement on TNR in June 2025. The event provided training to G7 RRM countries and likeminded partners on TNR detection using open-source research and analysis. Another G7 initiative is the Canada-UK Common Good Cyber Fund which is designed to support those who may be targets of TNR as well as members of civil society who are actively working to counter the threat. With a view to supporting implementation of these engagements by the G7, Canada, through Public Safety, is developing a TNR Resilience and Response Framework.

Canada is also raising awareness about transnational repression at the United Nations through resolutions, joint and national statements, and side events.

Budget 2025 – GAC elements of Budget 2025

• Budget 2025 focuses on our resilience, domestic investment, and economic transformation in response to global trade disruptions and rising protectionism.
• Canada’s new foreign policy echoes these priorities by emphasizing economic resilience, strategic autonomy, and working with others multilaterally, relying on core values as a guiding
• Working closely with the Minister of International Trade, my department will lead trade diversification efforts that seek to double non-U.S. exports, strengthen alliances, and help Canadian businesses seize opportunities in the world’s fastest-growing markets by focusing on our competitive strengths.
• The Budget also emphasizes our future efforts to participate in the reconstruction of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure through a new concessional trade finance envelope.

Supplementary messages 

• Budget 2025 launched a Trade Diversification Strategy to generate $300 billion in new trade by doubling non-US exports over a decade.
• As noted in the Budget, my department will establish a Strategic Exports Office to identify priority opportunities, open doors for Canadian businesses, and remove roadblocks for Canadian companies.
• Canada is also reaffirming its commitment to Ukraine by repurposing $35 million to NATO’s Ukraine Comprehensive Assistance Package, supporting security and interoperability with allies.
• These are only a sample of the many measures the Government is taking to invest in our resilience and economic transformation.

Supporting facts and figures 

• A total of $104.5M was approved in Budget 2025 over 4 years, towards trade diversification. Investments range from expanding existing successful programs like CanExport to creating opportunities through new trade agreements.
• The average U.S. tariff on Canadian goods is 5.6% and continues to disrupt Canadian exports, curbing investment, and straining supply chains.
• Canada retains the lowest net debt-to-GDP ratio in the G7, and the International Monetary Fund predicts we will have the second fastest annual growth in the G7 in both 2026 and 2027.
• The Budget authorized that $35M be re-purposed from the defunct NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund (ANATF) to Ukraine Comprehensive Assistance Package (UCAP).

Background

Budget 2025 features a commitment to tabling fall budgets in future years and introduces the Capital Budgeting Framework.

[REDACTED]

Supplementary messages

• These amendments do not shift Canada’s commitment to open, fair, and rules-based trade; however, we cannot ignore the fact that other countries are increasingly using coercive trade practices to exert pressure.
• The proposed powers are similar to economic security approaches taken by other countries like the U.S., E.U., Japan and Germany.
• These amendments would not automatically create new import or export controls; however, they would give the government more tools if needed to respond in the future to supply chain problems or economic coercion.
• Any controls that come out of these amendments would follow a regulatory process and comply with requirements under the Statutory Instruments Act, Financial Administration Act, and other legislative requirements.

Background

The primary purpose of these amendments is to provide the government with new tools to protect Canada’s economic security. The term “economic security” is broad. It includes the ability of Canada to manage foreign threats and shocks while guiding economic activity to support national security objectives and foster growth.

Canada has a robust economic security toolkit, including laws and enforcement tools to detect crimes, safeguard natural resources, protect intellectual property, promote trade, and respond to many kinds of economic coercion. For example, in cases of economic coercion, the government can use powers under Section 53 of the Customs Tariff or powers under the Special Import Measures Act with respect to imports. However, there are currently no equivalent tools with respect to exports.

The Export and Import Permits Act currently allows the government to control exports and imports for a limited set of reasons. For example, exports can be controlled to meet Canada’s international obligations, for national security reasons, or to manage processing of domestic natural resources and collect information to support trade investigations and disputes. Import controls are similarly limited in scope.

These new amendments would add to the existing economic security toolkit by giving Canada an extra layer of security where other tools may not get the job done. This would include the ability to monitor, limit, prevent or collect information on select imports or exports where doing so helps to protect Canada from an economic security threat or address supply chain vulnerabilities.

2025-26 Supplementary Estimates (B)

Overview and expected results

• The 2025-25 Supplementary Estimates (B) was tabled in Parliament on November 7, 2025.
• In the 2025-26 Supplementary Estimates (B), Global Affairs Canada sought an increase of $847.1M to its current authorities of $8,592.0M, bringing total authorities to $9,439.1M.
• Funding being sought mainly includes:
  • $673.0M for Canada’s International Climate Finance Program;
  • $67.5M for Reinvestment of revenues from the sale or transfer of real property;
  • $27.9M for the Management of the Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber file;
  • $20.0M for the Crisis Pool quick release mechanism; and
  • $13.3M for the Presidency of the G7 Summit in Canada.

Expected results – $673.0M for Canada’s International Climate Finance Program

• This funding will be used for four climate finance initiatives to help developing countries transition to low-carbon, more climate-resilient, inclusive and nature-positive economies.
• The first initiative, the Canada-African Development Bank Climate Fund (CACF 2.0) is an up to $140 million in unconditionally repayable contributions (URC) with the African Development Bank, aimed at addressing key financing barriers that hinder the realization of high-impact, inclusive, climate mitigation and adaptation public and private sector projects in Africa.
• The second initiative, the Climate Resilient Smallholder Program (CRSP), is up to $263 million in URC with the International Fund for Agricultural Development. This URC is provided to IFAD’s thirteenth replenishment to establish its first bilateral climate thematic Concessional Partner Loan (CPL), aimed at providing concessional loans primarily to low and lower-middle income member countries to develop climate adaptation initiatives that target small-scale farmers.
• The third initiative, the Canada – World Bank Clean Energy and Small Island Development States (SIDS) Resilience (CESR) Facility is an up to $170 million URC with the World Bank/ International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), aimed at scaling clean energy investments, while also strengthening coastal and marine resilience in (SIDS), where climate vulnerability is particularly acute.
• The fourth initiative, the Inclusive Climate Action Fund (ICAF), is an up to $100 million in URC with Deetken Asset Management Inc., a Canadian impact investment fund manager, aimed at providing tailored financing to small and medium-sized companies and financial institutions supporting climate change mitigation and adaptation projects in developing countries in Latin America and the Caribbean region.

Expected results – $67.5M for reinvestment of revenues from the sale or transfer of real property

• Through this initiative, Global Affairs Canada will be able to fund more of the activities identified in the 2024 Investment Plan, Real Property Capital. 

Expected results – $27.9 for the management of the Canada-U.S. softwood lumber file

• Continue Canada’s robust defence of the SWL industry by pursuing legal challenges to recover duty refunds and negotiating a new managed trade agreement with the U.S.
• Legal successes and a new agreement would protect Canadian forestry jobs, increase exports, and contribute to GDP growth.

Expected results – $20.0M for the Crisis Pool quick release mechanism

• The reprofiled funding will strengthen Canada’s ability to respond to major international crises in 2025-26, including natural disasters, food crises, conflict, political upheaval, and other unforeseen events.
• By replenishing the Crisis Pool, Canada can respond flexibly to urgent humanitarian needs without diverting resources from long-term sustainable development programming.
• This funding helps save lives, alleviate suffering, and protect the dignity and security of crisis-affected populations worldwide.

Expected results – $13.3M for the presidency of the G7 Summit in Canada

• Ensures Canada can deliver a secure, well-organized G7 Presidency and Leaders’ Summit that upholds Canada’s credibility and leadership on the world stage.
• Supports the successful hosting of ministerial and Sherpa meetings in fall 2025, as well as cultural, protocol, and security programming associated with the Summit.
• Reinforces Canada’s reputation as a reliable and capable G7 host, while meeting international expectations for timeliness, safety, and quality.

Climate and innovative finance

• Canada has taken a leadership role in climate and innovative finance to support economic development and poverty reduction.
• Canada recently renewed its International Assistance Innovation Program (IAIP), which makes targeted, repayable investments – together with private and public partners – in high-impact projects in developing countries.
• FinDev Canada is an important actor in development finance and a key player in Canada’s approach to support growth in emerging markets and developing economies, allowing us to use all the tools at our disposal.

Supplementary messages

• Canada recognizes the fundamental role of the private sector in driving economic growth, facilitating clean energy transitions and catalyzing innovation in developing and emerging economies.
• The new phase of the International Assistance Innovation Program (IAIP) was publicly announced during Canada’s G7 Presidency. It commits $290 million over five years to mobilize additional capital for sustainable economic growth and impact, deepen the impact and reach of Canada’s blended finance in emerging and developing economies, and leverage Canada’s international assistance resources for greater development impact.
• Climate finance also delivers returns for Canada. Since 2011, $862.3 million has been repaid to the Government of Canada’s Consolidated Revenue Fund, with another $2.34 billion expected over the life of projects funded through Unconditionally Repayable Contributions (URCs). 

Update

Canada’s international climate finance program is scheduled to sunset on March 31, 2026. Global Affairs Canada has submitted a sunsetter renewal proposal to the Department of Finance.

The Government of Canada announced via Budget 2024 a new concessional finance facility at FinDev Canada, providing $720 million over five years in concessional capital, including $20 million for technical assistance.

Supporting facts and figures

• As of March 2024, international climate finance initiatives funded by Canada since 2021 are expected to reduce, avoid or remove 286 megatonnes of greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. This is equivalent to the emissions produced from driving a passenger vehicle around the circumference of the globe almost 27,000 times. 
• As of March 2024, Canada’s climate finance is expected to help 7.7 million people in developing countries adapt to climate change between 2021 and 2050. 
• Canada uses concessional loans to increase private sector investment in climate solutions in developing countries to support economic development and poverty reduction. As of 2023 (the latest year for which data is available), $1.17 had been mobilized for every dollar of Canadian funding provided.

Comprehensive Expenditure Review (CER)

• Our goal is for a leaner, more agile department that is responsive to emerging challenges and priorities. Global Affairs Canada’s (GAC’s) core focus is to deliver results aligned with the Government’s 7 priorities, with an emphasis on:
• A new economic and security relationship with US;
• Collaborating with reliable trading partners and allies;
• Protecting sovereignty and keeping Canadians safe; and
• Spending less on government operations.
• We are preserving the tools, services and international footprint that allow us to deliver trade diversification in support of economic growth, and support Canada’s strategic autonomy. This means that internally, we will reorient some work towards economic diplomacy.
• We will keep our capacity to act with others to strengthen global stability, defend and upgrade international rules. We will also refocus international assistance.
• To achieve savings targets in support of Canada’s fiscal objectives, GAC will cease activities that are of lesser value to current interests and priorities, and continue to streamline and modernize operations, including finding efficiencies in Canada’s mission network.

Supplementary messages 

• In the face of global uncertainty, Canada is focused on what it can control.
• We are focusing our efforts where Canada can make the most difference while advancing Canadian security and prosperity interests strategically.
• Canada will be better positioned to respond quickly to emerging challenges while maintaining its influence in priority areas.

Update 

On November 4, the Government presented Budget 2025. The Budget was adopted in the House of Commons during the week of November 17 and has now been referred to the Senate for review.

Background 

• Canada’s new government aims to restore fiscal discipline by reducing operating spending to invest more in workers, businesses, and infrastructure.
• The Budget targets a balanced operating budget within three years by shifting expenditures toward capital investments that drive long-term economic growth.
• Budget 2025 launches a Comprehensive Expenditure Review to cut duplication, eliminate inefficiencies, and realign federal activities with core mandates.
• The Review will generate $13B in annual savings by 2028-29, totalling $60B over five years, requiring restructuring, modernization, and workforce reductions—including about 40,000 fewer public service positions.
• More specifically, per Budget 2025, GAC will generate $1.1B in annual savings by 2028-29, totalling $4.7B over five years by refocusing Canada's international presence in the areas of advocacy, security, and development, as well as implementing targeted reforms across its trade and investment portfolio to better align with current strategic priorities and the geo-political context.
• As part of these adjustments, there will be reductions in development funding to global health, some international financial institutions, and bilateral development programs. Together, these changes are expected to re-baseline the International Assistance Envelope to pre-COVID levels.
• GAC is committed to lowering administrative overhead, focusing its efforts on high-impact services for Canadian businesses as well as finding efficiencies across Canada’s mission network through strategies such of revamping emergency preparedness, modernizing consular services and consolidating its real property portfolio.

CER – Workforce adjustments

• GAC continues to ensure close collaboration with Central Agencies to be as precise as possible with guidelines and timelines.
• All communities will be affected, and notices are expected to be sent as early as January.
• Decisions are made with the goal of reallocating and preserving resources to meet future needs, while taking a people-centered approach to maintain the department’s flexibility.

Update

• GAC continues to work closely with Central Agencies, following established guidance and timelines. Every effort is being made to ensure accuracy and precision throughout the process.
• The CER will have significant implications for our workforce, including reductions. Notifications are planned to be issued in January.
• All communities will be affected: traditional and rotational staff; executives (EX) and non-executives (non-EX); Canada-Based Staff (CBS) and Locally Engaged Staff (LES); both at missions abroad and headquarters.
• We anticipate that the number of letters issued will exceed the number of positions ultimately abolished, reflecting the complexity of the process.
• GAC remains fully engaged with management and employees, prioritizing transparency and a people-focused approach at every stage.

CER - Mission closures

• Global Affairs Canada will close a small number of diplomatic offices over the next three years as part of its plan to realize savings under the Comprehensive Expenditure Review. No embassies or high commissions will be affected.
• The closures in no way convey a change in the diplomatic relationships with the host countries involved.
• Global Affairs Canada’s network abroad will continue to advance Canada’s interests through its remaining high commissions, embassies and diplomatic offices.

Supplementary messages

• Closures will be communicated in due course, with sensitivity to the host country, partners, employees and other stakeholders concerned.
• The details of each closure, such as specific timelines, will be determined mission-by-mission based on the specific context concerned.
• The Government of Canada will continue to deliver on its priorities through its remaining network abroad.

Supporting facts and figures

• Closure decisions were taken where operations could feasibly be managed from another location.
• In general, a single closure takes at least several months to effect once initiated, with potentially longer financial obligations due to severance and cancellation of leases and contracts, or disposal of properties. The timeline for implementation of these closures will be determined on a case-by-case basis.
• Reductions will be fully implemented by FY2028-29.

Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy

• Together with new defence investments in Our North, Strong and Free, the Government is taking an integrated and strengthened approach to exercising Canada’s sovereignty.
• Canada is expanding its diplomatic presence in the Arctic and deepening collaboration with Nordic Allies and NATO.
• The opening of our consulate in Nuuk will enhance Canada’s Arctic presence and strengthen ties with Greenland—a key Arctic partner.

Supplementary messages

• Canada’s foreign policy approach to the Arctic is informed by meaningful and ongoing engagement with territorial, provincial and Indigenous partners.
• Virginia Mearns, Canada’s Arctic Ambassador and an Inuk leader from Nunavut, is leading efforts to ensure that Canada’s diplomatic engagement reflects the priorities of our Arctic and northern communities.
• Our Arctic engagement also includes practical mechanisms like the Global Arctic Leadership Initiative to strengthen Canada’s leadership at the Arctic Council and support inclusion of Canadian Indigenous and youth voices.

Background

The Arctic Foreign Policy (AFP) is a comprehensive diplomatic policy for Canada’s engagement in and on the Arctic. It is comprised of four foreign policy pillars: asserting Canada’s sovereignty; advancing Canada’s interests through pragmatic diplomacy; leadership on Arctic governance and multilateral challenges; and adopting a more inclusive approach to Arctic diplomacy.

Under the AFP, Canada is committed to:

• appoint an Arctic ambassador with an office in Canada’s North;
• open new consulates in Anchorage, Alaska and Nuuk, Greenland;
• initiate an informal Arctic security dialogue with foreign ministers of like-minded Arctic states;
• expand domestic information sharing on emerging international Arctic security trends;
• support domestic partners in taking into account a national security lens to foreign research in the Arctic;
• work toward resolution of Arctic boundary disputes including in the Beaufort Sea;
• increase funding for the Global Arctic Leadership Initiative; and,
• establish an Arctic and northern Indigenous youth internship program at Global Affairs Canada.

The AFP emphasizes North American Arctic cooperation, including with Greenland, reflecting strong cultural and economic ties. Canada is in the process of opening a consulate in Nuuk to advance political, commercial, and Inuit mobility priorities. A GAC officer on temporary duty assignment is on the ground in Nuuk to continue on-site preparations. The consulate’s soft launch opening could be announced as early as January 2026.

