Your in-person, 1-hour appearance, begins at 3:30 p.m.
The following officials are accompanying you in-person during your appearance and may be called upon to respond to questions:
- David Morrison, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Alexandre Lévêque, Assistant Deputy Minister, Europe, Middle East and Arctic Branch
- Richard Arbeiter, Political Director and Assistant Deputy Minister, International Security and Political Affairs Branch
- Shirley Carruthers, Assistant Deputy Minister and Chief Financial Officer, People and Corporate Management Branch and Chief Financial Officer
Your appearance begins with your opening remarks of 5 minutes, which will be immediately followed by rounds of questions from members.
First round of questions: 6 minutes each for the Conservative Party (CPC), Liberal Party (LPC), Bloc Québécois (BQ).
Second and subsequent rounds of questions: CPC 5 minutes, LPC 5 minutes, BQ 2.5 minutes.
- The time allocated includes the questions from the member and your responses.
For awareness, following your appearance, Canada’s Ambassador to Haiti will appear before the committee on the situation in that country, from 4:30-5:30 pm.

Committee context

Information on committee members can be found in the member bios section of this briefing binder.
The last ministerial appearance at FAAE in the 44th Parliament was on February 7, 2024, when former Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon. Mélanie Joly appeared on the Committee’s study concerning Canada’s Diplomatic Capacity.
- During that appearance there was limited focus on the subject at hand by the Members, who focussed instead on:
  - The ongoing Israel-Hamas war, with particular attention to the humanitarian crisis and halting of funding to UNRWA;
  - Iran and if the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) would be listed as a terrorist organization by the Government;
  - The Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP) at GAC; and
  - Arms exports to Israel and Turkey, sanctions busting and dual-use exports (including allegations of exports of mines to Kyrgyzstan).
- Most recently, the committee has engaged in the following topics of study: The Situation in Haiti and Canada’s Response; Canada’s Arctic Strategy; Russian Incursion into Polish and Romanian Airspace.
- The committee also has plans to engage in the following topics of study: Canada's diplomatic, humanitarian, and security response to Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine, with a particular focus on the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia; foreign policy rationale behind the recent operation by the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Australian Navy in the Taiwan Strait; Canada’s Africa Strategy;
- Broadly speaking, during the 45th Parliament, Committee members’ interests reflect continued attention to Canada’s role in global security, diplomacy, and humanitarian engagement.
  - The CPC has focused on strengthening allied defence coordination, Arctic sovereignty, and the effectiveness of sanctions, while examining Canada’s military and financial responses to crises such as those in Ukraine, Haiti, and Sudan, alongside monitoring Russia’s global influence.
  - The LPC has emphasized balancing sovereignty, sustainable economic development, and environmental protection with Canada’s humanitarian and peacekeeping commitments in regions including the Arctic, Haiti, Lebanon, and Sudan, with particular attention to women’s rights and stability in conflict zones.
  - The BQ has maintained interest in advancing strategic and economic sovereignty through critical mineral and infrastructure development in the Arctic, aligning these with NATO cooperation, and ensuring effective humanitarian and evacuation responses to international crises such as those in Lebanon.

FAAE members’ biographies

Ahmed Hussen (Chair)
LPC – Ontario (Etobicoke – York South – Weston)

Election to the House of Commons

First elected: 2015
Re-elected: 2019, 2021, 2025

Professional background

Studies: Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in History from York University, law degree from the University of Ottawa and is a licensed member of the Ontario Bar.
Law: Practiced law, specializing in immigration and criminal law.
Community engagement: Active in civil society, having served on the board of the Global Enrichment Foundation, which empowers women in East Africa by facilitating access to post-secondary education. Also served on the board of Journalists for Human Rights.

Offices and roles as a parliamentarian

Minister of International Development (2023–2025)
Minister of Housing and Diversity and Inclusion (2021–2023)
Minister of Families, Children and Social Development (2019–2021)
Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship (2017–2019)

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

Chair: Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2025 – Present)

Areas of interest to Global Affairs Canada

Private Member’s Motion M-14: Canada’s International Development Assistance

Introduced Private Member’s Motion M-14 on September 15, 2025, proposing to integrate economic considerations into Canada’s international assistance programs. The motion seeks to include opportunities for Canadian businesses and workers within aid initiatives, aligning poverty reduction abroad with economic benefits at home.
Key elements include establishing a dedicated funding stream to support economic partnerships in sectors like clean energy, agriculture, digital technology, and education, and requiring the Minister of International Development to report annually to Parliament on Canadian involvement, partner outcomes, and domestic economic benefits.

Middle East: Israel and Gaza

Canada’s humanitarian assistance investments.
Concerns over Israeli parliamentary legislation affecting UNRWA operations. Has advocated for continued support to trusted international partners such as the World Food Programme, UNICEF, and WHO in Gaza.

Afghan refugees

Supports humanitarian funding for flood recovery efforts and Afghan refugees, reinforcing Canada’s commitment to disaster response and refugee assistance in South Asia.

Haiti

Outlined Government support for Haitian-led solutions to the political crisis during a FAAE Committee meeting on May 6, 2024, providing an overview of Canada’s humanitarian aid efforts in response to Haiti’s ongoing security and humanitarian challenges.

Michael D. Chong (Vice-Chair)
CPC – Ontario (Wellington – Halton Hills)

Critic

Foreign affairs

Election to the House of Commons

First elected:2004
Re-elected: 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2019, 2021, 2025

Professional background

Studies: Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in Philosophy, Trinity College, University of Toronto.
Private sector experience: Held roles in financial services and technology, including as Analyst at Barclays de Zoete Wedd (1994–1997) and Head of IT at Mackie Research Capital (1997–1999). Served as Assistant to the President at Canadian Tire Financial Services (1992–1994), and later as Senior Advisor at the Greater Toronto Airports Authority (2001–2004).
Civic engagement: Co-founder of the Dominion Institute (now Historica Canada), and member of its Board of Directors since 1997.

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

Vice-Chair:
- Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2023 - Present)
- Special Committee on the Canada–People’s Republic of China Relationship (2022 – 2025)
- Special Committee on Afghanistan (2021 – 2022)
Member:
- Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2020 – Present)
- Special Committee on the Canada–People’s Republic of China Relationship (2020 – 2025)

Areas of interest to Global Affairs Canada

Arctic sovereignty

Interest in implications of Russian-led undersea cable projects (e.g., Polar Express, Polar Connect) and Canada’s capacity to protect undersea cables from anchor damage or sabotage.
Capabilities of Canada’s naval and diplomatic assets to deter unauthorized Arctic vessel transits.
Suggested that the Government seek diplomatic support and recognition from other maritime nations to bolster Canada’s internal waters claim.

Middle East: Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank

Anti-Semitism in Canada: has advocated for designating Samidoun as a terrorist organization.
Defends Israel’s right to self-defence, noting the absence of credible reports of alleged war crimes.

China: Human rights and foreign interference

He and his family have been the target of online misinformation campaigns assessed to be linked to China, aimed at discrediting and intimidating them.
Concerned about Chinese interference, surveillance activities, and the potential misuse of Canadian university research by the Chinese military, calling for a public inquiry and stronger diplomatic responses.
Highlighted human rights abuses in China, including the treatment of Uyghurs and Tibetans.

Sudan: Sanctions

Questioned enforcement of Canada’s sanctions and underscored GAC’s role in preventing circumvention.

Ukraine/Russia: Sanctions

Submitted inquiries regarding waivers for Russian imports and raised concerns about civilian casualties in the context of Canada’s military support to Ukraine.
Supports the Canada-Ukraine strategic security partnership agreement.

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe (Vice-Chair)
BQ – Québec (Lac-Saint-Jean)

Critic

Foreign affairs, development and international cooperation
Human rights
Immigration, refugees and citizenship

Election to the House of Commons

First elected: 2019
Re-elected:2021, 2025

Professional background

Studies: Studied Art and Media Technology at Cégep de Jonquière.
Cultural Sector: Worked for 20 years as a sound technician and pole vaulter on film sets in Montreal (2000-2020).
Forestry Industry: Employed as a day labourer at Resolute Forest Products in Alma, Quebec (2018-2019).
Political Involvement: Served as President of the Bloc Québécois Lac-Saint-Jean riding association (2017-2019).
Son of former Bloc Leader Gilles Duceppe.

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

Vice-Chair:
- Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2025 - Present)
- Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2020 - 2025)
- Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (2021 - Present)
- Special Committee on Afghanistan (2021 – 2025); Standing Committee on National Defence (2020 – 2021)

Areas of interest to Global Affairs Canada

Haiti

Raised concerns about links between Haitian gangs on Canadian soil, including money laundering and arms trafficking, and has raised the impact of U.S. immigration decisions on Haitian migration patterns.

Human Rights and International Advocacy

Has been opposed to the Government’s invitations to leaders with controversial human rights records, including Narendra Modi, Mohammed bin Salman, and Mohammed bin Zayed, at the 2025 G7 Summit, emphasizing the need to align Canada’s diplomatic engagements with its human rights values.
Supports democracy and human rights in Hong Kong as Patron of Hong Kong Watch Canada, supporting vulnerable populations.
Introduced a motion recognizing Tibetans as a people with the right to self-determination, unanimously adopted by the House of Commons on June 10, 2024.

Afghanistan

Supported bringing Afghan refugees to Canada, citing examples from Kosovo and Syria.

Ziad Aboultaif
CPC – Alberta (Edmonton - Manning)

Election to the House of Commons

First elected: 2015
Re-elected: 2019, 2021, 2025

Professional background

Business owner: Where andowned and co-managed Axxess Furniture Inc., an Edmonton-based furniture distribution business, for 12 years.

Notable political roles

Critic: International Development (2017–2019)

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

Member:
- Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2017 – Present)
- Subcommittee on International Human Rights (2022 – 2023)
- Standing Committee on International Trade (2020 – 2021)
- Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates (2020)

Areas of interest to Global Affairs Canada

Arctic sovereignty

Concerns about potential confrontations with unauthorized foreign vessels in Canadian Arctic waters and Canada’s defence preparedness, particularly through NORAD and NATO.

Russian incursions and NATO response

Views Russia’s tactics as deliberate provocations aimed at distracting NATO.

Haiti

Concerns regarding beneficiaries of Haiti’s gang crisis and inquired about possible political motivations behind gang networks and potential foreign state support.

Export of LNG and energy infrastructure

Critical of the government with respect its support to the energy sector; favours a west-east pipeline to expand Alberta’s oil and gas access to key markets.

Canada’s approach to Africa

Highlighted challenges across Africa, including rising costs, food insecurity, and ongoing conflicts, and emphasized the importance of maintaining Canada’s market share amid growing influence from China and Russia during May 2024 FAAE meetings.

Canadian diplomacy

Raised concerns about declining foreign investment in Canada during a February 12, 2024, FAAE meeting and emphasized the role of diplomacy in attracting and sustaining international investment.

Lianne Rood
CPC – Ontario (Middlesex – London)

Critic

International development and federal economic development for Sourthern Ontario

Election to the House of Commons

First elected: 2019
Re-elected: 2021, 2025

Professional background

Studies: Honours Bachelor’s Degree in Criminology and Sociology from the University of Windsor.
Career: Assistant to former Parliamentary Secretary for Agriculture and the Canadian Wheat Board, David Anderson. Later served as a Special Assistant to Gerry Ritz, former Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food.
Community Engagement: Maintains a strong local presence in her riding through regular attendance at community events such as hockey game puck drops, Diwali celebrations, and the Strathroy Santa Claus Parade.

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

Member: Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2025 – Present)

Areas of interest to Global Affairs Canada

Arctic sovereignty

Interest in Canada’s coordinated sanctions efforts with likeminded countries to address Russian-Chinese strategic alignment in the Arctic.

Russian incursions and NATO response

Inquired about Canada’s defence readiness and potential capability gaps exposed by recent Russian incursions into Polish and Romanian airspace in 2025.

International trade

Advocated for removing internal trade barriers within Canada, framing reforms as essential to improving competitiveness for Canadian farmers and producers, in alignment with former CPC Leader Pierre Poilievre’s 2025 economic plan.
Participated in a November 2024 NASCO meeting on North American competitiveness, emphasizing the importance of Canada–U.S.–Mexico trade relations and supporting efforts to strengthen supply chains.

Shelby Kramp-Neuman
CPC – Ontario (Hastings – Lennox and Addington – Tyendinaga)

Critic

Canada - US Trade

Election to the House of Commons

First elected: 2021
Re-elected: 2025

Professional background

Studies: Bachelor of Arts degree in Communications and Political Science from the University of Ottawa.
Political and government experience: Served as the parliamentary assistant to the late Jim Prentice and was also a staff member for Senator Consiglio Di Nino. She also worked for Global Affairs Canada as a representative in Seattle, Washington.
Educational and teaching career: Nearly six years of teaching experience with the Hastings and Prince Edward District School Board and Loyalist College.
Municipal leadership: Served four years as Deputy Mayor on the Centre Hastings Municipal Council.

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

Member: Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2025 – Present).

Areas of interest to Global Affairs Canada

Arctic sovereignty

Concerns about Russian and Chinese military activities in the Arctic and their strategic partnership.

Russian incursions and NATO response

Explored Canada’s counter-drone capabilities and Canadian Armed Forces’ readiness.
Questioned how Canada balances deterrence efforts without escalating tensions.

Haiti

Raised concerns about CAF deployment capabilities and aid delivery in gang-controlled areas.
Interest in Canada’s long-term plan for supporting governance, justice, and democratic development.

Trade and tariff policy

Expressed concern during Question Period on September 17, 2025, over the government’s handling of Canada–U.S. trade negotiations, particularly tariffs and export performance, contrasting Canada’s export decline with Mexico’s growth.
Advocated renegotiating the Canada–U.S.–Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) to reduce trade tensions and foster stability for Canadian workers and businesses.

Defense, NATO, and NORAD

Supports Canadian leadership in international defense alliances, including NATO and NORAD.
Active member of Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association and the Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association.

Arctic sovereignty

Raised concerns about the operational capacity of the Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic, emphasizing the strategic importance of Arctic sovereignty.

Canada–Ukraine relations and humanitarian response

Emphasized the need to prioritize the health and well-being of women and children affected by the conflict, including targeted international assistance.

Bill Blair
LPC – Ontario (Scarborough Southwest)

Election to the House of Commons

First elected:2015
Re-elected: 2019, 2021, 2025

Professional background

Studies: Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in Sociology from York University; Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.) from Queen’s University.
Law Enforcement: Served over 30 years in the Toronto Police Service, including roles as Chief of Police.

Offices and roles as a parliamentarian

Minister of National Defence (2023 – 2025)
President of the King’s Privy Council for Canada (2022 – 2023)
Minister of Emergency Preparedness (2021 – 2023)
President of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada (2021 – 2022)
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (2019 – 2021)
Minister of Border Security and Organized Crime Reduction (2018 – 2019)
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada (2015 - 2018)

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

Chair: Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2025 – Present)

Areas of interest to Global Affairs Canada

Arctic sovereignty

Supports investments towards the Canadian Rangers Program in the Arctic and incorporating Indigenous knowledge into northern military operations like Operation Nanook.

Russian incursions and NATO response

Inquired about NATO cohesion in response to Russian incursions into Polish and Romanian airspace and the strengthening of collective defence.

Haiti

Canada’s coordination with Haitian and international partners through multilateral channels.
Reforms to MSSM funding and Canada’s support for democratic institutions and elections.

Arctic sovereignty and international relations

Supports the strategic importance of the Arctic and Canada’s $40 billion investment in NORAD modernization, including over-the-horizon radar, infrastructure upgrades, and early warning systems.

Mona Fortier
LPC – Ontario (Ottawa—Vanier—Gloucester)

Election to the House of Commons

First elected:2015
Re-elected: 2019, 2021, 2025

Professional background

Studies: Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in Sociology and Masters in Business Administration from the University of Ottawa
Communications/Marketing: Senior Director, Communications and Market Development, La Cité College (2011 – 2015); Principal, Executive Director at Equinox Inc. (2005 - 2008)
Community Involvement: Board Member, Montfort Hospital; Member, Provincial Advisory Committee on Francophone Affairs (Ontario); Board Member, Shaw Centre
Awards: Recipient of the Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal (2012) for community leadership

Offices and roles as a parliamentarian

Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (2025 – Present)
Chief government whip (2024 – 2025)
Deputy government whip (2024)
President of the Treasury Board (2021 – 2023)
Minister of Middle Class Prosperity (2019 – 2021)
Associate Minister of Finance (2019 – 2021)

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

Member:
- Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2025 – Present)
- Standing Committee on International Trade (2023 – 2025)

Areas of interest to Global Affairs Canada

Consular services

Engages with Parliamentarians and facilitates briefings to enhance their understanding of consular services provided by GAC, helping MPs and Senators effectively respond to constituent concerns and inquiries.

Arctic sovereignty

Infrastructure investments to improve mobility and logistics in the North.
The benefits of integrating Indigenous knowledge into northern infrastructure and defence projects.
Arctic security and NORAD modernization.

Environmental trade policy

Contributed to the Standing Committee on International Trade (CIIT) study on protecting Canadian manufacturing sectors, including electric vehicles, aluminum, and steel, from related Chinese imports.

Robert Oliphant
LPC – Ontario (Don Valley West)

Election to the House of Commons

First elected: 2008
Re-elected: 2011, 2015, 2019, 2021

Professional background

Studies: Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in Commerce from Victoria College, University of Toronto; Master of Divinity (M. Div.) from the Vancouver School of Theology; Doctor of Ministry (D. Min.) from the Chicago Theological Seminary, University of Chicago.
Religion: Minister at the Quyon United Church (1984 – 1986); Associate Minister at the Timothy Eaton Memorial Church (1984 – 1986); Interim Senior Minister at the Bloor Street United Church (1991 – 1993); Minister at the Whitehorse United Church (1991 – 1993); Minister at the Eglinton St. George's United Church (1999 – 2008).
Management: President and CEO at the Asthma Society of Canada (2011 – 2015).

Political and parliamentary roles

Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (2019 - Present)

Committee membership

Member: Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2019 – Present); Special Committee on the Canada–People’s Republic of China Relationship (2022 – Present)
Former Chair: Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (2017 – 2019); Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (2016 – 2017)
Former Vice-Chair:Standing Committee on Veterans Affairs (2009 – 2010)

Areas of interest to Global Affairs Canada

Arctic sovereignty

Examined the interrelationship between sovereignty, economic development, and environmental protection and sustainability in Arctic foreign policy.

Russian incursions and NATO response

Concerned about the broader implications of Russian drone incursions, interest in diplomatic engagement with non-NATO countries to pressure Russia.

Haiti and Dominican Republic

Inquired about Canada’s role in protecting aid workers in Haiti and collaboration with the Dominican Republic on border security.

Middle East: Gaza and UNRWA

Advocated for UNRWA as the most effective organization for delivering aid and essential services to Palestinian refugees during the October 2024 emergency debate on Lebanon and Israel.

Anita Vandenbeld
LPC – Ontario (Ottawa West – Nepean)

Election to the House of Commons

First elected: 2015
Re-elected: 2019, 2021, 2025

Professional background

Studies: Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in History and Political Science from the University of Calgary, and M.A. in Political and Constitutional History from York University.
Work in international development: for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the National Democratic Institute in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
Recognition: In 2008, she was awarded the Canadian Peacekeeping Service Medal in recognition of her work in Kosovo.

Offices and roles as a parliamentarian

Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of International Development (2021–2025); Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence (2019–2021)

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

Member:
- Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2017-2019; 2025 – Present)
- Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2020-2025)
Chair:
- Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2018-2019)

Areas of interest to Global Affairs Canada

Arctic Sovereignty

Interest in the role of the Canadian Coast Guard and the Canadian Rangers in Arctic security, and how their utilization could be enhanced.
Concerns about the impact that climate change and oceanic patterns have on Canada’s national security interests in the Arctic.
Emphasized Canada’s leadership in incorporating Indigenous knowledge in Arctic multilateral forums and cooperation with Nordic countries.

Middle East – Israel-Gaza Conflict

Has raised the critical importance of humanitarian access for civilians in Gaza and UNRWA’s role in delivering aid and essential services to Gaza and the West Bank.

Women’s Rights

Highlighted barriers and violence faced by women during conflicts and displacement, raising these issues in SDIR Committee meetings on June 4 and October 22, 2024.

Canada’s foreign policy approach

Canada’s foreign policy approach is guided by the seven priorities outlined in the Prime Minister’s mandate letter, including the building of global partnerships that strengthen our economy and protect our sovereignty.
The approach focuses on:
1. defence and security,
2. economic resilience, and
3. core values, supported by multilateral engagement.
My mandate is to leverage our bilateral relationships and work through multilateral fora to open markets, make Canada an attractive destination for capital, and work with our allies in NATO and NORAD to keep Canadians safe.

Supplementary messages

My department is meeting the government’s priority of spending less on operations by making clear strategic choices that maximize the impact of Canada’s foreign policy.
This includes strengthening Canada’s strategic autonomy by building resilient partnerships and reducing dependencies as we advance our security, trade, and investment interests.
Canada’s foreign policy is focusing on partners and institutions where our engagement can most effectively advance Canada’s interests and contribute to global stability and a safer, more prosperous, inclusive and sustainable future for Canadians.
Implementing Canada’s foreign policy will require leveraging – and where necessary, fine-tuning – the tools in our toolkit, including international assistance, to best serve Canadians.
If pressed: Guided by the vision outlined in the Prime Minister’s mandate letter and the Speech from the Throne, my Department has been developing advice to support a foreign policy that responds to a shifting and increasingly complex global landscape.

Background

The Government has promised to restore Canada’s global leadership “through a new full foreign policy”.

Middle East

Palestinian statehood recognition

Canada has long been committed to a two-state solution – an independent, viable, and sovereign Palestinian State living side by side with the State of Israel in peace and security.
We had hoped this outcome would be achieved as part of a negotiated settlement between Israel and Palestine. However, prospects for a two-state solution have been steadily and gravely eroded, including by:
- The threat of Hamas to Israel and its people, culminating in the attack of October 7, 2023, and its rejection of Israel’s right to exist and a two-state solution.
- Accelerated settlement expansion, soaring settler violence, and annexationist policies across the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
- The ongoing failure by the Israeli government to prevent the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian disaster in Gaza.
Canada proceeded to recognize the State of Palestine as a necessary step to preserve the prospect of a two-state solution, in the face of ongoing efforts to undermine it.

Supplementary messages

Canada remains firmly committed to Israel’s right to exist in peace and security, while recognizing that lasting peace also requires a viable, stable Palestinian state that fully acknowledges Israel’s inalienable right to security and peace.
Canada will intensify efforts to support the Palestinian Authority, an actor that has renounced violence, has recognised Israel, and is committed to the two-state solution.
Recognition is not a reward for Hamas. It is a strategic intervention to marginalize violent extremism and restore hope in diplomacy.

Supporting facts and figures

Canada has committed more than $400 million in international assistance to support efforts in the West Bank and Gaza since the outset of the conflict. This includes $87.5 million in development assistance to support the Palestinian Authority, including social recovery and job creation, democratic governance, accountability, and access to justice, and to support the economic resilience of women and youth in the West Bank.
Canada also provides multi-year funding to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) under a $100 million four-year agreement from 2023-2026. This supports the breadth of the Agency’s work to provide basic services and humanitarian assistance to Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.
Since the start of the conflict, Canada has also disbursed an additional $52 million to UNRWA for Emergency Appeals for the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), $4 million for Palestinians in Lebanon and Syria, and $1 million to support the implementation of the Colonna report recommendations.

Background

On September 21, 2025, Canada formally recognized the State of Palestine. In coordination with Australian, UK, and French counterparts, Canada has engaged the Palestinian Foreign Minister to advance reforms in democratic renewal, education, and social payment systems, and will continue to support this process. On advancing peace efforts, Canada has endorsed the New York Declaration, an outcome document outlining a roadmap to end the war and establish a sovereign Palestinian state alongside Israel. Canada is also engaging with likeminded on Gaza’s post-conflict plans, including France’s proposed UN-sanctioned international stabilization mission and U.S. President Trump’s latest 20-point plan. Canada welcomed President Trump’s plan as the most viable option to achieving an immediate end to the war in Gaza, the release of hostages, and a sustained influx in UN-led humanitarian aid. It also creates the conditions for negotiations towards a political solution to the conflict.

Peace plan

Canada is working with international partners to ensure a permanent ceasefire, sustained influx in humanitarian assistance and postwar recovery and reconstruction in Gaza.
Hamas must disarm and play no role in the future governance of a demilitarized Gaza.
There must be no displacement of the Palestinian people.

Supplementary messages

Canada is actively assessing where we can best contribute to stabilization and reconstruction and will participate in the Cairo International Conference on Early Recovery, Reconstruction and Development in Gaza in November.
The immediate priority is supporting scaled up humanitarian assistance, of which we are already a major contributor, having provided more than $400 million in humanitarian and development assistance since October 7, 2023.
Canada will also increase support to the Palestinian Authority’s reform and capacity-building efforts, enabling it to reassume governance of Gaza when conditions allow.
Canadian civilian and military personnel are actively engaged in the region, including at the U.S.-led Civil-Military Coordination Centre (CMCC) in Israel, which is tasked with monitoring the ceasefire and facilitating the flow of humanitarian assistance, logistics and security assistance into Gaza.

Supporting facts and figures

As of October 24, 2025, 15 deceased Israeli hostages’ remains have been returned. The remains of 13 hostages are believed to still be in Gaza.
The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have withdrawn to an agreed initial ceasefire line and remains in control of approximately 53% of Gaza.
As a transitional measure and with a UN mandate, Canada supports the deployment of an International Stabilization Force to ensure Hamas’ disarmament, facilitate the IDF’s withdrawal and protect civilians.
Global leaders, including PM Carney, assembled in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt on October 13 to endorse the US peace plan and discuss next steps, including humanitarian, security and reconstruction efforts.
The UN estimates Gaza’s reconstruction will cost USD $70 billion, including $20 billion over the next three years.
The UN Development Programme has assessed that destruction in Gaza has reached approximately 84%, with Gaza City experiencing up to 92% destruction.
The Office of the Special Coordinator plays a central role in facilitating international coordination for implementing the US peace plan. Canada has expressed strong support for the office’s security, governance and humanitarian efforts.

Gaza humanitarian situation

Canada welcomes the announcement of a U.S.-brokered peace deal between Israel and Hamas. Canada will continue to coordinate closely with international partners and will support all efforts to turn this positive step into lasting peace for Israelis and Palestinians.
Canada is deeply alarmed by the horrific humanitarian conditions in Gaza, and the confirmation that famine is occurring. The ceasefire provides a critical opportunity to scale up humanitarian assistance and Canada continues to urge Israel to facilitate the immediate, unimpeded and sustained increase of UN-led aid into and throughout Gaza.
Canada continues to support the efforts of the UN, Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs that are responding in extremely challenging circumstances.

Supplementary messages

Canada will continue to support our experienced humanitarian partners to deliver assistance through the existing and experienced UN-led humanitarian system in Gaza which was able to rapidly scale up aid distribution during the last ceasefire.
Since the beginning of the crisis, Canada has been clear that parties to the conflict must adhere to their obligations under International Humanitarian Law.
Canada is exploring modalities to support a scale up of humanitarian assistance, support stabilization efforts, and help Palestinians recover after two years of devastating conflict.
Responsive - Airdrops: Airdrops are a temporary measure used as a last resort, allowing for the provision of urgent life-saving relief. While Canada supported three humanitarian airdrops to respond to urgent needs, this action has not altered our consistent call for Israel to fulfill its obligations under international humanitarian law to ensure rapid and unimpeded access.
Responsive – Aid diversion:
The UN states it has found no evidence of systematic diversion of aid by Hamas.
The UN has consistently emphasized that looting stems from the economics of scarcity – when people are denied basic necessities for long periods, they will take what they can out of desperation.
During the previous ceasefire period, the UN reported that incidents of looting and criminal interference dropped significantly due to the influx of aid. Early UN reports indicate that looting has reduced since the current ceasefire was announced and more aid has been entering Gaza.

Supporting facts and figures

Since 7 October 2023, Canada has committed more than $400 million in international assistance in response to the crisis in the West Bank and Gaza. This includes:

Over $270 million in humanitarian assistance focusing on addressing urgent, lifesaving needs, such as the provision of food, nutrition, water, emergency healthcare, shelter and protection services;
$24.75 million in peace and security programming to support mine action and related activities in West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon and Syria;
$20 million to support early recovery efforts through restoring essential health services when conditions allow; and
$87.5 million in development assistance to support the Palestinian Authority, including social recovery and job creation, democratic governance, accountability, and access to justice, and to support the economic resilience of women and youth in the West Bank.

China

Bilateral relations and trade

Canada is taking a step-by-step approach to engagement with China to recalibrate the bilateral relationship, in order to seek avenues for pragmatic cooperation to advance Canadian interests.
In line with this approach, the Prime Minister, Minister of International Trade and I have had productive interactions with respective counterparts.
Canada continues to underline to China that there is no tolerance for foreign interference, including transnational repression, targeting Canadians or individuals on Canadian soil.