Implementation of the AFP is supported by the Global Arctic Leadership Initiative, with an annual budget of $8 million to strengthen Canada’s leadership at the Arctic Council and to support Indigenous and youth engagement in international Arctic affairs among other areas.

The AFP is the product of months of meaningful engagement with relevant territorial and provincial governments and Indigenous Peoples. Global Affairs Canada is committed to continuing meaningful and distinctions-based engagements during the implementation phase.

Threats to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty

• Canada’s Arctic sovereignty is longstanding and well established.
• The waters of Canada’s Arctic Archipelago, including the various waterways often referred to as the Northwest Passage, are internal waters of Canada by virtue of historic title.
• Every day, through a wide range of activities, governments, Indigenous peoples and local communities exercise Canada’s enduring sovereignty over its Arctic lands and waters.

Supplementary messages

• Canada welcomes navigation in its Arctic waters by vessels that comply with Canadian rules on, among others, safety, security and the protection of the environment.
• Canada’s differences with the U.S. on the status of the various waterways often referred to as the Northwest Passage are well managed, including through the 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement.
• Canada must be prepared to defend its national interests, strengthen security and assert its enduring sovereignty in the Arctic region, while working with international partners and more importantly, with local communities who call the North home.

Background

As the Arctic’s physical environment changes, the region is emerging as an area of greater international importance and strategic competition, with both Arctic and non-Arctic states expressing political, economic and military interests in the region. While Canada sees no immediate military threat in its Arctic territory, the rapidly evolving strategic environment underlines the importance of effective safety and security frameworks, national defence and deterrence. Russia remains the greatest military threat in and to the Arctic. China’s strategic interests and activities in the Arctic continue to draw the attention of Arctic states and NATO. China-Russia joint military exercises and operations are increasingly taking on a northern dimension. While China’s overt military activities remain limited, its ostensibly civilian Arctic activities, including scientific research and commercial investments, should be assumed to have a dual purpose.

No one disputes Canada’s sovereignty over the lands and islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Its waters, including the various waterways commonly referred to as the “Northwest Passage” (NWP) are internal waters of Canada by virtue of historic title, over which Canada has full sovereignty. As such, no right of innocent passage or transit passage for foreign-flagged vessels exists. The U.S. disagrees, asserting that the NWP is a strait used for international navigation, in which a right of transit passage exists. This disagreement has been well managed to date. Normally, as a matter of policy Canada welcomes navigation in its Arctic waters, provided that foreign vessels respect Canada’s rules and regulations.

In November 2024, Canada and the U.S. held initial negotiations over the Beaufort Sea boundary and the overlap area in the extended continental shelf of the Arctic Ocean. Such negotiations typically take many years and require strong political involvement, since they involve decisions with implications for State sovereignty. No subsequent meeting date has been set.

Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark continue to work on access and mobility issues for Hans Island in anticipation of our ability to ratify the treaty signed in 2022 resolving our land and sea boundaries in the Arctic and extended continental shelf overlap in the Labrador Sea.

Canada’s continental shelf submission for the Arctic Ocean is currently filed with the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf at the UN in New York. There is a long list of submissions for the Commission to consider, so it will take several more years before Canada’s comes up for consideration. In the meantime, Canada is carrying out further survey missions in the Arctic Ocean to obtain more science to support Canada’s submission. There was a successful survey mission this past summer, and another is being planned for next year. Overlaps of submissions in the Arctic Ocean were expected, as the Continental Shelf provisions under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea are a scientific and legal process to determine whether an area of the seafloor is continental in nature. It does not set political boundaries. All Arctic Ocean costal states have committed to resolving overlaps peacefully in accordance with international law.

Arctic infrastructure - Accelerating major projects in the North (CIRNAC Note)

• Nation-building projects in Canada's North will help diversify trade, strengthen the economy and secure the Arctic.
• Northern Regulatory Acceleration measures, including Indigenous-led cumulative effects studies, will help inform regulatory processes and clear the way for good projects to be built quickly.
• We will continue to work in close collaboration with territorial governments, Indigenous partners, boards, and proponents to build big things while respecting modern treaties and the North’s unique environmental and economic realities.

Supplementary messages 

Arctic and Northern Policy Framework

• The Arctic and Northern Policy Framework informs the Government’s work with Indigenous, territorial, and provincial partners to advance prosperity.
• The Government of Canada recognizes that building one Canadian economy and strengthening Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and security requires collaboration with Arctic and Northern governments and Indigenous rights-holders as partners.
• Mechanisms such as Arctic and Northern Policy Framework Leadership Committee, among others, could provide opportunities to meet with Indigenous, territorial, and provincial partners to advance these shared goals.

If pressed on Arctic and Northern priorities

• Crown – Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada (CIRNAC) has heard clearly from northern partners regarding the many challenges that persist and their priorities for action; these include, among other things, dual use infrastructure investments which enhance both northerners’ human security and Canada’s Arctic sovereignty, economic development, and housing.
• CIRNAC will continue to work closely with Arctic and Northern partners, including Indigenous leadership and territorial governments, to advance shared priorities.

 Background 

The Government of Canada has committed to establishing One Canadian Economy and accelerating the development of major infrastructure projects in the North. Northern projects are regulated by co-management regimes which implement commitments from Modern Treaties. There are distinct regimes in the Yukon, the Mackenzie Valley area and the Inuvialuit Settlement Region of the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut.

 Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada delivers the Northern Regulatory Initiative to support regulatory readiness and the Northern Participant Funding Program to enable participation in regulatory processes. Accelerating the development of major infrastructure projects in the North requires enhancements to these programs to help ensure that information needed to inform regulatory processes is available, and Indigenous governments and organizations have the ability to meaningfully participate in these processes.

Arctic infrastructure - National Defence (DND note)

• National Defence is committed to the sovereignty and security of the Canadian Arctic.
• Strategic competition, climate change, and advancements in emerging technologies are driving new security challenges.
• That is why National Defence, alongside its partners, is committed to defending the Arctic against threats to Canadian interests.
• In fact, over the summer and early fall, the Canadian Armed Forces undertook a number of important activities in the North, including deployments under Operation NANOOK.
• For example, during a recent serial of Operation NANOOK, the Canadian Rangers were joined by members of Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.
• Together, they completed several long-range reconnaissance patrols across Ellesmere Island to enhance domain awareness and inform future planning.
• Notably, the addition of the Canadian Coast Guard under the portfolio of the Minister of National Defence will allow for even greater coordination in the North.
• With the Coast Guard, we will continue to strengthen Canada’s domain awareness and presence in the Arctic, including by supporting community resupply missions, icebreaking, and emergency response programs.
• Further, new investments will allow the Canadian Armed Forces to maintain a persistent and meaningful year-round presence.
• For example, National Defence is building a satellite ground station in the Arctic and establishing Northern Operational Support Hubs.
• These projects which will enhance support for military operations in the Arctic.
• As our presence in the region grows, we are working with partners to maximize multi-purpose, dual-use infrastructure where feasible.
• These efforts will support both defence operations and Northern communities, strengthening regional security, resilience, and economic opportunity.

Supporting facts and figures

Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Arctic presence

• There are over 300 military personnel in the North and Inuit Nunangat.
• There are approximately 5,500 Canadian Rangers that maintain a meaningful presence in 205 remote and isolated communities, including over 1,500 Rangers in 66 Northern communities and Inuit Nunangat.
• On March 18, 2025, Prime Minister Carney announced $420 million in new funding to boost the presence of the CAF in the North and Inuit Nunangat.
  • The CAF is planning to expand its Northern and Arctic operations.
  • This expansion anticipates including more CAF personnel and the potential for increased inclusion of forces from Allied nations with an Arctic interest.
  • New activities aim to support a near year-round military presence through exercises and training to assert Canada’s presence and sovereignty as well as refine information-sharing processes.
  • Enabling increased Northern and Arctic operations will allow the CAF to better detect, deter, and defend against threats to Canada and North America.

Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) Arctic presence

• A CCG Base in Hay River, NT.
• The Regional headquarters (HQ) office in Yellowknife, NT.
• Response depots in Yellowknife, NT, and Iqaluit, NU.
• A Marine Communications and Traffic Services Centre in Iqaluit, NU, plus 10 remotely controlled radio sites.
• Response (unstaffed) depots in Churchill, MB, and Tuktoyaktuk, NT.
• The Arctic Marine Response Station in Rankin Inlet, NU, operating from June to November.
• CCG Auxiliary - Arctic Chapter: 41 units; 533 members; 59 vessels.

Investments with an Arctic Nexus in Canada’s Defence Policy (cash basis)

• $6 billion for the development of Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR) technology.
• $420 million to expand Northern and Arctic operations to maintain and exert Canada’s sovereignty.
• $2.672 billion over 20 years to establish Northern Operational Support Hubs.
• $29.099 billion over 20 years to acquire a more modern, mobile, and effective tactical helicopter capability.
• $7.556 billion over 20 years for airborne early warning aircraft.
• $2.085 billion over 20 years to acquire specialized maritime sensors to conduct ocean surveillance.
• $985 million over 20 years to build a new satellite ground station in the Arctic.
• National Defence is in the process of acquiring up to 12 conventionally powered, under-ice capable submarines to enable the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) to project a persistent deterrent on all three coasts, including in the Arctic.

 Background 

Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) presence in the Arctic

• The CAF’s permanent presence in the North is anchored by Joint Task Force North (JTFN) in Yellowknife with detachments in Iqaluit and Whitehorse, along with 440 Transport Squadron, 1 Canadian Ranger Patrol Group Headquarters and a Company of Reserve Infantry.
• The Canadian Army’s Arctic Response Company Groups have the ability to conduct sovereignty operations, facilitate disaster response support, and provide general assistance to other government departments in the Canadian North.
• The CAF’s footprint in the North and Inuit Nunangat also includes:
  • Canadian Forces Station Alert, the northernmost CAF outpost;
  • CAF Arctic Training Centre in Resolute Bay, Nunavut, which provides a permanent location for training and operations in the Arctic; and
  • Assets that support North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) operations, including the North Warning System, three Forward Operating Locations in Yellowknife, Inuvik, and Iqaluit, and one Deployed Operating Base in Goose Bay.
• National Defence supplements its capabilities in the North and Inuit Nunangat through collaboration with intergovernmental and Inuit and Northern First Nation and Metis partners, including through the Inuit-Crown Partnership Committee (ICPC), which meets three times annually, and briefings to northern Premiers and Indigenous leaders.
  • The ICPC has co-developed a work plan with Defence focused on multi-purpose infrastructure and procurement in Inuit Nunangat.
• Canada will further bolster its presence in the Arctic with $2.672 billion over 20 years (cash basis) for Northern Operational Support Hubs. These hubs will better ensure Canadian sovereignty by establishing a greater year-round presence across the Arctic and the North, and investing in multi-use infrastructure that also meets the needs of the territories, Indigenous peoples, and Northern communities.
• On March 6, 2025, the Minister of National Defence announced Iqaluit, Inuvik, and Yellowknife as Northern Operational Support Hub locations.
• Further, the NORAD Northern Basing Infrastructure project, part of Canada’s NORAD modernization plan, will upgrade legacy and build new infrastructure to support NORAD and Royal Canadian Air Force operations.
  • As part of this project, National Defence is maintaining and enhancing CAF infrastructure at Inuvik, Yellowknife, Iqaluit, and 5 Wing Goose Bay. The investment covers recapitalization, modernization, replacement or addition of new critical infrastructure, airfield rehabilitation, as well as upgrades to security, information management/information technology and electrical systems.
  • Other projects will upgrade infrastructure in Alert, Rankin Inlet, the North Warning System locations and the Whitehorse Cadet Camp.

Canadian Coast Guard presence in the Arctic

• The Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary (CCGA) in the Arctic has undergone tremendous expansion in recent years. Prior to 2015, the CCGA operated nine community-based units in the Arctic; currently, there are 41 community-based CCGA units with 533 members and 59 vessels. This expansion has strengthened local response capacity.
• The CCG also operates the Arctic Marine Response Station (AMRS) in Rankin Inlet, NU. The AMRS is the primary search and rescue facility in the Arctic, improving maritime safety in Arctic waters. The station operates seasonally from June to November.
• The CCG Arctic Region’s Marine Environmental and Hazards Response (MEHR) team has enhanced the Agency’s footprint across the Canadian Arctic with staffed facilities in Iqaluit, Yellowknife, and Hay River, and equipment caches in 47 communities by the end of FY 25-26.

Exercises and Operations

• CAF presence and responsiveness in the Arctic is maintained through regular national, bilateral, and multilateral exercises and operations.
• Operation LATITUDE focuses on increasing domain awareness in the Western Arctic and its approaches, in addition to enhancing interoperability with the United States military in the context of continental defence involving live-fire training, personnel exchanges, integrated drills, and tactical coordination.
• Operation NANOOK is the CAF’s signature Northern operation and takes place each year across Yukon, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Labrador. It involves engaging with Northern and Indigenous partners, territorial emergency planners and other government departments to identify threats to Northern communities and plan for disaster response.
• Now evolving into a persistent, all-domain operation, Op NANOOK will expand its Joint Operations Area, increase funding, and deepen Allied integration to better detect, deter, and defend against threats. It features up to five deployments throughout the year:
• Operation NANOOK-NUNALIVUT demonstrates our ability to project and sustain forces in the High Arctic under the harshest conditions and test new capabilities and interoperability with Allies.
• Operation NANOOK-TATIGIIT is a Whole of Government disaster response rehearsal that reinforces domestic and international Arctic partnerships to respond to security challenges and emergencies in the North.
• Operation NANOOK-TUUGAALIK showcases the RCN’s ability to demonstrate its presence and conduct surveillance in the North in concert with partners and Allies.
• Operation NANOOK-NUNAKPUT focuses on increasing our presence and surveillance along the Northwest Passage in cooperation with mission partners.
• Operation NANOOK-TAKUNIQ is the newest serial, introduced as a concept development operation in 2025. It is designed as a pan-domain training and capability development operation focused on enhancing the capacity of the Canadian Rangers to act as Canada’s Eyes and Ears in the North, and to integrate with other organizations, sensors and surveillance capabilities.

Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar (A-OTHR) Project

• On March 18, 2025, Prime Minister Carney announced Canada’s intention to partner with the Government of Australia on advanced A-OTHR technology. Subsequently, in June 2025, Canada and Australia signed a technology partnership to advance collaboration to rapidly develop Canada’s A-OTHR capability.

Polar Over-the-Horizon Radar (P-OTHR) Project

• National Defence is conducting research and development into the P-OTHR capability, which will further extend surveillance coverage for early threat identification and warning.
• In April 2025, the Government of Canada awarded a two-year contract, valued at $48.4 million, as a joint venture between ATCO Frontec Ltd and Inuvialuit Development Corporation (IDC) to design, build, install and operate the P-OTHR research and development data collection system in the Northwest Territories.

International Cooperation

• National Defence maintains strategic-level collaboration with Arctic Allies and partners through regular multilateral policy dialogues such as the Northern Defence Dialogue at the Defence Ministerial level, the Arctic Chiefs of Defence meetings, the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, and the Arctic Security Policy Roundtable.
• National Defence is also committed to increasing information sharing and joint training opportunities with Arctic and non-Arctic partners, including through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
• The CCG collaborates with other Arctic states on maritime search and rescue and environmental response issues. It has taken a leadership role in the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and Arctic Council’s Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group.
• Defence Research and Development Canada is an active participant in the International Cooperative Program for Polar Research with several Arctic nations to advance our scientific knowledge of the evolving Arctic.
• In July 2024, Canada, the United States and Finland announced an enhanced trilateral partnership called the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, or ICE Pact, to build best-in-class Arctic and polar icebreakers.

Canada-Mexico relations

• In September, Prime Minister Carney and President Sheinbaum launched the Canada–Mexico Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, anchored by a three-year Action Plan to deliver tangible results for both countries.
• The Action Plan strengthens cooperation on trade and investment (notably in mining and agriculture), port connectivity, security, energy, and climate action.
• This renewed partnership reinforces North American unity as Canada and Mexico prepare for the CUSMA review and co-host the FIFA 2026 World Cup with the United States.

 Supplementary messages 

• Minister LeBlanc will travel to Mexico in early December to lay the groundwork for a Canada Trade Mission to Mexico planned for February 2026.
• I will also travel to Mexico in December to maintain the positive momentum and take stock of progress achieved under the Canada-Mexico Action Plan in the first 90 days, as requested by the PM and the President.
• Recent progress in areas such as agriculture and mining is already creating new opportunities for Canadian companies. Additionally, significant progress has been achieved towards the re-establishment of a bilateral security dialogue, to advance discussions on combating illicit drug production, smuggling, and arms trafficking.

Supporting facts and figures

• Recent high-level bilateral collaborations include the visit of the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada to Mexico in October.
• Mexico has participated in G7 meetings in October and November – bilaterals were held on the margins, including between Canada’s Minister of Environment and Climate Change and their Mexican counterpart and between Minister Anand and Secretary De La Fuente.
• Mexico is Canada’s third largest trading partner with nearly $56 billion in two-way merchandise trade and is increasingly an important gateway for Canadian firms to Latin American markets.
• Canadian Direct Investment in Mexico was $46.4 billion in 2024, making it Canada's ninth largest direct investment destination.
• Over 2.6 million Canadians visited Mexico in 2024.

Background 

The Prime Minister’s visit to Mexico City in September 2025 led to a renewal of the bilateral relationship, elevating the cooperation framework to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and launching the Canada-Mexico Action Plan (CMAP) 2025–2028, an ambitious 3-year strategic roadmap based on 4 pillars that reflect our shared priorities: prosperity; mobility, well-being and inclusion; security; and, environment and sustainability. The CMAP serves as the directive for carrying out concrete actions, including in trade and investment (with a particular emphasis on natural resources and agriculture), port connectivity, health, security, emergency preparedness, energy, and climate action. On November 27, Mexico will host the first Canada-Mexico Strategic Partnership Annual Meeting, building on the 20-year Canada-Mexico Partnership. This year’s annual meeting, which will be co-chaired by Global Affairs Canada Deputy Minister Morisson and Mexico Undersecretary Velasco, will review early progress on the new CMAP and will help tee up Minister Anand’s important visit to Mexico in December.

Canadians In ICE detention

• As soon as our consular team is made aware of a Canadian in ICE detention, officials reach out to those detained and offer consular services.
• Consular officials provide assistance in accordance with the Canadian Consular Services Charter. This includes helping detainees contact their loved ones, providing information on finding a lawyer, ascertaining their wellbeing, and providing travel documents when needed.
• The Government of Canada cannot exempt Canadians from the due process of local law, and Canadians are responsible for abiding by the laws of the country they are in, including immigration laws.

Supplementary messages

• Canadian officials maintain frequent and ongoing engagement with U.S. counterparts related to Canadians in immigration-related detention, including with the officials at detention centres, to monitor individual cases.
• When there are Canadians with particular vulnerabilities (e.g. due to age or a medical condition), consular officials maintain closer contact.
• For reasons of privacy, I will not be able to discuss any specific cases.

Supporting facts and figures

• There are several dozen Canadian citizens known to be in ICE detention at any given time.
• There are approximately 65,000 detainees of all nationalities held by ICE. Canadians represent a fraction of this total, approximately 0.01%
• Canadian Johnny Noviello died in ICE custody in June 2025.

Background

GAC becomes aware of detained Canadians either through the citizen themself, loved ones or via periodic notification from US officials. Canadian officials at the Canadian Embassy in Washington and the additional 12 offices in the US are in frequent and productive communication with US officials to gain access to detainees and deliver consular services. If welfare/medical concerns are raised by detainees, consular will advocate with US officials to address the matter in line with the policies of the detention centre. GAC can facilitate travel documents for deportations or travel to Canada. Canadians in ICE detention are a mix of persons with criminal convictions or charges, and others who have been detained because they do not have valid immigration status in the US.

Media have reported on several Canadian citizen children who have been held in custody with their non-Canadian parents. Consular officials have heightened their vigilance related to children.

Consular officials conduct in-person visits to detention centres when possible and often communicate with detainees via phone/videoconference.

The Great Lakes Fishery Commission

• The Great Lakes Fishery Commission provides a mechanism for Canada and the U.S. to control sea lamprey, to protect and sustain Great Lakes fisheries, and coordinate fisheries management and research.
• Following the transfer of responsibility of the GLFC to GAC in Fall 2024, officials from GAC and DFO continue to work closely to ensure a smooth and efficient transition.
• GAC and DFO are committed to maintaining the resources required for sea lamprey control in the Great Lakes and to ensuring Canada meets its obligations under the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries.

Supplementary messages

• Q: As lead Minister, are you confident that despite the concerns raised by the GLFC with part of the GLFC funding remaining with DFO, the issues will not re-occur?
  • A: Great strides have been made in addressing the concerns of the Commission. GAC and DFO are working together to ensure full transparency of financial reporting.
• Q: As the lead Minister, do you feel that the machinery of government changes were adequate for you to ensure that no further issues arise at this delicate time in the Canada-US relationship?
  • A: Canada takes seriously its international obligations. We are, and will continue to, meet our obligations under the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries.

Background

The 1954 Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries between Canada and the United States created the Great Lakes Fishery Commission (GLFC). The GLFC provides a mechanism for Canada and the U.S. to work together to eradicate and minimize sea lamprey populations, to protect and sustain Great Lakes fisheries, and to coordinate fisheries management and research.

Pursuant to the Convention, the Commission is funded by both Canada and the U.S. As decided at the Commission’s organizational meeting in 1956, for implementation of the Sea Lamprey Control Program, the U.S. and Canada contribute 69% and 31% of the Commission's budget, respectively. Canada and the U.S. share other costs equally, such as support for the Commission’s scientific research efforts, binational fisheries management coordination, communications program, and administrative matters. Since 2022, Canada’s total contribution to the Commission has been C$19.6 million per year.

The Commission consists of a Canadian and a U.S. section, each composed of four commissioners. Canadian Commissioners are appointed by the Governor in Council on the recommendation of the responsible Minister. Two of the four Canadian Commissioners are traditionally identified by Canada, one of which is a federal civil servant. The other two Commissioners are identified by the Government of Ontario given responsibilities the province has over some aspects of the fishery resource. This arrangement is not formally in place between Canada and the Ontario government but is a longstanding practice.

On October 18, 2024, an Order in Council transferred responsibility for the Great Lakes Fishery Commission (GLFC) from the Minister of Fisheries to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This change was driven by longstanding concerns within the GLFC about DFO’s management of the funds that they received as Canada’s contributions to the Commission.

While the responsibility of the GLFC was transferred to GAC, the OIC, read in the context of Canadian law, does not legally allow Canada’s funding commitment to the GLFC to be completely transferred to GAC because DFO must oversee the Sea Lamprey Control program in line with its legal mandate and responsibilities. GAC is working closely with DFO, the Commission Secretariat, PCO, and the Treasury Board Secretariat to ensure a smooth transition, including the most efficient administrative arrangement to transfer the funds Canada contributes to the Commission to ensure that Canada continues to honour its obligations under the Convention.

El Salvador: Cooperation with the U.S. administration on mass deportations of alleged gang members, and detentions in CECOT prison

• Detentions are part of a broader trend of deteriorating human rights in El Salvador.
• We are concerned about reports of overcrowding, lack of access to legal counsel, prolonged pretrial detention across El Salvador’s prison system.
• We remain concerned about the State of Exception in place since March 2022.

Supplementary messages

• Canada called on El Salvador, notably through its intervention during the 2024 Universal Periodic Review, to improve detention conditions in order to comply with international law and international human rights standards.

Background

The cooperation between El Salvador and the U.S. administration regarding mass deportations and detentions at the CECOT mega-prison has sparked significant controversy and international concern.

Under a bilateral agreement, the U.S. deported over 200 alleged gang members to El Salvador’s Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo (CECOT). The Trump administration invoked the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, a wartime law, to justify expedited deportations without due process.

El Salvador, in response to UN inquiries, clarified that it merely provided prison infrastructure and that jurisdiction and legal responsibility remain with the United States.

In July 2025, President Bukele announced a prisoner swap with Venezuela, exchanging the Venezuelan detainees for 10 American hostages and several political prisoners.

Canada has not made any public statements regarding U.S. deportations to El Salvador.

Torture allegations

Human Rights Watch and Cristosal (a regional human rights organization working across El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) report that Venezuelan migrants deported from the United States to El Salvador’s CECOT prison were subjected to systematic abuse, including beatings and other acts amounting to torture. The Canadian Embassy to El Salvador advises that these allegations have been refuted by others.

Since March 2022, El Salvador’s State of Exception has suspended key constitutional rights to combat gang violence, resulting in over 86,000 arrests and significantly improved security, but also widespread human rights concerns. Although the government has announced a phased plan to end the SoE, details remain unclear. This August, the Bukele administration secured the right to extend the SoE for an additional two years, after El Salvador’s Congress voted to allow prosecutors more time to investigate alleged gang ties among those detained—raising further concerns about democratic erosion and long-term impacts on civil liberties.

• Deaths in custody: According to credible human rights organizations such as Cristosal, 427 individuals have died in custody in El Salvador since the State of Exception (SoE) was introduced in 2022.
• Listed terrorist entities: On February 2025, Canada listed La Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) as a transnational criminal organization associated with terrorism. In addition to MS-13, the U.S. Department of State has designated Barrio 18, another Salvadorean-associated gang, as both a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist.

Canada’s support to Ukraine

• Canada’s support to Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and long-term security is unwavering.
• Since 2022, Canada has committed nearly $22 billion in multifaceted support to Ukraine, which includes economic, military, humanitarian, development, security, stabilization, accountability and immigration measures.
• Canada is steadfast in its commitment to the Coalition of the Willing and its intent to deploy direct and scalable military assistance in support of upholding a ceasefire and lasting peace.

Supplementary messages

• Canada does not support recognition of territorial gains made by force and opposes premature easing of pressure on Russia.
• Only Ukraine can decide its future; Canada has joined Ukraine and its partners in calling for an immediate end to the fighting.
• Canada is leading global efforts to address the human dimension of the war and the return of unlawfully transferred and deported Ukrainian children. Canada co-chairs the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children and funds initiatives for their return and reintegration.
• Canada supports Ukraine’s recovery by responding to urgent needs and sustaining longer-term efforts that advance Ukraine’s reform agenda, foster trade and investment, and mobilize the private sector in reconstruction.
• Responsive [Corruption allegations & investigations]
• Canada does not comment on ongoing legal proceedings or issues.
• All of Canada’s international assistance projects undergo a rigorous assessment before the agreement is signed – this allows us to identify any potential fiduciary risks, put in place robust risk management measures, and regularly monitor compliance.
• Canada is a long-time supporter of Ukraine’s reform efforts. Continued reform is essential for transparency, accountability and good governance, which are all critical for Ukraine’s long-term prosperity. These are messages we share regularly with the Government of Ukraine.

Update

The Prime Minister has participated in person or virtually in most meetings of the Coalition of the Willing since its creation in the spring of 2025. On September 23, Prime Minister Carney and President Zelenskyy co-hosted a leader-level meeting of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly to mobilize international support. Canada continues to leverage its G7 presidency for coordinated action on Ukraine, most recently by inviting Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Sybiha to the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Niagara (he was presented and engaged in three sessions - a dedicated one on Ukraine; and on maritime and energy security).

Supporting facts and figures

• Canada is consistently among the top donors to Ukraine. Since 2022, Canada has committed nearly $22 billion in multi-faceted assistance for Ukraine, including:
• $12.3 billion in macro-economic support (highest per capita contribution in G7)
• $6.5 billion in military assistance
• $702.1 million in recovery and reconstruction, including development assistance
• $396.8 million in humanitarian assistance
• $229.8 million in security and stabilization assistance.
• Canada is intensifying its pressure on Russia by sanctioning more than 3,300 individuals and entities, lowering the price cap for Russia’s crude oil, tightening financial controls, introducing new export and import restrictions, targeting Russia’s shadow fleet (over 400 vessels), and freezing Russian assets.
• Under Operation UNIFIER, the Canadian Armed Forces have trained more than 46,000 Security Forces of Ukraine personnel since 2015.
• On September 16, Prime Minister Carney appointed the Hon. Chrystia Freeland as Special Representative for the Reconstruction of Ukraine.

Canada’s support for reconstruction efforts In Ukraine

• Canada is consistently among the top donors to Ukraine, with almost $22 billion in multifaceted support since 2022, which includes support for long-term recovery and reconstruction.
• Canada’s assistance aligns with Ukraine’s vision for its recovery, reconstruction and integration into the European Union, and fosters the enabling conditions for greater and deeper Canadian trade and investment with Ukraine.
• Canada is engaging its private sector in Ukraine’s reconstruction, taking advantage of opportunities for Canadian businesses to participate in infrastructure development, energy, agriculture and other sectors.

Supplementary messages

• The Prime Minister’s recent appointment of Chrystia Freeland as Canada’s Special Representative for the Reconstruction of Ukraine demonstrates our commitment to support Ukraine’s recovery and advance economic partnership.
• The Government of Canada, through the Trade Commissioner Service, Export Development Canada, the Canadian Commercial Corporation and other key departments, is working to support Canadian companies in doing business and investing in Ukraine.
• Canada is actively engaged in the Ukraine Donor Platform and other mechanisms, working closely with international partners to coordinate support for Ukraine’s reform and recovery agenda, including anti-corruption reforms.
• All projects funded through Canada’s international assistance envelope undergo a rigorous evaluation prior to the signing of any agreement.

Update

• A Canadian delegation of 24 companies and municipal, provincial, and federal government representatives participated in the Rebuild Ukraine Conference and Trade Show in Warsaw on November 13-14, 2025. Over one hundred business-to-business meetings were held.

Supporting facts and figures

• The multi-faceted assistance for Ukraine comprises $12.3 billion in macro-economic support and $702.1 million in recovery and reconstruction, including development assistance.
• In February 2025, the World Bank estimated that the cost of reconstruction in Ukraine will reach up to US$524 billion and is likely to continue to grow as the war continues.
• 2024 Canadian merchandise exports to Ukraine totalled $487.6 million. Canadian merchandise imports from Ukraine totalled $295.5 million.
• In 2024, the stock of Canadian direct investment in Ukraine stood at $93 million.
• Major Canadian firms are active in the reconstruction and recovery process, including Cameco and Stantec.

Canada’s support to return Ukrainian children

• Canada actively supports efforts to return unlawfully deported and forcibly transferred Ukrainian children, in line with international law and humanitarian principles.
• With Ukraine, Canada launched the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children in February 2024. We co-chair this Coalition to coordinate global efforts to bring children home and reunite them with their families and communities.
• In October 2024, Canada hosted a Ministerial Conference on the Human Dimension of Russia’s war against Ukraine and launched the Montreal Pledge. In September 2025, PM Carney co-chaired a UN leaders-level meeting to advocate for returns. Canada also supports the reintegration of Ukrainian children through partners such as UNICEF.

Supplementary messages

• Canada considers the returns of prisoners of war, unlawfully detained civilians, and deported children – the human dimension of the war in Ukraine - a critical priority and a vital confidence-building measure in peace efforts.
• Canada launched the Working Group on the Human Dimension in Kyiv in February 2024, alongside Norway and Ukraine’s Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, and hosted the October 2024 Ministerial Conference that launched the Montreal Pledge, endorsed by 54 states and organizations to coordinate efforts to repatriate deported children and support reintegration.
• In September 2025, Prime Minister Carney and President Zelenskyy convened over 50 delegations at the UN General Assembly High-Level Meeting “Restoring Childhood and Humanity” to continue to advocate for returns and maintain international momentum behind this priority.
• Canada has invested in tracing and reintegration of Ukrainian children through projects with partners such as Hala Systems ($2M), UNICEF ($10M), and the Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine ($15M), demonstrating Canada’s commitment to accountability, child protection, and cultural and linguistic identity in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Update

Canada, the EU, and Ukraine are advancing a UN General Assembly resolution calling for the immediate and unconditional return of Ukrainian children, an end to all practices that alter their legal status or separating them from their guardians, and strengthened international efforts to ensure accountability and support for safe return. Ukraine is planning to table the resolution on November 25. The resolution is expected to be adopted on December 3, 2025.

On November 24, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Parliamentary Assembly formally joined the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children, bringing the total membership to 42 states and 3 organizations (Council of Europe, the European Union and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly).

A co-chairs' statement from the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children was announced by Minister Anand on November 18, during Sweden’s State Visit to Canada, calling for the immediate and safe return of Ukrainian children. 23 member states, including Sweden, endorsed the statement ahead of UN World Children’s Day (November 20).

In September 2025, PM Carney, alongside President Zelenskyy, co-chaired a high-level meeting of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children, on the margins of UN General Assembly. Over 50 delegations participated. Belgium, Latvia, Norway, Slovenia, and other partners pledged support for tracing, psychosocial support, rehabilitation, and foster care initiatives. The EU announced €200 million for school meals in Ukraine. Austria reconfirmed its mediation efforts to facilitate the return of children and Italy confirmed readiness to work with the Vatican on returns.