Supplementary messages

We continue to work closely with our security and intelligence partners, including our allies, to counter foreign interference, including transnational repression, to safeguard our national interests, and to lessen its impact on Canadians.
Canada remains actively engaged with China at all levels to find a path forward to address our trade irritants.

Supporting facts and figures

You last met with your counterpart, Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi, on October 17, in Beijing. This was your second meeting, after the July 11 meeting on the margins of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Malaysia.
The Prime Minister met with Premier Li Qiang on the margins of UNGA, on September 23, 2025.
The Minister of International Trade met with his counterpart, Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao, on June 3, 2025, at the OECD in Paris.

Democracy and human rights

Background

There is momentum with the Canada-China relationship and mutual interest in recalibrating the relationship. Canada seeks to further increase its economic relations with China while protecting its economic security and national security interests, first and foremost. There are clear opportunities; our interests can benefit from stable, constructive engagement with China, even when we disagree, including with regards to several ongoing friction points. These include the PRC’s foreign interference activities, concerns over China’s human rights record, its stance on issues related to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea, its economic coercion, non-market policies and practices and a number of trade irritants, including tariffs on certain agricultural and seafood products, and anti-dumping duties on canola seeds.

The PRC, including Mainland China and Hong Kong, uses a variety of tactics to carry out transnational repression activities. It exploits PRC-based family members to pressure those in Canada to cease certain activities the PRC views as hostile, or to return to the PRC. It also threatens PRC-based family members with a range of potential coercive actions, including detention or financial penalties. The PRC also leverages overseas actors to monitor, surveil, and report on others in Canada.

Canada has publicized several information operations that we assess with high confidence were backed by the government of the PRC, targeting members of Parliament, critics of the Chinese Communist Party, and pro-democracy activists.

Hong Kong

Hong Kong is important to Canada given our strong, historic people-to-people ties and its status as a key economic and financial hub in the Indo Pacific.
Canada remains concerned about the deterioration of rights, freedoms and autonomy in Hong Kong.
We condemn acts of transnational repression by Hong Kong authorities against Canadians and those in Canada, including the issuance of international bounties and arrest warrants.

Supplementary messages

Canada has called for the repeal of the National Security Law, which has been used for political repression and violates Hong Kong’s international human rights obligations.
Canada continues to work with international partners to advocate for the promotion and protection of human rights, including the right to freedom of opinion and expression.

Supporting facts and figures

Hong Kong (HK) remains a tariff-free port and an important market for Canadian exports within Asia. It ranks as Canada’s fourth-largest market for seafood, sixth for beef and eighth for pet food.
Hong Kong remains an attractive business environment for Canadian companies, due to its English-speaking business environment, strong legal and information protection (IP) enforcement, lack of capital controls, efficient logistics and access to regional markets (including acting as a gateway to mainland China).
An estimated 300,000 Canadian citizens are living in HK.
However, HK’s national security legislation is impacting the safety and security of Canadians living in HK and people in Canada with ties to HK. Three Canadian citizens (Victor Ho, Joseph Tay and Dennis Kwok) have been targeted with arrest warrants for their political views. A range of other Hong Kongers who have fled to Canada have been subject to transnational repression by HK authorities, including intimidation, harassment and coercion.
Two permanent residence pathways were put in place by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) in June 2021 to help HK residents come to Canada, in response to the passing of the NSL. Approximately 44,000 Hong Kongers have come to Canada via these pathways.

Background

The Sino-British Joint Declaration governing the UK’s 1997 handover of HK to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), enshrined the “One Country, Two Systems” framework, which guaranteed HK its own political and legal systems, economic autonomy and respect for human rights for 50 years. Given this, HK was granted “special status” by Canada and many other countries, granting it privileges in trade, tourism, education, finance and legal that are not granted to Mainland China.

Canada and HK share a longstanding commercial relationship, centered on trade in services and investment, and maintain strong people-to-people ties. Over 100 Canadian companies operate in HK, and many use the city as a gateway to the Indo-Pacific and Mainland China. This includes several well-known Canadian companies, including BMO, Sunlife and Manulife. In addition, many Canadian citizens hold prominent positions in international and local companies across all sectors in HK. Of the estimated 107 billionaires residing in HK, many of them hold dual Canadian-HK citizenship.

HK’s autonomy and respect for human rights have deteriorated significantly since the imposition of the NSL by Beijing in 2020. The relative freedom that Hong Kong residents have enjoyed when compared with the Mainland has rapidly eroded amid tightening media censorship and arrests of media, civil society and opposition figures.

Jimmy Lai

Canada supports media freedom and has called for the release of Jimmy Lai.
Canada remains deeply concerned about the detention and prosecution of individuals under the National Security Law in Hong Kong.
Canada will continue to work with international partners to promote and protect human rights globally.

Supplementary messages

In public and in private, Canada has consistently called for the People's Republic of China to repeal its National Security Law in Hong Kong.
We first and foremost take responsibility for the safety and security of Canadian citizens and residents of Canada.
We continue to advocate for the promotion and protection of human rights globally, including the right to freedom of opinion and expression.
Canada remains committed to ensuring that journalists and media workers can operate freely and safely, without fear of reprisal in any form, online and offline.

Update

A verdict in Jimmy Lai’s national security trial is expected between late October and early November but could be delayed. A guilty verdict is the expected and most likely outcome. On October 16, 2025, Prime Minister Carney called for Jimmy Lai’s release on humanitarian grounds and in support of media freedom. Jimmy Lai was also raised by Minister Anand during a bilateral meeting with her Chinese counterpart Wang Yi on October 17.

Supporting facts and figures

Canada’s approach to Jimmy Lai’s advocacy has been to support U.K efforts. The U.K offered significant support to Canada during the detentions of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig from 2018 to 2022.
Since Jimmy Lai’s arrest in 2019, Canada has issued several public statements, including referencing Jimmy Lai in ministerial and departmental statements in 2020 and 2021, and co-signing Media Freedom Coalition and Community of Democracies
Hong Kong’s national security legislation is impacting the safety and security of Canadians living in Hong Kong and people in Canada with ties to Hong Kong. At least three Canadian citizens have been charged under the National Security Law and others have been detained for questioning. Given that an estimated 300,000 Canadians live in Hong Kong, it is likely that Canadian citizens will continue to be impacted.

Background

Jimmy Lai, a British and Chinese citizen, is the most high-profile pro-democracy activist facing national security charges in Hong Kong. He is the founder of the now defunct popular Hong Kong newspaper, Apple Daily, and has significant familial and investment ties to Canada. He currently faces two charges under Hong Kong’s National Security Law – conspiring to collude with foreign forces and conspiring to publish “seditious” materials. If convicted, Mr. Lai could face life imprisonment. Concerns have been raised about Mr. Lai’s advanced age (77 years) and history of chronic health conditions.

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Taiwan

Canada continues to advance its interests and engagement with Taiwan in a manner consistent with its longstanding One China Policy.
In concert with its G7 partners, Canada has been steadfast in reinforcing the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and continues to call for the peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues.
Canada is advancing its trade relationship with Taiwan through concrete collaboration in science, investment, and supply chains resilience.

Supplementary messages

Established in 1970, Canada’s One China Policy recognizes the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China, taking note of—neither challenging nor endorsing—the Chinese government’s position on Taiwan. This policy forms the basis of Canada’s diplomatic relations with the PRC and unofficial ties with Taiwan. For over five decades, Canada has maintained and advanced unofficial but valuable economic, cultural and people-to-people ties with Taiwan.
Canada opposes unilateral attempts to change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.
Bilaterally, Canadian officials have communicated to PRC counterparts ongoing concerns over the situation in the region and publicly called on the PRC to cease its threatening and escalatory actions, which risk increasing tensions and destabilizing the region.
In recent years, Canada has expanded its defence and security engagement in the Indo-Pacific, including through an enhanced naval presence and increased defence and security engagement with key partners. The Canadian Armed Forces continue to maintain a routine presence in the Indo-Pacific, including in the Taiwan Strait, in full accordance with international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Canada remains engaged in the region through its longstanding partnership in the Five Eyes as well as its involvement in regional multilateral organizations like the ASEAN Regional Forum.
Canada has continued to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations where there is a practical imperative and where Taiwan’s absence would be detrimental to global interests.
Taiwan is important to the global economy, notably its pivotal role in semiconductors, and its economy is highly compatible with Canada’s, with opportunities for Canadian business in tech, life sciences, aerospace, and Indigenous trade.
Every mission of the Global Affairs Canada network has a Mission Emergency Plan as part of a systemic preparedness. The Government of Canada’s assessment remains that the likelihood of events triggering a mass departure of Canadians from Taiwan is very low.
Responsive – Trade Cooperation Framework Arrangement:
- Canada and Taiwan enjoy strong unofficial economic and people-to-people ties, consistent with Canada’s One China policy.

Supporting facts and figures

In 2024, Taiwan was Canada’s 15th largest merchandise trading partner and 6th largest in Asia. Two-way merchandise trade totaled $9.1bn, down 9.9% from $10.1bn in 2023. Exports to Taiwan in 2024 were $2.02bn, up slightly from 2023 ($2bn). Imports from Taiwan totaled $7.1bn, down 11.46% from 2023 ($8,1bn).
Over 30 Canadian companies operate in Taiwan, mainly in the transportation, aerospace/air services, fashion and consumer goods, ICT, clean energy, life sciences and environmental services sectors.
Taiwan hosts approximately 50,000 Canadians and Canada’s largest investment project in Asia (in offshore wind by Northland Power Inc. and Canadian pension funds).

Background

Cross-Strait tensions: Canada is committed to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and opposes unilateral actions that threaten the status quo. Along with the G7, Canada has consistently expressed our position, most recently through a joint foreign ministers’ statement issued on the margins of UN General Assembly High-Level Week.

Security and cooperation: The Taiwan Strait is indispensable to the security and prosperity of the international community, and Canadian Armed Forces’ operations and activities reaffirm Canada’s commitment to maintaining the status quo across the Strait. The Canadian Armed Forces continues to operate in the Indo-Pacific, including in the Taiwan Strait, in full accordance with international law. Most recently, HMCS Ville de Quebec completed a joint transit of the Strait with the HMAS Brisbane (Australia) on September 6, 2025.

Taiwan’s international participation: Canada continues to find ways to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations where there is a practical imperative, and where Taiwan’s absence would be detrimental to global interests. Canada and Taiwan cooperate at multilateral forums where both are represented (e.g. APEC, the WTO, and regional fisheries organizations). Canada, as Chair of the Safer Skies Consultative Committee, invited Taiwan (as “Chinese Taipei”) to participate in the Safer Skies Forum in 2020 and 2022.

Science, Technology, and Innovation Arrangement: Signed on April 15, 2024, this Arrangement enables opportunities for business-led co-innovation partnerships in high tech sectors under the Canadian International Innovation Program as well as expanded research collaborations across the Canadian and Taiwanese ecosystems

Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Arrangement: On December 22, 2023, Canada and Taiwan completed signatures of a non-legally binding Arrangement. This instrument offers protection to Canadian investments in Taiwan and attracting Taiwanese foreign investment in Canada.

Collaborative Framework on supply chains resilience: On December 6, 2023, Canada and Taiwan endorsed the Framework, which aims to build sustainable and diverse trade among reliable partners to mitigate supply chain disruptions and increase resiliency.

Contingency planning for Canadian citizens: All Canadian Government Offices abroad maintain detailed emergency plans to address a broad range of emergency situations, ranging from natural disasters to civil unrest. The Canadian Trade Office in Taipei have detailed emergency plans and resources in place to respond to events.

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India

Bilateral relations

India is a country of significant consequence when it comes to issues like economic security, energy transition and global stability. These are all areas where Canada and India can benefit from increased cooperation.
Diversifying our trade is critical. India is now the world’s fourth largest economy. It is an important market for our exports.
PMs Carney and Modi held a first meeting at the G7 Summit in Kananaskis. Since then, our countries have appointed high commissioners. This is part of a step-by-step approach to deepening diplomatic engagement and advancing bilateral cooperation, while ensuring respect for sovereignty and security of our citizens.

Supplementary messages

Canada and India have had diplomatic relations for over 75 years. This has benefited families, students and businesses in both our countries.
We have taken action to address concerns regarding activities by agents linked to the Indian government: 7 Indian officials were expelled, arrests were made in both Canada and the US in connection with criminal activities, judicial process underway in BC, new measures were implemented to ensure our democracy is better protected from foreign interference.
In addition, Indian law enforcement officials are actively collaborating with Canadian officials to ensure that coordination and dialogue is proceeding.

Supporting facts and figures

On October 13, 2025, you met with Prime Minister Modi, Commerce Minister Goyal, and External Affairs Minister Jaishankar. Following these meetings, Canada and India issued a substantive Joint Statement, renewing momentum toward a stronger partnership.
On August 28, 2025, Canada and India announced the appointment of respective high commissioners to New Delhi and Ottawa.
On May 25, 2025, you held an introductory call with External Affairs Minister Jaishankar. Last in-person meeting between Foreign Ministers was October 13, 2025, in Delhi.
Last travel to India by a Canadian Foreign Minister was in October 2025. Last travel to Canada by an Indian Foreign Minister was 2019.
In 2024, Canada’s two-way merchandise trade with India was $13.3 billion ($5.3 billion in exports; $8.0 billion in imports).
In 2023, $5.6 billion of Canadian foreign direct investment and almost $47 billion in investments by Canadian pension funds and private equity in India.
In August 2023, Canada and India paused trade agreement negotiations.
As of December 2024, there were 392,810 Indian international students in Canada.

Background

NSIA and her counterpart discussed Canada and India’s respective security concerns and committed to non-interference including refraining from transnational repression. They also agreed on the importance of reciprocal exchange of information and mutual responsiveness.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs and Global Affairs Canada held pre-Foreign Office Consultations in New Delhi on September 19, 2025.

To support the strong people-to-people linkages, and expanding economic opportunities between India and Canada, both sides also decided to constructively address capacity-related issues at their respective Missions and Consulates.

Diplomatic presence

Canada and India announced the appointment of High Commissioners to New Delhi and Ottawa on August 28. Indian HC Designate Danesh Patnaik and Canadian HC Designate Chris Cooter have each arrived in country.
This is part of Canada’s step-by-step approach to deepening diplomatic engagement and advancing bilateral cooperation.
The appointments are helping to restore necessary diplomatic services to citizens and businesses in both countries.
Diplomatic presence in India is key to advancing Canadian interests like promoting trade and investment and enabling dialogue between our countries.

Supplementary messages

Full return of Canadian diplomats to India after expulsions

Reinstating High Commissioners is a foundational step. Canadian diplomats will also be returning to consulates and to our High Commission in Delhi. We are in active discussion with India on this.

Screening of Indian diplomats appointed to Canada

Diplomatic representatives to Canada go through a thorough screening process. This process has evolved to better address issues like foreign interference.
Canada has made it clear that we will not tolerate any inappropriate activities by foreign diplomats here. This was a part of our discussions before the re-appointment of high commissioners.

Accountability following Canada’s allegations of Indian diplomat-linked criminal activity

A lot has changed since 2023. Canada has undergone a public inquiry on foreign interference. We have implemented new measures to protect Canada’s sovereignty and security.
With respect to concerns relating to India, 7 Indian officials were expelled, arrests were made in both Canada and the US in connection with criminal activities, and there is a legal process underway in BC on the Nijjar case.

Supporting facts and figures

On September 18, 2023, former PM Trudeau alleged a potential link between Indian agents and the killing of Canadian citizen Hardeep Singh Nijjar. Canada expelled 1 Indian diplomat the same day.
India responded by expelling a Canadian diplomat and revoking diplomatic immunities for 41 Canadian diplomats.
In October 2024, Canada expelled 6 more Indian officials following an RCMP investigation into alleged violent criminal activity linked to India.
India responded by declaring 6 Canadian diplomats Persona Non Grata.
These personnel reductions have impacted service delivery for citizens in both countries.
Canada’s mission in India now has 15 CBS (down from 62), with offices in New Delhi, Mumbai, Bengaluru, and Chandigarh. India has 54 diplomats in Canada, with missions in Ottawa, Toronto, and Vancouver.

Foreign interference

Canada has taken action to address concerns: 7 Indian officials were expelled in 2023 and 2024; 4 arrests were made in Canada in connection with criminal activities; and there is an independent investigation and criminal trial underway on the Nijjar case.
Canada and India have also had regular, constructive dialogue over the past two years at the political, diplomatic and law enforcement level. These exchanges are ongoing.
Canada held a Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference. New measures have been implemented to protect Canadians, safeguard our democratic institutions, and to ensure transparency and respect for the rule of law.

Supplementary messages

Canada is not alone in facing foreign interference, but what sets it apart is its transparent and proactive approach. Canada has implemented new measures to protect sovereignty and works closely with allies to counter threats, including transnational repression. In India’s case, Canada’s longstanding partnership and shared values create space for cooperation on sensitive issues. This has included active dialogue across political, diplomatic, and law enforcement levels.
Foreign Interference and the Nijjar Case: The Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference was not related to the investigation into potential assassination of a Canadian citizen. There is an ongoing, independent investigation and criminal trial into this case.
Indo-Canadian Gang Activity and Extortion: Following the RCMP’s October 2024 statement, Canada expelled six Indian officials to disrupt criminal networks. The RCMP reported a significant drop in related activity and established a national team to coordinate investigations targeting the South Asian community.

Supporting facts and figures

October 14, 2024: Canada expelled six Indian officials linked to criminal networks.
October 30, 2024: CSE published its National Cyber Threat Assessment for 2025-2026.
January 31, 2025: The Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference released its final report.
June 18, 2025: CSIS released its public report, identifying India as a persistent source of foreign interference and linking its activities to transnational repression and the Nijjar case.

Background

Between 2024-2025, Canadian agencies flagged India for espionage and repression targeting diaspora communities. Bill C-70 and a public inquiry confirmed efforts to influence Canadians, especially around Khalistan. In 2023, PM Trudeau linked Indian agents to the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar. RCMP later uncovered ties to Indo-Canadian gangs, prompting multiple diplomat expulsions and a drop in threats.

Canada-U.S.

Trade

Canada and the U.S. share the world’s most integrated and mutually beneficial trade partnership, exchanging nearly $3.6 billion in goods and services daily.
Nearly 8 million U.S. jobs depend on trade with Canada, while 2.6 million Canadian jobs depend on exports to the U.S.
We stand ready to resume discussions on reshaping our economic and security partnership when the U.S. is prepared to re-engage.
Canada is prepared to defend its interests and do what is best for Canadians and the Canadian economy. We will take the time to negotiate a good deal for Canada.
We will continue working to preserve CUSMA benefits, protect Canadian market access from future tariff risks, diversify trade, and strengthen domestic capacity to adapt to global shifts and ensure long-term-resilience.

Supporting facts and figures

Every day, approximately 386,000 people and 3.6 billion in goods and services cross the Canada-U.S. border. This amounts to $1.3 trillion per year.
Canada is the largest market for U.S. goods in the world. Canada buys more goods from the U.S. than China, Japan, France, and the UK combined.
Canada is the top merchandise export market for 32 U.S. states and ranks among the top three for 45 states.
Canadian-owned businesses in the U.S. employ about 900,000 American workers, with nearly 8 million U.S. jobs tied to trade with Canada.
Canada has invested more in the United States than the other way around, in 2024, U.S. FDI in Canada stood at $762.7 billion, while Canadian FDI in the U.S. stood at $1.3 trillion.

Background

Canada and the United States have shared one of the world’s most integrated and beneficial bilateral economic relationships. This relationship has been shaped over decades through free trade agreements, most recently the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), referred to as USMCA in the U.S. and T-MEC in Mexico, in force since July 2020. Canada remains strongly committed to preserving and strengthening this trilateral framework with Mexico and the United States as the foundation for North American economic competitiveness. CUSMA has supported North American trade and investment integration and facilitated regional economic growth. Canada and the United States are currently in the process of redefining their economic relationship, with growing attention on strategic sectors and supply chain resilience. While CUSMA has supported North American trade and investment integration and facilitated regional economic growth, the current U.S. administration’s shift toward more assertive and protectionist trade policies—exemplified by various tariff measures—has strained bilateral relations and introduced significant risks to Canada’s economy. Since taking office for his second term, President Trump has taken a number of unilateral tariff action against Canada on national security ground out of concerns related to fentanyl/border and to protect US sectors from alleged unfair trade practices (s. 232).

In August 2025, the United States reaffirmed a core commitment under the CUSMA by maintaining the CUSMA-compliant exemption for Canadian exports to the United States from U.S. tariffs imposed under its International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). As a result of this exemption, with the exception of goods facing U.S. sectoral tariffs (e.g. steel, aluminum, autos and auto parts, copper, wood products), the vast majority of Canadian exports to the U.S. enter duty-free.

Effective September 1, Canada removed its counter-tariffs on certain U.S. imports, but counter tariffs on steel, aluminum, and autos remain in place. A key focus of Canada engagement with the US administration has been to reach agreements to reduce U.S. tariffs that impede market access for Canadian exports, including s. 232 sectoral tariffs on steel, aluminium, autos, copper, and wood products.

On October 23, 2025, President Trump announced a halt to all trade negotiations with Canada, citing a controversial Ontario-sponsored ad featuring Ronald Reagan. This marks the second disruption in trade talks this year. In June, negotiations were similarly paused in response to Canada’s Digital Services Tax, which the U.S. alleged was targeting U.S. tech firms. Talks resumed only after Canada suspended the tax’s implementation. These incidents highlight the fragility of current bilateral trade engagement.

The upcoming mandated review of CUSMA in 2026 presents an opportunity to reaffirm the agreement's success and ensure that it remains fit for purpose in a changing global landscape. Canada has launched a second round of public consultations (September 20-November 3) to identify a wide range of both sensitivities and strategic opportunities ahead of the joint review, with a view to ensuring that the CUSMA continues to reflect Canada’s national interests and delivers real benefits to Canadians.

Despite the growing challenges in the bilateral trade relationship, Canadian firms are expected to continue prioritizing the U.S. market due to geographic proximity and cultural ties.

Defence and security

Canada will protect its sovereignty and security. We will collaborate with the United States where it is in Canada’s interest.
Geography matters: The defence partnership between Canada and the United States is integral to continental security, including in the Arctic.
Canada is committed to detecting, deterring, and defeating threats to North America in partnership with the United States.
As directed by the Prime Minister in March of this year, Canada is reviewing its procurement of the F-35 aircraft to ensure that it continues to be the best choice for Canada.

Supplementary messages

Decisions about military and defence partnerships are made primarily through the lens of Canadian national security.
The United States is Canada’s primary partner in the Arctic, and our approach to Arctic security and defence is largely aligned. The relationship is critical to the collective defence of North America.
Given our level of integration through NORAD, we have signalled Canada’s interest in collaborating on an Integrated Air and Missile Defence architecture for North America. This will build on significant work already underway to modernize NORAD capabilities to defend our continent against rapidly changing threats.

On the F35 acquisition and review

In 2023, the Government of Canada announced that we would acquire the F-35 as Canada’s Future Fighter Jet, representing the most significant investment in the Royal Canadian Air Force.
The review of the F-35 remains ongoing, addressing operational needs, industrial benefits, strategic partnerships, and potential alternatives along with their associated delivery timelines.
The review seeks to ensure that the F-35 continues to represent value for money for Canada in light of evolving geopolitics.

Background

The Canada-U.S. defence partnership spans the full spectrum of cooperation, including shared defence of the continent through NORAD, NATO, the Five Eyes intelligence sharing partnership, and defence materiel cooperation. The defence relationship includes a high degree of military-to-military cooperation and policy dialogue in several thematic and geographic areas, overlaid with regular strategic-level engagements by Ministers and Chiefs of Defence.

There are approximately 670 CAF personnel serving in the United States at any given time, including some in command positions. About 90 U.S Armed Forces personnel are in exchange positions with the CAF in Canada. Geography matters, and Canada and the United States have the same top priority: the defence of North America. Canada takes seriously its commitment to continental defence and is making significant investments to modernize NORAD. Canada is following developments related to Golden Dome and has signalled interest in aligning plans to develop an Integrated Air and Missile Defence architecture for North America. The Trump Administration is increasingly focused on Arctic security, particularly in the context of its strategic competition with China. The United States is Canada’s primary partner in the Arctic, and the relationship is essential to deter and defend against increasingly sophisticated threats to the continent, including from Northern approaches.

Canada has Arctic assets and capabilities that the United States does not, including Arctic offshore patrol ships and a significantly larger fleet of icebreakers. Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy includes a greater focus on strengthening partnerships with Arctic Allies (the United States and Nordic countries) and commits to opening new consulates in Alaska and Greenland. Canada’s defence policy, Our North, Strong and Free, includes significant funding investments for initiatives in the Arctic, including:

new Northern Operational Support Hubs;
airborne early warning aircraft; and
specialized maritime sensors.

On April 9, the United States published an Executive Order “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance,” which directs United States agencies to develop a strategy to “ensure the security and leadership of Arctic waterways”, a component of a broader Maritime Action Plan intended by the Administration to strengthen United States shipbuilding.

F35 procurement and review: Quick facts

The acquisition budget of $27.7 billion includes 88 F-35A jets, associated equipment, sustainment set-up and services, and the construction of Fighter Squadron Facilities.
The initial eight aircraft will be delivered in 2026-2027 to Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, for the training of Canadian pilots.
First Aircraft Arrival in Canada: 2028 to Canadian Forces Base Cold Lake
Initial Operational Capability in 2029 and full Operational Capability in 2033
Canada’s current fighter fleet, the CF-18 Hornet, has already begun its retirement and will be entirely removed from service by 2032. This means that the replacement capability must be in place and fully operational by 2032 to avoid a critical capability gap. The planned F-35 acquisition delivery schedule has been coordinated with the phased retirement of the CF-18 to minimize operational impacts during the transition.
As a partner in the F-35 program, Canada has access to industrial participation in production of the aircraft.
Currently, 37 Canadian companies have F-35 contracts, including Magellan Aerospace in Manitoba (horizontal tail assembly), GasTops in Ontario (engine sensors), and Heroux-Devtek in Quebec (landing gear components).
Each F-35 aircraft coming out of the production line contains approximately $3.2 million dollars of Canadian-made components.
The acquisition and initial sustainment of the F-35 project has the potential to contribute over $425 million annually to Canada’s gross domestic product and maintain 3,300 jobs annually for Canadian industry and value chain partners (direct and indirect).

Canada’s Arctic

Foreign policy

Climate change, technology and economic interests are converging in the Arctic and leading to increased strategic competition.
Canada is expanding its diplomatic presence in the Arctic and deepening collaboration with Nordic Allies and NATO.
Together with new defence investments in Our North, Strong and Free, the Government is taking an integrated and strengthened approach to exercising Canada’s sovereignty.

Supplementary messages

Canada’s foreign policy approach to the Arctic is informed by meaningful engagement with territorial, provincial and Indigenous partners.
Virginia Mearns, an Inuk leader from Nunavut, has been appointed as Canada’s Arctic Ambassador effective September 15, 2025.
The Global Arctic Leadership Initiative strengthens Canada’s leadership at the Arctic Council and supports Canadian Indigenous and youth voices.

Background

The Arctic Foreign Policy (AFP) is a comprehensive diplomatic policy for Canada’s engagement in and on the Arctic. It positions Canada to address current needs and gives it the flexibility to adapt to future challenges including Russia’s disruptive activities, evolving security threats, new dynamics in Arctic governance, accelerating climate change and increasing challenges to Arctic state primacy.

The AFP is comprised of four foreign policy pillars: asserting Canada’s sovereignty; advancing Canada’s interests through pragmatic diplomacy; leadership on Arctic governance and multilateral challenges; and adopting a more inclusive approach to Arctic diplomacy.

Under the AFP, Canada committed to:

appoint an Arctic ambassador with an office in Canada’s North;
open new consulates in Anchorage, Alaska and Nuuk, Greenland;
initiate an informal Arctic security dialogue with foreign ministers of like-minded Arctic states;
expand domestic information sharing on emerging international Arctic security trends;
support domestic partners in taking into account a national security lens to foreign research in the Arctic;
work toward resolution of Arctic boundary disputes including in the Beaufort Sea;
increase funding for the Global Arctic Leadership Initiative; and,
establish an Arctic and northern Indigenous youth internship program at Global Affairs Canada.

Implementation of the AFP is supported by the Global Arctic Leadership Initiative, with an annual budget of $8 million to strengthen Canada’s leadership at the Arctic Council and to support Indigenous and youth engagement in international Arctic affairs among other areas.

The AFP is the product of months of meaningful engagement with relevant territorial and provincial governments and Indigenous Peoples, including First Nations, Métis, Inuit, Modern Treaty and Self-Governing partners. Global Affairs Canada is committed to continuing meaningful and distinctions-based engagements during the implementation phase.