Coalition members also committed to intensify sanctions on Russia, and the Coalition co-chairs (Canada and Ukraine) issued a joint statement. The EU and Andorra joined the Coalition at thatis time.Coalition members reaffirmed that the forced transfer and deportation of children by Russia constitutes a serious breach of international law and a profound humanitarian crisis.

Supporting facts and figures

• Ukraine reports 19,546 children as unlawfully deported or transferred, though this figure is still being validated. About 1,700 children have been returned, including approximately 700 since the Coalition launched in February 2024. These returns have been facilitated by intermediary states like Qatar, back-channel talks, and Ukrainian civil society efforts.
• Canada has invested $2 million in Hala Systems to support the use of AI-driven open-source intelligence in locating and returning unlawfully deported and transferred Ukrainian children. This technology helps identify victims, preserve evidence, and support accountability efforts.
• Canada contributes $15 million to the Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine II, a multi-donor initiative strengthening resilience and enabling the return of deported children and missing persons. This includes policy advice, technical assistance, and community-level programming for reintegration and recovery, and through a $10 million UNICEF-led project, Canada supports safe return and reintegration, focusing on family-based care and child protection services for the most vulnerable.
• Canada’s support includes establishing a centralized information management system to identify, trace, and verify cases of deported children, and empowering Ukrainian civil society and local actors to deliver mental health and psychosocial services for returned children and their families.
• Canada first used sanctions to target key actors implicated in transfers of Ukrainian children in May 2023, listing 30 individuals and eight entities “involved in Russia’s ongoing human rights violations, including the transfer and custody of Ukrainian children,” under the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations.
• To date, Canada has sanctioned over 80 individuals and entities in relation to violations of the rights of Ukrainian children, including Russia’s Presidential Children’s Rights Commissioner, Maria Lvova-Belova, who is under an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court, as well as regional Children’s Rights Commissioners, government-related entities and other organizations.
• Looking at doing more with partners.

Russian assets in Canada

• Canada is a leader in the immobilization and seizure of Russian private assets.
• Canada supports further leveraging Russian sovereign assets and is engaging with the EU on its proposed leverage of the €140 billion in Euroclear.
• The use of frozen assets in any potential peace plan must be based on concrete changes in Russia’s behaviour and assessed with partners.
• Responsive only – Approximately $185 million of assets in Canada have been effectively frozen - these can include private or sovereign assets.

Update

The EU is developing – and negotiating – a proposal with its member states to use the €140 billion in immobilized Russian sovereign assets held by Brussels-based Euroclear to back EU-issued reparations loans for Ukraine. EU Leaders will discuss this proposal at the European Council meeting on December 18/19. [REDACTED]

Supporting facts and figures

• G7 countries and Australia have frozen approximately US$285 billion in Russian sovereign assets, with two-thirds held in Europe [REDACTED] Of the amount held by Euroclear, approximately 7% (approximately $22 billion) are held in Canadian-issued bonds. Canada has no jurisdiction over these funds, which are frozen under EU law.
• [REDACTED] This amount has not been made public.
• As of June 2025, Canada has frozen approximately $185 million in assets [REDACTED]. Canada has also blocked $473 million in transactions.
• In December 2022, Canada issued a seizure (restraint) order targeting US$26 million believed to be owned, held, or controlled by oligarch Roman Abramovich.
• Canada also seized an Antonov aircraft believed to be owned, held or controlled by Volga-Dnepr Airlines or Volga-Dnepr Group.
• The Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loan initiative leverages the revenues earned on the Russian sovereign assets immobilized in Euroclear by lending against the future revenues of these assets [REDACTED] Canada contributed $5 billion out of a total of approximately $73 billion across the G7. Canada’s contribution has been fully disbursed to Ukraine.
• Lenders (including Canada) received their first repayment through the repayment mechanism in August. Additional repayments are expected semi-annually.

West Bank and extremist settler violence

• Canada is deeply alarmed about Israel’s accelerated settlement expansion, increasing settler violence, and policies that advance annexation across the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
• This rise in attacks is unacceptable. Civilians must be protected. Israel must hold perpetrators to account.
• The deteriorating situation constitutes a serious obstacle to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace, including a two-state solution.

Supplementary messages

• Canada supports Israel’s right to live in peace with its neighbours within secure boundaries. Israeli settlement expansion, attacks by extremist Israeli settlers, and impunity for violence against Palestinians undermine this peace, the human rights of Palestinians, and prospects for a two-state solution, while also posing significant risks to Israeli and regional security.
• Canada opposes the forced displacement of Palestinians as a violation of international humanitarian law.
• Canada condemns the October 22 Knesset vote on a bill to annex the West Bank. This is a destabilising move at a time when critical peace efforts are underway.
• The recently advanced plans for the “E1 settlement” would separate Palestinian communities, violate international law and undermine the viability of a future Palestinian state.

Supporting facts and figures 

• On 21 August, Canada along with 25 partners issued a joint statement condemning Israeli plans for settlement construction in the E1 area in the West Bank and called on the Israeli government to stop settlement construction in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2334.
• Settler attacks on Palestinians average four per day, with over 740 incidents recorded in 2025 alone. Israel’s settlement activity in the West Bank has surged to unprecedented levels in 2025, driven by aggressive government policies and settler mobilization.
• To date, Canada has imposed four (4) rounds of sanctions targeting individuals whose actions facilitate, support, fund or incite extremist settler violence and undermine peace efforts, imposing measures on seventeen (17) individuals and seven (7) entities. Most recently, in June 2024, Canada imposed sanctions on Israel’s Finance Minister and National Security Minister. This action was done in coordination with the UK, Norway, New Zealand, and Australia.

Background

Israeli settlements and settlers’ violence constitute a serious obstacle to a two-state solution. Settlement activity in East Jerusalem and the West Bank has continued under all Israeli governments since 1967. Canada does not recognize permanent Israeli control over territories occupied in 1967, nor Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Calls for the formal annexation of parts of the West Bank have intensified, driven by extreme right-wing ministers, settler leaders, and far-right factions.

[REDACTED] Israel regularly declares parts of land in the West Bank as state land or land for military purposes, often depriving Palestinian landowners of their property. Additional negative impacts on Palestinians include forced displacement, movement restrictions, diversion of water resources, and settler violence and vandalism. When violence occurs, settlers are subject to Israeli civil law and Palestinians in the West Bank are subject to Israeli military law.

In August 2025, Israel’s Higher Planning Committee of the Civil Administration approved the highly controversial E1 settlement (east of Jerusalem) project to build approximately 3,400 housing units between Jerusalem and the Ma’ale Adumim settlement in the West Bank. [REDACTED] In response to the mention of a pathway to Palestinian statehood in the UN Security Council resolution endorsing the US peace plan, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir made incendiary comments that no plan paving the way to a Palestinian state will ever be implemented, and that senior PA officials should be targeted for assassination.

Canada supports Lebanese stability

• Canada recognizes the Lebanese government’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah and improve regional stability.
• Canada underscores the importance of adhering to the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire and to fully implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1701.
• Canada remains committed to supporting Lebanon’s stability. Since 2016, Canada has committed over $700 million in support of humanitarian and security needs in Lebanon.

Supplementary messages 

• Canada welcomes the Lebanese government’s ongoing efforts to advance governance and security-related reforms and encourages progress on necessary economic reforms.
• We continue to support Lebanon’s efforts to improve national and regional stability, including through support for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and efforts to counter terrorism.

Update 

• Lebanese government efforts to disarm Hezbollah in a phased approach are underway. Challenges persist including continued strikes from Israel into southern Lebanon which has resulted in Hezbollah’s reluctance to give up arms.The U.S. has tied reconstruction and security aid to the success of these efforts.
• On August 28^th, 2025, the UNIFIL mandate was extended until December 2026 to support the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1701, including the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon.

Supporting facts and figures 

• Canada supported humanitarian needs in Lebanon with over $44.2M in 2025, building on $42M in 2024.
• In 2024-2025, Canada contributed $9.7 million to UNIFIL.
• Under the Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building (CTCBP) program, Canada disbursed over $1.8 million to Lebanon in 2023 and 2025. This initiative provides training and equipment to Lebanese security forces—including LAF and Internal Security Forces.

Background

The Israel-Hezbollah conflict is long-standing. Key turning points include the creation of UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) in March 1978 following Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon. Israel invaded again in 1982 and in 2006. The latter war resulted in the evacuation of more than 20,000 Canadian citizens and ended in a United Nations-mediated ceasefire under UNSC Resolution 1701. UNIFIL monitors the border between Lebanon and Israel and reports quarterly on violations. The mandate was extended until the end of 2026, with a one-year transitional period in 2027 to transfer all security related responsibilities to the Lebanese Armed Forces.

On October 8, 2023, Hezbollah attacked northern Israel in support of Hamas. The conflict lasted until the U.S. and France brokered a ceasefire in November 2024, during which 4,000 were killed and 1.2 million displaced in Lebanon. Some Canadian diplomats and their families were evacuated during the peak of the conflict. Key provisions of the ceasefire include Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon and Hezbollah’s disarmament.

Lebanon’s government, elected in January 2025, faces reform and reconstruction challenges. Reconstruction costs are estimated at US$11 billion. Assistance from Gulf States and Western donors is linked to progress on political and economic reforms and Hezbollah’s disarmament.

Since 2016, Canada has provided over $700 million in international assistance. This includes $400 million in humanitarian aid, $165 million in development, and over $45 million in stabilization and security support via the Middle East Strategy, which ended in March 2025. Canada channels its assistance through trusted partners, not directly to the Lebanese government.

Canada’s diplomatic engagement in Syria

• Canada welcomes the Syrian transitional Government’s efforts to build a stable and inclusive future for Syria.
• Canada is committed to the Syrian people and has provided over $842M in humanitarian assistance since 2017, and $68M in peace and stabilization funding since 2016.
• Canada recognizes the importance of sanctions relief to Syria’s economic recovery and, on August 27, 2025, renewed the General Permit for 6 months.

Supplementary messages

• Canada welcomes the Syrian government’s acceptance of a Beirut-based non-resident Ambassador to Syria and reaffirms our intent to deepen diplomatic engagement.
• Responsive: Will Canada re-establish an embassy in Syria?
  • Reopening our mission in Syria will depend on a number of factors, including the security situation.

Supporting facts and figures

• Since 2015, Canada has welcomed over 100,000 Syrian refugees.

Background

Ahmed al-Sharaa, then-leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), assumed the position of interim President after overthrowing the Assad regime in December 2024. In March 2025, President al-Sharaa formed a transitional government and established a 5-year transitional constitution. The interim government is implementing a political transition – with the support of international partners - including improving human rights, addressing terrorism, and supporting regional stabilization efforts.

Canadian engagement

Since 2015, Canada has welcomed over 100,000 Syrian refugees and allocated more than $842 million in humanitarian assistance to Syria—including $106.3 million in 2025.

Following the fall of the Assad regime, Canada resumed diplomatic engagement with the Syrian government. Former Prime Minister Trudeau and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Joly engaged with Syrian counterparts in February and March 2025.

Canada’s ability to support stabilization and development programming in Syria is limited by the fact that: HTS is a listed terrorist entity under the Canadian Criminal Code; Canada maintains sanctions on Syria under the Special Economic Measures Permit Act; Syria remains listed under Canada’s State Immunity Act (SIA) and the UN continues to list HTS as a terrorist organization. Public Safety has issued a 5-year authorization which shields Canadian officials from criminal liability for incidental benefit to a terrorist group, for diplomatic or consular activities in Syria.

On February 28, 2025, Canada issued a General Permit under the Special Economic Measures Permit Authorization Order that temporarily allows humanitarian transactions by Canadians with Syria, including with the Central Bank of Syria and other sanctioned state banks. This permit was renewed on August 27 for an additional 6 months.

In October 2025, Canada’s non-resident Ambassador to Syria, Greg Galligan, presented a copy of his credentials to Syrian authorities.

On November 10, Syria signed a political-only cooperation declaration with the Global Coalition Against Daesh, of which Canada is a member.

On November 6, 2025, the UNSC removed Syrian President al-Sharaa and Interior Minister Khattab from the ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions list. Canada automatically delisted both individuals following this decision.

Iran’s nuclear program

• Iran’s nuclear proliferation activities have long been a major threat to regional and international security.
• Canada supported the E3 decision to trigger the snapback mechanism to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran.
• Consistent with Canada’s obligations as a Member State of the UN, on October 1, Canada reimposed previously terminated UN Security Council sanctions against Iran.
• Canada encourages Iran to return to diplomacy and to engage in talks with the US and EU, as the most sustainable path to address Iran’s nuclear program.

Supplementary messages

• Canada has been consistently clear that Iran can never have a nuclear weapon.
• Iran must give the IAEA access to its nuclear sites and provide information on enrichment. Iran has reached levels of uranium enrichment for which there is no plausible civilian use.
• Canada expects the IAEA to continue to play a role in verifying Iran’s compliance with any deal that is struck. As an independent institution, the IAEA’s role is vital to ensure the international community is confident in any deal and that there is transparency to Iran’s nuclear efforts.

Supporting facts and figures

• Canada has consistently opposed Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions, supporting sanctions and diplomatic efforts to curb its nuclear program.
• Canada is one of the largest contributors to the IAEA’s verification and monitoring activities in Iran and has contributed $23 million to this effort.

Background

Since 2019, following the U.S. unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under the first Trump administration, Iran’s breaches of the nuclear deal have been well documented, in particular by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA is the UN agency that was mandated by the JCPOA to monitor and verify that Iran's nuclear program remains exclusively for peaceful purposes.

On June 12, the IAEA Board of Governors declared Iran in breach of its non-proliferation obligations. In the ensuing 12-day war, Israel, briefly joined by the U.S., targetted Iran’s nuclear program.

Citing significant non-performance, on August 28, France, Germany, and the U.K. (E3) initiated the snapback mechanism under UNSCR 2231 (2015), the resolution that endorsed the JCPOA, addressing proliferation concerns over Iran’s nuclear program.

This followed months of unsuccessful efforts to reach a diplomatic outcome, culminating in a final meeting with Iranian officials in Geneva on August 26, where Tehran offered no substantive concessions that could have delayed the E3 decision. On August 28, Canada posted on social media channels in solidarity with the E3 having initiated JCPOA snapback.

Russia and China argued against the legitimacy of snapback but, as the snapback provision is veto-proof, UN sanctions came back into force on September 28. Canada was prepared for this eventuality and, on October 1, announced regulatory amendments to reimpose those UN sanctions domestically, shortly after similar announcements by the E.U. and the U.K. on September 29.

On November 20, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution demanding that Iran give the IAEA access to its nuclear sites and provide information on enrichment. Canada voted in support of this resolution.

Africa Strategy

• Implementation of Canada's Africa’s Strategy is underway, in line with the priorities outlined in the PM mandate: increasing economic cooperation; developing mutually beneficial relationships with reliable partners; and safeguarding Canada’s security interests.
• Canada is increasingly collaborating with multilateral partners such as the African Union to support African leadership on economic and trade development as well as peace and security efforts in Africa.
• Canadian trade and development programming aims to generate mutual economic benefits for Canadians and Africans alike.

Supplementary messages

• Africa’s role and importance on the world stage are growing. Canada is a reliable partner to achieve the African Union’s vision Agenda 2063, and work towards our mutual prosperity and collective security.
• Africa is Canada’s largest recipient of international assistance. Over the past 5 years, Canada has invested $4.5 billion in bilateral international assistance programming in Africa to build economies, support health and education, and respond to humanitarian needs. Building on this experience, Canada's Africa Strategy provides an opportunity to look at innovative international assistance mechanisms including leveraging the private sector.

Update

• On November 22-23, 2025, PM Carney and Foreign Minister Anand participated in the G20 Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa. This was the first G20 Summit held in Africa and under an African Chairmanship.
• As announced in the Africa Strategy, PM Carney confirmed that Canada will open a FinDev office in Cape Town in 2026 which will expand Canadian investment across the continent, building on more than $318 million provided by FinDev Canada in 2025 alone.
• In July 2025, Canada’s Secretary of State for International Development, Randeep Sarai, traveled to Ghana, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and South Africa, where he participated in the G20 Development Working Group Ministerial.

Supporting facts and figures 

• Canada’s diplomatic footprint in Africa includes 22 Embassies and High Commissions and 5 diplomatic offices.
• Canada has 21 bilateral development programs and two regional development programs in Africa.
• In Canada, almost 1.4 million people are of African origin (2021 census).
• Once implemented, the African Continental Free Trade Area will be the world’s largest free trade area and represent a market of 1.3 billion people.
• Africa holds 30% of the world's critical mineral reserves.
• 60% of Africa’s population is under the age of 25, making Africa the youngest continent in the world. By 2050, ¼ of humanity is projected to be African.
• Africa forms the largest voting bloc at the United Nations (54/193).

Background

Canada’s Africa Strategy: A Partnership for Shared Prosperity and Security, launched in March 2025, involved consultations with more than 600 African, Canadian and international stakeholders. Its implementation makes use of existing resources. The focus of the Africa Strategy on trade and development intends to create conditions for mutually beneficial trade and investment, and to support the enabling environment for Africa to build its own capacities and systems.

Africa represents about 1% of Canada’s global trade ($15.2 billion), up 29.5% since 2020. Canada’s top trading partners include South Africa, Nigeria, Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania.

USAID’s dismantling in early 2025 created a significant shortfall in international assistance and a profound impact on the continent. The US signalled a new approach with development aid more focussed on trade and access to resources.

China’s engagement in Africa has grown significantly as it seeks to expand its global influence, including in multilateral settings, and strengthen its economic interests, including by securing access to critical minerals. China is the continent's largest bilateral trade partner and creditor. In 2024, trade with China is estimated to have reached over US$295 billion, a 6% increase over the previous year.

Russia has significantly expanded its influence and sought to strengthen its military footprint in Africa mainly through state-linked military contractors with a focus on the Central Sahel region. Russia’s economic footprint in Africa lags top trade partners such as E.U., China, U.S., UAE and India.

Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda

• Canada welcomes efforts to promote peace and stability in eastern Congo, including facilitation by the U.S. and Qatar.
• Support the U.S.-led Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF), which encourages Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda to end hostilities through greater economic incentives.
• 6 Canadian Armed Forces officers and 6 police are deployed to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) to support peace efforts, alongside USD $21M (CAD $29M) in funding for the mission in 2025-2026.
• Canada continues to provide humanitarian assistance in DRC, with over $44 million in 2025 for food, health, and protection.

Supplementary messages 

• On March 3, 2025, Canada imposed restrictive measures against Rwanda in response to the presence of the Rwanda Defence Forces in eastern DRC and its active support of M23’s military activities in easter DRC.
• This action was taken in coordination with likeminded partners who adopted separate measures and is part of Canada’s broader efforts to engage on this issue, including in its role as G7 President.

Update 

• On 30 October, a high-level conference on the Great Lakes Region, co-chaired by France and Togo, took place in Paris to mobilize support for humanitarian efforts and ongoing mediation in eastern DRC and the region. Partners pledged over €1.5 billion. Ambassador Dion represented Canada.
• The DRC and Rwanda subsequently initialed the full REIF on November 7 after initial reticence by the DRC.

Supporting facts and figures 

• In 2023-2024, Canada’s international assistance to the DRC totaled $149 million - 7th largest recipient of Canadian support. Canada ensures the effectiveness of its aid through robust results-based management, strict partner due diligence, and comprehensive risk mitigation measures.
• On March 21, 2025, Canada announced over $41 million in funding for the DRC crisis, including $26 million in humanitarian aid and $15 million in development assistance to support survivors of sexual and gender-based violence and provide sustainable livelihoods (in 2025 the total of this aid is $44.3 million, including Ebola response and emergency funds).
• Canada-Rwanda two-way trade is limited: $9.5 million in 2024. Rwanda is Canada’s 165th export partner in the world in 2024 and 147th for imports.
• Canada-DRC two-way trade was $249.8M in 2024 and Canadian direct investment was $335.0 million. The DRC is Canada’s 133rd export partner in the world in 2024 and 74th for imports. In 2023, Canadian mining assets were valued at $7.7 billion. Mining in the DRC is of high interest for Canada.

Background

• Between January-March 2025, renewed clashes between government forces and the M23 armed group culminated in a large-scale offensive by the M23 backed by the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) in eastern DRC. Peace initiatives are underway, including the U.S.-brokered Washington Accord between the DRC and Rwanda, and the Qatari-mediated Doha Declaration and October 14 agreement between the DRC and the M23 as well as the 15 November framework agreement.

Eritrea and Ethiopia

• Canada is closely monitoring the increasing rhetoric and tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as the outbreaks of violence in northern Ethiopia.
• We are concerned any conflict could become protracted, with a high risk to civilians and backsliding of the progress made since the Pretoria Agreement signed in 2022.
• We are committed to supporting peace and security in northern Ethiopia, including support for the national Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program.

Supplementary messages

• Canada is aware of a stop work order for many mining operations in Tigray since a change in regional government in June 2025, as well as reports of illegal mining on mining licences held by Canadian companies.
• Canada is a leader in respecting the environment, employing local labour, corporate social responsibility and in contributing to the local economy.
• The Government of Canada expects Canadian companies active abroad to abide by all relevant laws and to respect human rights in their operations.

Update

The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has accused the Ethiopian federal government of conducting a drone strike on the Tigray-Afar border on November 7, resulting in casualties and property damage. Simultaneously, the TPLF has accused the federal government of supporting a splinter armed faction, the Tigray Peace Force (TPF), operating in the Afar region. The Afar Regional Administration has condemned the TPLF for allegedly crossing into Afar, seizing six villages, and attacking civilians.

Supporting facts and figures

Canada-Ethiopia relations

In 2023/24, Ethiopia was Canada’s largest international assistance partner in Africa: $195.3 million. Canada does not provide financial assistance to the Government of Ethiopia.

• Ethiopia’s national Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Program is the largest DDR initiative globally. Canada is a leading partner. The program demobilized 80,039 individuals between November 2024 and September 2025. The DDR in Tigray is currently on hold.
• From July 17 to 20, 2025, Secretary of State Randeep Sarai (International Development) travelled to Ethiopia to advance Canada’s development priorities, including health, economic growth, peace and security.
• In 2024, Canada’s bilateral merchandise trade with Ethiopia totaled $102 million, with $64 million in imports from Ethiopia, and $38 million in exports to Ethiopia.

Canada-Eritrea relations

Canada has limited bilateral relations with Eritrea. Canada does not maintain an international assistance program in Eritrea.

Eritrea-Ethiopia background

Eritrea and Ethiopia are long-standing adversaries since Eritrea secured its independence from Ethiopia in 1993. The Eritrean-Ethiopian war (1998-2000) broke out over the delineation of the international border. The war officially concluded under the Algiers Agreement in 2000. In July 2018, Ethiopia agreed to implement the 2000 Algiers Agreement formally ending the war.

War in Tigray

Eritrean Defence Forces engaged in the 2020 Ethiopian civil war in Tigray (Nov 2020 – Nov 2022), at the invitation of the Ethiopian government against the TPLF. After two years and estimates of 600,000 dead, the Government of Ethiopia and the TPLF signed the Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) ending the armed conflict. Other parties to the conflict were excluded from negotiations, including Eritrea. The implementation of the CoHA has been uneven, and the lack of progress on returning internally displaced persons, disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants, and resolving the contested status of Western Tigray have been a significant source of grievance for Tigrayans.

Mining in Tigray

Some Canadian mining companies operating in Tigray have not been able to access their legally owned licenses and had to declare force majeur. A Globe and Mail article (published November 13) reported on illegal gold mining in Tigray, linking the practice to environmental and human rights abuses, and corruption by government and regional forces. The article cites a Canadian firm, East Africa Metals (EAM), as reportedly unable to access its two sites in Tigray. The article linked EAM to several Chinese mining companies, some of whom were reportedly operating at EAM’s gold mines. EAM "unequivocally rejects the suggestion that it, or any of its subsidiaries or affiliated business partners, financed or facilitated illegal artisanal mining activities."

Alleged persecution of christians in Nigeria

• Canada is aware of reports that the U.S. is considering actions against Islamist militants in Nigeria and is closely monitoring developments.
• We recognize that violence, whether stemming from terrorist or criminal acts, remains a significant challenge in Nigeria and impacts all segments of its population.
• It is my understanding motivations for violence go beyond just religion, but can also be attributed to ethnic tensions, conflicts over land and resources, and governance issues.

Supplementary messages

• Canada closely monitors instances of hatred and intolerance affecting faith and belief communities worldwide, and opposes all religious hatred, discrimination, and xenophobia where it occurs.
• Canada supports peace and security efforts in Nigeria through its Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program, Weapons Threat Reduction Program, and Peace and Stabilization Operations Program.

Supporting facts and figures

• Since 2019, Canada has invested $23 million in Nigeria through its Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program to address the root causes of violent extremism, strengthen resilience against radicalization, and support judicial capacity in terrorism prosecutions.
• Canada, though its Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOPs) is currently supporting projects in Nigeria (approximately $2 million) to reduce the flow of small arms and light weapons in the northwest region, to conduct research on reintegration of those formerly associated with armed groups, and to support implementation of the WPS agenda in the country.
• Additionally, Canada has allocated $10.7 million under its Weapons Threat Reduction Program to counter chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear proliferation and terrorism threats in Nigeria.
• Bilateral development programming ($16.5 million in 2023-2024) aims to reduce extreme poverty and foster a more peaceful, inclusive, and prosperous society. Canada's efforts support economic development, increased access to health and empowering women and youth, including in conflict affected regions of northern Nigeria, focussing on building resilience for communities affected by conflicts.

Background

The U.S. is ramping up its rhetoric on perceived Christian persecution in Nigeria, including hosting high-level meetings on this issue at the UN (November 18) that included pop singer Nicki Minaj as a guest speaker. [REDACTED] There is increased media attention to this issue, especially since President Trump suggested possible military intervention in Nigeria

U.S. designation of Nigeria as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC)

On October 31, 2025, the U.S. State Department designated Nigeria as a Country of Particular Concern on the grounds of “severe violations of religious freedom.” The U.S. government cited systematic attacks on Christian communities, including killings, kidnappings, and the destruction of churches, by extremist groups such as Boko Haram and militant Fulani herders. The administration has raised the prospect of targeted sanctions, including visa restrictions and asset freezes, and President Trump has gone so far as to threaten potential U.S. military action in response.

Analysts suggest these policy moves reflect, in part, lobbying by conservative Christian groups in the U.S. and the influence of domestic political considerations, which have become more pronounced against a backdrop of already tense bilateral relations with Nigeria over trade, visa, and deportation issues. While attacks on Christians are real, the U.S. has been accused of misrepresenting Nigeria’s complex insecurity situation—many victims are Muslim or from other religious or ethnic communities, and much of the violence is driven by other factors, including terrorism, ethnic tensions, conflicts over land and resources, and criminality and weak governance, rather than purely religious motives.

A high-level Nigerian delegation led by Nigeria’s National Security Advisor Ribadu visited Washington D.C. on 20 November 2025 to meet with some U.S. senior officials and lawmakers to address the issue.

Situation of Christians in Nigeria

Nigeria, with a population exceeding 200 million, is roughly divided between Christians and Muslims, with Christians predominantly in the south and Muslims in the north. The constitution prohibits a state religion and guarantees freedom of religion, including the right to choose, practice, share, or change one’s religion.

Two main sources seem to form the basis of the American view: [REDACTED] The Open Doors International 2025 World Watch List ranks Nigeria seventh among countries where Christians face the most severe persecution, reporting that 82% of the 4,998 Christians killed worldwide in 2023 were in Nigeria. Data from the Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa (ORFA) indicates 30,880 civilian killings and 21,532 abductions between October 2019 and September 2023, disproportionately affecting Christians (16,769 killed; 11,185 abducted) compared to Muslims (6,235 killed; 7,899 abducted), suggesting targeted attacks.

In the past week, Nigeria experienced two separate attacks involving the mass abduction of students from schools. One of the schools was Catholic. The perpetrators remain unidentified, and authorities suspect that the attacks were primarily driven by ransom demands.

Nigeria’s response

President Tinubu rejects allegations of religious targeting, emphasizing that counterterrorism efforts aim to protect all citizens and uphold constitutional guarantees of religious freedom. Nigerian officials highlight the complexity of violence, citing terrorism, ethnic tensions, and land disputes as root causes. They expressed willingness to accept U.S. assistance against insurgents, provided Nigeria’s sovereignty is respected. Domestic critics, including political figures and civil society actors, welcome U.S. attention as an opportunity to strengthen protections for Christian communities.

Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan

• We are deeply concerned by the ongoing humanitarian crisis and the Taliban’s deplorable violations of Afghan women’s and girls’ rights.
• Canada remains steadfast in its rejection of the Taliban, which is not the legitimate government of Afghanistan.
• Canada remains committed to supporting the Afghan people, especially Afghan women and girls, and we call upon the Taliban to reverse their repression of women and girls.

Supplementary messages

• Canada’s position is that engagement must be conditional upon the Taliban reversing its repression of women and girls.
• In September 2024, Canada, together with Germany, Australia and the Netherlands, formally took steps to hold Afghanistan accountable for its violations of women’s and girls’ rights under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), to which Afghanistan is a state party. We have invited Afghanistan to resolve this issue through negotiations, which is the necessary first step in the dispute settlement procedure under CEDAW. If the dispute cannot be settled through negotiations, it could move to the next steps foreseen in CEDAW.
• Since the Taliban takeover, Canada has remained resolute in our solidarity with Afghan women and girls. Working with NGOs, UN partners, and the World Bank, our support includes health services for women and girls in remote communities, alternative education for women and girls, and documentation of human rights violations for accountability efforts.
• As of November 2025, more than 59,000 Afghan refugees have been resettled in Canada as part of the second-largest Afghan resettlement commitment globally.

Supporting facts and figures

• Examples of the results of Canada's development assistance since the takeover in 2021 include more than 26,000 young girls reached through community-based education, and more than 600 young women accessing on-line learning; additionally, working with other donors we have supported health services for approximately 13 million women and children;
• In 2025, Canada has provided $40.57 million in humanitarian support for the delivery of life-saving assistance in Afghanistan.

Background

Canada’s engagement since 2021

Canada’s embassy in Afghanistan has been closed since the fall of Kabul in August 2021. Canada is actively engaged in international diplomatic efforts on Afghanistan, including through the Doha Process, the G7+ Special Representatives for Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Coordination Group, and as chair of the New York-based UN Group of Friends of Afghanistan.

CEDAW Initiative

If negotiations fail to resolve the dispute, any party to the dispute may submit the issue to arbitration. If the terms of arbitration cannot be agreed upon within six months, then the dispute may be submitted to the ICJ. Should the case be referred to the ICJ, the estimated time for the ICJ to render a decision is 7-10 years.

International Assistance

Canada has been a leading donor to Afghanistan, providing over $4 billion in combined humanitarian, development, peace and security assistance since 2001. In 2023, Canada amended the Criminal Code to facilitate the provision of international assistance in Afghanistan.

Humanitarian and Basic Needs Situation

The 2021 Taliban takeover plunged the country into a humanitarian and economic crisis. The situation is worsening with Iran and Pakistan returning Afghans (over 2.4 million in 2025), and dramatic cuts in donor funding. The Taliban’s ongoing and egregious campaign of human right violations makes Afghanistan the worst place in the world to be a girl or woman.

China-Uyghurs

• Canada is gravely concerned at systematic violations of human rights in China against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims as supported by credible reports from UN bodies, UN experts and international human rights organizations.
• On December 10, 2024 Canada imposed sanctions on eight former or current PRC officials involved in gross and systematic human rights violations in the PRC - Canada strongly condemns those grave violations of human rights.
• Canada continues to take action in support of the Uyghur people in China through diplomacy, our efforts in the UN, including via the Human Rights Council.

Supplementary messages

• Mosques across China have faced destruction under a program of Sinicization, that aims to restrict religious freedom and make worship compliant with Chinese Communist Party objectives.
• State run forced labour programs continue to target ethnic Uyghurs, relocating them to factories across China, breaking up families and destroying communities.
• Uyghur children in Xinjiang continue to be forcibly placed in residential schools, where the curriculum prioritizes the Mandarin language and fails to encourage Uyghur language, culture and religion.
• Canada is still dealing with the intergenerational harm caused by past policies that separated indigenous children from their parents and placed them in residential schools.
• Canada continues to urge China not to repeat Canada’s past mistakes, and to recognize the harm that its current policies are inflicting on ethnic and religious minorities in China.