Sovereignty and security

Canada’s Arctic sovereignty is longstanding and well established.
The waters of Canada’s Arctic Archipelago, including the various waterways often referred to as the Northwest Passage, are internal waters of Canada by virtue of historic title.
Every day, through a wide range of activities, governments, Indigenous peoples and local communities exercise Canada’s enduring sovereignty over its Arctic lands and waters.

Supplementary messages

Canada welcomes navigation in its Arctic waters by vessels that comply with Canadian rules on, among others, safety, security and the protection of the environment.
Canada’s differences with the U.S. on the status of the various waterways often referred to as the Northwest Passage are well managed, including through the 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement.
Canada must be prepared to defend its national interests, strengthen security and assert its enduring sovereignty in the Arctic region, while working with international partners and more importantly, with local communities who call the North home.

Background

As the Arctic’s physical environment changes, the region is emerging as an area of greater international importance and strategic competition, with both Arctic and non-Arctic states expressing political, economic and military interests in the region. While Canada sees no immediate military threat in its Arctic territory, the rapidly evolving strategic environment underlines the importance of effective safety and security frameworks, national defence and deterrence. Russia remains the greatest military threat in and to the Arctic. China’s strategic interests and activities in the Arctic continue to draw the attention of Arctic states and NATO. China-Russia joint military exercises and operations are increasingly taking on a northern dimension. While China’s overt military activities remain limited, its ostensibly civilian Arctic activities, including scientific research and commercial investments, should be assumed to have a dual purpose.

No one disputes Canada’s sovereignty over the lands and islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Its waters, including the various waterways commonly referred to as the “Northwest Passage” (NWP) are internal waters of Canada by virtue of historic title, over which Canada has full sovereignty. As such, no right of innocent passage or transit passage for foreign-flagged vessels exists. The U.S. disagrees, asserting that the NWP is a strait used for international navigation, in which a right of transit passage exists. This disagreement has been well managed to date. Normally, as a matter of policy Canada welcomes navigation in its Arctic waters, provided that foreign vessels respect Canada’s rules and regulations.

In November 2024, Canada and the U.S. held initial negotiations over the Beaufort Sea boundary and the overlap area in the extended continental shelf of the Arctic Ocean. Such negotiations typically take many years and require strong political involvement, since they involve decisions with implications for State sovereignty. No subsequent meeting date has been set.

Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark continue to work on access and mobility issues for Hans Island in anticipation of our ability to ratify the treaty signed in 2022 resolving our land and sea boundaries in the Arctic and extended continental shelf overlap in the Labrador Sea.

Canada’s continental shelf submission for the Arctic Ocean is currently filed with the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf at the UN in New York. There is a long list of submissions for the Commission to consider, so it will take several more years before Canada’s comes up for consideration. In the meantime, Canada is carrying out further survey missions in the Arctic Ocean to obtain more science to support Canada’s submission. There was a successful survey mission this past summer, and another is being planned for next year. Overlaps of submissions in the Arctic Ocean were expected, as the Continental Shelf provisions under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea are a scientific and legal process to determine whether an area of the seafloor is continental in nature. It does not set political boundaries. All Arctic Ocean costal states have committed to resolving overlaps peacefully in accordance with international law.

Haiti

Recent developments

On September 23, Canada announced new funding of $60 million to support multilateral efforts aimed at stabilizing the situation in Haiti.
The Government of Canada remains extremely concerned about the humanitarian and security situation in Haiti, and the risk that this crisis spills over to the region.
Canada’s approach in Haiti focuses on efforts to restore security through supporting the multinational force, and through building the capacity of Haitian institutions, including the Haitian National Police.

Supplementary messages

Canada’s new funding of $60 million includes $40 million for the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSSM) in Haiti and its successor mission (“Gang Suppression Force”) to target gang violence, and $20 million for a Regional Maritime Security Initiative to combat transnational crime in Haiti and the Caribbean.
In addition, since 2022, Canada has contributed over $450 million in international assistance to Haiti, including more than $86.2 million to the MSSM.
The ongoing gang violence in Haiti undermines the organization of free and fair elections. Haiti’s future depends on restoring security, having a stable and democratically elected government and improving socioeconomic conditions.
Canada continues to encourage Haitian-led and Haitian-owned solutions that prioritize the Haitian population and the accountability of the transitional authorities.
Canada welcomes the UN Security Council’s resolution to establish a strengthened security mission (Gang Suppression Force) backed by a robust UN Support Office.
Adequate contributions of funding and personnel are essential to its success.
Responsive: What results does the Government have to show from its support provided to Haiti?
- Canada is proud of its support which has helped prevent a full gang takeover, provide over 100,000 schoolchildren with a daily hot meal, document and investigate cases of corruption, provide critical health services, and enhance small farmers’ resilience, among other results.
- Our humanitarian assistance continues to save lives by providing emergency food and nutrition, water, sanitation, protection, and health services to Haiti's most vulnerable.
- We provided training to more than 200 Haitian National Police through the RCMP, and designed and delivered tactical operations training to 330 CARICOM personnel to support their participation in the MSSM.
- We remain committed to working alongside Haitian and international partners to restore security and democratic rule, and promote prosperity for all Haitians.

Supporting facts and figures

Gangs control about 90% of Port-au-Prince.
MSSM currently includes 991 personnel from Kenya, Jamaica, Guatemala, the Bahamas, and El Salvador - well below the target of 2,500. The recent UNSC resolution authorizes an expanded mission of up to 5,500.
Canada is the second largest contributor to the MSSM (after the U.S.) with more than $86.2
Total U.S. contributions to the MSSM are estimated at U.S. $1.2 billion.
Canada has sanctioned 34 Haitian elites and gang leaders.

Background

The Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support Mission (MSSM) has helped prevent a full takeover by gangs but it has not reclaimed territory. The mission suffers from a lack of legal status, poor planning, lack of governance, and insufficient resources.

On September 30, the UN Security Council adopted a U.S.-Panama resolution to transform the current MSSM into a Gang Suppression Force (GSF) backed by a newly established UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) in Port-au-Prince. The GSF will operate for an initial 12-month period, and the UNSOH will provide logistical and operational support, funded through assessed contributions. Troop contributions and stipends will continue to rely on voluntary contributions. China, Russia and Pakistan abstained on the vote.

As per the resolution, a Standing Group of Partners will provide strategic direction for the mission. It will be initially comprised of Canada, the U.S., Kenya, and other troop contributing countries from Latin American and the Caribbean, i.e. Jamaica, The Bahamas, Guatemala, and El Salvador.

Arctic Council

The Arctic Council is key to Arctic governance and to Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy.
We are firmly committed to the Arctic Council for the peoples and communities of the Canadian Arctic.
We support the Kingdom of Denmark’s program for their two-year chairship of the Council.

Supplementary messages

Russia’s membership in the Arctic Council

The Council comprises eight states (including Russia) and six Indigenous Permanent Participant organisations.
The Council reflects the important principle that Arctic States should lead on Arctic governance.
Canada’s policy of limited engagement with the Russian Federation remains in place.
Canada will always act in conformity with the Council’s Rules of Procedure.

Update

The Kingdom of Denmark assumed the Chair of the Arctic Council for a 2-year term on May 12, 2025. Their Chairship program focusses on the following priorities: Indigenous Peoples and communities, sustainable economic development, oceans, climate change, and biodiversity. A work-plan to deliver on these themes is in place and will be carried out by the Council’s expert Working Groups over the next two years. Sweden will follow the Kingdom of Denmark as Chair in 2027, then Canada in 2029.

Supporting facts and figures

Arctic States: Canada, Kingdom of Denmark (includes Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden and USA.
International Indigenous Permanent Participants organisations: Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Saami Council.
38 accredited observers include non-Arctic States: China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK; intergovernmental and interparliamentary organizations (e.g. International Maritime Organization, UN Environment Programme); and NGO’s (e.g. International Arctic Science Committee). The EU is a de facto observer.
Global Arctic Leadership Initiative (GALI): Global Affairs Canada’s $8 million annual program supports Arctic Council activities and projects and the Canadian Indigenous Permanent Participant organisations, and other key Arctic foreign policy priorities, including Indigenous engagement and youth.

Background

The Arctic Council was established in 1996 in Ottawa as a high-level forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous Permanent Participant organisations and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic. It does not deal with matters related to military security, nor is it a treaty-based organization.

Greenland sovereignty

Canada supports Greenland’s right to self-determination and its sovereignty.
Strong collaboration between Canada, the U.S., Denmark and Greenland is essential for our shared security in the Arctic.
Canada is deepening its relationship with Greenland—a valued partner and Arctic neighbour—and will soon open a consulate in Nuuk.

Supplementary messages

President Trump's focus on Greenland indicates that Arctic security and Great Power competition is front of mind.
Important to stress to the U.S. that the best way to counter these threats is by staying united with Allies and partners to support a predictable global order.
Canada is seen as a trusted partner to Greenland, shown by its plan to open a diplomatic office in Nuuk in fall 2025 and its collaboration on Indigenous mobility.

Supporting facts and figures

President Trump has revived his proposal to purchase Greenland, suggesting military or economic pressure, if necessary, while falsely claiming local support—despite January 2025 polling showing 85% of Greenlanders oppose joining the U.S. On August 27, the Danish MFA summoned the U.S. chargé d’affaires in Copenhagen after Danish broadcaster DR reported that at least three Americans linked to President Trump allegedly tried to infiltrate Greenlandic society. One reportedly compiled a list of Greenlanders who support Trump’s interest in acquiring Greenland.
Greenland is asserting greater autonomy and international presence through its new Foreign, Security, and Defence Strategy, aligning with Western partners on Arctic security, climate action, and stronger ties with North America as it advances toward potential independence.

Background

Greenland, the world’s largest island with approximately 57,000 residents (~89% Inuit), has transitioned from a Danish colony to a self-governing territory within the Kingdom of Denmark. While Denmark retains control over foreign affairs and defense, Greenland oversees most domestic matters and is asserting a stronger role in Arctic security. Canada and Greenland share close geographic, cultural, and Inuit ties, and collaborate regularly on shared priorities. Greenland’s 2024 Foreign, Security, and Defence Strategy highlights its growing international presence and push for greater autonomy.

Greenland in Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy (AFP): The AFP emphasizes North American Arctic cooperation, including with Greenland, reflecting strong cultural and economic ties. As part of the AFP, Canada is in the process of opening a consulate in Nuuk to advance political, commercial, and Indigenous mobility priorities. Funding for the AFP was approved in March 2025. A GAC officer on temporary duty assignment is expected to arrive in October 2025 to continue on-site preparations. The consulate’s soft launch opening could be announced as early as November 2025.

Indigenous mobility and cultural ties: Both governments emphasize strong people-to-people ties, particularly among Inuit communities with shared cultural and familial links across the Arctic. Canada and Greenland are working toward greater cross-border mobility for Inuit, aligning with reconciliation and Indigenous rights priorities.

Security and arctic sovereignty: Canada and Greenland share interests in Arctic sovereignty, surveillance, and multilateral cooperation through NATO (Greenland has a representative within the Danish delegation to NATO) and the Arctic Council (which Greenland currently chairs on behalf of the Kingdom of Denmark).

China - Arctic

China is demonstrating a growing interest in the Arctic and is increasing its capabilities to operate in the region
Chinese and Russian interests do not always overlap, but they are strengthening their partnership in the Arctic
China now rarely calls itself a ‘near-Arctic state’, but its strategic ambitions for the Arctic have not changed

Supplementary messages

China first explicitly laid out its Arctic ambitions in its 2018 White Paper on the Arctic, including its plan to develop a “Polar Silk Road” across the Arctic in the context of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Global Affairs Canada is coordinating with partner departments and agencies to provide further support to northern governments and Indigenous partners, including dedicated China policy briefings and information-sharing to support decision-making and to build confidence in managing interactions with China.
Canada supports rules-based governance in the Arctic, including through the Arctic Council. Canada will challenge China when warranted and will cooperate with China when interests are aligned.
China’s research activities in the Arctic often have dual civilian/military purposes, with the objective of advancing China’s strategic interests in the region, including its military and intelligence interests

Update

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues construction and deployment of five Arctic-capable icebreakers. Canada has deployed Coast Guard and naval assets to monitor the activities of Chinese vessels near or around Canadian Arctic waters.

Supporting facts and figures

PRC became an accredited observer in the Arctic Council in 2013
A Chinese commercial shipping agent completed 13 transits across the Northern Sea Route in 2025, and plans to build five icebreakers to support further such trips
Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) has done Arctic research since 1990
Canada released its Arctic Foreign Policy in 2024

Background

China’s stated ambition is to become a ‘polar great power’ by 2030. China called itself a ‘near-Arctic state’ in its 2018 Arctic White Paper; while China now rarely uses this term publicly, there is no indication that this change in rhetoric indicates any reduction in China’s Arctic ambitions. Despite China’s professed respect for the sovereignty of Arctic states, China views the Arctic as international space and seeks a larger role for non-Arctic states in Arctic governance.

Russia is China’s primary point of access to the Arctic. They cooperate on developing Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR), which could reduce cargo transit times and strengthen China’s energy security. They also cooperate on LNG production in Russia’s Arctic, conduct joint coast guard and military exercises at higher latitudes, and hold annual foreign ministry consultations on Arctic issues.

China does not have a permanent overt military presence in the Arctic but continues to prepare its military for Arctic operations.

China has contributed to Arctic research on pollution, migratory birds, and biodiversity and climate change. China also conducts significant oceanographic research and ground-based research, both of which have civilian and military uses.

In Canada’s Arctic, China seeks partnerships with northern governments and communities but has also targeted Northerners and Indigenous Peoples with disinformation and influence campaigns, cyber operations and espionage. Commercial investments are limited and primarily focused on mining exploration, pre-production and extraction related to critical mineral supply chains and critical infrastructure.

Russia - Arctic

Despite the immense costs of its war against Ukraine, Russia continues to invest in its Arctic military infrastructure and capabilities; it remains the greatest military threat to the region.
We must maintain vigilance in the approaches to the North American Arctic as well; Russian aircraft are increasingly active over the Bering Sea.

Supplementary messages

We continue to see no immediate threat of military attack in the Canadian Arctic. That said, the rapidly evolving strategic environment is underlining the importance of effective safety and security frameworks, national defence, and deterrence.
Investments in continental defence and NORAD modernization are meant to address this new strategic environment, and to ensure NORAD is equipped to continue its critical mission.
Russian military aircraft have been intercepted by NORAD in international airspace. Canada is always closely engaged with the U.S., including through NORAD, on intercepting these activities.

Background

Russia’s Arctic revitalization

Russia has the largest Arctic territory and population amongst Arctic states, and Arctic resources account for a significant portion of its national GDP. Already the most capable actor militarily in the Arctic, Russia continues to expand its military footprint and capabilities in the region, especially in the European High North.

China-Russia collaboration

Western sanctions on the Russian economy have elevated China’s economic importance to the Russian North, and China may leverage this influence towards greater engagement in international Arctic affairs. China and Russia are increasingly collaborating militarily in the air and sea of the sub-Arctic. In August 2023, Russian and Chinese warships conducted a joint patrol in international waters off the Aleutian Islands (Alaska).

Russian military activity in the approaches to North America

The Arctic Foreign Policy recognizes that the North Pacific, through the Bering Strait, is one of the key approaches to the North American Arctic. In July 2024, Russian and Chinese military aircraft were detected, tracked, and intercepted by NORAD while flying in Alaska’s Air Defence Identification Zone over the Bering Sea. The aircraft did not enter Canadian or U.S. sovereign airspace. In February 2023, NORAD identified a Chinese high-altitude surveillance balloon that violated U.S. and Canadian airspace (and international law) via Alaska. Canada was closely engaged with the U.S., including through NORAD, on the decision to shoot down the balloon. ONSAF places significant emphasis on Arctic security and defence. Among other investments, announced investments include a network of northern operational support hubs across the Arctic, a fleet of airborne early warning aircraft, sensors on our coasts and underwater, and a new tactical helicopter fleet.

Canada-United States relations

As the Prime Minister has said many times, our objective is not to reach a deal at any cost. We are pursuing a deal that will be in the best interest of Canadians.

Supplementary messages

Border

The Canada-U.S. border is among the most secure and efficient in the world, and Canada will continue to work closely with our U.S. partners to ensure it remains a driver of both, safety and prosperity.
Canada accounts for a very small fraction of U.S. fentanyl imports, and we have been working intensively to further reduce these volumes.
We are making historic investments in border security to arrest drug traffickers, take down transnational gangs, and end migrant smuggling; our shared border is demonstrably more secure than ever.
Introduced in June 2025, the Strong Borders Act (Bill C-2) is designed to keep people in Canada safe. It would make sure law enforcement has the right tools to:
- Keep our borders secure;
- Fight transnational organized crime;
- Stop the flow of illegal fentanyl;
- Crack down on money laundering;
- Protect Canada while upholding Canada’s privacy and Charter rights.

Foreign policy

Canada remains committed to working with the U.S. on global issues of common concern and where it aligns with Canadian interests.

Update

I met with Secretary Rubio on October 8 while in Washington DC following the working meeting between PM Carney and President Trump at the White House on October 7.

Supporting facts and figures

Nearly 8 million U.S. jobs are supported by trade with Canada.
Canada is the top merchandise export market for 32 U.S. states.
Canada is the U.S.'s top foreign energy supplier.
The U.S. has run a services trade surplus with Canada for over 20 years, reaching $31.7 billion in 2023.
Trade with Canada supports manufacturing jobs in the United States. Canada sells inputs to the U.S. that are used to manufacture higher-value U.S.-made goods.
There are several dozen Canadian citizens known to be in ICE detention at any given time. There are approximately 60,000 detainees of all nationalities held by ICE. Canadians represent a tiny fraction of this total, approximately 0.01%
Since 2022 about one tenth of one percent of fentanyl seizures are attributed to the Northern U.S. border or crossing into the U.S. from Canada. These volumes are far less than the flow of illegal narcotics into Canada from the U.S.

Canadians in ICE detentions

As soon as our consular team is made aware of a Canadian in ICE detention, officials reach out to those detained and offer consular services.
Consular officials provide assistance in accordance with the Canadian Consular Services Charter. This includes helping detainees contact their loved ones, providing information on finding a lawyer, ascertaining their wellbeing, and providing travel documents when needed.
The Government of Canada cannot exempt Canadians from the due process of local law, and Canadians are responsible for abiding by the laws of the country they are in, including immigration laws.

Supplementary messages

Canadian officials maintain frequent and ongoing engagement with U.S. counterparts related to Canadians in immigration-related detention, including with the officials at detention centres, to monitor individual cases.
When there are Canadians with particular vulnerabilities (e.g. age, medical condition), consular officials maintain closer contact.
For reasons of privacy, I will not be able to discuss any specific cases.

Supporting facts and figures

There are several dozen Canadian citizens known to be in ICE detention at any given time.
There are approximately 60,000 detainees of all nationalities held by ICE. Canadians represent a tiny fraction of this total, approximately 0.01%
Canadian Johnny Noviello died in ICE custody in June 2025.

Background

GAC becomes aware of detained Canadians either through the citizen themself, loved ones or via periodic notification from US officials. Canadian officials at the Canadian Embassy in Washington and the additional 12 offices in the US are in frequent and productive communication with US officials to gain access to detainees and deliver consular services. If welfare/medical concerns are raised by detainees, consular will advocate with US officials to address the matter in line with the policies of the detention centre. GAC can facilitate travel documents for deportations or travel to Canada. Canadians in ICE detention are a mix of persons with criminal convictions or charges, and others who have been detained because they do not have valid immigration status in the US.

Media have reported on several Canadian citizen children who have been held in custody with their non-Canadian parents. Consular officials have heightened their vigilance related to children.

Consular officials conduct in-person visits to detention centres when possible and often communicate with detainees via phone/videoconference.

Line 5 and energy security

Keeping Line 5 open is essential to the Canadian economy, and for Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario and Quebec.
The federal government works closely with provinces and the energy sector to defend Canada's rights under the 1977 Transit Pipelines Treaty and the good jobs that depend on Line 5.
Line 5 supplies vital energy for the entire Great Lakes region, including in the U.S. Midwest, something we point out to our U.S. counterparts.

Supplementary messages: Line 5 Great Lakes tunnel project

Canada supports the Line 5 tunnel project under the Straits of Mackinac.
The tunnel project represents a cooperative solution that would respect Canada’s Treaty rights and maintain critical energy supplies to Canada and the U.S. Midwest.
It would also enhance protections to Great Lakes waters, and address the concerns of communities in Michigan, including Indigenous communities.

Update

On August 8, 2025, Canada filed an amicus brief in the U.S. District Court for Western Michigan, defending its rights under the 1977 Transit Pipelines Treaty against Michigan’s attempt to shut down Line 5, and requesting the court defer to these rights. On August 29, 2025, Canada submitted comments supporting the Great Lakes Tunnel Project to a Michigan state agency considering a permit application for the project.

Supporting facts and figures

Line 5 is protected by the 1977 Canada-U.S. Transit Pipelines Treaty. Line 5 a “transit pipeline” carrying “hydrocarbons in transit” under the Treaty’s definitions. The Treaty prohibits any public authority from impeding hydrocarbons in transit.
Transboundary pipeline running 1,068 km from Superior, Wisconsin to Sarnia. The Line 5 segment in Canada (middle of the St Clair River to Sarnia) is 12 km.
Key link in Canada’s only west-to-east crude oil pipeline network, starting in Edmonton, transiting via Wisconsin/Michigan, and ending in Montreal.
Operating since 1953. Carries 540,000 barrels per day of light and synthetic crude oil, and natural gas liquids (later transformed into propane).
Functions both as a transit pipeline carrying Canadian energy from western to central Canada via the U.S.; and, as export pipeline to the U.S. Midwest.
Supplies ten refineries in Canada and the U.S. (six in Ontario and Quebec; four in Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania) and three fractionators producing propane (in Wisconsin, Michigan and Sarnia).

Background

Canada has twice invoked the 1977 Treaty’s dispute settlement mechanism, in October 2021 (Michigan Attorney General’s lawsuit to shut down the pipeline in the Straits of Mackinac) and in August 2022 (Bad River Band’s lawsuit in Wisconsin to shut down Line 5 on its Tribal Reservation). Diplomatic negotiations with the U.S. are ongoing. The last session was in May 2024, with one planned in September 2025. Since May 2021, Canada has intervened as amicus curiae five times in the U.S. lawsuits against Line 5 in Michigan and Wisconsin, defending Canada’s rights under the 1977 Treaty and requesting courts defer to those rights. Since 2020, Canada has submitted comments six times to federal and state permitting processes on the Straits of Mackinac tunnel project. The four affected provinces (Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, Quebec) strongly support Canada’s actions to defend Line 5.

Columbia River Treaty

For decades, the Columbia River Treaty has provided predictability and joint benefits for Canada and the U.S.
Canada stands ready to work with the U.S. to modernize the Treaty so both countries can continue to reap the economic and environmental benefits.
In July 2024, Canada and the U.S. reached an Agreement in Principle, which Canada remains committed to and on which basis a modernized Treaty could be drafted.
Meanwhile Canada and the U.S. have put in in place interim measures to cover flood risk and payment for a period of three years and power coordination for a period of 20 years.

Supplementary messages

Since 1964, the Columbia River Treaty (CRT) has been delivering significant benefits to the U.S. through flood risk management, increasing hydropower generation, and providing irrigation and navigation. An updated Treaty seeks to provide additional ecosystem benefits and integrate Indigenous cultural values.

Update

Negotiations and the drafting of the modernized treaty have been paused since early January as part of the State Department’s broad review of its foreign policy. Although GAC awaits a signal from the U.S. to resume negotiations, movement will depend on U.S. willingness to continue negotiations based on the Agreement in Principle (AIP) reached in July 2024 and the overall pacing of the new Canada-U.S. economic and security relationship. The non-legally binding AIP provides a framework for Canada and the U.S. to draft Treaty language and contains updated flood control measures, power generation provisions, and remuneration to Canada (BC) as well as ecosystem provisions. In the absence of a modernized treaty, Canada and the U.S. have already agreed to “interim measures” covering flood risk management for a period of three years (2027) and power coordination for a period of twenty years (2044). GAC continues to focus on domestic discussions with B.C. and the First Nations to ensure continued unity within the Canadian delegation. Domestic discussions are centred on redress, benefit-sharing and governance with the aim of obtaining the free, prior and informed consent from the First Nations in advance of the ratification of a modernized Treaty.

Background

Negotiations to modernize the 60-year-old CRT began in May 2018. The CRT is an international transboundary water management agreement between Canada and the U.S. that came into force in 1964. A Canada-BC Agreement from 1963 allocates most rights, benefits and obligations of the CRT to BC and requires Canada to obtain BC’s concurrence before terminating, amending, or making certain elections under the Treaty. Given this Agreement, BC plays a significant role in modernization negotiations. For modernization negotiations, the Canadian delegation is made up of federal, provincial and First Nation representatives from the Ktunaxa, the Syilx-Okanagan and the Secwépemc Nations.

The Great Lakes Fishery Commission

The Great Lakes Fishery Commission provides a mechanism for Canada and the U.S. to combat sea lamprey, to protect and sustain the Great Lakes fishery, and acts as a coordinating body for fishery management and research.
Following the transfer of responsibility to GAC in Fall 2024, officials from GAC and DFO continue to work closely to ensure a smooth and efficient transition.
GAC and DFO recognize the importance of sea lamprey control in the Great Lakes and both our departments are committed to ensuring that the resources required for this critical task are maintained.

Background

The 1954 Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries Between Canada and the United States created the Great Lakes Fishery Commission (GLFC). The GLFC provides a mechanism for Canada and the United States to work together to combat sea lamprey, to protect and sustain the Great Lakes fisheries, and to act as a coordinating body for fishery management and research.

Pursuant to the Convention, the Commission is funded by both Canada and the U.S. As decided at the Commission’s first meeting in 1956, for implementation of the Sea Lamprey Control Program, the U.S. and Canada contribute 69% and 31% of the Commission's budget, respectively. To support the Commission’s science research efforts, coordination of binational fisheries management, communications program, and other matters undertaken at the Secretariat office, Canada and the U.S. contribute equal amounts. Since 2022, Canada’s annual contribution to the Commission is $19.2 million.

The Canadian section of the Commission is comprised of four commissioners. Two of the four Commissioners appointed by Canada are traditionally reserved for federally appointed representatives, one of which is a federal civil servant. The Governor in Council normally appoints individuals identified by the Government of Ontario to two of the four Canadian Commissioner seats given responsibilities the province has over some aspects of the fishery resource. This arrangement is not formally in place between Canada and the Ontario but is a longstanding practice.

In September 2024, former Prime Minister Trudeau transferred responsibility for the GLFC from the portfolio of the Minister of Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard to the portfolio of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The transfer was formalized by an Order in Council dated 18 October 2024. This machinery change arose out of a history of the GLFC’s distrust over DFO’s administration of the funds allocated to the Commission.

The machinery of government decision does not legally allow Canada’s funding commitment to be completely transferred to GAC as DFO remains responsible for the Sea Lamprey Control Program. As a result, GAC has been working closely with DFO, the Commission Secretariat, PCO and the Treasury Board Secretariat to ensure a smooth transition, including the most efficient administrative arrangement to fully implement the process of transferring the funds allocated to the Commission, while honouring Canada’s obligations under the Treaty.

The International Joint Commission

The International Joint Commission (IJC) is an asset in our relationship with the United States, helping our two countries prevent and resolve differences around the management of transboundary waters.
The IJC has two main responsibilities: approving projects that affect water levels and flows across the boundary and investigating transboundary issues with a view to recommending solutions.
Canada and the United States continue to provide stable funding to the IJC, including ad hoc funding so the IJC can carry out binational studies on key transboundary water issues.

Background

The International Joint Commission (IJC) was created under the Boundary Waters Treaty, which was signed by Canada and the U.S. in 1909. The IJC is a binational, independent body which helps to address current and emerging challenges in shared waters and provides an essential forum to channel, and at times contain, transboundary disputes with cross-cutting political, economic and environmental implications.

Canada and the U.S. each appoint three of the six IJC Commissioners. The U.S. Commissioners are appointed by the President and Canadian Commissioners are appointed by the Governor-in-Council of Canada. The Commissioners are required to carry out their duties in an impartial manner as they represent the Commission and not the government that has appointed them.

The salaries and expenses of the IJC’s Canadian and U.S. Sections are paid for by the respective governments, while all joint expenses are shared by the governments. Our share of the IJC’s annual budget fluctuates depending on the number of projects the Commission is working on but averages between $6-8 million.

The IJC’s budget has been flat for nearly two decades, and the impact of inflation over time has resulted in cuts to other areas, increasingly constraining the ability of the IJC to fulfil core mandate responsibilities, threatening Canada’s credibility in light of new and growing financial commitments by the U.S. Significant ad hoc investments are required on an ongoing basis, and have been addressed through the Budget process as the department is unable to fund them from existing reference levels.

Current studies

St. Mary and Milk Rivers study: launched in November 2021, is exploring options to improve access to apportioned waters by each country, in recognition of climate change and challenges to apportionment since the original 1921 Order was issued. The effort includes a desire to achieve long-term resilience in accessing the shared waters of the St. Mary and Milk Rivers. The final report is expected in 2026.

International Elk-Kootenay watershed study: On March 8, 2024, Canada and the U.S., in partnership with the Ktunaxa Nation, requested the IJC to study the impact of transboundary water pollution in the Elk-Kootenai/y watershed. The IJC will prepare an interim report by fall 2025 and a final report by September 2026.

Phase 2 of the expedited review of Plan 2014: launched in 2022 to broadly examine the performance of the regulation plan for Lake Ontario, particularly its response to extreme high and low water levels and to variability brought on by the changing climate. The final report is expected to be provided in the spring of 2026.

Canada unequivocally condemns the ongoing repression and restrictions on the population of Venezuela by the Maduro regime, particularly following the 2024 presidential election.

We are committed to continuing to work with international partners to advance human rights, support a democratic solution, and mitigate the destabilizing impacts of the Venezuela crisis on neighbouring countries.

Venezuela

Ongoing human rights abuses

Supplementary messages

The continuation of Nicolas Maduro in the presidency is illegitimate and against the will of Venezuelans. On January 8, 2025, Canada recognized opposition presidential candidate Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia as president-elect of Venezuela. The U.S., Italy, Israel and 7 Latin American countries have also recognized Gonzalez as president-elect.
On March 21, 2025, Canada announced its most recent round of sanctions against 8 members of the Maduro regime. Since 2017, Canada has imposed targeted sanctions on 139 Venezuelan officials including de facto President Maduro and other high-ranking regime officials responsible for undermining democracy, human rights violations and corruption.

Update

On January 10, 2025, Maduro was illegitimately inaugurated for a third 6-year mandate (until January 2031) after fraudulently proclaiming himself winner of the July 2024 presidential election. The G7 issued its first statement under Canada’s presidency in 2025 condemning the illegitimate inauguration of Maduro on January 10. Several countries, including the U.S., the UK, the E.U. and many Latin American countries have also publicly condemned Maduro’s illegitimate grip on power. Repression and coercion remain key means of control used by the Maduro regime. This includes criminalizing and silencing opposing political views; arresting, harassing and forcing into exile opposition political figures, social leaders and journalists; and subjecting many to torture. The Maduro regime continues to be a significant perpetrator of arbitrary detention of foreign nationals for use as political leverage, with nearly 80 foreigners from multiple countries in detention (no Canadians).

Supporting facts and figures

In October 2024, Canada led the renewal of the Human Rights Council mandates of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela (FFM) and of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
On September 22, 2025, the FFM published its 6th report concluding that repression has deepened in Venezuela and that, given the complicity of the judiciary, “the only hope to find justice for victims lies with the international community.”

Background

Under President Nicolas Maduro, Venezuela has become increasingly authoritarian and a major source of geopolitical instability, notably because of its permissive environment for violent non-state actors, its migration outflows, its disregard for democratic processes, and systemic human rights violations. The regime controls all governing institutions, including notably the judiciary. The support of the regime by the security forces has been crucial to its survival and reflects their involvement in the political process and ability to profit from illegal revenue streams, including illegal mining and drug trafficking. The Maduro regime also benefits from the strategic support of Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba. Since August 2025, the U.S. has significantly escalated its posture by framing Venezuela as a threat to U.S. national security, designating the Cartel de los Soles as a terrorist organization - which the U.S. alleges is headed by Maduro, and deployed 8 military warships to the Southern Caribbean Sea. As of October 16, the US conducted 16 lethal strikes in international waters against boats allegedly linked to Venezuela drug cartels that Washington claims respond to Maduro’s command.

Venezuela-Guyana tensions over the Essequibo region, disputed territory currently administered by Guyana

The Government of Canada has reiterated on multiple occasions its support for Guyana’s sovereignty.
We denounce Venezuela's repeated provocative actions in the Essequibo region.
Canada supports the peaceful resolution of the dispute through the process already underway at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Canada urges both parties to comply with the Court’s legally binding provisional measures order of December 2023 and refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve.

Update

The increased U.S. military presence near the Venezuelan coast is a deterrent to Venezuela undertaking further provocations in Essequibo. The stated purpose of this deployment is for the U.S. to counter threats from regional drug cartels. However, this move is seen as a means to apply pressure on Venezuelan military forces, to show force against external regime allies, and to deter the regime from doing anything against U.S. interests in Venezuela and in Essequibo (e.g. Chevron license in Venezuela & U.S. extractives in the Essequibo including Exxon).

On September 1, security forces in Guyana stated that a boat carrying election officials and ballot boxes was shot at "from the Venezuelan shore" in the contested Essequibo region. Venezuela has denied being behind incident.

On August 11, Venezuela filed its final written Rejoinder in the case before the ICJ. The next steps in the process are oral hearings, deliberations and the issuance of the final judgement, which will be binding on the parties under international law. However, Venezuela has officially indicated that the submission of the Rejoinder “does not imply Venezuela's consent or recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction, nor will we abide by any ruling that may be issued in the matter”. In May 2025, de facto President Nicolas Maduro held regional and legislative elections across Venezuela, which included, for the first time, elections for the governorship and 8 legislative representatives of “Guayana Esequiba”. On May 1, the ICJ specified that Venezuela must refrain from conducting or preparing to conduct elections in the disputed territory. On May 25, GAC stated its support for the ongoing ICJ process and Guyana’s sovereignty through its social media accounts.

Supporting facts and figures

The Essequibo region is approximately 160,000 square kilometers in size and it represents two-thirds of Guyana’s territory.
Since 2024, there have been at least 9 airspace or sea incursions by the Venezuelan armed forces into Guyana’s territory.
All eleven Canadian mines in Guyana currently being explored, built or actively mined fall in the contested region. In 2023, the value of Canadian mining assets in Guyana totaled $394 million.

Background

Although the current border was settled by international arbitration in 1899, Venezuela rejected this decision in 1966 and revived the dispute in 2015, following discovery of large offshore oil reserves within the Essequibo region. The dispute escalated in 2023 following a series of provocative actions by the de facto Venezuelan regime.

El Salvador

Cooperation with the U.S. administration on mass deportations of alleged gang members, and detentions in CECOT Prison

Detentions are part of a broader trend of deteriorating human rights in El Salvador.
We are concerned about reports of overcrowding, lack of access to legal counsel, prolonged pretrial detention across El Salvador’s prison system.
We remain concerned about the State of Exception in place since March 2022.

Supplementary messages

Canada called on El Salvador, notably through its intervention during the 2024 Universal Periodic Review, to improve detention conditions in order to comply with international law and international human rights standards.

Background

The cooperation between El Salvador and the U.S. administration regarding mass deportations and detentions at the CECOT mega-prison has sparked significant controversy and international concern.

Under a bilateral agreement, the U.S. deported over 200 alleged gang members to El Salvador’s Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo (CECOT). The Trump administration invoked the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, a wartime law, to justify expedited deportations without due process.

El Salvador, in response to UN inquiries, clarified that it merely provided prison infrastructure and that jurisdiction and legal responsibility remain with the United States.

In July 2025, President Bukele announced a prisoner swap with Venezuela, exchanging the Venezuelan detainees for 10 American hostages and several political prisoners.

Canada has not made any public statements regarding U.S. deportations to El Salvador.

Since March 2022, El Salvador’s State of Exception has suspended key constitutional rights to combat gang violence, resulting in over 86,000 arrests and significantly improved security, but also widespread human rights concerns. Although the government has announced a phased plan to end the SoE, details remain unclear. This August, the Bukele administration secured the right to extend the SoE for an additional two years, after El Salvador’s Congress voted to allow prosecutors more time to investigate alleged gang ties among those detained—raising further concerns about democratic erosion and long-term impacts on civil liberties.

Deaths in custody: According to credible human rights organizations such as Cristosal, 427 individuals have died in custody in El Salvador since the State of Exception (SoE) was introduced in 2022.

Listed terrorist entities: On February 2025, Canada listed La Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) as a transnational criminal organization associated with terrorism. In addition to MS-13, the U.S. Department of State has designated Barrio 18, another Salvadorean-associated gang, as both a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist.

Armenia/Azerbaijan peace process

The August 8^th agreements between Armenia and Azerbaijan established a foundation for mutual respect and chart a course for a lasting peace.
Canada reaffirms its commitment to long-term peace, stability, and prosperity in the South Caucasus.

Supplementary messages

Canada will continue to support the ongoing peace process and looks forward to the resolution of outstanding issues.
Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan will help ensure future prosperity and stability in the South Caucasus, as well as reduce Russia’s influence.
Canada notes the decision to end the OSCE Minsk Group and supports future efforts to ensure the non-use of force, respect for territorial integrity, and the right to self-determination.

Update

On August 8, 2025, under the auspices of President Trump, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev initialed the Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, underscoring respect for one another’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the inviolability of international borders. While not legally binding, the agreements include commitments to dissolve the OSCE Minsk Group, open transport links connecting Azerbaijan with its exclave, Nakhchivan (including the proposed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity), and reject force for territorial gains. The U.S. committed to develop a Strategic Partnership with Azerbaijan, to suspend prohibitions on direct U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan; and to the cooperation between Azerbaijan’s state oil company and ExxonMobil. Numerous issues remain, including the return of prisoners of war by Azerbaijan, the right of return for ethnic Armenians to Nagorno-Karabakh, and the protection of cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh. There is also a need for support for the displaced Nagorno-Karabakhians now based in Armenia. Continued progress on the normalization of Armenia-Türkiye relations will bolster the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process. Armenia is expected to hold parliamentary elections in June 2026.

Background

On March 13,2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan announced agreement on the text of a peace agreement to end nearly four decades of conflict. However, Azerbaijan refused to sign, insisting that Armenia amend its constitution to remove territorial claims which Armenia denies exist.

Outside the peace process, in 2024 the respective state border commissions of both countries agreed to be guided on border delimitation by the Almaty Declaration of 1991. The peaceful “return” of four villages to Azerbaijan was proof of concept.

The Nagorno-Karabakh region has been a long-standing source of territorial and ethnic conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The region was autonomous within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1991, the ethnic Armenian residents of Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence, triggering a three-year war that pitted Azerbaijan against the Karabakhi separatists and Armenia. The 1994 ceasefire left most of Nagorno-Karabakh under Armenian control, displacing 700,000 Azerbaijanis. The 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War returned significant territory to Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan’s 2023 military operation gave the country complete control of Nagorno-Karabakh, exiling 120,000 ethnic Armenians to Armenia. Canada has always considered Nagorno-Karabakh part of Azerbaijan.

Canada’s support to Ukraine

The Prime Minister’s August 24 visit to Kyiv reinforced Canada’s unwavering support to Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and long-term security.
Since 2022, Canada has committed nearly $22 billion in multifaceted support to Ukraine, which includes economic, military, humanitarian, development, security, stabilization, accountability and immigration measures.
Canada is steadfast in its commitment to the Coalition of the Willing and its intent to deploy direct and scalable military assistance in support of upholding a ceasefire and lasting peace.

Supplementary messages

Canada does not support recognition of territorial gains made by force and opposes premature easing of pressure on Russia.
Canada consistently underscores that the safe return of Ukrainian prisoners and deported persons must be central to any negotiated settlement.
Canada is leading global efforts to address the human dimension of the war, co-chairing the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children and the Kyiv-based Working Group on the Release of All Prisoners and Deported Persons. Canada hosted the October 2024 Ministerial Conference that launched the Montreal Pledge – signed by 54 states and organizations – and invested over $27 million in initiatives to support the safe return and reintegration of affected Ukrainians.
Canada is committed to Ukraine’s recovery by providing immediate support for urgent needs and sustaining longer-term efforts to advance Ukraine’s reform agenda, foster trade and investment, and mobilize private sector involvement in reconstruction.

Update

Prime Minister Carney visited Kyiv on the 34th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence on August 24, where he announced new measures to advance security, defence and economic cooperation with Ukraine. These included the allocation of the $2 billion military assistance package announced at the G7 Leaders’ Summit, steps to implement the Agreement on Security Cooperation, additional $31 million in international assistance, a new agreement on customs cooperation, and opportunities to further joint defence projects, trade and investment. Prime Minister has participated in person or virtually in all meetings of the Coalition of the Willing since its creation in the spring of 2025. On September 23, Prime Minister Carney and President Zelenskyy co-hosted a leader-level meeting of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly to mobilize international support. The European Union and Andorra announced their Coalition membership, bringing the total to 44 members.

Supporting facts and figures

Canada is consistently among the top donors to Ukraine. Since 2022, Canada has committed nearly $22 billion in multi-faceted assistance for Ukraine, including:
- $12.3 billion in macro-economic support (highest per capita contribution in G7)
- $6.5 billion in military assistance
- $702.1 million in recovery and reconstruction, including development assistance
- $395.7 million in humanitarian assistance
- $229.8 million in security and stabilization assistance.
Canada is intensifying its pressure on Russia by sanctioning more than 3,300 individuals and entities, lowering the price cap for Russia’s crude oil, tightening financial controls, introducing new export and import restrictions, targeting Russia’s shadow fleet, and freezing Russian assets.
Under Operation UNIFIER, the Canadian Armed Forces have trained more than 46,000 Security Forces of Ukraine personnel since 2014.

On September 16, Prime Minister Carney appointed the Hon. Chrystia Freeland as the Special Representative for the Reconstruction of Ukraine.

Canada’s support to return Ukrainian children

Canada is actively supporting efforts to return unlawfully deported and forcibly transferred Ukrainian children, in line with international law and humanitarian principles.
Together with Ukraine, Canada launched the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children in February 2024, which we co-chair to coordinate global efforts for repatriation and reunification.
In October 2024, Canada hosted a Ministerial Conference and launched the Montreal Pledge. This September, PM Carney co-chaired a leaders-level UN meeting to advocate for returns. Canada directly supports the return and reintegration of Ukrainians through partners including UNICEF and others.

Supplementary messages

Canada considers the returns of prisoners of war, unlawfully detained civilians, and deported children – the human dimension of the war in Ukraine - a critical priority and a vital confidence-building measure in peace efforts.
Canada also launched the Working Group on the Release of Prisoners and Deported Persons in Kyiv in February 2024, alongside Norway and Ukraine’s Human Rights Commissioner.
Canada hosted the October 2024 Ministerial Conference that launched the Montreal Pledge—signed by 54 states and organizations—to coordinate efforts to repatriate deported children and support their reintegration into Ukrainian society.
In September, Prime Minister Carney and President Zelenskyy convened XX leaders at the UN General Assembly High-level meeting “Restoring Childhood and Humanity” to continue to advocate for returns.
Canada has invested in the tracing and reintegration of Ukrainian children through a number of projects, including with partners such as Hala Systems ($2 million), UNICEF ($10 million) and the Project Fund for a Resilient Ukraine (PFRU, $15 million supporting many different areas including child reintegration).
Through these efforts, Canada is reinforcing its commitment to accountability, child protection, and the preservation of cultural and linguistic identity, in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Update

In September 2025, PM Carney, alongside President Zelenskyy, co-chaired a high-level meeting of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children, on the margins of UNGA. Over 50 delegations participated. Belgium, Latvia, Norway, Slovenia, and other partners pledged support for tracing, psychosocial support, rehabilitation, and foster care initiatives. The EU announced €200 million for school meals in Ukraine. Austria reconfirmed its mediation efforts to facilitate the return of children and Italy confirmed readiness to work with the Vatican on returns. Coalition members committed to intensify sanctions on Russia, and a joint statement form the co-chairs was issued. The European Union and Andorra also announced their new membership, bringing the total to 44 member States and organizations. Coalition members reaffirmed that the forced transfer and deportation of children by Russia constitutes a serious breach of international law and a profound humanitarian crisis.

Supporting facts and figures

Ukraine reports 19,546 children have been unlawfully deported or transferred, though this figure is still being validated. About 1,700 children have been returned, including 700 since the launch of the International Coalition in February 2024. These returns have been facilitated by intermediary states like Qatar, back-channel talks, and Ukrainian civil society efforts.
Canada is investing $2 million in Hala Systems to support the use of AI-driven open-source intelligence in locating and returning Ukrainian children unlawfully deported and transferred to Russia and occupied territories of Ukraine. This technology aids in identifying victims, preserving critical evidence, and supporting accountability efforts.
Canada is contributing $15 million to the Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine II, a multi-donor initiative that strengthens Ukraine’s resilience and, inter alia, enabling the return of deported children and missing persons. This includes policy advice, technical assistance, and community-level programming to aid reintegration and long-term recovery.
Through a $10 million UNICEF-led project, Canada is supporting Ukrainian children, including the safe return and reintegration of displaced and unlawfully deported Ukrainian children. This initiative focuses on strengthening family-based care and child protection services for the most vulnerable.
Canada’s support is contributing to efforts to establish a centralized information management system that serves to identify, trace and verify cases of deported or forcibly transferred Ukrainian children.
Canada’s support empowers Ukrainian civil society and local actors to deliver essential mental health and psychosocial services, ensuring returned children and their families receive the care they need to rebuild their lives.

Sanctions

Canada is leveraging existing tools to advance accountability for the unlawful deportation or transfer of Ukrainian children and other serious violations. Canada first targeted key actors implicated in transfers in May 2023, listing 30 individuals and 8 entities “involved in Russia’s ongoing human rights violations, including the transfer and custody of Ukrainian children,” under the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations.
To date, Canada sanctioned over 80 individuals and entities in relation to violations of the rights of Ukrainian children, including Russia’s Presidential Children’s Rights Commissioner, Maria Lvova-Belova, wanted by the ICC, as well as regional Children’s Rights Commissioners and government-related entities and other organizations.
Looking at doing more with partners.

Russia - General

Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its disregard for international law, human rights, and the sovereignty of neighboring states.
Canada, its allies and the international community have strongly condemned Russia’s actions and taken concrete steps to hold it to account.
Canada has done so by adopting our most comprehensive sanctions; working with likeminded countries to isolate Russia diplomatically; strengthening NATO’s Eastern Flank to deter further aggression; and supporting Ukraine in its right to self-defence and through the provision of substantial assistance.

Supplementary messages

Canada, its allies, and the international community strongly condemn Russia’s actions which undermine the rules-based international order.
The unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine is not an isolated incident; it is part of a broader pattern of destabilization, disinformation, and coercion that threatens peace and security across Europe and beyond.
Canada, its allies, and the international community also condemn the repressive measures Russia has taken domestically that further crack down on civil liberties and silence dissent, including those suppressing any criticism of the war in Ukraine.

Background

The unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine is not an isolated incident—it is part of a broader pattern of unacceptable behaviour. Russia’s unprovoked and illegal war against Ukraine and other actions, such as the repeated airspace violations in Moldova (28 drone incidents since 2022), show blatant disrespect for national borders and international norms. Furthermore, Moscow continues to prop up and collaborate with repressive regimes, including in Belarus, where democratic freedoms are suppressed and opposition voices silenced. Russia has employed and continues to use cyberattacks, propaganda, and energy blackmail to weaken democratic institutions and sow division within the EU and NATO and beyond. From targeting civilians in Ukraine to persecuting dissenters at home, Russia’s actions reflect a systemic disregard for human dignity and freedom.

Since the start of the war against Ukraine in 2022, Russia has further intensified its crackdown on civil liberties domestically, targeting dissenters and opposition figures with harsh measures. The death of opposition leader Alexei Navalny in prison in 2024, under suspicious circumstances, exemplifies the regime's ruthless approach to silencing critics. Authorities have expanded repressive laws, labeling individuals and organizations as “foreign agents,” “undesirable,” or “extremist,” often leading to heavy fines or long prison sentences. The United Nations has condemned Russia’s use of national security laws to imprison thousands on politically motivated charges, including children and the elderly.

Sanctions against Russia

Canada’s economic measures toward Russia, Belarus and malign actors in Ukraine and Moldova respond to Russia’s attack on the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and its broader alleged actions.
These measures aim to limit Russia’s ability to finance its illegal war, increase pressure on Russia to change its behavior and expose supporters of Russia’s grave breaches of international peace and security.
Sanctions are a key part of Canada’s comprehensive response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, alongside nearly $22 billion in financial, development, humanitarian, military, and security and stabilization support.

Supplementary messages

Many of these sanctions have been implemented in coordination with Canada’s Allies and partners, including G7 members.
Until Russia halts its aggression, Canada, in coordination with Allies and partners, will intensify pressure through sanctions—targeting Russia’s shadow fleet, lowering the crude oil price cap, tightening financial restrictions, and combating sanctions evasion.
Canada is committed to Ukraine’s recovery and has disbursed its $5 billion contribution through the G7 Extraordinary Revenue Allocation (ERA) loans mechanism.

Update

On September 3, the European Union and the United Kingdom, Canada lowered its price cap for Russian crude oil from U.S. $60 to U.S. $47.60 per barrel. On August 28, Canada imposed sanctions against 16 individuals and two entities under the Special Economic Measures (Moldova) Regulations for their role in Russia’s malign interference activities in Moldova.

Supporting facts and figures

Since 2014, Canada has imposed sanctions on more than 3,300 individuals and entities including those who are complicit in the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and in gross and systematic human rights violations.
Since February 2025, Canada also sanctioned over 300 Russia-linked vessels involved in the movement of oil, liquefied natural gas, arms and other items for the benefit of Russia.
Canada was the first G7 country to amend its sanctions legislation to allow for the seizure and forfeiture of the assets of sanctioned individuals and entities.
Since February 24, 2022, a total approximate equivalent of $185 million of assets in Canada have been effectively frozen and a total approximate equivalent of $473 million in financial transactions have been blocked as a result of the prohibitions in the SEMA Russia Regulations.

Background

Following Russia’s occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea in March 2014, in tandem with partners and Allies, Canada enacted sanctions under the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA) and imposed various import and export prohibitions.

Russia – NATO airspace incursions

Canada condemns the reckless and provocative Russian incursions into NATO airspace.
These dangerous violations serve to reinforce the need to deter Russian aggression and safeguard the territory of all NATO Allies.
Russia’s actions – deliberate or not – are reckless and unnecessarily risk escalation.

Supplementary messages

On September 11, the Russian Ambassador to Canada was summoned to express Canada’s grave concerns over Russia’s violations of Polish and NATO airspace.
NATO’s EASTERN SENTRY initiative will ensure Poland, Estonia, Romania, other front-line countries, and all other Allies are adequately equipped to respond to such episodes.
NATO and Allies will employ, in accordance with international law, all necessary military and non-military tools to defend themselves and deter all threats from all directions.
NATO will continue to respond in the manner, timing, and domain of its choosing.

Background

Airspace violations in Europe

Since September, NATO fighters scrambled over Poland, Romania, and Estonia to intercept Russian drones and Fighters. Unidentified drones and weather balloons have also been reported over Belgian, Danish, French, German, Lithuanian, Norwegian, and Swedish airports and military bases. Some vessels from Russia’s Shadow Fleet are alleged by intelligence sources to be involved in launching or coordinating drone surveillance missions. Russia’s Shadow Fleet, composed of aging oil tankers and cargo ships operating under obscure ownership and flags of convenience, is officially tasked with circumventing Western sanctions on Russian oil exports. Airspace violations on the part of Russia are not a new phenomenon. This has been a regular occurrence since Russia began its illegal invasion of Ukraine, but it has accelerated in intensity and scope in 2025, including with the use of drones and fighter jets.

Eastern sentry

On September 12, in response to the Polish incursion incident, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and SG Rutte announced the establishment of EASTERN SENTRY, which will bolster NATO’s air defence capabilities along the entire Eastern Flank. EASTERN SENTRY seeks to present an entirely new defence design, aiming to be a comprehensive and innovative approach that will plug gaps, deploy concentrated capabilities, and increase communications for an integrated approach. The activity will leverage new assets already offered by some Allies such as fighter aircraft, early warning systems and ground-based interceptors.

West Bank

Canada is deeply alarmed about Israel’s accelerated settlement expansion, increasing settler violence, and policies that advance annexation across the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Violence is unacceptable. Civilians must be protected. Israel must hold perpetrators to account.
The deteriorating situation constitutes a serious obstacle to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace, including a two-state solution.

Supplementary messages

Canada supports Israel’s right to live in peace with its neighbours within secure boundaries. Israeli settlement expansion, attacks by extremist Israeli settlers, and impunity for violence against Palestinians undermine this peace, the human rights of Palestinians, and prospects for a two-state solution, while also posing significant risks to Israeli and regional security.
Canada opposes the forced displacement of Palestinians as a violation of international humanitarian law.
Canada condemns the October 22 Knesset vote on a bill to annex the West Bank. This is a destabilising move at a time when critical peace efforts are underway.
The recently advanced plans for the “E1 settlement” would separate Palestinian communities, violate international law and undermine the viability of a future Palestinian state.

Supporting facts and figures 

On 21 August, Canada along with 25 partners issued a joint statement condemning Israeli plans for settlement construction in the E1 area in the West Bank and called on the Israeli government to stop settlement construction in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2334.
Settler attacks on Palestinians average four per day, with over 740 incidents recorded in 2025 alone. Israel’s settlement activity in the West Bank has surged to unprecedented levels in 2025, driven by aggressive government policies and settler mobilization. The annual olive harvest has become a flashpoint for settler violence against Palestinians.

Background

Israeli settlements and settlers’ violence constitute a serious obstacle to a two-state solution. Settlement activity in East Jerusalem and the West Bank has continued under all Israeli governments since 1967. Canada does not recognize permanent Israeli control over territories occupied in 1967, nor Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Calls for the formal annexation of parts of the West Bank have intensified, driven by extreme right-wing ministers, settler leaders, and far-right factions.

Settlement activity has a daily, detrimental effect on Palestinians and contributes to friction between Israelis and Palestinians. Israel regularly declares parts of land in the West Bank as state land or land for military purposes, often depriving Palestinian landowners of their property. Additional negative impacts on Palestinians include forced displacement, movement restrictions, diversion of water resources, and settler violence and vandalism. When violence occurs, settlers are subject to Israeli civil law and Palestinians in the West Bank are subject to Israeli military law.

In August 2025, Israel’s Higher Planning Committee of the Civil Administration approved the highly controversial E1 settlement (east of Jerusalem) project to build approximately 3,400 housing units between Jerusalem and the Ma’ale Adumim settlement in the West Bank. By further dividing the West Bank, it would engender the separation and segregation of communities, cause forced displacement, and compromise the viability of a future Palestinian state—and, in turn, of a two-state solution.

The annual olive harvest in Palestine is a primary source of livelihood for thousands of families and a cornerstone of Palestinian culture. However, settler violence is threatening the livelihoods of Palestinian farmers and furthering the coercive environment designed to displace communities from their land. In the past week, settler violence has skyrocketed in scale and frequency according to the UN and right groups.

On 22 October, the Knesset approved two preliminary bills calling for the annexation of either parts or the entirety of the West Bank. Both proposals were submitted by opposition parties, in open defiance of PM Netanyahu’s position, as he preferred to avoid such a politically charged vote during the visit of U.S. Vice President Vance. U.S. officials have publicly criticized the passage of the bill as detrimental to the Gaza ceasefire. While the bills passed their preliminary readings, they did not enjoy overwhelming support and are largely seen as a political stunt by the opposition against the government’s wishes. It is doubtful that they would advance past the Committee phase.

Arms exports to Israel

Since January 8th, 2024, the Government of Canada has not approved any new arms export permits to Israel that could be used in the current conflict in Gaza.
In 2024, the government also suspended export permits for parts destined for Israel that could be incorporated into items used in Gaza; all of these permits suspended in 2024 remain suspended and cannot be used to export to Israel.

Supplementary messages

Since January 8, 2024, processing of export permits for items destined to Israel has been effectively paused; only two export permits have been approved in the broad category of “military goods”, which were for parts for Israel’s Iron Dome defensive system.
The government is in contact with those involved with the possible Foreign Military Sale by the United States to ensure that it would adhere to Canada’s rigorous export permit regime and be consistent with its long-standing policy towards the United States.
Canada’s Export Control List (ECL) identifies specific goods and technology that require export permits, using carefully selected technical parameters. These parameters are based on Canada’s international obligations as a signatory to multilateral or bilateral agreements and regimes.

Background

As a consequence of the humanitarian situation in Gaza resulting from the Israeli military operation that followed the October 7, 2023 attacks by Hamas, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly instructed that issuance of new export permits to Israel be suspended as of January 8, 2024. Following a more detailed review approximately 30 existing export permits were suspended after they were identified as potential inputs into items that could possibly be used in military operations by Israel. All of the permits suspended in 2024 remain suspended and cannot be used to export to Israel. In 2024 prior to the pause of export permits, Canadian companies exported approximately $18.9 million of strategic goods and technologies to Israel (down from $30.6 million in 2023).

The Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA) allows for the broad authority to amend, suspend, cancel or reinstate any export permit including suspending for the purpose of further investigation of new credible and relevant information. The specific details of items exported under an export permit are protected commercial information.

On August 13, 2024, the U.S. Department of State announced approval of “a possible U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS)” to Israel involving General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems Inc. (GDOTS-C), located in Quebec. Items described under this potential FMS include 50,400 mortar cartridges (i.e. “120mm High Explosive Mortar Cartridges and related equipment”) which are controlled for export under Canada’s Export Control List. The government understands that the soonest delivery of any such items would be in 2026. Officials are in touch with the company to ensure that it adheres to Canada’s export permit regime.

Canada’s diplomatic engagement in Syria

Canada welcomes and supports Syrian transitional authorities’ efforts towards an inclusive political transition.
Canada resumed diplomatic engagement with the Syrian government, including at ministerial and leader levels, and via the appointment of a non-resident Ambassador.
Canada recognizes the importance of sanctions relief to Syria’s economic recovery and, on August 27, renewed the General Permit to temporarily ease sanctions.

Supplementary messages

The General Permit temporarily eases sanctions and allows more humanitarian transactions by Canadians with Syria, including with the Central Bank of Syria and other sanctioned state banks.
Canada calls on all actors, from inside and outside of Syria, to avoid further destabilizing activities.
The Canadian embassy in Syria closed in 2012. Consequently, the ability to provide consular assistance within Syria is extremely limited.

Update

On August 27, Canada extended the March General Permit under the Special Economic Measures (SEMA) Permit Authorization Order that temporarily allows more humanitarian transactions by Canadians with Syria. The listing of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as a terrorist entity in Canada’s Criminal Code serves as a significant barrier to Canada’s ability to deliver any development programming in Syria.

Supporting facts and figures

Canada allocated $106.3 million in humanitarian assistance to Syria in 2025. Since 2017, Canada allocated over $842 million in humanitarian assistance.
Since 2015, Canada has welcomed over 100,000 Syrian refugees.

Background

Following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Canada resumed diplomatic engagement with the Syrian government. The previous Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Prime Minister engaged with their counterparts in February and March of 2025. Canada nominated its ambassador to Lebanon as the non-resident ambassador to Syria in March 2025. Syria is set to hold the first Parliamentary elections since the fall of Assad on October 5, 2025.

International reaction: Sanctions

On June 30, 2025, U.S. President Trump signed an Executive Order terminating the Syria sanctions program and directing additional actions, including waivers and new measures. The order removes sanctions on Syria, while maintaining sanctions on Bashar al-Assad, his family and associates, human rights abusers, and others. On May 28, the EU lifted economic sanctions on Syria, excluding sanctions related to the Assad regime. In March/April, the UK delisted 36 entities, including the Central Bank of Syria, state oil companies, and Syrian Air.

Sectarian violence

Sectarian tensions persist in Syria. In March, clashes along the coast of Northwest Syria between militias associated with government forces and Assad loyalists resulted in 1,426 fatalities. In July, Sweida saw clashes between Druze and Bedouin fighters; government security forces were unable to end the hostilities. Following the Syrian military's engagement in Sweida, Israel launched strikes on Syrian government targets. It is estimated that this caused over 1,000 deaths, including more than 200 civilians.

Sanctions against extremist settler violence

Canada remains alarmed by the rise in extremist settler violence against Palestinians, condemns all violence targeting civilians, calls for the protection of civilians and their property and demands accountability for those responsible.
We call on Israel to immediately halt construction of settlements, which are illegal under international law and undermine the viability of the two-state solution.
Canada does not recognize permanent Israeli control over territories occupied in 1967.

Supplementary messages

Canada’s sanctions are not directed at Israel as a State, its institutions, or its democratic process. They specifically target individuals and entities whose actions undermine peace efforts by facilitating, supporting, or contributing to the use of violence against Palestinian civilians in the occupied Palestinian territories.
Settlements constitute a serious obstacle to achieving a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace.
Canada is committed to the goal of a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East, including the creation of a Palestinian State living side-by-side in peace and security with Israel.

Supporting facts and figures

On May 16, 2024, Canada imposed its first-ever sanctions on violent extremist Israeli settlers under the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA), aiming to hold perpetrators accountable and deter future violence against Palestinian civilians in the occupied Palestinian territories.
Canada has issued four (4) rounds of sanctions imposing measures on seventeen (17) individuals and seven (7) entities.
Most recently, in June 2024, Canada imposed sanctions on Israel’s Finance Minister and National Security Minister for facilitating, supporting, and contributing to settler violence against Palestinians.
The UK has imposed five (5) rounds of sanctions imposing measures on thirteen (13) individuals and thirteen (13) entities.
The EU has announced two (2) rounds imposing sanctions on nine (9) individuals and five (5) entities.
Australia has announced two (2) rounds of sanctions imposing measures on nine (9) individuals and one (1) entity.

Background

Extremist settler violence against Palestinian civilians and their property in the occupied Palestinian territories has long been a source of tension and conflict. The number of extremist settler attacks has risen on a yearly basis since 2020 and peaked following Hamas’ terrorist attacks against Israel on October 7, 2023. On May 16, 2024, the sanctions related to extremist settler violence under the SEMA came into force. These are the first ever Canadian sanctions measures listing extremist Israeli settlers. They represent a significant step in Canada’s response to this ongoing violence.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the situation in Iran

The Iranian regime is one of the main sources of instability in the Middle East, threatening regional and global peace and security.
Canada enforces some of the world’s toughest sanctions and restrictions to hold Iran accountable and curb its malign activities.
On June 19, 2024, Canada listed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code.

Supplementary messages

Iran supports armed groups, advances ballistic missile and UAV programs, and engages in transnational repression that threatens Canadians.
Canada has imposed autonomous sanctions on 467 Iranian individuals and entities for peace and security violations, human rights violations, and terrorism.
In 2012, Canada designated Iran as a state supporter of terrorism under the State Immunity Act. In concert with the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, this listing allows victims to bring a cause of action (e.g. civil litigation) against perpetrators of terrorism and their supporters for loss or damage from an act of terrorism committed anywhere in the world.
In 2022, Canada designated senior leaders of the Iranian government, including officials in security and intelligence agencies, as inadmissible under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for engagement in terrorism and gross human rights violations, ensuring they cannot enter Canada.
Canada maintains a controlled engagement policy with Iran, limited to nuclear issues, regional security, human rights, and consular matters (including PS752).

Update

On July 31, 2025, Canada co-signed a joint statement with 13 other countries condemning Iranian state threat activity in Europe and North America, calling on Tehran to cease illegal operations against journalists, dissidents, and officials. Transnational repression not only violates our sovereignty, it undermines the ability of individuals to exercise their human rights freely, fully and equally.

Background

Escalation in Iran-Israel conflict: Iran’s decades-long confrontation with Israel has escalated since the onset of the war in Gaza. On June 13, 2025, Israel launched a 12-day campaign of widespread strikes against Iranian nuclear sites, military infrastructure, and senior commanders. Israel framed the offensive as essential to degrade an existential nuclear threat amid faltering U.S.-Iran diplomacy. The U.S. joined hostilities on June 22, targeting three key nuclear facilities. Iran’s response was limited to a calibrated missile strike on a U.S. military base in Qatar. A fragile ceasefire followed, underscoring the volatility of the regional balance.

Expanding transnational repression: Iran increasingly threatens Canada and its allies through systematic transnational repression targeting diaspora communities, human rights defenders and political opponents abroad.

Support to Russia’s war effort: Tehran remains a critical supplier of arms and technology to Russia, including ballistic missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). Iran has reportedly provided drones, artillery shells, and more recently, short-range ballistic missiles to support Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): The IRGC, established after Iran’s 1979 Revolution, is a powerful military and political force, with its Quds Force conducting overseas operations and supporting proxy groups across the Middle East.

Iran’s nuclear program

Canada stands in solidarity with the E3 announcement triggering the snapback mechanism to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran.
Iran’s nuclear proliferation activities have long been a major threat to regional and international security.
We have been consistently clear that Iran can never have a nuclear weapon.
Canada continues to advocate for a diplomatic solution to address the proliferation risks of Iran’s nuclear program.
As G7 President this year, we continue to work towards a diplomatic outcome.

Supplementary messages

Iran has reached levels of uranium enrichment for which there is no plausible civilian use. It is imperative that this and other concerns related to Iran’s nuclear program be resolved.
Canada expects the IAEA to continue to play a role in verifying Iran’s compliance with any deal that is struck. As an independent institution, the IAEA’s role is vital to ensure the international community is confident in any deal and that there is transparency to Iran’s nuclear efforts.

Supporting facts and figures

Canada has consistently opposed Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions, supporting sanctions and diplomatic efforts to curb its nuclear program.
Canada is one of the largest contributors to the IAEA’s verification and monitoring activities in Iran and has contributed $23 million to this effort.

Background

Citing significant non-performance, on August 28, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (E3) initiated the snapback mechanism under UNSCR 2231 (2015), the resolution that endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) addressing proliferation concerns over Iran’s nuclear program. This move will result in the ‘snapback’ of UN sanctions that had been lifted in 2015 with the signing of the JCPOA.

This follows months of unsuccessful efforts to reach a diplomatic outcome on several fronts culminating in a final meeting with Iranian officials in Geneva on August 26, where Tehran offered no substantive concessions that could have delayed the decision. E3 efforts had recently intensified after U.S.-Iran talks proved to be futile despite several optimistic proclamations by President Trump and participation in several rounds of talks including through Omani intermediaries.

On August 28, 2025, Canada posted on social media channels in solidarity with the E3 having initiated JCPOA snapback. Since 2019, following the U.S. unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA under the first Trump administration, Iran’s breaches of the nuclear deal have been well documented, in particular by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was mandated by the JCPOA to monitor and verify Iran's nuclear program to ensure it remains exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Russia is lobbying against snapback but, as the snapback provision is veto-proof, it is expected to be activated once the procedural 30-day period has passed (on September 27). Canada is preparing for this eventuality and intends on having our sanctions framework (to reimpose UN sanctions) ready to support this outcome.

Iran’s human rights violations and related sanctions

Canada is deeply concerned about Iran’s human rights violations and is committed to holding the regime accountable for its abhorrent domestic conduct.
Canada has sanctioned 467 Iranian individuals and entities, including 110 individuals and 17 entities for human rights violations, and barred senior Iranian officials from entering Canada.
Canada is an unwavering advocate for human rights in Iran and has led the UN General Assembly resolution on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran since 2002, most recently adopted in December 2024 with 49 cosponsors.

Supplementary messages

Canada continues to pursue accountability for the downing of Flight PS752, which killed 176 people, including 55 Canadians and 30 permanent residents, prioritizing justice, reparation, and support for the families and loved ones of the victims.

Update

On March 7, 2025, Canada imposed its latest round of sanctions under the Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations targeting three individuals and four entities involved in human rights violations and destabilizing activities in the Middle East.

Supporting facts and figures

Since October 2022, Canada has imposed 19 rounds of sanctions under the Special Economic Measures Act and the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act targeting individuals and entities involved in human rights abuses and threats to international peace, including 239 entities and 101 individuals for violations of international peace and security, and 110 individuals and 17 entities for human rights violations.
On November 14, 2022, tens of thousands of senior Iranian regime members, including many IRGC officials, were designated inadmissible to Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
Canada works with international partners to hold Iran accountable for violations of international law, including through the International Coordination and Response Group (aka “Coordination Group”) for the victims of PS752 (Canada, Sweden, Ukraine, UK), coordinating legal efforts at the International Court of Justice and ICAO to pursue full accountability and reparations.

Background

On August 29, 2025, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reported that Iran executed at least 841 people since January 2025, disregarding repeated international appeals to impose a moratorium on capital punishment. July alone saw 110 executions, underscoring a systematic use of the death penalty to intimidate, disproportionately targeting ethnic minorities and migrants.

Other human rights violations include the use of torture and arbitrary arrest, repression of women’s and girls’ rights, persecution of ethnic and religious minorities, violations against human rights defenders, journalists and their families, transnational repression, and restrictions on the rights to freedom of opinion and expression and peaceful assembly and association, online and offline.

Canada’s approach to Africa

Canada is prioritizing opportunities with African countries and institutions to deepen relationships that advance Canada’s economic and security interests.
Through collaboration with multilateral partners such as the African Union (AU), Canada supports continental peace and security efforts and strengthened intra-African trade.
Trade and development programming aims to generate mutual economic benefits for Canada and Africa alike.

Supplementary messages

Africa’s role on the world stage and geopolitical relevance is growing and its influence in international organizations is expanding. Canada and likeminded countries, adversaries and emerging economies are competing for influence across the continent.
Over the past 5 years, Canada has invested $4.5 billion in bilateral international assistance programming in Africa to build economies, support health and education, and respond to humanitarian needs.

Update

In March 2025, the Government of Canada launched Canada’s Africa Strategy: A Partnership for Shared Prosperity and Security.
In July 2025, Canada’s Secretary of State for International Development, Randeep Sarai, traveled to Ghana, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and South Africa, where he participated in the G20 Development Working Group Ministerial.

Supporting facts and figures

Canada’s diplomatic footprint in Africa includes 26 missions.
Canada has 22 development programs in Africa.
In Canada, almost 1.4 million people are of African origin (2021 census).
Once implemented, the African Continental Free Trade Area will be the world’s largest free trade area and represent a market of 1.3 billion people.
Africa holds 30% of the world's critical mineral reserves.
60% of Africa’s population is under the age of 25, making Africa the youngest continent in the world.
Africa forms the largest voting bloc at the United Nations (54/193).

Background

Developing the Africa Strategy involved consultations with more than 600 African, Canadian and international stakeholders since 2022.

Africa represents about 1% of Canada’s global trade ($15.2 billion), up 29.5% since 2020. Canada’s top trading partners include South Africa, Nigeria, Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania.

Africa was Canada’s largest recipient of international assistance in 2023-2024 ($3.2 billion). Canadian international assistance for Africa has increased by 52% over the past eight years.

Sudan

Canada is providing significant humanitarian, development, and peace operations assistance to Sudan, where the conflict has created the world’s largest humanitarian crisis.
Nearly 15 million people have been displaced, including 11 million internally and nearly 4 million crossing borders as refugees.
As many as 150,000 people have died since the conflict erupted in April 2023, though this number is likely significantly underreported.
Over half the population of 50 million is facing acute hunger and over 600,000 are facing famine conditions.
Recent reports, including from the UN-mandated Fact-Finding Mission on Sudan, indicate grounds to believe that war crimes and crimes against humanity are taking place, with systematic attacks on civilians, hospitals and infrastructure in Sudan.
Over 400 cases of conflict-related sexual violence have been reported (likely a severe undercount), and up to 80% of health facilities are deemed non-functional.

El Fasher

The situation in El Fasher is especially catastrophic, with mass killings, summary executions, and other serious violations of international law, including ethnic cleansing being credibly reported following the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) takeover of the city.
Canada is actively assessing how best we can respond.

Canada’s assistance

Since the onset of the conflict, Canada has provided $84 million in humanitarian assistance, $41.52 million in development funding, and $18.46 million in peace and stabilization operations to support those affected by the crisis in Sudan.
Despite limited resources, Canada’s funding has demonstrated global leadership and commitment to human rights, helping millions of displaced people recover from famine, restore health services, and access conflict-sensitive education, while supporting organizations to reach 2.9 million people with aid in January 2025 and providing 7.5 million with seed distribution to alleviate food insecurity.
At the onset of the conflict, Canada suspended its diplomatic operations in Sudan due to escalating violence and the inability to guarantee the safety of staff.
While Canada currently has no diplomatic presence in Sudan, it maintains active engagement through its Embassy in Ethiopia where our Ambassador also serves as Ambassador-designate for Sudan.
Canada has two dedicated staff members at the embassy in Addis Ababa focused on Sudan and continues to support mediation efforts and civil society engagement from the region.
Canada has imposed three rounds of sanctions on 18 targets (11 individuals and 7 entities) for undermining peace, security, and stability in Sudan, and for committing gross human rights violations, including leaders of the warring parties, for their refusal to negotiate in good faith.
Canada continues to call for a permanent nationwide ceasefire, the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian aid, and a peaceful transition to a civilian-led government in Sudan.
Canada is providing life-saving food, water, sanitation and health services, including support to survivors of sexual violence, and education.
Canada welcomes the “Joint Statement on Restoring Peace and Security in Sudan” by the US-led Quad and hopes its terms will be fulfilled.

Supplementary messages

Beyond being the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, the conflict in Sudan impacts regional and international security, including Canada’s security interests, by fuelling instability in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, the Red Sea and the Middle East.
As outlined in Canada’s Africa Strategy, strengthening Canada’s national security includes enhancing peace and security while promoting local benefits in Africa.
Canada supports peace efforts and humanitarian access through strategic diplomatic engagement.

Background

On April 15, 2023, conflict erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), triggering severe humanitarian crisis and the largest displacement crisis in the world. 64% of the population - 30.4M- people need humanitarian assistance and over half the population face severe food insecurity. UN reports implicate all parties to the conflict in gross violations or abuses of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law, some of which may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity. Both sides have been implicated in aid obstruction. In January 2025, senior U.S. officials alleged that the SAF used chemical weapons against the RSF. This finding was reaffirmed in April 2025, prompting the U.S. to impose sanctions in June 2025 under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act.

The international community has been divided. Canada and likeminded condemn both the SAF and the RSF. Each side reportedly receives backing from various external actors who compete for influence in Sudan. The conflict threatens stability in the strategic Red Sea shipping corridor, and risks Sudan again becoming a terrorist haven, potentially enabling an extremist resurgence of hardline Islamist actors. Vast amounts of gold are being illicitly funneled out of Sudan, reportedly fuelling other ongoing conflicts, including with Russia’s War in Ukraine. Peace processes undertaken to date have not succeeded. Most recently, on September 12, 2025 the US-led Quad (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, US) statement calls for unhindered humanitarian access, a three-month humanitarian truce leading immediately to a permanent ceasefire, and an inclusive and transparent transition process to establish an independent, civilian-led government. A follow-up Quad meeting in Washington is expected within the next few months.

At the onset of the conflict, Canada’s mission operations in Khartoum were temporarily suspended. In September 2024, Canada moved political and development functions to the Embassy of Canada in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Situation in El Fasher

The humanitarian and security situation in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur which stood as the last SAF stronghold in the state, has deteriorated catastrophically following the RSF takeover in late October, 2025, after more than 18 months of siege. Despite the high fluidity of the situation and a communication blackout there are credible reports of widespread atrocities, including mass summary executions, ethnically motivated killings, and sexual violence, as reported by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and UNFPA. While some 35,000 civilians were able to escape to neighboring towns, many attempting to flee are detained, executed, or held for ransom along escape routes. The UN Human Rights Chief, Volker Türk, warned that the risk of large-scale, ethnically motivated violations is mounting by the day, and called for urgent action to protect civilians. The World Food Programme (WFP) and other humanitarian actors have been unable to access the city due to intensified fighting, leaving tens of thousands of civilians, including over 6,200 pregnant women, without medical care, food, or protection.

Canadian funding disbursements to Sudan since conflict

Type of Funding	2023-2024	2024-2025**	Total
Humanitarian*	$28.8 M	$55.2 M	$84 M
Development	$22.7 M	$18.8 M	$41.52 M
Peace and Security	$2.8 M	$15.7 M	$18.46 M
Total	$54.3 M	$89.68 M	$143.98 M

*Humanitarian funding is planned and allocated on a calendar year basis. Variances between fiscal years may not be reflective of year-on-year funding levels.

* * Figures for 2024/25 are preliminary and only include bilateral (earmarked) international assistance from Global Affairs Canada.

Tanzania and the imprisonment of Tundu Lissu

We anticipate that President Samia Suluhu Hassan was re-elected in yesterday’s election, which was marked by the exclusion of opposition parties, internet disruptions, and protests – some violent.
We are aware of and closely following the protests; all Canadian and locally engaged staff are accounted for and safe, and Canadians in Tanzania have been alerted through Registration of Canadians Abroad (ROCA).
Canada’s High Commission in Tanzania is following the imprisonment and trial of opposition leader Tundu Lissu closely, including by attending court hearings in coordination with likeminded missions.
We are concerned by reports of politically motivated arrests, enforced disappearances, and restrictions on civic space. In the spirit of our long and friendly bilateral friendship, our High Commission has engaged Tanzania in frank and constructive dialogue on human rights and democratic governance.

Supporting facts and figures

Note: The Tanzania election commission says it will announce the results within three days of election day. The department will transmit the results to the DLU/RCL as and when they are available for the Ministers’ information.
HOM reports protests targeting CCM (ruling government party) offices with some apparent fatalities in Dar es Salaam and isolated incidents of violence across the country. The road to the airport has been closed by the military. All our staff are accounted for and have been asked to shelter in place (in line with U.S. and UK).
There are also media reports of the local police imposing a curfew for all resident of the city of Dar es Salaam starting at 6 p.m. on October 29, 2025.
Tanzanian authorities have cut internet access. [REDACTED] Tundu Lissu, leader of Tanzania’s main opposition party, CHADEMA, has been detained on treason charges since late April 2025 for allegedly urging citizens to disrupt the October 29 general election.
On October 23, the High Court of Tanzania rejected the prosecution’s key video evidence on technical grounds, effectively undermining the case. Despite this, the trial was adjourned to November 3, well after the October 29 General Election.
CHADEMA was barred from participating in the election after refusing to sign a controversial electoral code of conduct. Other opposition figures were also disqualified, leaving Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan to run unopposed.
In May, the European Parliament adopted a resolution urging Tanzania to release Tundu Lissu, reinstate CHADEMA, and end politically motivated arrests and rights abuses. On October 10, Members of the European Parliament strongly condemned abductions in Tanzania.
UN experts report more than 200 enforced disappearance since 2019.
Canada maintains strong economic ties with Tanzania, including $108.6 million in two-way trade (2024) and $2.85 billion (2023) in Canadian mining assets.

Background

Canada and Tanzania have maintained relations since 1961 rooted in growing economic ties, especially in mining and energy. Canada is represented in Tanzania by its High Commission in Dar es Salaam, headed by High Commissioner Emily Burns. Eric Kendrick, Program Manager for the Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Service, is attending, in coordination with likeminded missions, Tundu Lissu’s court hearings to report on any developments. In 2023–2024, Canada provided $141 million, including $55.2 million in bilateral aid focused on health, education, inclusive growth, and governance. Tanzania is a generally stable country, but political space has narrowed significantly since 2015. Under former President John Magufuli, opposition figures—including Tundu Lissu—were subject to harassment, arrests, and violence. Since taking office in 2021, President Samia has signaled limited reforms, but political freedoms remain tightly restricted, with continued limits on rallies and opposition activity. Tundu Lissu remains a key opposition figure with strong grassroots support. After years in exile, he returned to Tanzania in 2023 to resume political activity. In 2024-2025, prior to his arrest, he was subject to police questioning, threats of arrest, and restrictions on rallies, reflecting broader constraints on opposition activity.

Canada and the Indo-Pacific Strategy

Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy reflects our continuing commitment to engage with the most economically dynamic region in the world.
We are redoubling our effort to accelerating trade diversification with the region and building partnerships that advance Canadian interests across our security, economic and foreign assistance agenda.

Supplementary messages

Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) recognizes that developments in the Indo-Pacific will shape Canada’s prosperity, security, and ability to address global challenges.
We are strengthening partnerships with reliable allies and expanding trade and investment ties, including through new agreements like the Comprehensive Economic Partnership (CEPA) we just signed with Indonesia.
Canada is also deepening defence and security cooperation in the region. Canada deployed three Royal Canadian Navy ships annually under Operation HORIZON and expanded its cyber diplomacy footprint with eight cyber attachés across the region.
We are aligning development assistance to support inclusive growth, climate resilience, and democratic governance in priority countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

Update

Over 2023-2024, Canada concluded negotiations with Indonesia, advanced FTA negotiations with ASEAN, and chaired the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) Commission. Team Canada Trade Missions to Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Republic of Korea facilitated over 1,400 business-to-business meetings, resulting in $8.3 million in new revenue and $23 million in strategic partnerships. New diplomatic and trade offices were opened in Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Canada launched the $360 million Canadian Climate and Nature Fund for the Private Sector in Asia and opened the Indo-Pacific Agriculture and Agri-Food Office in the Philippines.

Supporting facts and figures

The Indo-Pacific region is home to 65% of the world’s population and over one-third of global GDP; projected to exceed 50% by 2040.
Canada’s Shared Ocean Fund ($84.3 million) supports maritime cooperation and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing enforcement.
Dark Vessel Detection (DVD) platform deployed in the Philippines and across Pacific Island countries.
190 scholarships awarded in 2024-2025 under the Canada-ASEAN Scholarships and Educational Exchanges for Development (SEED) Program.

Background

Canada’s IPS, launched in November 2022, is a whole-of-government framework for engagement in the region. It is built around five strategic objectives and involves 24 initiatives across 17 departments and agencies. Canada’s approach aligns with similar strategies from key partners including Australia, Japan, the U.S., India, the EU, and ASEAN. The IPS is designed with a 10-year horizon and includes a built-in review process. Canada’s presence in the region is expanding through diplomatic, trade, development, and defence channels.

[REDACTED]

Bangladesh

Democratic transition

Canada supports the desire of the people of Bangladesh to build a peaceful, democratic future with respect for human rights, gender equality, and social inclusion.
We welcome the commitment of the Bangladesh Interim Government to hold free, fair, and inclusive elections.
Canada's engagement in Bangladesh promotes the principles of democracy and good governance, respect for human rights, and the rule of law, which are critical for our shared prosperity.

Supplementary messages

Canada is committed to supporting the Interim Government in its pursuit of institutional reforms setting the foundation for free and fair elections and inclusive economic growth, which benefits both our countries.
Canada’s international assistance helps Bangladesh improve governance by strengthening public systems, including health and education, building civil society capacity, protecting labour rights, and improving the security sector.
Canada is committed to a free, open, inclusive, and democratic Indo-Pacific.

Update

The Bangladesh Interim Government has committed to hold elections in February 2026 after undertaking consensus-based reforms involving key stakeholders such as political parties, student activists, and army leadership. Canada welcomes Bangladesh’s commitment to pursue accountability, including in cooperation with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

Supporting facts and figures

Then-Minister of International Development Hussen visited Bangladesh in February 2025 to highlight Canada’s international assistance ties and support a broad base for engagement between the two countries.
Bangladesh is one of Canada’s largest aid recipients, with over $6.2 billion from all channels since 1972.
In fiscal year 2023-2024, Global Affairs Canada provided $119 million in international assistance to Bangladesh.
In 2024, bilateral trade reached $3.3 billion, consisting of $1.1 billion of Canadian exports to Bangladesh and $2.2 billion in imports.
In an August 2024 Ministerial statement, Canada welcomed the appointment of the Bangladesh Interim Government as a notable step towards peace and democratic governance.

Background

In summer 2024, Bangladesh security forces violently suppressed student-led protests, leading to the government's fall. The Interim Government has committed to reforms to address corruption, security and judiciary sectors, education, finance, health, media, workers' rights and women’s affairs, with aims to hold democratic elections in 2026. This transition falls at a critical time. Bangladesh will graduate from UN Least Developed Country status in 2026, which will affect preferential market access for their priority Ready-Made Garments, and key supplier for Canada’s textile market.

Rohingya crisis

We are deeply concerned by Myanmar’s worsening conflict, with attacks against civilians including Rohingya, which undermines prospect for refugee returns.
We are committed to ensuring human rights, justice and supporting needs of Rohingya refugees.
Canada has levelled 10 rounds of sanctions against the Myanmar military regime since the 2021 coup to respond to its continued intransigence, most recently on March 7.

Supplementary messages

Critical that international community, including ASEAN, advance durable inclusive peace in Myanmar and a long-term solution for stateless Rohingya people.
Canada continues to respond to the protracted refugee crisis in Bangladesh, while supporting the people of Myanmar’s efforts toward justice, human rights, peace and democracy.
Although Canada’s Strategy to respond to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises sunsetted in March 2024, diplomatic engagement and international assistance continue, including new health and skills initiatives for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh.

Update

Ambassador Bob Rae represented Canada at the UN-hosted High-level Conference on the Situation of Rohingya Muslims and Other Minorities in Myanmar on September 30. New arrivals to Bangladesh’s crowded and international assistance-dependent refugee camps continue. Recent cuts by several top humanitarian donors are reducing essential services—health, food, nutrition, protection, education and shelter. UNHCR indicates the plight of Rohingya, and lack of long-term solutions is increasing the number of dangerous sea journeys across the region.

Supporting facts and figures

Canada has provided over $600 million to respond to the Rohingya crisis, which began in 2017, and later to the Myanmar political crisis.
In 2025, GAC has allocated over $15 million in lifesaving humanitarian assistance for refugees and host communities in Bangladesh, and over $25 million for crisis-affected people in Myanmar, including Rohingya.
Canada pursuing accountability for perpetrators of human rights abuses in Myanmar, including through joint intervention in International Court of Justice case alleging Myanmar’s genocide and support to the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM).
Myanmar sanctions: Canada has listed 149 individuals and 92 entities, including key military officials, their associates, and family members, and has imposed broad economic measures including an arms ban and prohibition on aviation fuel.