Supporting facts and figures

• In March 2021, one PRC entity and four Chinese officials were sanctioned under SEMA for their roles in gross and systematic human rights violations against the Uyghur people in China’s Xinjiang region.
• Canada’s December 10, 2024 imposition of sanctions on eight current and former PRC officials was, inter alia, due to their roles in designing and implementing China’s system of state-imposed forced labour.
• In 2022, Minister Joly issued a statement of support for the UN Assessment of the Situation of Human Rights in Xinjiang. Global Affairs Canada issued a subsequent statement in 2024 calling for action on the report’s recommendations.
• In 2024, Canada supported a joint statement at the UN Third Committee expressing concern over human rights violations against Uyghurs in China. Canada previously supported such statements in 2023, 2022 and 2021.
• In 2023, Parliament unanimously adopted private members’ motion M-62, which called for the resettlement of 10,000 vulnerable Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims to Canada. In 2024, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada created a dedicated stream for Uyghurs in third countries at risk of refoulement. That program is currently in operation, but details cannot be shared for the safety and security of those involved.

Background

Mosques across China have faced destruction under a program of Sinicization, that aims to restrict religious freedom and make worship compliant with Chinese Communist Party objectives. State run forced labour programs continue to target ethnic Uyghurs, relocating them to factories across China, breaking up families and destroying communities. Uyghur children in Xinjiang continue to be forcibly placed in residential schools, where the curriculum prioritizes the Mandarin language and fails to encourage Uyghur language, culture and religion.

On December 22, 2024, the Government of the People’s Republic of China arbitrarily targeted two Canadian civil society organizations and twenty human rights campaigners with sanctions. China’s decision was in response to Canada’s sanctions against the eight PRC officials over human rights violations.

Several independent United Nations experts and other established multilateral mechanisms have called on China to respond meaningfully to credible allegations of human rights violations. The Government of Canada has insisted that China must respect its obligations under international law. Canada has publicly declared that it views scrutiny of its own human rights record as an opportunity to improve its performance, and continues to call on China to do so, as well.

During the review of China as part of the UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in 2024, Canada urged the Chinese government to end all coercive measures against Uyghurs, Tibetans, and other ethnic minorities, specifically citing forced labor, coercive labor transfers, forced sterilizations, and mandatory residential schools.

High profile China consular cases

• We continue to work with China on consular issues, which includes advocating for the wellbeing, equitable treatment, and safety of Canadians who live or travel to China. We put a high priority on being able to provide consular services to Canadians, while recognizing national jurisdiction.
• We continue to have cases of Canadians that we engage directly with China on, and we welcome engaging in bilateral consular dialogues.
• Given privacy considerations, there are limitations to the details that can be shared on specific cases.

Supplementary messages

Robert Schellenberg

• Continue to advocate for clemency for Robert Schellenberg, as we do for all Canadians facing the death penalty.
• Continue to raise our concerns on this case, and our firm opposition to the death penalty, with China at every opportunity.

Li Yonghui (‘‘lee YOUNG-way’’)

• Aware of procedural delays regarding the start of Li Yonghui’s trial.
• Providing consular support to him and his family in Canada.
• Continue to advocate for procedural transparency and a clear trial timeline, while supporting his bail application.

Huseyincan Celil (‘‘hoo-SAY-in-jahn jeh-LEEL’’)

• Remain deeply concerned by the detention of Huseyincan Celil.
• Repeatedly raised with China at the highest levels.
• Continue to assert his Canadian citizenship and continue to urge China to grant consular access and provide information on his well-being.

Denise Ho

• Following legal case closely; verdict is still pending. Continue to provide consular support while Ms. Ho is out on bail.
• Continue to call on China to repeal National Security Law. Law violates Hong Kong’s international human rights obligations.
• Also call for withdrawal of all related arrest warrants and bounties.

Background

In 2024-25, approximately 250 new consular cases were opened in China. Cases of arrest and detention of Canadian nationals are the most complex. At any given time, approximately 100 Canadians are in Chinese custody for various allegations and crimes, the majority of which relate to narcotics, corruption, and economic crimes. China has very strict penalties, including the death penalty, for both violent and non-violent offences, such as serious drug crimes. Canada advocates for clemency in all death penalty cases. Despite enhanced advocacy efforts, four Canadians were executed by China in early 2025. Robert Schellenberg remains on death row. Canada has deemed his case to be arbitrary sentencing and continues to advocate for clemency.

Canada and China have held biannual consular dialogues in the past (the last one held in May 2024). GAC is currently exploring with Chinese counterparts to re-commence these bilateral consular dialogues, ideally in early 2026.

[REDACTED]

Consular - Jacob Le

• Parental child abductions are a profoundly difficult and damaging experience for both the children and their families, as well as some of the most difficult consular situations to which the Government of Canada responds.
• When a parent abducts a child to another country, they are subject to the laws and procedures of the country they are in, which may be very different from those of Canada.
• Vietnam is not a signatory to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, nor is parental abduction a crime in the country.

Supplementary messages

• We cannot comment on this case for privacy reasons. However, in cases of this nature, officials provide support to help Canadians navigate the local legal system.
• In countries where the Hague Convention does not apply, a parent’s path to securing custody, access, or the return of their child is either through mediation with the other parent or through the courts in the country where the child is located.
• The Government of Canada cannot enforce a Canadian court order in foreign jurisdictions. The left-behind parent must work with a local lawyer to navigate the court system in the other jurisdiction. These processes can be complex and difficult for families.
• In all cases of international parental abduction, Canada works with partners in Canada and other countries to open channels of communication between parents, obtain information on local legal processes and, where possible, identify resources or organizations that may assist families in navigating these processes and in addressing concerns related to the well-being of abducted children.

[REDACTED]

Canada’s export strategy - Critical minerals

• Canada’s critical minerals endowments and sectoral expertise represent an extraordinary opportunity to promote security of supply for Canada and its key partners and allies, while supporting Canada’s economic prosperity.
• Canada is working with partners around the world to strengthen critical mineral security and the resilience of global supply chains, including through its G7 presidency and its Critical Minerals Action Plan.
• Canada has also been bolstering its economic security toolkit to ensure it has the means to protect its mining industry and resources.

Supporting facts and figures

• As of September 2025, $792M from $3.8 billion has been announced for 127 projects under the Critical Minerals Strategy to develop critical mineral value chain.
• G7 funding allocated $80.3 million in total for critical mineral supply chains; $50.3 million for innovation to secure global critical minerals supply chains, $20 million for Resilient and Inclusive Supply-Chain Enhancement partnership (RISE) and $10 million for emerging markets capacity building.
• In 2022 and 2024, Canada issued Investment Canada Act (ICA) policy statements to strengthen national security oversight concerning foreign investments in Canada’s critical minerals sector and modernized the ICA in 2024.
• In August, Prime Minister Carney travelled to Germany where agreements between several Canadian and German companies on co-operation to secure critical mineral supply chains from Canada.
• Canada is attracting foreign direct investment in the critical minerals sector, aligning with its national interests.

Background

The growing concentration of critical mineral supply chains under Chinese control leaves Canada and its allies increasingly vulnerable to supply chain disruptions. Most recently, on October 9, China announced one of its most far-reaching sets of export controls targeting rare earth elements (REEs) and related products. Another concern is that China uses mining acquisitions to secure access over key infrastructure, such as ports, airstrips, and radar stations.

 The G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan has a goal of building a standards-based market to reflect the cost of responsible mining, mobilizing capital and investing in partnerships and promoting innovation.

 The US is pursuing an aggressive America First critical minerals strategy to secure supply chains and go after the resources it needs globally to reduce dependencies on China. While they are working within the G7 process, the US is still threatening to place national security 232 tariffs on critical minerals (including potash and uranium).

Export control – Military goods

• Canada has one of the strongest export controls systems in the world, and respect for human rights is enshrined in our export controls legislation.
• All applications for controlled items are individually reviewed.
• If there is substantial risk that the export would result in a serious violation of human rights, the permit will be denied.
• Exporting controlled goods or technology without a valid permit is a violation of Canadian law and may result in enforcement actions, including fines, seizure of goods, and potential criminal prosecution.

Supplementary messages

Responsive: Sudan - Alleged diversion of Canadian technology from UAE

• Canada strictly enforces the UNSC arms embargo on Sudan, which has been in place since 2004.
• All permit applications for controlled items are reviewed on a case-by-case basis under Canada's robust risk assessment framework.
• Canada has made no exceptions to this legal requirement.

Responsive: Russia - Alleged diversion of Canadian technology from Hong Kong

• Canada maintains its presumptive denial policy on the export and brokering of any controlled goods and technology to Russia.
• The Government will deny permits that are not in line with Canada’s domestic and international legal obligations, foreign policy, defence or security interests.

 Responsive: Diversion of Canadian controlled goods or technology

• Exporting controlled goods or technology without a valid permit is a violation of Canadian law and Canada will take appropriate action regarding the misuse of any controlled Canadian good or technology.

Background – Hong Kong/Russia

Alleged diversion of Canadian technology to Russia from Hong Kong

Canadian media and non-government groups have recently reported on allegations of diversion of Canadian-made Cadex rifles to Russia and used on the battlefield against Ukraine. Separately, human rights groups have alleged that Hong Kong shell companies have acted as intermediaries for the diversion of dual-use items to Russia. On July 7, 2020, Global Affairs Canada issued a Notice to Exporters which indicated that Canada will not permit the export of sensitive military items to Hong Kong, and this policy remains in effect. No export or brokering permit has been issued for Russia-destined items, apart from one permit issued for the Russian Federation in 2013.  [REDACTED]

Canada’s sanctions regime

• Canada remains committed to playing a leadership role in the preservation and strengthening of an international rules-based order. Sanctions are a key component of this approach.
• Canada is judicious when it chooses to deploy sanctions and is committed to their effective and coordinated use.
• Canada has established a rigorous due diligence process to consider and evaluate possible cases of human rights violations, corruption or other circumstances that may warrant the use of sanctions.

Supplementary messages

• Canada considers its use of autonomous sanctions to be consistent with international law and uses humanitarian exemptions, when appropriate, to mitigate the unintended consequences of sanctions.
• Canada considers the broader political and international contexts when deciding whether sanctions or any other tools in Canada’s foreign policy toolbox may be an appropriate response.
• Responsive on Targeted Windfall Profit Charge and Mitigating Potential Financial Sector Risks from Sanctions: I would defer to the Minister of Finance as this pertains to proposed authorities under the Minister of Finance.

Update

On November 12, sanctions were imposed on 13 individuals and 11 entities including those involved in the development and deployment of Russia’s drone program and entities that supply the cyber infrastructure used in Russian hybrid strategies against Ukraine. Canada also sanctioned 100 vessels from Russia’s shadow fleet.

Supporting facts and figures

• Since 2022, global use of sanctions has increased significantly. Canada has sanctioned nearly 2,300 individuals and over 1,000 entities or vessels since 2022.
• In total, nearly 4,900 individuals and entities have been designated by Canada across its autonomous sanctions regimes.

Background

The Special Economic Measures Act allows the government to impose sanctions in relation to a foreign state, as well as individuals and entities related to that foreign state. Sanctions can be imposed in response to:

• a grave breach of international peace and security that has or is likely to result in a serious international crisis;
• an international organization or association of states which Canada belongs to calls on members to take economic measures against a foreign state;
• gross and systematic human rights violations; and
• acts of significant corruption.

The Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act allows the government to sanction foreign nationals who are responsible for, or complicit in, specific cases of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights or acts of significant corruption committed in foreign states, independent of state-related sanctions.

The UNSC may also legally require member states to introduce the measures into domestic law, which is implemented in Canada through the United Nations Act.

Sanctions are implemented as regulations through the Governor-in-Council regulatory process. Measures vary by regulation and can include dealings bans, trade prohibitions, or financial restrictions. Sanctions restrict activities between Canadians or persons in Canada and sanctioned states, individuals or entities. Individuals subject to sanctions under all 3 laws are inadmissible to Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Canada’s fulfillment of NATO commitments

• NATO remains a cornerstone of Canadian security. We remain fully committed to NATO and transatlantic security, this includes our leadership role of the Multinational Brigade in Latvia along the Alliance’s Eastern Flank.
• Canada is committed to meeting 3.5% of GDP on core defence spending, and 1.5% of GDP on defence-related investments by 2035.
• We are securing NATO’s northern and western flanks by investing in Arctic security and resilience, continental defence and increasing our military presence in the Indo-Pacific.

Supplementary messages

• Canada is an active NATO Ally, contributing substantially to the Alliance’s core tasks and missions.
• Canada has participated in virtually every NATO operation and mission, and we will continue to do our part.

Background

At the NATO Summit in The Hague, PM Carney committed Canada to the 5% target, calling for action over words in high-impact areas like critical minerals. In doing so, he made the most direct assertion to date of Canada’s intent to focus defence investments on securing Canada and the Arctic amidst a changed threat environment that has removed Canada’s geostrategic advantage. Highlighting Canada’s unique geographic, demographic, and strategic challenges, Canadian defence spending would simultaneously: 1) meet Canada’s Article 3 commitments (i.e. to maintain and develop Canada’s individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack); 2) complement U.S. security efforts in support of North American continental defence; and 3) strengthen NATO’s North-Western Flank. He stressed that this reality must be better accounted for in NATO plans and processes.

Persistent deployment to Latvia

Since 2017, Canada has served as Framework Nation for NATO’s Multinational Brigade (MNB) Latvia. MNB Latvia includes troops from thirteen other Allies. As Framework Nation, Canada is responsible for coordinating with Latvia and the contributing nations to help set the tone, pace, and vision for the Brigade.

The CAF footprint in Europe

National Defence has approximately 3,300 CAF members deployed (approximately 2,575) or assigned (approximately 725) in Europe. The majority of CAF members are deployed as part of Operations REASSURANCE and UNIFIER in Latvia (approximately 1,920), the U.K. (approximately 220), and Poland (approximately 130).

Leading Ally in NSATU

Canada is the third-largest troop contributor to NATO’s mission providing Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU). Canada commands the training coordination cell and is also the leading contributor to the NSATU Trust Fund, which provides some of the most urgent military equipment needs to Ukraine, in support of NSATU’s objectives.

Maritime operations

Since 2014, the CAF have normally deployed a frigate (for six months of the year) and two Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (for four months per year) to be employed for exercises and operational tasks in the NATO Maritime Command’s areas of responsibility.

NATO missions and operations

Canada currently makes modest contributions to NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) and NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR). Since March 2022, Canada has provided three CC-130J Hercules aircraft and a team of 60 support personnel which allows the CAF to support various NATO operations across the world, in particular NSATU.

Canada-EU Security and Defence Partnership

• Canada has been, and will continue to be, a reliable and trusted partner for the EU and its Member States.
• Canada is pleased to have signed a Security and Defence Partnership (SDP) with the EU and our teams are working diligently to advance the SDP’s ambition.
• Canada strongly supports deepening cooperation with our European Allies on defence procurement and defence industrial production, including through participating in the EU’s Readiness 2030 plan.

Supplementary messages

• Bringing Canada closer to Europe is a top priority for the Canadian government.
• Canada welcomes the efforts Member States are making toward European and transatlantic security and recognizes the EU efforts to work in collaboration with NATO, and in respect of its mandate.
• Canadian industry has much to offer in terms of high-end capabilities that can be of interest to Member States, including through SAFE-funded projects.

Background

Readiness 2030

Proposed by the European Commission on March 18, the plan aims to mobilize up to EUR 800 billion in defence investments of EUMS through two key mechanisms:

• the activation of the National Escape Clause to allow Member States to run greater budget deficit, freeing up to EUR 650 billion of fiscal space in their national budgets, and
• the EUR 150 billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) lending programme for joint procurement projects.

Security and Defence Partnership (SDP)

The Canada-EU SDP was signed during the Canada-EU Summit on 23 June 2025 and is one of the most ambitious to date of the EU’s SDPs with partners. [REDACTED] It is a non-binding political declaration aiming to deepen cooperation and streamline security and defense-related activities under one framework while opening the door to new areas of cooperation.

SAFE Negotiations

Further to the SDP, Canada and the EU committed to negotiate a SAFE-specific treaty. Canada and the EU have concluded their 6^th Round of negotiations and have closed most of the text. [REDACTED]

Defence cooperation

Canada was one of the first countries to establish a dialogue on security and defence with the EU and one of the first non-EU countries to deploy personnel into the EU’s civilian and military Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions when they were first launched in 2003. To date, we have participated in 13 EU missions around the world. Canada strengthened its participation to these missions by renewing its contribution of a gender advisor to the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and recently deployed two visiting expert advisors on case building of international crimes to the EU Assistance Mission in Ukraine. Canada also participates in two EU Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects on logistics hubs and military mobility and submitted (on May 5, 2025) a formal request to join the anti-torpedo torpedoes project led by Germany and The Netherlands.