Background

The Rohingya crisis is escalating, with destabilizing impacts across the Indo-Pacific region. Rohingya in Myanmar face systematic discrimination and targeted violence. Bangladesh hosts nearly 1.2 million refugees who fled violence, making it home to the largest refugee camp in the world. Bangladesh maintains a closed-border policy to new asylum seekers, prioritizing repatriation and to a lesser extent resettlement. Canada, with likeminded donors and humanitarian partners, assesses that conditions in Myanmar do not yet permit repatriation.

Canada’s engagement In Afghanistan

We are deeply concerned by the ongoing humanitarian crisis and the Taliban’s deplorable violations of Afghan women and girls’ rights.
Canada remains committed to supporting the Afghan people, especially Afghan women and girls.
On 5 September 2025, Canada announced $3 million in support to respond to the humanitarian needs caused by the Afghanistan earthquakes.

Supplementary messages

Canada remains steadfast in its rejection of the Taliban, which is not the legitimate government of Afghanistan.
Canada is actively engaged on Afghanistan, including through delivery of international assistance and participation in various diplomatic channels, such as the UN-led political roadmap process (“Doha Process”).
In September 2024, Canada together with Germany, Australia and the Netherlands, formally took steps to hold Afghanistan accountable for its violations of women’s and girls’ rights under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), to which Afghanistan is a state party.
In addition to the newly announced $3 million, in 2025 Canada has provided over $36 million in humanitarian assistance to support the delivery of food and nutrition assistance, emergency health services, shelter, and other life-saving assistance. This funding is delivered through experienced UN, Red Cross, and NGO partners.

Supporting facts and figures

Since 2021, Canada's development assistance has supported joint efforts to procure medical supplies, including vaccines for 1.7 million children and 6.1 million women; provide health services to over 14 million people, which includes approximately 13 million women and children. In 2024, Canada’s support contributed to over 67 million doses of the polio vaccine were administered to children under five.
Following the Taliban takeover, Canada was still able to reach 29,303 students (26,169 girls) through the operation of 1,000 community-based education classes.
As of December 2024, more than 59,000 Afghan refugees have been resettled in Canada as part of the second-largest Afghan resettlement commitment globally.

Background

Canada’s engagement since 2021: Canada’s embassy in Afghanistan has been closed since the fall of Kabul in August 2021. Canada is actively engaged in international diplomatic efforts on Afghanistan, including through the Doha Process, as chair of the New York-based UN Group of Friends of Afghanistan, and as a member of the officials’-level international donors’ Afghanistan Coordination Group.

International assistance: Canada has been a leading donor to Afghanistan, providing $4 billion in combined humanitarian, development, peace and security assistance since 2001. Since the fall of Kabul in August 2021, Canada has provided international assistance to the people of Afghanistan through trusted multilateral organizations as well as Canadian and international non-governmental organizations. This funding is completely off-budget (out of the control of the Taliban). In 2023, Canada amended the Criminal Code to facilitate the provision of international assistance in Afghanistan.

Humanitarian and basic needs situation: Nearly 23 million Afghans need critical humanitarian assistance in 2025, with the termination of USAID programs in Afghanistan (U.S. $560 million) having severely disrupted life-saving assistance. With a significant reduction of food insecurity and malnutrition programs, 25% of the population is projected to face crisis levels of food insecurity in the coming months. Since January 2025, more than 2.1 million Afghans have returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran, with humanitarian partners and local infrastructure ill-equipped to receive them.

China - Uyghurs

Canada is gravely concerned at systematic violations of human rights in China against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims as supported by credible reports from UN bodies, UN experts and international human rights organizations.
On December 10, 2024 Canada imposed sanctions on eight former or current PRC officials involved in gross and systematic human rights violations in the PRC - Canada strongly condemns those grave violations of human rights.
Canada continues to take action in support of the Uyghur people in China through diplomacy, our efforts in the UN, including via the Human Rights Council.

Supplementary messages

Mosques across China have faced destruction under a program of Sinicization, that aims to restrict religious freedom and make worship compliant with Chinese Communist Party objectives.
State run forced labour programs continue to target ethnic Uyghurs, relocating them to factories across China, breaking up families and destroying communities.
Uyghur children in Xinjiang continue to be forcibly placed in residential schools, where the curriculum prioritizes the Mandarin language and fails to encourage Uyghur language, culture and religion.
Canada is still dealing with the intergenerational harm caused by past policies that separated indigenous children from their parents and placed them in residential schools.
Canada continues to urge China not to repeat Canada’s past mistakes, and to recognize the harm that its current policies are inflicting on ethnic and religious minorities in China.

Supporting facts and figures

In March 2021, one PRC entity and four Chinese officials were sanctioned under SEMA for their roles in gross and systematic human rights violations against the Uyghur people in China’s Xinjiang region.
Canada’s December 10, 2024 imposition of sanctions on eight current and former PRC officials was, inter alia, due to their roles in designing and implementing China’s system of state-imposed forced labour.
In 2022, Minister Joly issued a statement of support for the UN Assessment of the Situation of Human Rights in Xinjiang. Global Affairs Canada issued a subsequent statement in 2024 calling for action on the report’s recommendations.
In 2024, Canada supported a joint statement at the UN Third Committee expressing concern over human rights violations against Uyghurs in China. Canada previously supported such statements in 2023, 2022 and 2021.
In 2023, Parliament unanimously adopted private members’ motion M-62, which called for the resettlement of 10,000 vulnerable Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims to Canada. In 2024, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada created a dedicated stream for Uyghurs in third countries at risk of refoulement. That program is currently in operation, but details cannot be shared for the safety and security of those involved.

Background

Mosques across China have faced destruction under a program of Sinicization, that aims to restrict religious freedom and make worship compliant with Chinese Communist Party objectives. State run forced labour programs continue to target ethnic Uyghurs, relocating them to factories across China, breaking up families and destroying communities. Uyghur children in Xinjiang continue to be forcibly placed in residential schools, where the curriculum prioritizes the Mandarin language and fails to encourage Uyghur language, culture and religion.

On December 22, 2024, the Government of the People’s Republic of China arbitrarily targeted two Canadian civil society organizations and twenty human rights campaigners with sanctions. China’s decision was in response to Canada’s sanctions against the eight PRC officials over human rights violations.

Several independent United Nations experts and other established multilateral mechanisms have called on China to respond meaningfully to credible allegations of human rights violations. The Government of Canada has insisted that China must respect its obligations under international law. Canada has publicly declared that it views scrutiny of its own human rights record as an opportunity to improve its performance, and continues to call on China to do so, as well.

During the review of China as part of the UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in 2024, Canada urged the Chinese government to end all coercive measures against Uyghurs, Tibetans, and other ethnic minorities, specifically citing forced labor, coercive labor transfers, forced sterilizations, and mandatory residential schools.

China - High profile consular cases

We continue to work with China on consular issues, which includes advocating for the wellbeing, equitable treatment, and safety of Canadians who live or travel to China. We put a high priority on being able to provide consular services to Canadians, while recognizing national jurisdiction.
We continue to have cases of Canadians that we engage directly with China on, and we welcome engaging in bilateral consular dialogues.
Given privacy considerations, there are limitations to the details that can be shared on specific cases.

Supplementary messages

Robert Schellenberg

Continue to advocate for clemency for Robert Schellenberg, as we do for all Canadians facing the death penalty.
Continue to raise our concerns on this case, and our firm opposition to the death penalty, with China at every opportunity.

Li Yonghui (‘‘lee YOUNG-way’’)

Aware of procedural delays regarding the start of Li Yonghui’s trial.
Providing consular support to him and his family in Canada.
Continue to advocate for procedural transparency and a clear trial timeline, while supporting his bail application.

Huseyincan Celil (‘‘hoo-SAY-in-jahn jeh-LEEL’’)

Remain deeply concerned by the detention of Huseyincan Celil.
Repeatedly raised with China at the highest levels.
Continue to assert his Canadian citizenship and continue to urge China to grant consular access and provide information on his well-being.

Denise Ho

Following legal case closely; verdict is still pending. Continue to provide consular support while Ms. Ho is out on bail.
Continue to call on China to repeal National Security Law. Law violates Hong Kong’s international human rights obligations.
Also call for withdrawal of all related arrest warrants and bounties.

Background

In 2024-25, approximately 250 new consular cases were opened in China. Cases of arrest and detention of Canadian nationals are the most complex. At any given time, approximately 100 Canadians are in Chinese custody for various allegations and crimes, the majority of which relate to narcotics, corruption, and economic crimes. China has very strict penalties, including the death penalty, for both violent and non-violent offences, such as serious drug crimes. Canada advocates for clemency in all death penalty cases. Despite enhanced advocacy efforts, four Canadians were executed by China in early 2025. Robert Schellenberg remains on death row. Canada has deemed his case to be arbitrary sentencing and continues to advocate for clemency.

Canada and China have held biannual consular dialogues in the past (the last one held in May 2024). GAC is currently exploring with Chinese counterparts to re-commence these bilateral consular dialogues, ideally in early 2026.

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Consular - Jacob Le

Parental child abductions are a profoundly difficult and damaging experience for both the children and their families, as well as some of the most difficult consular situations to which the Government of Canada responds.
When a parent abducts a child to another country, they are subject to the laws and procedures of the country they are in, which may be very different from those of Canada.
Vietnam is not a signatory to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, nor is parental abduction a crime in the country.

Supplementary messages

We cannot comment on this case for privacy reasons. However, in cases of this nature, officials provide support to help Canadians navigate the local legal system.
In countries where the Hague Convention does not apply, a parent’s path to securing custody, access, or the return of their child is either through mediation with the other parent or through the courts in the country where the child is located.
The Government of Canada cannot enforce a Canadian court order in foreign jurisdictions. The left-behind parent must work with a local lawyer to navigate the court system in the other jurisdiction. These processes can be complex and difficult for families.
In all cases of international parental abduction, Canada works with partners in Canada and other countries to open channels of communication between parents, obtain information on local legal processes and, where possible, identify resources or organizations that may assist families in navigating these processes and in addressing concerns related to the well-being of abducted children.

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Recent events in Nepal

Canada is concerned by the recent unrest in Nepal and continues to monitor the evolving situation closely.
We welcome the appointment of Nepal’s first female Prime Minister and support the Interim Government’s efforts to restore democratic stability.
Canada encourages peaceful dialogue among all stakeholders and emphasizes the importance of protecting human rights as Nepal prepares for elections.

Supplementary messages

As Nepal marks the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations with Canada on January 18, 2025, Canada reaffirms its longstanding commitment to supporting democratic governance, human rights, and inclusive dialogue through sustained diplomatic engagement and development cooperation.

Update

Nepal experienced significant political unrest beginning on September 8, 2025, when youth-led demonstrations escalated into violent clashes with security forces, resulting in 75 deaths and hundreds of injuries. The protests, initially sparked by a ban on social media platforms, led to the resignation of Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and the dissolution of Parliament. On September 12, former Chief Justice Sushila Karki was appointed interim Prime Minister, becoming Nepal’s first female head of government. Her administration is focused on stabilizing the country and preparing for general elections in March 2026. Curfews in the Kathmandu Valley have been lifted, and the situation is showing signs of stabilization since the events of early September.

Supporting facts and figures

The Gen Z protests in Nepal lasted five days, from September 8 to 13, 2025, and resulted in 75 deaths, mostly students under 30, and over 2,100 injuries.
26 social media platforms were banned by the Nepalese government prior to the protests.
Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli resigned, and Parliament was dissolved following the unrest.
Sushila Karki was appointed interim Prime Minister on September 12, 2025.
General elections are scheduled for March 5, 2026.
PM Karki met with foreign diplomats on October 17, 2025, to discuss Nepal’s return to normalcy.
The third round of bilateral consultations between Canada and Nepal, planned for late 2025, will likely be postponed to 2026.
Canada advises against non-essential travel to Nepal due to ongoing instability.

Background

Canada and Nepal established diplomatic relations in 1965, marking 60 years of bilateral ties in 2025. Canada’s representation to Nepal is based out of the High Commission of Canada in New Delhi and is supported by an honorary consul in Kathmandu. Nepal maintains an embassy in Ottawa and honorary consuls in Calgary, Victoria, and Toronto. The commercial relationship remains modest but growing, with Canadian exports to Nepal reaching $62.5 million in 2024 and imports totalling $16.3 million. Canada began bilateral development assistance in 1970, and while its formal development office closed in 2013, support continues through multilateral climate financing, global health initiatives, and local development projects. Canada also contributes to humanitarian responses, including recent earthquake relief and past support following the 2015 earthquake. India, Nepal’s closest neighbour, views stability in Nepal as vital to regional peace and security, particularly given their open border and deep cultural ties.

Critical minerals

Canada’s critical minerals endowments and sectoral expertise represent an extraordinary opportunity to promote security of supply for Canada and its key partners and allies, while supporting Canada’s economic prosperity.
Canada is working with partners around the world to strengthen critical mineral security and the resilience of global supply chains, including through its G7 presidency and its Critical Minerals Action Plan.
Canada has also been bolstering its economic security toolkit to ensure it has the means to protect its mining industry and resources.

Supporting facts and figures

As of September 2025, $792M from $3.8 billion has been announced for 127 projects under the Critical Minerals Strategy to develop critical mineral value chain.
G7 funding allocated $80.3 million in total for critical mineral supply chains; $50.3 million for innovation to secure global critical minerals supply chains, $20 million for Resilient and Inclusive Supply-Chain Enhancement partnership (RISE) and $10 million for emerging markets capacity building.
In 2022 and 2024, Canada issued Investment Canada Act (ICA) policy statements to strengthen national security oversight concerning foreign investments in Canada’s critical minerals sector and modernized the ICA in 2024.
In August, Prime Minister Carney travelled to Germany where agreements between several Canadian and German companies on co-operation to secure critical mineral supply chains from Canada.
Canada is attracting foreign direct investment in the critical minerals sector, aligning with its national interests.

Background

The growing concentration of critical mineral supply chains under Chinese control leaves Canada and its allies increasingly vulnerable to supply chain disruptions. Most recently, on October 9, China announced one of its most far-reaching sets of export controls targeting rare earth elements (REEs) and related products. Another concern is that China uses mining acquisitions to secure access over key infrastructure, such as ports, airstrips, and radar stations.

The G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan has a goal of building a standards-based market to reflect the cost of responsible mining, mobilizing capital and investing in partnerships and promoting innovation.

The US is pursuing an aggressive America First critical minerals strategy to secure supply chains and go after the resources it needs globally to reduce dependencies on China. While they are working within the G7 process, the US is still threatening to place national security 232 tariffs on critical minerals (including potash and uranium).

Export control – Military goods

Canada has one of the strongest export controls systems in the world, and respect for human rights is enshrined in our export controls legislation.
All applications for controlled items are individually reviewed.
If there is substantial risk that the export would result in a serious violation of human rights, the permit will be denied.
Exporting controlled goods or technology without a valid permit is a violation of Canadian law and may result in enforcement actions, including fines, seizure of goods, and potential criminal prosecution.

Supplementary messages

Responsive: Russia - Alleged diversion of Canadian tech from Hong Kong

On July 7, 2020, Global Affairs Canada issued a Notice to Exporters which indicated Canada will not permit the export of sensitive military items to Hong Kong.

Responsive: Sudan - Alleged diversion of Canadian technology from UAE

As the public annual reports to Parliament indicate, no permits for military goods and technology to Sudan have been issued since 2019.

Responsive: Diversion of Canadian controlled goods or technology

Exporting controlled goods or technology without a valid permit is a violation of Canadian law and Canada will take appropriate action regarding the misuse of any controlled Canadian good or technology.

Background

Alleged diversion of Canadian technology to Russia

Canadian media and non-government groups have recently reported on allegations of diversion of Canadian-made Cadex rifles to Russia and used on the battlefield against Ukraine. No export or brokering permit has been issued for Russia-destined items, with the exception of one permit issued for the Russian Federation in 2013, for a single Remington 700 compatible rifle stock (i.e. no actual guns). Cadex rifles in Russian hands were possibly acquired either via battlefield loss from Ukrainian forces who are being supplied with some Cadex rifles, or via illicit acquisition through third countries. Separately, human rights groups have alleged that Hong Kong shell companies have acted as intermediaries for the diversion of dual-use items to Russia.

Alleged diversion of Canadian technology from UAE to Sudan

Canadian media have previously reported on allegations of diversion of military vehicles by Streit Group from the UAE to Sudan for deployment in Darfur. Streit Group, a Canadian-founded armoured vehicle manufacturer, now headquartered in the UAE (since 2007), has been subject of allegations of misuse and breaching arms embargoes. The U.S. Department of Commerce fined Streit USA, Streit Group (UAE), and executives U.S. $3.5 million for unlicensed exports/re‑exports of armored vehicles to multiple countries in 2008-2009.

In Canada, it has limited operations in Midland, Ontario and operates a subsidiary called Streit Manufacturing Inc. which focuses on the Americas. Beyond Canada and the UAE, Streit maintains or has maintained production or assembly facilities in the U.S., Jordan, Iraq, India, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, and Uganda. Streit Group has denied responsibility for how its vehicles are modified or used after sale, stating that it complies with UAE export laws.

Foreign interference

Foreign interference continues to pose a significant threat to Canada’s social cohesion, values, sovereignty and national security. Transnational repression is one of the most aggressive forms of foreign interference.
The Government of Canada has put strong measures in place to reinforce our capacity to detect, deter, and respond to foreign interference. We are actively working to make Canadians aware of the threat and ensure they have the information they need to build resilience.
Transparency is an important component of the Government’s approach to foreign interference. Canada took a forward-leaning communications approach on various incidents of foreign interference during the election, while maintaining trust in the integrity of the election process.

Supplementary messages

GAC works closely with the department of Public Safety, who leads the Government efforts to counter foreign interference.
An important aspect of our work as foreign ministry is to support our security agencies in differentiating legitimate diplomatic activities from foreign interference and ensuring complementary response.
GAC is the permanent Chair of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), which strengthens G7 coordination to identify and respond specifically to foreign information manipulation and interference threats in the digital info environment.
The June 2025 G7 leaders' statement on transnational repression, as well as the G7 RRM statements issued this year condemning foreign interference (e.g. on Russia, Hong Kong and Iran) has shown Canada’s leadership to address this threat, keep our communities safe, to defend human rights, and to safeguard our sovereignty.

Update

As part of Canada’s G7 Presidency, a joint leaders’ statement on Transnational Repression (TNR) was successfully issued in June 2025, with the objective of fostering a common understanding of this form of foreign interference, raising awareness, and promoting accountability to increase costs for those who engage in the acts of TNR. GAC – via its RRM Canada - is launching a Digital TNR Detection Academy through the G7 RRM to strengthen collective capacity to detect online threats. The inaugural Academy is taking place in Toronto on October 27 to 31, 2025. Another G7 initiatives is the Canada-UK Common Good Cyber Fund which is designed to support those who may be targets of TNR as well as members of civil society who are actively working to counter the threat. With a view to supporting implementation of these engagements by the G7, Canada, through Public Safety, is developing a TNR Resilience and Response Framework to enhance cooperation, share best practices, and monitor trends.

Background

Foreign interference (FI) includes activities undertaken by state or non-state actors that are harmful to Canada's interests and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person. Transnational Repression (TNR) and Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) are among the most harmful manifestations of FI. These activities can be directed at Canadians, or residents of Canada, or against Canadian institutions to advance their strategic interests at the expense of our national interests and values. The PRC is the most active perpetrator in Canada, followed by India, Russia, Pakistan (on opportunistic issues) and Iran.

Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference: On September 7, 2023, the Government of Canada established the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions. The inquiry concluded in January 2025, noting that the PRC is the most active perpetrator in Canada, followed by India, Russia, Pakistan and Iran. Specifically, the Commission found that while there were some concerning incidents in the 2019 and 2021 general elections, there were no acts of FI which undermined the outcomes in any ridings. It also noted that foreign interference is not limited to federal elections, but a pervasive threat to all levels of government. A key takeaway from the Commission was that while foreign states targeting parliamentarians has garnered much attention, the greater threat to Canadian democracy is the spread of misinformation and disinformation in the media and on social networks.

The Commission identified challenges with:

The flow of intelligence to senior consumers, including to the Prime Minister;
Tracking the flow of intelligence;
Governance; and,
Competing definitions of what constitutes foreign interference.

International efforts: Canada is the permanent Chair of the G7 RRM via GAC’s RRM Canada. The G7 RRM was created in 2018 to strengthen coordination among G7 countries and other allies to counter foreign state-sponsored information threats. RRM Canada is spearheading international efforts in the G7 RRM. Leveraging a robust and multilingual analytics and data science capacity across over 25 social media platforms, RRM Canada monitors, detects, and responds to FIMI threats in the digital information environment related to Canada’s foreign policy and national security priorities. RRM Cananda is GAC’s representative on SITE. Since 2019, RRM Canada monitors the information environment for FIMI as part of SITE during Canadian general elections and by-elections, as well as leadership race of recognized political parties.

Canada’s sanctions regimes

Canada remains committed to playing a leadership role in the preservation and strengthening of an international rules-based order. Sanctions are a key component of this approach.
Canada is judicious when it chooses to deploy sanctions and is committed to their effective and coordinated use.
Canada has established a rigorous due diligence process to consider and evaluate possible cases of human rights violations, corruption or other circumstances that may warrant the use of sanctions.

Supplementary messages

Canada considers its use of autonomous sanctions to be consistent with international law and uses humanitarian exemptions, when appropriate, to mitigate the unintended consequences of sanctions.
Canada considers the broader political and international contexts when deciding whether sanctions or any other tools in Canada’s foreign policy toolbox may be an appropriate response.

Update

Canada reimposed UN sanctions against Iran over nuclear proliferation activities and lowered the price cap for Russian oil as part of its actions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Sanctions continue to be a key tool considered in response to other crises (e.g. Haiti, extremist settler violence, Hamas terrorist attacks).

Supporting facts and figures

Since 2022, global use of sanctions has increased significantly. Canada has sanctioned nearly 2,300 individuals and over 1,000 entities or vessels since 2022.
In total, nearly 4,900 individuals and entities have been designated by Canada across its autonomous sanctions regimes.

Background

Canada has two laws authorizing the imposition of autonomous sanctions and one law authorizing the implementation of mandatory UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions.

Firstly, the Special Economic Measures Act allows the government to impose sanctions in relation to a foreign state, as well as individuals and entities related to that foreign state. Sanctions can be imposed in response to: (1) a grave breach of international peace and security that has or is likely to result in a serious international crisis; (2) an international organization or association of states which Canada belongs to calls on members to take economic measures against a foreign state; (3) gross and systematic human rights violations; and (4) acts of significant corruption.

Second, the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act allows the government to sanction foreign nationals who are responsible for, or complicit in, specific cases of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights or acts of significant corruption committed in foreign states, independent of state-related sanctions.

Finally, the UNSC may legally require member states to introduce the measures into domestic law, which is implemented in Canada through the United Nations Act.

Sanctions are implemented as regulations through the Governor-in-Council regulatory process. Measures vary by regulation and can include dealings bans, trade prohibitions, or financial restrictions. Sanctions restrict activities between Canadians or persons in Canada and sanctioned states, individuals or entities. Individuals subject to sanctions under all 3 laws are inadmissible to Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Status of seizure/forfeiture proceedings for assets of sanctioned persons (Russia)

Canada introduced a sanctions-based private asset seizure and forfeiture regime in 2022, signalling that impunity is not tolerated for those who have profited from Russia’s war in Ukraine.
These authorities have been used: in December 2022, to restrain U.S. $26 million believed to be owned or controlled by Roman Abramovich; and in June 2023, to seize an Antonov aircraft grounded at Pearson airport believed to be owned or controlled by Volga-Dnepr Airlines and related entities.
Canada is moving forward with the forfeiture of these assets; in March 2025, forfeiture proceedings for the aircraft were initiated.

Supplementary messages

Canada’s sanctions-based asset seizure and forfeiture regime involves several steps in a legal process, respecting the principle of judicial fairness.
Forfeiture is not a means to provide immediate financial support, but rather to hold Russia to account and support longer-term reconstruction and compensation.

Update

In accordance with the legislation, work is underway to address relevant applications and claims, and to consider the next steps regarding the potential forfeiture of both assets.

Supporting facts and figures

On February 14, 2025, Canada updated the June 8, 2023, seizure order for the Antonov aircraft to include additional persons believed to have ownership interests in the aircraft.
On March 18, 2025, the Attorney General of Canada sought the issuance of a Notice of Application for forfeiture of the aircraft from the Superior Court of Ontario.

Background

In June 2022, Canada amended the Special Economic Measures Act and the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act, to allow the Government to seize, forfeit, dispose and redistribute property in Canada belonging to sanctioned persons listed under any of Canada’s autonomous sanctions’ regulations. In doing so, Canada became the first G7 member to implement a G7 commitment to find, restrain, freeze, and, where appropriate, seize, confiscate or forfeit the assets of individuals and entities that have been sanctioned in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The regime sets out a multi-stage process including: (1) a government order to seize/restrain an asset; and (2) a subsequent application by the Attorney General of Canada to the relevant provincial Superior Court to seek forfeiture of the asset.

Canada’s legislation specifies that funds resulting from asset forfeiture may be used for: the reconstruction of a foreign state adversely affected by a grave breach of international peace and security; the restoration of international peace and security; and the compensation of victims of a grave breach of international peace and security, gross and systematic human rights violations or acts of significant corruption.

Canada’s fulfillment of NATO commitments

Canada remains fully committed to NATO and transatlantic security, this includes our leadership role of the Multinational Brigade in Latvia.
Canada is committed to meeting 3.5% of GDP on defence spending, and 1.5% of GDP on defence related investments by 2035.
Outside of Europe, we are securing NATO’s northern and western flanks by investing in the Arctic, continental defence and increasing our military presence in the Indo-Pacific.

Supplementary messages

Canada is an active NATO Ally, contributing substantially to the Alliance’s core tasks and missions.
Canada has participated in virtually every NATO operation and mission, and we will continue to do our part.
Canada stands in solidarity with its Allies affected by Russian incursions.

Background

At the NATO Summit in The Hague, PM Carney committed Canada to the 5% target, calling for action over words in high-impact areas like critical minerals. In doing so, he made the most direct assertion to date of Canada’s intent to focus defence investments on securing Canada and the Arctic amidst a changed threat environment that has removed Canada’s geostrategic advantage. Highlighting Canada’s unique geographic, demographic, and strategic challenges, Canadian defence spending would simultaneously:

meet Canada’s Article 3 commitments (i.e. to maintain and develop Canada’s individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack);
complement U.S. security efforts in support of North American continental defence; and
strengthen NATO’s North-Western Flank. He stressed that this reality must be better accounted for in NATO plans and processes.

Persistent deployment to Latvia: Since 2017, Canada has served as Framework Nation for NATO’s Multinational Brigade (MNB) Latvia. MNB Latvia includes troops from thirteen other Allies. As Framework Nation, Canada is responsible for coordinating with Latvia and the contributing nations to help set the tone, pace, and vision for the Brigade.

The CAF footprint in Europe: National Defence has approximately 3,300 CAF members deployed (approximately 2,575) or assigned (approximately 725) in Europe. The majority of CAF members are deployed as part of Operations REASSURANCE and UNIFIER in Latvia (approximately 1,920), the U.K. (approximately 220), and Poland (approximately 130).

Leading ally in NSATU: Canada is the third-largest troop contributor to NATO’s mission providing Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU). Canada commands the training coordination cell and is also the leading contributor to the NSATU Trust Fund, which provides some of the most urgent military equipment needs to Ukraine, in support of NSATU’s objectives.

Maritime operations: Since 2014, the CAF have normally deployed a frigate (for six months of the year) and two Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (for four months per year) to be employed for exercises and operational tasks in the NATO Maritime Command’s areas of responsibility.

NATO missions and operations: Canada currently makes modest contributions to NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) and NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR), after having previously played larger roles in these missions. Since March 2022, Canada has provided three CC-130J Hercules aircraft and a team of 60 support personnel which allows the CAF to support various NATO operations across the world, in particular NSATU.

NATO and the U.S.

NATO remains the core guarantor of transatlantic security and collective defence.
The U.S. is vital to NATO and NATO is vital to the U.S., particularly in the face of growing cooperation between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea.
Need to project unity and strength; we continue to work with the U.S. to secure NATO’s Eastern, Western and Northern approaches.

Supplementary messages

Russia is the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security, now and future.
Canada is also a Pacific nation and sees China as a significant threat.
President Trump reiterated that the U.S. would come to the defence of Allies affected by Russia’s incursions.

Background

Since President Donald Trump resumed office on January 20, 2025, his interactions with European leaders have been marked by a blend of direct diplomacy, recalibration, and occasional tension, particularly concerning the ongoing war in Ukraine. In particular, the Trump administration sees European partners as failing Allies that under-invested in their own security and defence, while taking actions against core “western” values like free speech, freedom of religion, democracy and others. The U.S. State Department has called for “civilizational allies” in Europe and for European partners to align more closely with the Trump administration values, positions and actions. However, at The Hague Summit, Trump expressed his continued commitment to NATO, which would enjoy the deterrence of the U.S. military for years to come.

Burden shifting: The U.S. is using the term “burden shifting” to describe the transfer of financial and military responsibility for European security to European Allies so that it can shift its resources towards China and the Indo-Pacific. In response, European countries are calling for a responsible pull-back of U.S. presence on the continent and the maintenance of the American nuclear umbrella. Canada is an active NATO Ally, contributing substantially to the Alliance’s core tasks and missions. As Europe seeks to build its capabilities and defence, there is renewed interest in cooperation with Canada in the EU, reflecting shared values and strong like-mindedness.

NATO is a cornerstone of Canada’s defence: As Alliance decisions are made by consensus, NATO membership gives Canada a voice and a veto on issues related to Trans-Atlantic security. The Alliance also provides Canada a key venue to engage, influence, strengthen its relationships and build inter-operability with its closest Allies. U.S. engagement in NATO is vital to ensure that NATO remains at the heart of trans-Atlantic defence and security cooperation while also ensuring that it remains postured to meet today’s and tomorrow’s security challenges and threats.

European perspective: The new U.S. Administration’s stated focus to shift away from European security toward China and demands of Allies for higher defence spending (5% of GDP) has prompted substantial changes in defence spending policy. The EU has increasing ambitions as a geopolitical actor and aims to strengthen defence and security partnerships with NATO and regional partners while also developing tailored bilateral partnerships with countries such as Canada and the U.K. As a result of national economic and industrial interests, and the growing uncertainty around U.S. policy, some EU member states are advocating for the bloc to prioritize European-made defence equipment and technologies, aiming to limit third-party involvement and strengthen the bloc's strategic autonomy, although there seems to be some willingness to create opportunities with the UK and Canada. Norway regularly gets privileged conditions as member of European Economic Area.

Canada-EU security and defence partnership

Canada has been, and will continue to be, a reliable and trusted partner for the EU and its Member States.
Canada is pleased to have signed a Security and Defence Partnership (SDP) with the EU.
Canada strongly supports deepening cooperation with our European Allies on defence procurement and defence industrial production, including through participating in the EU’s Readiness 2030 plan.

Supplementary messages

Bringing Canada closer to Europe is a top priority for the Canadian
Canada welcomes the efforts Member States are making toward European and transatlantic security and recognizes the EU efforts to work in collaboration with NATO, and in respect of its mandate.
Canadian industry has much to offer in terms of high-end capabilities that can be of interest to Member States, including through SAFE-funded projects.

Background

Readiness 2030: Proposed by the European Commission on March 18, the plan aims to mobilize up to EUR 800 billion in defence investments of EUMS through two key mechanisms:

the activation of the National Escape Clause to allow Member States to run greater budget deficit, freeing up to EUR 650 billion of fiscal space in their national budgets, and
the EUR 150 billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) lending programme for joint procurement projects.

Security and Defence Partnership (SDP): The Canada-EU SDP was signed during the Canada-EU Summit on 23 June 2025 and is one of the most ambitious to date of the EU’s SDPs with partners. Canada’s main interest is to use the SDP to widen defence procurement opportunities in Europe. It is a non-binding political declaration aiming to deepen cooperation and streamline security and defense-related activities under one framework while opening the door to new areas of cooperation

SAFE negotiations: Further to the SDP, Canada and the EU committed to negotiate a SAFE-specific treaty. Canada has a negotiation mandate while the EU is finalizing their domestic processes to launch negotiations. A SAFE Agreement would address joint defence procurement rules only and has no bearing on the domestic procurement regulations of individual countries. It will nonetheless provide an important signal to the EU that Canada values this defence and economic partnership and demonstrate to the defence industry that Canada is prioritizing the creation of new export markets.

Defence cooperation: Canada was one of the first countries to establish a dialogue on security and defence with the EU and one of the first non-EU countries to deploy personnel into the EU’s civilian and military Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions when they were first launched in 2003. To date, we have participated in 13 EU missions around the world. We currently contribute a gender advisor to the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and will soon contribute two visiting expert advisors on case building of international crimes to the EU Assistance Mission in Ukraine. Canada also participates in two EU Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects on logistics hubs and military mobility and submitted (on May 5, 2025) a formal request to join the anti-torpedo torpedoes project led by Germany and The Netherlands.

Defence industry: Canada and Europe have a long history of defence industry cooperation. Beyond bilateral and NATO procurement and projects, Canada has also been a partner for the EU as it has expanded its security and defence capabilities over the past two decades. Canadian defence exports to Europe (including the UK) amounted to $1.1 billion in 2022, with exports to the U.S. valued at $4.4 billion the same year.

Canada’s position on nuclear proliferation

Canada is committed to the universal adoption and full implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Canada is committed to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons through halting the spread of nuclear weapons, reducing existing stockpiles and irreversibly eliminating them.
Canada supports urgent action to reduce the risk of nuclear weapon use, whether intentional, inadvertent, or accidental, particularly in an increasingly challenging security context.

Supplementary messages

Canada has contributed $23 million to support monitoring of Iran’s compliance with nuclear commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and over $35 million since 2018 to support efforts to contain and confront North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile proliferation.
Canada continues to deploy ships, aircraft and personnel as part of multinational efforts to counter North Korea's evasion of UN sanctions.
Canada helped establish the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team in October 2024 to monitor and report on North Korea’s sanctions evasion efforts.
For more than 30 years, Canada has been a leader at the UN in calling for negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. This would be essential for verifiable, irreversible nuclear disarmament.

Background

Canada’s policy on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT outlines a three-part bargain: states not possessing nuclear weapons commit not to acquire them; the five “nuclear-weapons states” (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States) agree to pursue good-faith negotiations aimed at nuclear disarmament; and all NPT States Parties undertake to facilitate international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. There are occasional comments by a small number of European and Asian states about the possibility of developing their own domestic nuclear arsenals. However, this would breach their legal obligations under the NPT, in addition to the significant time, investment, and risks that would be involved.

Canada, as a NATO ally, recognizes the contribution of extended nuclear deterrence to its own defence and that of our Allies. NATO’s Strategic Concept (2022) states that “as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.” The Strategic Concept also notes that “the circumstances under which NATO might have to use nuclear weapons are extremely remote” and that NATO “seek(s) to create the security environment for a world without nuclear weapons.”

Nuclear weapons are gaining salience in military doctrines in Europe and the Indo-Pacific due to the challenging security environment resulting from the increasing use of force or threats of use of force by nuclear weapon possessing states to achieve geopolitical ends. In Europe, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to increased political-level interest among European states in self-reliance for military capabilities, including nuclear deterrents, potentially through extended nuclear deterrence arrangements with France, and continuing with the UK’s commitments to NATO. In the Indo-Pacific, China’s nuclear build-up and North Korea’s continued development of nuclear weapons have produced considerable debate in South Korea, and to a lesser extent Japan, about the value of acquiring nuclear weapons, either domestically or through stationing U.S. nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons testing

As the Prime Minister has said we live in a more dangerous and divided world.
The Government of Canada’s main priority is to protect Canadians.
Canada has been protected by international instruments, including non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament treaties, that have kept Canadians safe.
Canada, as a signatory and ratifier of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), views that treaty as an essential component to Canada’s national security.
Canada believes in multilateral solutions to today’s challenges, recognizing that they represent a significant contribution to international peace and security.

Supplementary messages

Responsive

Q: What are the implications of this U.S. announcement?

We are seeking further clarity from the U.S. on what President Trump’s announcement would entail.
Certain actions, such as the testing of missiles or other delivery systems, would be consistent with the provisions of the CTBT.

Q: Is the U.S. allowed to do this?

All signatories to the CTBT have a legal obligation to “refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty”

Background

In a late-night post on Truth Social on October 29^th, U.S. President Trump claimed he had instructed the US Department of War to resume testing U.S. nuclear weapons “on an equal basis” (with Russia and China) with the “process to begin immediately”. The announcement comes one day after Russian President Putin announced the testing of the Poseidon “nuclear powered drone” and a week after Russian testing of the nuclear capable “Burevestnik” missile. The Kremlin has stated that its test of a nuclear-powered missile and nuclear-powered torpedo were not nuclear weapons tests. Russia has stated that if any other country tested a nuclear weapon, then so too would Russia. Trump’s announcement appeared timed to immediately presage his bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi in Seoul.

The U.S. has signed but not ratified the CTBT and last conducted a physical nuclear weapons test in 1992. Russia rescinded its CTBT ratification in 2023. The other (Annex 2) states needed to ratify the treaty before it enters into force are China, the DPRK, India, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, and Iran. The U.S. is understood to not have the means in place to conduct live nuclear weapons testing and reportedly would require 18-36 months or more to resume testing. As such, there would be no means to “immediately” resume nuclear weapons testing.

The U.S. otherwise conducts simulated nuclear testing using historical data and supercomputers to do modelling and through “sub-critical” experiments, which involve physical explosives and small amounts of fissile material. These experiments do not result in a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction and therefore are considered to be consistent with the CTBT. Russia and China also conduct sub-critical experiments. There is a broad consensus amongst U.S. experts that physical nuclear weapons testing is not necessary to modernize U.S. nuclear weapons system.

Canada’s response to the use of chemical weapons

Canada is committed to the complete elimination of chemical weapons and holding to account those that use them.
Canada has advanced this objective by directly supporting the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and through funding by its Weapons Threat Reduction Program (WTRP).

Supplementary messages

With its partners, Canada has contributed over $240 million to support chemical weapons destruction in Russia, Libya, Iraq, Syria, and other related threat reduction efforts.
We urge the new government of Syria to fully cooperate with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
Canada is concerned that Russia appears to be violating the Chemical Weapons Convention by using riot control agents and possibly other toxic chemicals as weapons in its illegal war in Ukraine.

Supporting facts and figures

Canada is one of the largest national contributors to global efforts to end the use of chemical weapons. It funds the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) through the Weapons Threat Reduction Program (WTRP) and its contribution to the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP).
Canada contributed more than $46 million to the OPCW since 2013 and more than $200 million to the destruction of Russia’s declared chemical weapons arsenal. Canada has also contributed ~$20 million to the International Police Organization’s (INTERPOL) Chemical and Explosives Terrorism Prevention Programme to strengthen the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies abilities to prevent, detect, investigate, and respond to chemical terrorism incidents.

Background

The norm against the use of chemical weapons has been repeatedly breached in recent years. Russia and the former Assad regime in Syria repeatedly violated their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Russia used nerve agents (Novichok) in the attempted assassinations of Kremlin critic Alexei Navalny in Russia in 2020, and of former spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in the UK in 2018 (resulting in the death of a British national). In 2018, Canada expelled four Russian diplomats in solidarity. Canada also had a leadership role in adding Novichok nerve agents to the CWC list of prohibited chemicals. There are numerous reports of the use of riot control agents and other toxic chemicals, including the CWC Schedule 3 chemical chloropicrin, by Russian forces against Ukraine since 2022. Canada and other likeminded States are demanding answers from the Russian government. Russia is spreading disinformation and using anti-Ukraine rhetoric in response.

Chemical weapons were repeatedly used by the Assad regime during the Syrian civil war. Canada contributed to the destruction of Syria’s declared chemical weapons stockpile since its accession to the CWC in 2013, but this process was incomplete and the threat remained. The new transitional government has shown encouraging signs of cooperation. Canada is working closely with the OPCW to identify opportunities to support verification and destruction of Syria’s remaining chemical weapons stockpile.

In January 2025, the U.S. accused Sudan of using chemical weapons in 2024 in its war against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The U.S. announced sanctions on Sudan in April, effective around June 6.

Canada’s role in supporting the Ottawa Convention

The threat posed by Russia to Europe has compelled some NATO Allies to take extraordinary measures to deter Russia and to defend themselves.
Withdrawals from the Ottawa Convention are among the challenges to the international disarmament framework resulting from this threat.
Canada’s support for the Ottawa Convention remains unwavering and enduring.
Canada has fervently advocated for states to remain party to the Convention and to prioritize international humanitarian law in their defence considerations.

Supplementary messages

Regret the difficult decisions made by the Baltic states, Finland, and Poland to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention.
Canada is seized with the need to prevent further withdrawals and will continue advocacy efforts.
Will continue to stress the importance of humanitarian concerns and the disproportionate impact on civilians caused by anti-personnel landmines.

Update

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its threatening behaviour toward other European NATO Allies have driven a number of states, especially those bordering Russia, to reassess their security needs. In 2024, Ukraine received U.S. supplied anti-personnel land mines, in contravention of the treaty. This spurred strong domestic political currents among other states to consider all measures possible to deter and defend against Russia. A highly publicised speech by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk on the need to increase defence capabilities—both through conventional means and with nuclear weapons—further stimulated action, while proclamations by U.S. administration officials questioning the U.S. commitment to European defence and calling on states to take on more responsibility for its own defence, have also been contributing factors leading to announcements by Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland that they will withdraw from the Ottawa Convention. These countries have now all submitted instruments of withdrawal to the UN, and the withdrawal will officially take effect six months after it was received by the UN (ranging from December 2025 to February 2026). While Ukraine cannot legally withdraw from the Convention as it is in a state of armed conflict, it announced in July 2025 that it would suspend its obligations under the Convention in accordance with Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, citing a fundamental change of circumstances.

Supporting facts and figures

In view of an anticipated further slide from the treaty, Canada engaged on several levels bilaterally with Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland to advocate against withdrawal.
When decisions to withdrawal were formalised, Canada engaged to convey regret, while expressing understanding for the security concerns driving their decisions.
Canada has coordinated closely with key likeminded partners—Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, the UK—who have taken the same approach.
Canada supports de-mining efforts globally, with more than $46 million committed in 2024. This programming supported de-mining in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire, Cambodia, Iraq, Laos, Mali, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Syria, Togo, and Ukraine.
These projects target mine clearance, victim assistance, mine risk education, and assistance to national policy development.
Canada’s approach to addressing this has drawn a balance between recognition of the credible security threats posed by Russia and Belarus and continued support to the norms of the Convention.

Le Canada et la Francophonie

La Francophonie is a privileged platform for promoting our interests and values without the presence of major powers such as China and the United States.
Canada will focus its efforts on ensuring that La Francophonie institutions take action to foster an environment conducive to entrepreneurship, trade, and investment within member countries.
Canada also continues to strengthen democracy and human rights; reinforce multilateralism; promote the French language; and promote cultural and linguistic diversity in the digital space.
Canada will continue to combine advocacy with concrete actions to improve the effectiveness and accountability of the International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF) and other Francophonie institutions.

Facts and figures

The Francophonie brings together more than 90 states and governments from five continents, representing more than 321 million French speakers.
It accounts for nearly 20% of global trade flows and 14% of global mineral and energy resources.
Economic growth in the French-speaking world averaged 4% between 2011 and 2021.
The OIF operates on an annual budget of approximately $115 million.
Canada is the second largest donor after France, with a statutory contribution of $16.5 million in 2025 and voluntary contributions of $25 million.
Cambodia will host the 20th Summit in Siem Reap in the fall of 2026.

Context

Institutional Francophonie: The term "institutional Francophonie" or simply "Francophonie" refers to all the institutions that structure cooperation between countries that share the French language, in particular: the International Organization of La Francophonie; the Agence universitaire de la Francophonie; the TV5Monde television channel; the International Association of Francophone Mayors; and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Francophonie.

International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF): Based in Paris, the OIF is the institutional body of La Francophonie responsible for implementing diplomatic and multilateral cooperation. Since 2019, the OIF has been pursuing institutional reforms to improve its functioning, strengthen its credibility, and enable more effective action. In 2023, relations between the OIF and Canada deteriorated following the results of an internal investigation into allegations of harassment within the OIF. This led Canada to briefly suspend its voluntary contributions until a code of ethics and conduct was adopted and complaint handling mechanisms were put in place.

The provinces: The governments of Quebec and New Brunswick are full members of the OIF. Ontario and Nova Scotia have observer status. Manitoba has expressed interest in obtaining observer status.

Francophonie Summit: Every two years, heads of state and government meet at the Francophonie Summit. The 2026 Summit in Cambodia is expected to focus on the economic potential of the Francophonie. It will be an opportunity to showcase Canadian organizations, particularly those in the private sector and civil society.

Economic Francophonie: There is growing interest in the economic aspect of the Francophonie among various stakeholders in Canada and internationally. Since 2022, the OIF has co-organized six economic and trade missions (Cambodia/Vietnam, Gabon/Rwanda, Lebanon, Romania, Canada, Benin). These missions strengthen Francophone economic resilience by promoting investment and the exploration of new markets.

Women, Peace and Security

Women, Peace and Security is a fundamental enabler of security and sovereignty: It sharpens understandings of threats, strengthens responses, and enhances our ability to deter, detect, and defend.
Canada remains committed to implementing the WPS agenda through our third National Action Plan, which extends to 2029.
Canada is marking 25th anniversary of the WPS agenda by defending progress against pushback, focusing on the immense work remaining, and paying tribute to women around the world who risk their lives to build peace.

Supplementary messages

Canada’s Action Plan addresses the relevance of WPS to traditional security threats and emerging challenges such as climate and economic insecurity, artificial intelligence, and competition in the Arctic.
WPS has proven to strengthen Canada’s relationships with a diverse range of countries, including many non-traditional allies in strategically important regions.
The percentage of uniformed women in peacekeeping has more than doubled since 2018 (to approximately 10%) – progress the UN Secretary General credits in part to Canada’s Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations.
Canada is deeply concerned about the rapidly increasing use of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) as a tactic of war, torture, terrorism, and political repression around the world.

Update

The second term of Canada’s Ambassador for Women, Peace and Security concluded in March 2025. The Government is considering options for how best to sustain leadership on WPS at home and globally. The UN Secretary General’s 2025 report on Women, Peace and Security highlights progress yet warns of stagnation or even regression across many areas (see facts and figures below). While the U.S. position continues to evolve under President Trump, the U.S. remains the only country to adopt a comprehensive law on WPS, implemented and signed into law by President Trump during his first administration. On October 6, 2025, 91 countries including Canada, affirmed support for WPS at the UN Security Council.

Supporting facts and figures

Conflict-related sexual violence documented by the UN increased by 87% over the last two years.
In 2024, women represented 7% of negotiators and 14% of mediators in peace processes worldwide – figures that remain low, and in line with earlier levels.
When women participate meaningfully in peace negotiations, an agreement is more likely to be reached, and the probability of that agreement lasting two years increases by 20%, and of lasting 15 years, by 35%.
115 countries now have National Action Plans on WPS, including all G7 members and nearly every member of NATO.
Canada’s Action Plan includes 10 federal partners and is one of the world’s only to feature an official role for civil society.

Canada and the United Nations

The United Nations (UN) is Canada’s preeminent international forum for advancing issues that matter to Canadians and engaging with partners from around the world to address global challenges.
The UN is key to Canada’s ability to advance and preserve its national security and economic prosperity given its unique convening power and extensive norm- and standard-setting functions in areas.
Now in its 80th year, the UN remains a critical body for maintaining global peace and security, protecting human rights.

Supplementary messages

In the context of acute polarisation, rising uncertainty, and global threats, the UN’s role in upholding the core pillars of peace and security, human rights, and development is more important than ever.
The rules and standards set by the UN and its various entities have direct implications for the economic prosperity and security of Canadians. By participating actively in the UN, Canada promotes its interests in shaping these global norms and standards.
Canada supports reform efforts, such as UN80, aimed at ensuring that the UN’s capacity to fulfil its mandate is improved and strengthened.

Supporting facts and figures

Canada is one of the UN’s founding members, a respected and influential voice at many UN tables, and the 7th largest financial contributor.
Canada is also a proud host state to several UN agencies located in Montreal, including the headquarters of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

Background

The UN is at a crossroads in the face of the U.S.’s shift in its multilateral engagement and priorities under the new Administration, the increasing assertiveness of authoritarian regimes, and an unprecedented financial crisis. This has forced the UN Secretary General to double-down on reform efforts. His UN80 reform initiative, launched in March 2025, is being presented as a once-in-a generation opportunity to rethink how the UN conducts its business and to retool the organization for the future. However, proposals presented to date have been primarily administrative, repetitive of reforms already underway, and focused primarily on cost savings, raising resistance by UN staff and Member States, particularly in the global South. Consensus on the tough decisions that lie ahead will be difficult to achieve.

Despite these challenges, the UN is key to Canada’s ability to advance and preserve its national security and economic prosperity given its unique convening power and extensive norm- and standard-setting functions in areas ranging from human rights to aviation security, with direct impacts on the daily lives of Canadians and millions around the world.

This year, the High-level Week of the UN’s General Assembly took place on September 22-30, 2025, in New York. Hundreds of heads of state and government met to discuss global issues and current geopolitical challenges. Canada’s delegation was headed by the Prime Minister accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of State for International Development, and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs also participated in HLW events.

Global health

Canada is a longstanding supporter of global health efforts.
International collaboration on global health keeps Canadians and people around the world safe from infectious disease threats and advances the health and rights of women and girls.
Canada is working to make global health assistance more efficient, sustainable and aligned with developing country priorities.

Supplementary messages

Canada supports global health programs through a range of partners, including Canadian civil society, multilateral initiatives and UN agencies.
The COVID-19 pandemic underscored that global health threats are domestic health and economic threats, and that strong health systems are necessary to stop outbreaks before they grow into pandemics.
Enabling greater country ownership, including mobilizing increased domestic financing for health, will be core to any reforms to the global health ecosystem.

Supporting facts and figures

Maternal and under-5 mortality rates have significantly decreased in the past three decades, polio cases have declined by 99% and AIDS-related deaths have fallen by 70%, all achieved, in part, by Official Development Assistance (ODA) for health, which has improved access to affordable, quality health services.
The Government of Canada is the 6th largest donor to global health and nutrition, allocating an average of 19% (2019 to 2023) of its ODA to health-related programs. Canada’s longstanding leadership includes a strong focus on fighting infectious diseases and advancing the health and rights of women and girls, including their sexual and reproductive health and rights, and improving nutrition.
63% of Canada’s global health investments were directed to sub-Saharan Africa in FY2023/24. Top bilateral recipients were Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Tanzania.

Background

For over 20 years, Canada has made substantial investments toward improving health outcomes in developing countries, particularly through reproductive, maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health and nutrition programs. As countries and the global health ecosystem adapt to declining levels of ODA for health, Canada is well-positioned to engage constructively on the way forward and ensure that Canadian support for global health continues to deliver maximum impact.

Feminist Foreign Policy

Firmly committed to advancing gender equality, human rights, and democracy as essential components of our foreign policy.
Working with allies and diverse partners to counter coordinated anti-gender movements around the world and in multilateral forums. These threaten progress on rights, peace and stability, and sustainable development.
Recently joined 30 other countries in a declaration from the 4^th Ministerial Conference on feminist foreign policies in Paris (October 22-23), in support of gender equality, women’s rights and a feminist approach to international engagement.

Supplementary messages

Member of the Feminist Foreign Policy + Advocacy Group at the United Nations, seeking to coordinate action on advancing gender equality.
Played a leadership role in formalizing the Women Foreign Ministers’ Group, following a landmark meeting in Toronto in September 2024.

Update

Department of National Defence Deputy Minister Stefanie Beck attended the 4^th Ministerial Conference on feminist foreign policies hosted by France (October 22-23, 2025). Then Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of International Development Anita Vandenbeld attended the previous iteration in Mexico (July 1-3, 2024). Former Minister Joly co-hosted with her Jamaican counterpart a Women Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Toronto in September 2024, bringing together women foreign ministers from around the world who pledged to advance women’s participation in leadership and decision making and to support safe and inclusive spaces for women in politics and public life. They also called on the Taliban to restore women’s and girls’ rights in Afghanistan and discussed the question of gender imbalance within the UN system, amongst other priorities. This meeting led to the announcement of the creation of the Women Foreign Minister’s Group after a virtual meeting hosted by former Minister Joly in February 2025.

At the UN General Assembly High-Level Meeting on September 22, 2025, you represented Canada at the 30th anniversary event of the Beijing World Conference on Women, engaging with over 160 world leaders to reaffirm Canada’s commitment to gender equality and announce actions under the Beijing+30 Action Agenda.

During Canada’s 2024-25 presidency of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Canada advanced gender equality by integrating inclusion and gender considerations across all three presidential priorities— Financing for Development, Forced Displacement, and Artificial Intelligence—ensuring these themes were reflected in both action and dialogue throughout the Council’s work. Canada is advancing gender equality in the context of the UN80 reform initiative, including by leading a Joint Statement, endorsed by 83 cross-regional signatories, emphasizing the centrality of gender equality in UN renewal efforts. The statement was delivered by Deputy Permanent Representative Michael Gort during a Member States briefing with Under-Secretary-General Guy Ryder on June 24, 2025.

Supporting facts and figures

Governments endorsing the joint declaration from the 4^th Ministerial Conference on feminist foreign policies (October 22-23, 2025): Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Kosovo, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Moldova, the Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Portugal, Rwanda, Slovenia, Spain, Thailand, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Uruguay.
Canada has been a champion of gender equality for decades. In 2023-2024 alone, Canada reached over 40 million people with international assistance projects that addressed sexual and gender-based violence.

Background

Investing in gender equality is a strategic response to global turbulence and geopolitical fractures. Persistent inequality, including gender-based violence, destabilizes communities and undermines security. A growing global backlash threatens decades of progress for women, girls and LGBTI+ people. Working with women’s rights organizations is one of the most effective ways to protect and advance gender equality because they often have lived experience and are therefore best-placed to effectively address inequality issues within their own communities.

Canada is a longstanding champion of gender equality through its international engagements, foreign policy, and international development assistance. As Canada adapts its foreign policy and international assistance approach to align new government priorities, Canada remains committed to protecting and advancing gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls.

Feminist Foreign Policy + Group

Former Minister Joly was one of four Foreign Ministers participating in the January 4, 2022 inaugural meeting of the Feminist Foreign Policy + Advocacy Group, which aims to mobilize gender equality-related initiatives at the UN. In addition to Canada, the Group includes Albania, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, France, Germany, Israel, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Rwanda, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, and the UK.

Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action

Adopted in 1995, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action remains the most comprehensive global framework for advancing the rights of women and girls. Thirty years later, the anniversary of the Beijing World Conference on Women was commemorated during a UN General Assembly High-Level Meeting on September 22, 2025, where Minister Anand reaffirmed Canada’s enduring commitment to gender equality. The Beijing+30 Action Agenda builds on the Declaration’s legacy, focusing on six priorities—digital revolution, freedom from poverty, zero violence, equal decision-making, peace and security, and climate justice—underpinned by financing and gender data, with adolescent girls and young women at the centre.

Humanitarian assistance

In Fiscal Year 2024-2025, Canada provided $796^{Footnote 1} million to respond to the life-saving needs of those affected by conflict and natural disasters around the world.
Driven by new and increasingly protracted conflicts and natural disasters, over 300 million people need humanitarian assistance in 2025.
Canada will continue to respond by working through experienced humanitarian partners, including the UN, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and Canadian and international NGOs, to provide urgent humanitarian assistance where it is needed most.

Supplementary messages

Canada is committed to upholding and promoting respect for International Humanitarian Law, including the protection of civilians and humanitarian workers.

Update

As a result of major global funding cuts, the humanitarian system is undergoing significant reforms – under the umbrella of a ‘Humanitarian Reset’- to reaffirm the system’s core purpose: to protect and assist those most at risk during acute emergencies and prioritize life-saving assistance.

Supporting facts and figures

Canada remains a committed humanitarian donor, ranking 13th largest in 2024.
GAC’s top funded humanitarian partners for FY 2024-25 included:
- World Food Programme (WFP) - $202 million.
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)- $94 million.
- UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) - $87 million.
- UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) - $84 million.
In 2025, key humanitarian assistance responses include:
- $104.5 million to address the urgent needs in Palestine, and $44 million to those affected in Lebanon; and,
- $64 million to meet humanitarian needs in Sudan, and $105.8 million for neighbouring countries impacted by the Sudan crisis, including the Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Uganda;
- Over $17 million to respond to urgent needs in Haiti.

Background

Over the last decade, the scope, scale, and complexity of humanitarian crises have significantly grown, characterized by an increasing number of conflicts and natural disasters, exacerbated by climate change. As of August 2025, over 300 million people need humanitarian assistance globally, and 122 million people are forcibly displaced. Canada continues to respond to sudden onset and protracted humanitarian crises, including in Palestine, Ukraine, Sudan, and Haiti, and is actively addressing global food insecurity.