Defence industry

Canada and Europe have a long history of defence industry cooperation. Canadian defence exports to Europe (including the UK) amounted to $1.1 billion in 2022, with exports to the U.S. valued at $4.4 billion the same year.

Non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament

• Canada has been protected by international instruments, including non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament treaties, that have kept Canadians safe.
• Canada, as a signatory of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), views that treaty as an essential component to Canada’s national security.
• Canada’s support for the Ottawa Convention remains unwavering and enduring.

Supplementary messages

Q: What are the implications of this U.S. announcement to resume nuclear testing?

• It is too early to assess the implications, and we await further details on what the announcement will entail.

Q: Is the U.S. allowed to do this (nuclear weapons testing)?

• All states have a sovereign right to protect their national security.
• Under international law all states must “refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty” to which they are a signatory.

Q: What is Canada doing to prevent further withdrawals from the Ottawa Convention?

• Canada will continue advocacy efforts with NATO Allies and Ukraine to uphold the norms of the Ottawa Convention in the face of Russian aggression.
• We will continue to underline the importance of humanitarian concerns and the need to prioritize international humanitarian law in defence considerations.

Update

On November 5, 2025, President Putin stated that Russia would take appropriate measures if the U.S. or any other NPT state conducted a nuclear test. The Kremlin also ordered a feasibility study for resumed nuclear testing. In July 2025, Ukraine announced it would suspend its obligations under the Ottawa Convention by citing article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), a legally dubious claim.

Background

On October 29, 2025 U.S. President Trump stated that he had instructed the US Department of War to resume testing U.S. nuclear weapons “on an equal basis” (with Russia and China) with the “process to begin immediately”. The announcement came one day after Russian President Putin announced the testing of the Poseidon underwated “nuclear powered drone” and a week after Russian testing of the nuclear capable “Burevestnik” missile. The Kremlin noted these were not nuclear tests.

The U.S. has signed but not ratified the CTBT and last conducted a physical nuclear weapons test in 1992. All US testing since has been computer simulated. Russia rescinded its CTBT ratification in 2023. The other (Annex 2) states needed to ratify the treaty before it enters into force are China, the DPRK, India, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, and Iran. The U.S. is understood to not have the means in place to conduct live nuclear weapons testing and reportedly would require 18-36 months or more to resume testing. As such, there would be no means to “immediately” resume nuclear weapons testing. US resumption of testing would likely enable China and Russia to similarly resume testing allowing those states to close the technological gap.

Russia’s war in Ukraine and its threatening behaviour toward other European NATO Allies have driven several states, especially those bordering Russia, to reassess their security needs. In 2024, Ukraine received US-supplied anti-personnel landmines in contravention of it Ottawa Convention obligations. This spurred strong domestic political currents among those states to consider all measures possible to deter and defend against Russia. In 2025, five European NATO allies—Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—formally withdrew from the Ottawa Convention using the Treaty’s established withdrawal mechanism. Despite unwavering support for Ukraine, Canada does not believe its reliance on Article 62 of the VCLT is a valid basis for suspension of operation of the Ottawa Convention. Further, the purported suspension could establish an unwanted legal precedent and have a negative impact on the integrity of the treaty system and the stability of treaty relations.

Canada and la Francophonie

• La Francophonie is a privileged platform to promote our interests and to build and strengthen strategic partnerships, without the presence of major powers.
• Canada will focus its efforts on ensuring that La Francophonie institutions take action to foster an environment conducive to entrepreneurship, trade, and investment within member countries.
• Canada also continues to strengthen democracy and human rights; reinforce multilateralism; promote the French language; and promote cultural and linguistic diversity in the digital space.
• Canada will continue to combine advocacy with concrete actions to improve the effectiveness and accountability of the International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF) and other Francophonie institutions.

Facts and figures

• The Francophonie brings together more than 90 states and governments from five continents, representing more than 321 million French speakers.
• It accounts for nearly 20% of global trade flows and 14% of global mineral and energy resources.
• Economic growth in the French-speaking world averaged 4% between 2011 and 2021.
• The OIF operates on an annual budget of approximately $115 million.
• Canada is the second-largest donor after France, with a statutory contribution of $16.5 million in 2025 and voluntary contributions of $25 million.
• Cambodia will host the 20th Summit in Siem Reap in the fall of 2026.

Context

Institutional Francophonie

The term ‘Francophonie’ refers to all the institutions that enable cooperation between countries that share the French language, in particular the International Organisation of La Francophonie, the Agence universitaire de la Francophonie and the Parliamentary Assembly of La Francophonie.

International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF)

Based in Paris, the OIF is the body at the heart of institutional Francophonie responsible for implementing diplomatic and multilateral cooperation. Since 2019, the OIF has stepped up its institutional reforms to improve its functioning, strengthen its credibility and enable more effective action.

Recent developments

On 26 September 2025, the Minister of Foreign Affairs met with Her Excellency Louise Mushikiwabo, Secretary General of La Francophonie, in Ottawa to reaffirm Canada's commitment to La Francophonie and discuss strategic priorities, including economic Francophonie.

Canada also participated in the Francophonie Ministerial Conference (CMF) on 19 and 20 November in Kigali, under the theme of women's contribution to the Francophone world. This participation highlighted Canada's inclusive position on gender equality and laid the groundwork for fruitful collaboration in preparation for the 2026 Summit in Cambodia.

The provinces

The governments of Quebec and New Brunswick are full members of the OIF. Ontario and Nova Scotia have observer status. Manitoba has expressed interest in obtaining observer status, pending a decision by the 2026 Summit.

Francophonie Summit

Every two years, heads of state and government meet at the Francophonie Summit. The 2026 Summit in Cambodia is expected to focus on the economic potential of La Francophonie. It will be an opportunity to showcase Canadian organisations, particularly those in the private sector and civil society.

Economic Francophonie

There is growing interest in the economic aspect of the Francophonie among various stakeholders in Canada and internationally. Since 2022, the OIF has co-organised six economic and trade missions (Cambodia/Vietnam, Gabon/Rwanda, Lebanon, Romania, Canada, Benin). These missions strengthen Francophone economic resilience by promoting investment and the exploration of new markets.

Women, Peace and Security

• Canada remains committed to implementing the WPS agenda through our world-renowned third National Action Plan, which extends to 2029 and includes ten federal partners.
• Canada is marking 25th anniversary of the WPS agenda by sustaining our leadership, defending progress against pushback, focusing on the immense work remaining, and paying tribute to women around the world who risk their lives to build peace.
• To embed Women, Peace and Security even more firmly across the department, and to sustain our depth of expertise, we brought former Ambassador for WPS, Jacqueline O’Neill, into Global Affairs Canada as our standing WPS policy lead.

Supplementary messages

• The percentage of uniformed women in peacekeeping has more than doubled since 2018 (to approximately 10%) – progress the UN Secretary General credits in part to Canada’s Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations.
• Canada is deeply concerned about the rapidly increasing use of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) as a tactic of war, torture, terrorism, and political repression around the world.
• Canada’s Action Plan addresses the relevance of WPS to traditional security threats and emerging challenges such as climate and economic insecurity, artificial intelligence, and competition in the Arctic.
• WPS has proven to strengthen Canada’s relationships with a diverse range of countries, including many non-traditional allies in strategically important regions.
• Women, Peace and Security is a fundamental enabler of security and sovereignty: It sharpens understandings of threats, strengthens responses, and enhances our ability to deter, detect, and defend.

Update

The UN Secretary General’s 2025 report on Women, Peace and Security highlights progress yet warns of stagnation or even regression across many areas (see facts and figures below). While the U.S. position continues to evolve under President Trump, it remains the only country to adopt a comprehensive law on WPS, implemented and signed into law by President Trump during his first administration. On October 6, 2025, 91 countries including Canada, affirmed support for WPS at the UN Security Council.

Supporting facts and figures

• Conflict-related sexual violence documented by the UN increased by 87% over the last two years.
• In 2024, women represented 7% of negotiators and 14% of mediators in peace processes worldwide – figures that remain low, and in line with earlier levels.
• When women participate meaningfully in peace negotiations, an agreement is more likely to be reached, and the probability of that agreement lasting two years increases by 20%, and of lasting 15 years, by 35%.
• 115 countries now have National Action Plans on WPS, including all G7 members and nearly every member of NATO.
• Canada’s Action Plan includes 10 federal partners and is one of the world’s only to feature an official role for civil society.

Feminist foreign policy

• Committed to advancing gender equality, human rights, and democracy as important components of our foreign policy.
• Working with allies and diverse partners to counter coordinated anti-gender movements around the world and in multilateral forums. These threaten progress on rights, peace and stability, and sustainable development.
• Promoting rights-based, open, and inclusive societies leads to a safer, more sustainable and prosperous world, which supports Canada’s own stability, security and prosperity.
• Canada remains committed to implementing our third national action plan on women, peace and security, which extends to 2029.

Supplementary messages

• While no longer using the “feminist foreign policy” label, Canada remains committed to protecting and advancing gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls.
• We will continue to take advantage of opportunities to champion LGBTQI+ rights across multilateral forums and international assistance programs.

Update

While in November 2025, the Prime Minister stated that he would not describe Canada’s foreign policy as a feminist foreign policy, he acknowledged that it was an element of it. Many aspects of Canada’s commitments to gender equality, human rights, and women and girls are expected to endure, albeit in a way that recognizes that the new geopolitical and fiscal context demands a different emphasis.

Canadian representatives continue to engage internationally in events related to feminist foreign policy. You represented Canada at the 30th anniversary event of the Beijing World Conference on Women (September 22, 2025) and reaffirmed Canada’s commitment to gender equality. Deputy Minister of National Defence Stefanie Beck attended the 4^th Ministerial Conference on feminist foreign policies hosted by France (October 22-23, 2025). The Women Foreign Ministers’ Group, whose creation was formalized by your predecessor in 2025, is now led by Slovenia’s Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Tanja Fajon and held its last meeting in September 2025.

Supporting facts and figures

Near gender-parity in Canadian Heads of Mission abroad since 2018; 51% women ambassadors as of March 31, 2025.

Background

Canada is a longstanding champion of gender equality through its international engagements, foreign policy, and international development assistance. Between 2016 and 2025, Canada pursued a deliberately labelled feminist foreign policy (FFP), through a series of complementary policies, programs and initiatives that placed Canada as a progressive feminist leader.

Launched in 2017, the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) specifically guided the delivery of Canada’s international assistance. Canada was – and remains – among the top bilateral donors supporting investments in gender equality and empowerment of women and girls.

The Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda was considered an element of Canada’s feminist foreign policy, but also exists as a distinct, international agenda. It was a policy of the government long before the term feminist foreign policy was ever used (Canada’s first National Action Plan on WPS was released in 2011).

Canada’s support for peacekeeping efforts

• UN peacekeeping remains a vital and cost-effective means of addressing international peace and security crises.
• However, the current liquidity crisis is having severe impacts on budgets while Security Council impasses contribute to diminishing political support.

Supplementary messages

• Canada’s contribution of personnel to UN missions is currently comprised of 21 military and 6 police deployed to four peacekeeping operations.
• Canada also contributes through other means, such as capacity building and episodic tactical airlift.
• Canada helps shape peacekeeping policy and practise through our leading role in the UN’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34); initiatives such as the Elsie Initiative and the Vancouver Principles; and engagement with the ongoing UN review of peace operations.
• Canada is the 8th largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget and a top five contributor of voluntary funding.

Update

In May 2025, at the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial, Canada pledged over $40M (CAD) in peacekeeping support for 2025-2027 (GAC, CAF, and RCMP).

Supporting facts and figures

• Canadian personnel are currently deployed to four UN operations: MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of the Congo: 6 RCMP; 6 CAF); UNMISS (South Sudan: 9 CAF); UNTSO (Middle East: 5 CAF); and UNFICYP (Cyprus: 1 CAF).
• For 2025-2026, Canada’s assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping equalled approximately $224M CAD. Canada also provides a range of other direct and indirect supports to UN peacekeeping. For example, for the period 2022/23 to 2026/27, Canada has committed approximately $23M to support training and capacity building and $45.7M in support of the Elsie Initiative for Women and Peace Operations. For 2022/23 to 2024/25, Canada also provided $70M to the UN Peacebuilding Fund, which contributes to the ability of peacekeeping missions to transition out of post-conflict situations.
• Canada also supports various non-UN peace operations, such as the Multinational Force and Observers in Egypt (39 CAF) and the Office of the Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (30 CAF, 8 police).

Background

UN peacekeeping has faced difficulties in recent years, including a lack of unity of purpose at the UN Security Council; a liquidity crisis (largely due to record US arrears); and diminishing support from some host governments and communities. These, along with field-level challenges relating to the evolving nature of conflicts, have set off a review of UN peace operations. Canada is engaged in order to promote efficacy and efficiency and protect gains made in fields such as Women, Peace, and Security and in parallel, Canada is reviewing how it contributes to peace operations, in the face of changing dynamics and challenges faced by the CAF and Canadian police services, to take advantage of outside of uniformed deployments, and in response to new government priorities.

Although the current round of UN reforms and reflections is not a new phenomenon, the liquidity crisis has added a critical factor to the debate. As of 30 September, peacekeeping budgets of approximately $5.4B USD were .7B in arrears, with approximately $2.4 being owed by the USF for reductions of 15% to 25%This is expected to result in significant cuts to mission personnel, with estimates ranging, arguably, mission viability in some instances. (Canada consistently pays its assessed contributions in full.)

Canada’s international humanitarian assistance

• In Fiscal Year 2024-2025, Canada provided $797¹ million to respond to the life-saving needs of those affected by conflict and natural disasters around the world.
• Driven by new and increasingly protracted conflicts and natural disasters, over 300 million people need humanitarian assistance in 2025.
• Canada will continue to provide urgent humanitarian assistance where it is needed most through experienced humanitarian partners, including the UN, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and Canadian and international NGOs.

Supplementary messages

Sudan

Canada is alarmed by Sudan’s humanitarian crisis, marked by famine and widespread conflict-related sexual violence, as well as reports of mass killings and ethnically motivated violence, especially since the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) capture of El Fasher. Since April 2023, Canada has provided over $120 million in humanitarian funding for Sudanese affected by the crisis, including those finding refuge in neighbouring countries.

Palestine

Canada is deeply concerned by the appalling humanitarian conditions endured by civilians in Gaza and we continue to call for unimpeded and at scale UN-led humanitarian assistance into and throughout the Strip. Since October 2023, Canada has committed more than $400 million in international assistance in response to the crisis, including over $270 million in humanitarian funding and $20 million in early recovery programming.

Hurricane Melissa

Canada has committed more than $11 million to support emergency response efforts in Jamaica, Cuba and Haiti – this includes support for emergency food, water, shelter, and health services. As part of this response, Canada has launched a matching fund where it will match up to $1.5 million in donations to the Canadian Red Cross’ Hurricane Melissa Appeal.

Philippines typhoons

Following the recent typhoons and a major earthquake, Canada has committed more than $1.25 million to support emergency relief efforts in the Philippines. This funding is helping provide emergency shelter, clean water, hygiene kits, and protection services for affected people.

Supporting facts and figures

• Canada remains a committed humanitarian donor, ranking 13th largest in 2024.
• GAC’s top funded humanitarian partners for FY 2024-25 included:
• World Food Programme (WFP) - $202 million.
• International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)- $94 million.
• UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) - $87 million.
• UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) - $84 million.

Background

As a result of major global funding cuts, the humanitarian system has prioritized assistance in line with reduced resources. It is also undergoing significant reforms that will increase its efficiency and effectiveness while reaffirming its core purpose of providing life-saving protection and assistance to those most at risk during acute emergencies. As of August 2025, over 300 million people need humanitarian assistance globally, and 122 million people are forcibly displaced. Canada continues to respond to sudden onset and protracted crises and is actively addressing global food insecurity.

Canada’s support to the Global Fund

• On 21 November 2025, Canada announced a pledge of $1.02 billion for the Global Fund’s 8^th Replenishment for the 2026-2028 implementation period.
• The Global Fund is an impactful financing mechanism that plays a key role in meeting the needs of the poorest and marginalized, while strengthening global and Canadian health security.
• This important pledge shows that Canada is doing its part to support global approaches to tackling global common health challenges. At the same time, it takes into account fiscal realities and recalibrates our support.

Supplementary messages

• Canada has supported the Global Fund since its inception, contributing to saving over 70 million lives and reducing the combined death rate from the three diseases by 63%.
• Every $1 invested in the Global Fund leads to an estimated $19 in health and economic gains in low and middle-income countries.

 Update

The Global Fund’s Eighth Replenishment process -- mobilizing pledges from governments, private sector, foundations for the Fund’s 2026 – 2028 implementation period -- culminated on November 21, 2025, at a Replenishment Summit, in Johannesburg, South Africa, co-hosted by South African President Ramaphosa and UK Prime Minister Starmer. A total of US $11.34 billion in pledges were committed. At the event, Cindy Termorshuizen, Deputy Minister for the G7 Summit and Personal Representative of the Prime Minister (Sherpa) for the G7 and G20 Summits outlined Canada’s pledge of $1.02 billion for the replenishment, with a GAC news release formally announcing the commitment.

Supporting facts and figures

• Since its inception in 2002, Canada has contributed $5.4 billion to the Global Fund. With this new pledge, Canada’s support will total over $6 billion.
• Since 2002, health programs supported by the Global Fund partnership have saved over 70 million lives.
• Since 2002, the combined death rate from the three diseases has reduced by 63% and the incidence rate has reduced by 42% in countries where the Global Fund invests.
• In 2024, through Global Fund supported grants, 25.6 million people received antiretroviral therapy for HIV, 7.4 million people were treated for tuberculosis (TB), and 162 million mosquito nets were distributed to help protect against malaria.

Background

Created in 2002, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (“Global Fund”) operates as a financing mechanism, mobilizing financial resources from governments, foundations and the private sector to support countries to combat the three diseases. Founded through the then-G8 and supporting grants in 126 countries (91% in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia Pacific), the Global Fund is the largest investor in the fight against the three diseases.

Supplementary Estimates (B) - Final Page Proofs

The information can be found in these websites:

• Supplementary Estimates (B), 2025-26
  • Statutory Forecasts for Supplementary Estimates (B), 2025-26
  • Expenditures by Purpose for Supplementary Estimates (B), 2025-26
  • Budgetary Expenditures by Standard Object for Supplementary Estimates (B), 2025-26

Canada’s international assistance commitments

• Canada’s international assistance will work to advance shared priorities with partner countries, including in economic prosperity, security, inclusive growth, trade readiness, and private sector investment.
• Reducing poverty, supporting humanitarian assistance and advancing gender equality and climate action remain key priorities for Canada.
• The government works with a wide range of trusted partners to deliver international assistance. This work takes place across fragile, conflict-affected or complex country contexts.

Supplementary messages

• Through the comprehensive expenditure review, Canada is reviewing how it delivers international assistance to ensure it reflects Canadian interests and values, delivers results, and addresses today’s global challenges.
• Canada will maintain focus on poverty reduction, gender equality, climate action and innovative finance while advancing economic and security objectives.
• Pending ratification, Budget 2025 proposes to return the size of the International Assistance Envelope to pre-COVID levels. New funding may support a greater focus on trade, including Export Development Canada’s new $2 billion concessional trade finance envelope.

Supporting facts and figures

• Preliminary data shows Canada was the 7^th largest donor in official development assistance in 2024, down from 6^th in 2023. It remains the 15^th largest donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of gross national income.
• In 2024-25, Canadian organizations received approximately $1.3 billion in development funding, followed by multilaterals with $3.6 billion and international organizations at $900 million.
• Canada is among the largest contributors to humanitarian response in Ukraine, $395.65 million since January 2022 ($15 million in 2024/25) and in the Middle East ($300 million in 2024/25).
• Canada has a long history of supporting global public goods. From 2019-20 to 2023-24, GAC’s aid focused on health ($7.8 billion), climate/biodiversity ($5 billion), humanitarian ($5 billion), economic growth ($3.1 billion), and peace and security ($1.4 billion).
• Canada is one of the top bilateral donors supporting gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls.
• In fiscal year 2023-24, Canada contributed $14.6 million in international assistance to China, $0.6 million to Iran and $0.38 million to North Korea, primarily through multilateral channels. This was provided largely in the energy, transport and storage, and general environmental protection sectors.

GAC workforce at a glance

• Through its Transformation Implementation Plan, Global Affairs Canada is actively working to address many of the human resource and workforce development challenges that were highlighted in the 2023 Senate Committee Report.
• Recruitment will continue at calibrated levels, focused on excellence, the skills needed to meet emerging diplomatic priorities, and appropriate representation of Canadian society.
• Regular staffing processes are also providing opportunities for career progression for experienced employees within the Department, building retention and long-term sustainability.

Supplementary messages

• Recruitment and assignment processes are designed to meet the Department’s organizational needs and priorities, taking into account workforce availability, and alignment of skills based on a competency, performance and talent-based approach with clear employment equity considerations.
• Rotational assignments provide the Department the flexibility to assign resources where they are needed, when they are needed, with employees who have the skills and competencies for the job.
• The Department is advancing its career development approach through the establishment of a Career Support Unit that will empower employees in managing their careers and support managers in building agile, high-performing teams.
• Since 2021, GAC has appointed 374 junior foreign service officers (FS-01) from across the country through various staffing processes and has provided Official Languages training to those requiring it.

Supporting facts and figures

• As of October 31, 2025, the Dept. has 14,068 employees, of which 61% are Canada-Based Staff (CBS) and39% are Locally Engaged Staff (LES).)
  Canada-Based Staff is comprised of 6,123 (73%) traditional employees and 2,328 (27%) rotational employees, for whom being deployed abroad is part of the condition of employment.
• Rotational employees include foreign service officers (1,690) and executives (384), as well as information technology (146) and administrative (102) professionals.
• Close to half (49,6%) of the Department’s total workforce is located abroad. The workforce abroad consists of 1,420 CBS (20%) and 5,558 LES (80%).

Mission footprint and networks

• Canada’s network abroad consists of 181 missions in 112 countries, the smallest footprint of all G7 partners both in terms of missions and countries.
• As of March 31, 2025, the mission network was comprised of 8,328 positions, including 2,400 Canada-based staff and 5,928 Locally engaged staff.
• Canada’s network of missions is paramount to building new alliances, strengthening relations with reliable trading partners, protecting Canada’s sovereignty, and building coalitions to ensure the security and prosperity of Canada.

Supplementary messages

• In line with the Government’s commitment to spend less while continuing to deliver on key priorities, GAC is pursuing embassy co-location arrangements with allies where it makes sense. I will be traveling to Nuuk, Greenland, soon where I will I open a new Consulate, co-located with the Consulate General of Iceland. This will strengthen Canada’s presence in the Arctic and our ties with key allies while containing costs.

Supporting facts and figures

• Under the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has the powers, duties and functions to conduct all diplomatic and consular relations on behalf of Canada, coordinate the direction given by the Government of Canada to heads of Canada’s diplomatic and consular missions, and has the management of Canada’s diplomatic and consular missions.
• As of March 31, 2025, Canada’s network abroad consists of 181 missions in 112 countries regionally distributed as follows: Europe/Middle East/Arctic (58), the Americas (54), Indo-Pacific (43) and Africa (26).
• Global Affairs Canada (GAC) maintains a further six regional trade offices located across Canada and close to 100 offices headed by honorary consuls. Honorary Consuls are private individuals appointed by Order in Council.
• GAC’s mission network enables the operations of 21 federal departments and agencies, 8 provincial governments and 3 Crown corporations.
• Canada has entered into co-location agreements to provide or receive, infrastructure and administrative support with the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Iceland and NATO. These agreements currently cover 21 locations.
• Provincial governments, while representing just over 2% of Canada’s positions abroad, have experienced significant growth of over 25% in the past five years, reaching 194 active positions as of March 31, 2025.
• Global Affairs Canada is exploring ways to make our global network of missions more cost-effective, including consolidating certain offices and pursuing co-location opportunities.

Bill C-219

• Our Government recently indicated during Second reading the intention to support Bill C-219. However, we consider that elements of the bill could be improved.
• I have concerns that some of the specific elements of this bill could put the safety and security of human rights defenders – including Canadians – at risk.
• Other elements are problematic as they would require departments to come to conclusions outside their areas of expertise, pose machinery of government issues, increase red tape and more.

Update

Bill C-219 was introduced in the House of Commons on September 16, 2025 by MP James Bezan. The bill received first hour of Second Reading debate on November 26.

Supporting facts and figures

• The Government takes a decentralized approach to supporting human rights defenders, anchored in Voices at Risk: Canada’s Guidelines on Supporting Human Rights Defenders. Canadian officials across our global diplomatic network actively engage in outreach, support and advocacy to identify and support important cases of concern in their country/countries of accreditation. The best support is often provided in concert with state and CSO partners through quiet diplomacy.
• Since 2017, Canada has imposed sanctions on over 520 individuals and entities in response to human rights violations and acts of significant corruption under both the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA) and Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law) (JVCFOA).
• Under s. 35.1 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, a foreign national is inadmissible to Canada if they are listed under either of Canada’s autonomous sanctions laws. Under s. 42(1)(b), accompanying family members of sanctioned individuals are also inadmissible.
• Canada’s sanctions asset seizure and forfeiture regime have procedural safeguards in place. Statutory recourse mechanisms and legal processes may be launched by parties, impacting the timelines for forfeiture.
• GAC’s Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM Canada) is active in detecting digital transnational repression globally using open-source research and data analytics. It leverages a full suite of diplomatic tools to respond to detected threats.

Background

Bill C-219 seeks to amend four laws – the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act, SEMA, JVCFOA as well as the Broadcasting Act.

Bill C-219 aims to strengthen Canada’s sanctions and human rights frameworks by requiring the development of an annual report on human rights, which requires a detailed listing of human rights defenders detained abroad – referred to as prisoners of conscience in the bill – whose release the Government is actively seeking, and seeking to align Canadian legislation with likeminded countries through the imposition of economic measures and visa bans. Among a suite of proposed amendments, it also seeks to change the title of SEMA, expand the legislation’s sanctions triggers, and provide a mechanism to remove broadcast licences from sanctioned entities.

A few elements of Bill C-219 are very similar to Bill C-281 from the previous parliament, namely the human rights reporting provisions, a requirement for the Minister to respond to parliamentary recommendations for Magnitsky Law sanctions under the JVCFOA, and Broadcasting Act provisions. Bill C-281 passed through the House unanimously and was awaiting committee study in the Senate before the dissolution of the 44^th Parliament. Whereas C-281 sought amendments to JVCFOA only, C-219 seeks to amend both SEMA and JVCFOA.

Bill S-214

• The bill aims to facilitate the forfeiture of foreign state assets and ultimately to provide the proceeds of their disposal to the affected state.
• Canada’s existing asset seizure and forfeiture regime is exhaustive. It enables the Government to seize (or restrain), forfeit (by judicial order), dispose and redistribute assets in Canada belonging to sanctioned individuals and entities.

Update

Bill S-214 was introduced in the Senate on May 28, 2025, by Senator Donna Dasko and is currently awaiting the start of second reading debate. No date has yet been confirmed.

Background

Bill S-214 seeks to amend the Special Economic Measures Act to allow for the disposal of a foreign state’s assets seized under the Act without needing a judicial order.

Bill S-214 is identical to former Bill S-278 that was introduced in the previous Parliament in October 2023. Bill S-278 was originally sponsored by Senator Omidvar. Senators Omidvar, Housakos, and Patterson spoke in support of the bill during second reading debates on four occasions between Oct 17, 2023 and Oct 22, 2024. However, Bill S-278 expired before completing second reading upon the prorogation and dissolution of Parliament in early 2025.

Bill C-228 and Quebec

• While we share the principles underlying Bill C-228, we believe that it risks undermining the agility and flexibility required to advance Canadian interests on the world stage, without significantly enhancing transparency.
• The current Policy on the Tabling of Treaties, operative since 2008, already affords a high degree of transparency by the Government to Parliament and allows for considerable parliamentary participation.

Supplementary messages

• The amendments contemplated in the Bill have the potential to cause significant delays in the treaty-making process, particularly for what the Bill defines as “major treaties” (including Free Trade Agreements and many other treaties).
• The flexibility under the current Policy would be replaced by legislated requirements that could delay or impede ratification by making it illegal for the Government to continue the treaty-making process without “advice” of the House of Commons, hindering the ability of the Government to deliver results for Canadians and Canadian business.
• The current Policy strikes a balance between ensuring transparency for Parliament and Canadians, and preserving the flexibility required for the Government in the interests of a timely and effective treaty-making process.

Background

The PMB C-228 seeks to add new elements to the current tabling process, including a requirement for the Minister of Foreign Affairs to obtain the advice of the House on “major treaties” through a parliamentary committee which must submit a report for this purpose “as soon as feasible” (a term not defined), prior to the Government taking actions to bind Canada. Exemptions from the tabling process are to be granted under “exceptional circumstances” by the Governor in Council by order and the reasons must be tabled. Currently, exemptions are granted by the Prime Minister or Cabinet. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke to the bill during the first hour of Second Reading debate in the House of Commons on October 21. The Bloc Québécois argued for greater involvement from legislators and suggested that other jurisdictions such as Europe and the U.S. have more transparent approaches to treaty-making. The Bloc also described Quebec’s internal process of publication and debate of treaties in the National Assembly and argued that C-228 seeks to replicate this at the federal level. In particular, the Bloc’s position aligns with the long-standing Gérin-Lajoie Doctrine, which argues for a significant role for the province in the negotiation and conclusion of international treaties with respect to subjects falling under its exclusive jurisdiction. The Gérin-Lajoie Doctrine has been explicitly included in successive BQ election platforms (including the 2021 and 2025 platforms). The Conservative Party highlighted that despite the good intentions guiding the Bill, its procedural requirements involving advice of the house and committee review of nearly all treaties would constitute an undue burden on the treaty-making process.

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Bill C-233

• Human rights are important to Canada and to Canadians.
• Canada has one of the strongest export controls systems in the world.
• Permit applications are reviewed on a case-by-case basis against the criteria drawn from Arms Trade Treaty which are embedded in Canadian law through the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA).

Supplementary messages

• Canada acceded to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2019.
• To be eligible for accession, Canada made considerable changes to its export control legislation and framework.
• Canada continues to participate actively in this treaty and to engage with civil society to ensure our regime remains on par with those of our allies.

Update

The first hour of second reading of Bill C-233 (An Act to amend the Export and Import Permits Act) is expected to occur on November 19. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, or her delegate, will deliver a speech as part of the debate outlining the government position on the Bill. The Bill, which was introduced MP Kwan (NDP), proposes several changes to the Export and Import Permits Act and Canada’s long standing export control regime.

Supporting facts and figures

• Canada acceded to the Arms Trade Treaty in 2019 further to amendments to the Export and Import Permits Act, its regulations and policies and practices.
• Canada went beyond the ATT requirements by embedding the ATT criteria and risk test in domestic legislation.
• Canada applies the ATT criteria to more than the full system conventional arms captured in Article 2 of the ATT, to include parts and components.

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Bill C-251 – Forced Labour

• Forced labour is an abhorrent human rights abuse.
• Canada implemented the forced labour import prohibition and the Supply Chains Act to address forced labour in international supply chains.
• The Government of Canada is reviewing Bill C-251 to assess the proposed measures.

Background

In July 2020, Canada introduced an import prohibition on goods mined, manufactured, or produced wholly or in part by forced labour further to its obligations under the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA). Separately, Parliament enacted Bill S-211, the Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act (Supply Chains Act) in January 2024, introducing mandatory forced labour supply chain reporting requirements for businesses.

On October 21, 2025, Bloc Québécois MP Simon-Pierre Savard Tremblay (vice chair of the Standing Committee on International Trade (CIIT)) introduced Private Member Bill (PMB) C-251 entitled, “An Act to amend the Customs Act and the Customs Tariff (forced labour and child labour)”.

Bill C-251 would amend the Customs Act and the Customs Tariff with the effect of increasing requirements on Canadian customs officers and importers related to goods at risk of having been made with forced labour or child labour. It would require customs officers to detain goods that come from a country, region, area, or a specific entity that the Governor in Council has designated as being associated with the use of forced or child labour. For goods from these designated jurisdictions or entities, the bill creates a “rebuttable presumption” that they were mined, manufactured, or produced wholly or in part using forced or child labour – effectively shifting the burden of proof from the Government to the importer. These goods would be treated as prohibited imports by default unless and until the Canadian importer can rebut the presumption by meeting prescribed supply-chain tracing, certification, and due-diligence requirements and by satisfying the customs officer that the goods were not made with forced or child labour.

ATIP protected background

In 2024, a Machinery of Government decision was taken that the Minister of International Trade be designated the "Competent Authority" responsible for providing policy guidance to the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and other departments involved in the implementation of the import ban. The Minister would also be responsible for providing advice to Canadian businesses to mitigate forced labour in supply chains.