Canada’s international assistance - Including impacts of U.S. and other donor aid cuts

Canada is reviewing how it delivers international assistance to ensure it reflects Canadian interests and values while remaining focused on addressing today’s global challenges.
Going forward, Canada’s international assistance will work to advance shared priorities with partner countries related to economic prosperity, inclusive growth, trade readiness, and private sector investment.
Canada will also remain responsive to global needs by investing in initiatives that tackle the root causes of conflict and instability and that address global challenges.

Supplementary messages

A government-wide spending review is underway; savings are being considered across departments and programs - no decisions yet made.
Canada will work with multilateral, Canadian, and local partners to deliver inclusive, sustainable outcomes aligned with national interests and shared partner priorities.

Supporting facts and figures

OECD projects a 9-17% decline in global official development assistance (ODA) in 2025, following a 9% drop in 2024, driven by cuts from major donors like France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S. (over 83% of U.S. aid projects canceled in 2025).
GAC receives over 65% of funding from the International Assistance Envelope (IAE), totaling $5.95 billion in 2023-24.
From 2019-20 to 2023-24, GAC’s aid focused on health (27%), climate/biodiversity (17%), humanitarian (17%), economic growth (11%).
Canada is among the top bilateral donors supporting investments in gender equality and empowerment of women and girls.

Background

The global development landscape is rapidly changing, and the international aid architecture is under tremendous strain. ODA is contracting, with OECD projections showing a downward trend as key donors reduce their aid budgets, citing domestic pressures and shifting foreign policy priorities. This decline is occurring amid rising geopolitical tensions, weakening multilateral consensus, and growing demands on global development institutions.

Within this context and in the midst of evolving Canadian priorities, the government is reassessing and refocusing its international assistance approach. Going forward, Canada’s international assistance will be refocused towards supporting economic prosperity and trade, in line with Canadian and partner country priorities; advancing global stability and resilience; strengthening multilateral engagement and partnerships; and modernizing our tools to deliver more effective assistance. On the global stage, efforts are underway to modernize the aid architecture. Canada is engaged in key reform processes, including the UN80 Initiative, multilateral development bank reforms, the Future of Development Cooperation Coalition (Gates Foundation-led initiative), and the OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) review process.

Canada’s international assistance by region

Americas

Canada is the 6^th largest bilateral donor to the region, providing $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2023-2024.
Key areas in which we have focused our development assistance include combating the spread of transnational organized crime, combating and adapting to climate change, and protecting and promoting democracy and human rights.
We remain committed to providing assistance to the region where the interests of Canada and the recipient country align.

Supplementary messages

Despite making significant progress in reducing poverty, the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region remains one of the most unequal in the world.
Due mostly to organized crime, LAC continues to have the world’s highest homicide rates.
The high level of irregular migration in the region has placed a significant burden on the many host and transit countries in the region.
Investing to improve security and prosperity in our hemisphere not only helps our neighbours but can also benefit our own security and prosperity.

Supporting facts and figures

In 2023-2024, LAC received 10% of Canada’s total international assistance.
In that year, Canada was the 6th largest Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) donor of assistance to the region (after Germany, U.S., France, Japan, and Spain).
In 2023-2024, Haiti was the 3rd largest recipient of Canadian international development assistance (behind Ukraine and Ethiopia).
Global Affairs Canada’s bilateral and regional assistance to LAC was $949 million (excluding Mexico) in 2023-24 ($955 million including Mexico).
The remainder of Canada’s funding to the region was provided by other departments ($77 million) or through Canada’s multilateral funding ($241 million).
Nearly a third of the LAC population experienced food insecurity in 2023.
LAC is the second-most exposed region in the world to extreme weather events.
The region recorded its lowest poverty rate ever in 2022, with 25% of the population living in poverty.
LAC has only 9% of the global population, but one-third of the world’s homicides.
There are over 23 million forcibly displaced people in LAC, not including the millions of economic and other migrants who have left their homes for various reasons.

Background

The aid environment is evolving rapidly in LAC, with the growth of non-traditional donors like China and the sudden and major reduction of U.S. assistance in recent months. In 2023, the U.S. was the region’s second largest donor, providing $3.7 billion in official development assistance. Recent U.S. funding cuts have created a major gap in assistance funding to the region. Canada’s assistance helps support its geopolitical priorities by providing alternatives to growing Chinese economic engagement in LAC, and the potential political leverage that comes with it.

Canada’s growing trade with LAC, and the free trade agreements it has with 7 countries in the region, represent an important avenue for Canadian trade diversification. Canadian international assistance and economic investments in LAC can help demonstrate Canada’s engagement in the region and underscore Canada’s status as a reliable partner.

Global Affairs Canada’s assistance to the region is delivered through three regional programs (Central America, Caribbean, and the Inter-American regional program), as well as bilateral programming in Haiti, Cuba, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Venezuela.

Europe and Middle East

Canada’s bilateral International Assistance to Ukraine in 2024-2025 totaled $3.1 billion, including $13M in humanitarian assistance, $130M in development assistance, $54M in conflict, peace and security assistance, and $2.9B in financial assistance provided through the Department of Finance.
Canada’s International Assistance to the Middle East** in 2024-2025 totalled $509M, including $298M in humanitarian assistance, $156M in development assistance and $55M in peace and security assistance.
In 2024-2025 financial year, top recipients in the Middle East were the Palestinian territories ($149M), Syria ($102M), Lebanon ($87M), Jordan ($61M), and Yemen ($59M).

** Preliminary figures for FY24/25: Excludes Egypt (counted under Africa) and core funding amounts to multilateral organisations, and includes only amounts from GAC.

Supplementary messages

Ukraine

Prime Minister Carney’s leadership in the G7 and visit to Kyiv on August 24th demonstrate Canada’s unwavering support for Ukraine’s immediate and long-term resilience, recovery and eventual reconstruction needs.
Canada is also leading efforts to address the war’s human dimension and is continuing to increase economic pressure on Russia to degrade its capacity to wage war.

Middle East

As a top donor responding to the crisis in Gaza and the West Bank, Canada has committed over $400M in international assistance since October 7, 2023.
We continue to call on Israel to facilitate the safe, rapid and unimpeded passage of aid into and throughout Gaza via the UN-led system.

Supporting facts and figures

Canada is among the largest contributors to humanitarian response efforts in Ukraine: $395.65 million since January 2022 ($13 million in 2024/25).
The development program ($130 million in 2024/25) advances inclusive governance, economic resilience, human dignity and gender equality, in line with Ukraine’s aim of EU accession. Canada (Finance) also provided $2.9 billion in financial assistance in 2024/25.
Ukraine remains a country of focus for Canada’s conflict, peace and security support, receiving $54 million in 2024/25 for Ukraine’s resilience and resistance.
Canada is one of the largest contributors to humanitarian response efforts in the Middle East ($298 million in 2024/25). Efforts focus on addressing urgent life-saving needs, such as food, water and emergency healthcare.
Development programs ($156 million in 2024/25) focus on education, health, economic growth, climate change and women’s equality. This assistance addresses causes of instability by reducing poverty, increasing socio-economic opportunities, supporting governance and human rights, and mitigating climate risks.
Peace and Security programming ($55 million in 2024/25) contributes to security sector reform, including building the capacity of national military, intelligence and law enforcement counterparts to counter crime and terrorism and address threats posed by the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction while supporting mine action, political transitions and enabling peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery efforts.

Africa

Canada’s development assistance has contributed to building African economies, increasing resilience to climate change, supporting health and education, and responding to humanitarian needs.
Canada’s international assistance programming provides us with an important tool to promote our values of compassion and human rights, and to advance our political, economic and security interests on the continent.
We are in a new phase of partnerships with African countries, pivoting from a development dominated relationship to one of shared prosperity and security.

Supplementary messages

Canada is competing for influence on the African continent. Global Affairs Canada is positioning itself to deploy its trade, development and diplomatic assets for greater influence and coherence.
Canada’s Africa Strategy: A Partnership for Shared Prosperity and Security refocuses and strengthens Canada’s engagement with Africa towards greater economic cooperation.
Canada’s new Trade and Development Program will support efforts to promote regional economic integration, reinforce rules-based systems, and unlock market opportunities for both African and Canadian businesses.

Supporting facts and figures

Canada has 22 International Development Assistance Programs in Africa.
Canada provided $3.2 billion in 2023-2024 (44.7% of Canada’s overall development assistance).
If fully implemented, the African Union’s African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) will be the world’s largest free trade area, representing a market of 1.3 billion people.
Africa has significant natural resource, including 30% of the world’s critical minerals, 60% of its solar energy potential, and 25% of its biodiversity.

Background

Poverty reduction efforts remain critical as: 60% of the population live in poverty, more than 85% experience severe or moderate food insecurity, over 600 million people lack access to energy, and more than 25% of youth face unemployment.

U.S. Administration executive orders suspending aid (note: USAID invested U.S. $15.2 billion in Africa in 2023) are having a very significant impact on Africa, particularly in the health sector.

Some G7 donors are shifting some development assistance in Africa to economic security and trade, including to secure access to critical mineral resources.

Africa has vast economic and human potential. It is a dynamic, geo-strategically important continent with a rapidly growing workforce and young population. The AfCFTA will enable an integrated, rules-based trading environment that will benefit Canadian companies, including as a result of enhanced transparency and predictability of the business environment.

Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific is a cornerstone of global prosperity with its future and stability hinging on the region’s ability to address poverty, inequality, climate change, and geopolitical tensions.
Canada is a trusted development partner in the region, advancing democratic governance, climate resilience, gender equality, and inclusive economic growth through strategic bilateral and regional initiatives.
Canada has provided $5.6 billion in development assistance since 2000 to the ASEAN region alone. (Optional: This includes regional and bilateral assistance to ASEAN and in ASEAN Member States as well as through multilateral organizations.)

Supplementary messages

Canada is delivering concrete results by strengthening partnerships, expanding scholarships, and increasing development assistance in Southeast Asia.
Canada’s approach in the Indo-Pacific is evolving to reflect emerging trade opportunities, shifting security dynamics, and broader geopolitical realignments.

Responsive messages (“How much aid do we provide to China?”)

Canada’s bilateral international assistance program to China ended in 2013.
Canada does not provide any direct bilateral assistance to China’s government.
In FY 2023-24, Canada contributed $14.6 million in international assistance in China, including $12.9 million provided through GAC, primarily through multilateral channels, as well as through Canada Fund for Local Initiatives projects.

Update

Canada deepened its development engagement by establishing its first dedicated Pacific Island international assistance program and opening a resident High Commission in Suva, Fiji.

Supporting facts and figures

The Indo-Pacific is home to 37% of the world’s poorest people, and countries in the Indo-Pacific will require an estimated U.S. $26 trillion for infrastructure by 2030.
Region is home to 70% of the world’s natural disasters.
Responsible for 53% of global GHG emissions and shows the fastest growth in emissions, in addition to accounting for most of the world’s transboundary pollution.
Fully half of new Canadians come from the region.

Background

Canada’s IPS, launched in 2022, is a whole-of-government framework for engagement in the region. Canada has supported the region through bilateral and regional development programs, focusing on climate finance, global health, biodiversity, gender equality, and human rights. The IPS focusses on strengthening partnerships with Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, and Pacific Islands, regions that have been prioritized for new investments. Canada delivers programs in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Myanmar, Mongolia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam, along with three regional programs covering ASEAN, Pan-Asia, and Pacific Islands.

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GAC Workforce at a Glance

Through its Transformation Implementation Plan, Global Affairs Canada is actively working to address many of the human resource and workforce development challenges that were highlighted in the 2023 Senate Committee Report.
Recruitment will continue at calibrated levels, focused on excellence, the skills needed to meet emerging diplomatic priorities, and appropriate representation of Canadian society.
Regular staffing processes are also providing opportunities for career progression for experienced employees within the Department, building retention and long-term sustainability.

Supplementary messages

Recruitment and assignment processes are designed to meet the Department’s organizational needs and priorities, taking into account workforce availability, and alignment of skills based on a competency, performance and talent-based approach with clear employment equity considerations.
Rotational assignments provide the Department the flexibility to assign resources where they are needed, when they are needed, with employees who have the skills and competencies for the job.
The Department is advancing its career development approach through the establishment of a Career Support Unit that will empower employees in managing their careers and support managers in building agile, high-performing teams.
Since 2021, GAC has appointed 361 junior foreign service officers (FS-01) from across the country through various staffing processes and has provided Official Languages training to those requiring it.

Supporting facts and figures

As of July 31, 2025, the Dept. has 14,279 employees, of which 8,689 (61%) are Canada-Based Staff (CBS) and 5,597 (39%) are Locally Engaged Staff (LES).

(The sum of CBS and LES does not equal the total presented because a few employees are in a CBS and LES position at the same time. At GAC level, we count these employees only once whereas when each group is taken separately, employees are counted in each group.)
Canada-Based Staff comprises both 6,288 (73%) traditional public servants and 2,325 (27%) rotational employees, for whom the disposition to be deployed abroad forms part of the condition of employment.
Rotational employees include foreign service officers (1,664) and executives (391), as well as information technology (142) and administrative (105) professionals.
Close to half (49%) of the Department’s total workforce is located abroad. The workforce abroad consists of 1,423 CBS (20%) and 5,597 LES (80%).

Mission footprint and networks

Canada’s network abroad consists of 181 missions in 112 countries, the smallest footprint of all G7 partners both in terms of missions and countries.
As of March 31, 2025, the mission network was comprised of 8,328 positions, including 2,400 Canada-based staff and 5,928 Locally engaged staff.
Canada’s network of missions is paramount to building new alliances, strengthening relations with reliable trading partners, protecting Canada’s sovereignty, and building coalitions to ensure the security and prosperity of Canada.

Supporting facts and figures

Under the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has the powers, duties and functions to conduct all diplomatic and consular relations on behalf of Canada, coordinate the direction given by the Government of Canada to heads of Canada’s diplomatic and consular missions, and has the management of Canada’s diplomatic and consular missions.
As of March 31, 2025, Canada’s network abroad consists of 181 missions in 112 countries regionally distributed as follows: Europe/Middle East/Arctic (58), the Americas (54), Indo-Pacific (43) and Africa (26).
Global Affairs Canada (GAC) maintains a further six regional trade offices located across Canada and close to 100 offices headed by honorary consuls. Honorary Consuls are private individuals appointed by Order in Council.
GAC’s mission network enables the operations of 21 federal departments and agencies, 8 provincial governments and 3 Crown corporations.
Canada has entered into co-location agreements to provide or receive, infrastructure and administrative support with the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, the Netherlands and NATO. These agreements currently cover 19 locations.
Provincial governments, while representing just over 2% of Canada’s positions abroad, have experienced significant growth of over 25% in the past five years, reaching 194 active positions as of March 31, 2025.
Global Affairs Canada is exploring ways to make our global network of missions more cost-effective, including consolidating certain offices and pursuing co-location opportunities.

The New York Residence

This replacement transaction was a sound investment, which will generate savings for Canadians.
The process was comprehensive – complied with all policies, was well documented and exempt from political influence.
The final decision was made by Global Affairs Canada Real Property officials within the departmental delegated authority for the acquisition of Official Residences.

Supplementary messages

To advance Canada’s foreign policy and trade, GAC is reviewing its global real property portfolio—including Official Residences—as part of a multi-year transformation to ensure it is well-positioned to meet today and tomorrow’s needs.
In full compliance with applicable legislation, policies, and frameworks – and exempt from political influence – GAC acquired a new Official Residence for its Consulate General in New York in 2024 to replace the previous costly and outdated property, which lacked barrier-free access.
The new Official Residence has barrier-free access, is strategically located and offers long-term value to Canadians, with operating costs cut in half through the sale of the former property.
Through a robust process supported by market analysis and third-party review of comparable properties, the former Official Residence is listed for sale; it was originally listed at U.S. $9.5 million, later adjusted to U.S. $8.65 million, and is now listed for U.S. $7.9 million (Sept. 2, 2025).

Unexplained health incidents

Health, safety, and security of diplomatic staff and families are our top priority.
Despite extensive efforts, the Interdepartmental Task Force found no clear cause for the symptoms and no evidence of a malicious act of a foreign actor.
The Government of Canada acknowledges the legitimacy of the symptoms and the impact on affected individuals and their families.

Supplementary messages

Since 2017, Canadian diplomats and dependents reported health incidents globally.
We are paying close attention to these reported health incidents, with medical support and follow-up investigations to protect the health and safety of Government of Canada staff and their families.
There is an ongoing litigation involving 33 employees of the Government of Canada and their dependants.

Background

In April 2017, Canada was informed by U.S. officials of unusual health symptoms affecting their personnel in Havana, Cuba, dating back to late 2016. Soon after, Canadian diplomats and their families reported similar symptoms.

The Government of Canada responded with a risk assessment, evacuated dependants, offered early departures, and reduced its diplomatic presence in Havana by 50% in January 2019.

The Havana mission was reclassified as an unaccompanied post, with shorter postings, increased hardship benefits, enhanced medical support, a rest and respite policy, and mandatory health briefings for all visiting officials.

Two main investigations were launched: a security investigation led by the RCMP, and a health study conducted by Dalhousie University and the Nova Scotia Health Authority. An environmental assessment examined pest control protocols.

Despite extensive efforts, the Interdepartmental Task Force found no clear cause for the symptoms and no evidence of a malicious act by a foreign actor.

In 2024, Global Affairs Canada published a report outlining the Government of Canada’s actions to protect its members and their families in Havana, Cuba and lifted some restrictions.

The Government of Canada acknowledges the legitimacy of the symptoms and the impact on affected individuals and their families.

In Octobre 2021, staff worldwide were invited to report any symptoms related to health incidents. A small number of reports have since been received from various locations, mostly reflecting past experiences. Each report has been met with medical support and follow-up investigations.

Litigation

In 2019, 17 Canada Based Staff (CBS) and their dependents filed a $55 million lawsuit against the Crown for injuries allegedly caused by unexplained health incidents (UHIs), while posted to the Canadian Embassy in Havana, Cuba.

The Plaintiffs allege negligence and breach of duty of care. They are represented by Waddell Phillips, in partnership with Howie, Sacks & Henry.

The Attorney General of Canada denies liability, arguing that the employees’ claims are barred under the provisions of the Government Employees Compensation Act, since they are entitled to workers’ compensation.

There is currently no litigation timeline for proceeding on the merits.

G7 agenda and costs

Canada successfully hosted the G7 Summit from June 15-17 in Kananaskis, Alberta, by leveraging a true Team Canada effort involving over 21 federal departments and agencies partnering with provincial, local and Indigenous authorities to showcase the best of Canada.
Canada’s G7 Presidency is a chance to shape the international agenda, champion issues of strategic importance and reaffirm the longstanding values of the G7: democracy, human rights, open markets and respect for international law.

Supplementary messages

As a G7 member, Canada assumes the Presidency and hosts the Summit every seven years. We have the responsibility to ensure the safety and security of world leaders attending the event. As noted in the December 2024 Fall Economic Statement, the Government of Canada allocated $714 million over two fiscal years for all the costs related to Canada’s 2025 G7 Presidency.

This includes the planning, delivery, security, and follow-up for the G7 Summit and all G7-related meetings, events and activities taking place over the course of Canada’s entire Presidency year.
These investments also drive local economic development, with the Calgary Chamber of Commerce estimating that this year’s Summit could generate approximately $190 million for the local economy and $240 million for Alberta overall.

Supporting facts and figures

Canada’s G7 Presidency runs from January 1 to December 31, 2025, and has so far involved organizing more than 250 events at the Leader, Ministerial and working levels. In the lead up to the Leaders’ Summit, Canada hosted two Ministerial meetings in Canada, and we will host four more Ministerial meetings in the Fall.
Canada delivered a “Made in Canada” Summit and as of September 2025, the Government of Canada awarded approximately $150 million in contracts to local businesses, including $40 million in the Bow Valley, $19 million in Banff, $50 million in the Calgary area and $41 million in the rest of Alberta.
In addition, $60 million has been invested in the region to permanently strengthen telecommunications infrastructure, including $20 million to upgrade the existing high-speed fiber-optic network connecting, and $40 million going toward expanding regional cellular coverage and capacity.

Background

G7 leaders delivered outcomes on some of the most pressing issues of our time: securing critical mineral supply chains; developing and adopting emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and quantum; fighting forest fires; and facing down threats like foreign interference and transnational crime.

Canada invited strategic outreach partners, including leaders from Australia, Brazil, India, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, South Africa and Ukraine, as well as NATO, the UN and the World Bank.

Consular services

Canadians seek consular services in moments of serious distress or difficulty abroad. Global Affairs Canada provides consular support without discrimination or judgement.
I as Minister have the authority, and the discretion, to provide consular assistance to Canadians. However, the support must be equitable and consistent. It must respect the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the sovereignty and legal systems of other countries, international law, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms along with other national laws.
This Ministerial authority provides a flexibility that allows us to react swiftly to unexpected international crises, such as unprecedented assistance to help Canadians get home during COVID-19.

Supplementary messages

We provide a spectrum of services to Canadians, including information on travel destinations so Canadians can make informed decisions on travel.

Once overseas, consular services include issuing passports, providing information on local services, and visiting Canadians who are arrested or detained to advocate for their fair and humane treatment.
In times of crisis, rapid onset instability or conflict, or natural disasters, we also have the capacity to support Canadians to leave, whether by sharing information on commercial options, or through assisted departures as a last resort.
On individual consular cases, we cannot share information about clients. We have an obligation to respect the personal information of Canadians under the Privacy Act.

Supporting facts and figures

Via our network of offices abroad, the 24/7 Operations Centre and more, we:
- respond annually to approximately 300,000 enquiries;
- open 7,000 new consular cases, helping Canadians facing medical emergencies, wellbeing concerns, deaths, arrests, and abductions.

Background

The delivery of consular services to Canadians abroad is a critical Government of Canada responsibility and a core GAC mandate. Consular services are delivered under the Crown Prerogative over foreign affairs. Authority to conduct all consular relations on behalf of Canada is assigned to the Minister of Foreign Affairs by the Department of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Development Act. There is no specific Canadian law that governs the provision of consular services, nor one that expressly obliges the Government of Canada to provide consular assistance. This affords GAC a certain level of discretion to balance consular service delivery with other elements of Canada’s foreign policy. The discretionary power is, however, limited by the Canadian Constitution, including the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; relevant Canadian legislation, such as the Privacy Act; and international conventions (such as the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations) and treaties to which Canada is party.

Consular responsibilities are exercised primarily by consular officials within a robust policy framework. GAC also leads a coordinated, whole-of-government response to hostage-takings, leveraging a range of diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, and military tools.

Bill C-219

Bill C-219 seeks to amend four laws – the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act, Special Economic Measures Act, Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law) as well as the Broadcasting Act.
The bill aims to strengthen Canada’s sanctions and human rights frameworks.
The bill requires the development of an annual report on human rights and seeks to align Canadian legislation with ally countries through the imposition of economic measures and visa bans, changing the name of SEMA and expanding its sanctions triggers, and providing a mechanism to remove broadcast licences from sanctioned entities.

Update

Bill C-219 was introduced in the House of Commons on September 16, 2025 by MP James Bezan. The bill is 24^th on the Order of Precedence and, barring trades, would be debated at second reading on November 27.

Supporting facts and figures

The Government takes a decentralized approach to supporting human rights defenders. Anchored in Voices at Risk: Canada’s Guidelines on Supporting Human Rights Defenders, Canadian officials across our global diplomatic network actively engage in outreach, support and advocacy to identify and support important cases of concern in their country/countries of accreditation.
Canada’s support for individual human rights defenders is complemented by strategic efforts to build norms and influence state behaviour at multilateral fora.
Further, when a human rights defender at risk is a Canadian citizen—regardless of whether they also have citizenship in the country in question—the case is considered a consular case, for which Canadian officials monitor situations closely, engage with local authorities, and provide consular assistance.
GAC’s Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM Canada) is active in detecting digital transnational repression globally using open-source research and data analytics. It leverages a full suite of diplomatic tools to respond to detected threats.
Under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), a foreign national is inadmissible to Canada if they are listed under either of Canada’s autonomous sanctions laws.
Canada’s sanctions asset seizure and forfeiture regime have procedural safeguards in place. Statutory recourse mechanisms and legal processes may be launched by parties, impacting the timelines for forfeiture.

Background

A few elements of Bill C-219 are very similar to Bill C-281 from the previous parliament, namely the human rights reporting provisions, a requirement for the Minister to respond to parliamentary recommendations for Magnitsky Law sanctions, and Broadcasting Act provisions. Bill C-281 passed through the House unanimously and was awaiting committee study in the Senate before the dissolution of the 44^th Parliament. That said, a large portion of C-219 includes new sanctions provisions.

Bill C-228

While we share the principles underlying Bill C-228, we believe that it risks undermining the agility and flexibility required to advance Canadian interests on the world stage, without significantly enhancing transparency.
The current Policy on the Tabling of Treaties, operative since 2008, already affords a high degree of transparency by the Government to Parliament and allows for considerable parliamentary participation.

Supplementary messages

The amendments contemplated in the Bill have the potential to cause significant delays in the treaty-making process, particularly for what the Bill defines as “major treaties” (including Free Trade Agreements and many other treaties).
The flexibility under the current Policy would be replaced by legislated requirements that could delay or impede ratification by making it illegal for the Government to continue the treaty-making process without “advice” of the House of Commons, hindering the ability of the Government to deliver results for Canadians and Canadian business.
The current Policy strikes a balance between ensuring transparency for Parliament and Canadians, and preserving the flexibility required for the Government in the interests of a timely and effective treaty-making process.

Background

The PMB C-228 seeks to add new elements to the current tabling process, including a requirement for the Minister of Foreign Affairs to obtain the advice of the House on “major treaties” through a parliamentary committee which must submit a report for this purpose “as soon as feasible” (a term not defined), prior to the Government taking actions to bind Canada. Exemptions from the tabling process are to be granted under “exceptional circumstances” by the Governor in Council by order and the reasons must be tabled. Currently, exemptions are granted by the Prime Minister or Cabinet. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke to the bill during the first hour of Second Reading debate in the House of Commons on October 21.

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Bill C-233

Human rights are important to Canada and to Canadians.
The government is studying Bill C-233 closely.
The government looks forward to learning more about this Bill in Second Reading.

Supplementary messages

All permit applications for controlled items are reviewed on a case-by-case basis under Canada’s robust framework, including against the Arms Trade Treaty criteria which are enshrined in Canada’s Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA).
Canada acceded to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2019.
To be eligible for accession, Canada made considerable changes to its export control legislation and framework.
Canada continues to participate actively in this treaty and to engage with civil society to ensure our regime remains on par with those of our allies.

Update

On September 19, 2025, NDP MP Kwan tabled Bill C-233 (An Act to amend the Export and Import Permits Act) in Parliament. Second reading of this Bill is expected to occur by mid-November 2025. The Bill proposed several changes to the Export and Import Permits Act and Canada’s long standing export control regime.

Supporting facts and figures

Canada acceded to the Arms Trade Treaty in 2019 further to amendments to the Export and Import Permits Act, its regulations and policies and practices.
Canada went beyond the ATT requirements by embedding the ATT criteria and risk test in domestic legislation.
Canada applies the ATT criteria to more than the full system conventional arms captured in Article 2 of the ATT, to include parts and components.

Background

Officials are closely studying this Bill to better understand its potential impacts on Canadians and for Canada. Briefing products are being prepared.

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Date modified:: 2026-02-23

Appearance before the House of Commons Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs and International Development (FAAE)

Table of Contents

Scenario note

Committee context

FAAE members’ biographies

Ahmed Hussen (Chair)LPC – Ontario (Etobicoke – York South – Weston)

Election to the House of Commons

Professional background

Offices and roles as a parliamentarian

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

Areas of interest to Global Affairs Canada

Private Member’s Motion M-14: Canada’s International Development Assistance

Middle East: Israel and Gaza

Afghan refugees

Haiti

Michael D. Chong (Vice-Chair)CPC – Ontario (Wellington – Halton Hills)

Critic

Election to the House of Commons

Professional background

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

Areas of interest to Global Affairs Canada

Arctic sovereignty

Middle East: Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank

China: Human rights and foreign interference

Sudan: Sanctions

Ukraine/Russia: Sanctions

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe (Vice-Chair)BQ – Québec (Lac-Saint-Jean)

Critic

Election to the House of Commons

Professional background

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

Haiti

Human Rights and International Advocacy

Afghanistan

Ziad AboultaifCPC – Alberta (Edmonton - Manning)

Election to the House of Commons

Professional background

Notable political roles

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

Areas of interest to Global Affairs Canada

Arctic sovereignty

Russian incursions and NATO response

Haiti

Export of LNG and energy infrastructure

Canada’s approach to Africa

Canadian diplomacy

Lianne RoodCPC – Ontario (Middlesex – London)

Critic

Election to the House of Commons

Professional background

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

Areas of interest to Global Affairs Canada

Arctic sovereignty

Russian incursions and NATO response

International trade

Shelby Kramp-NeumanCPC – Ontario (Hastings – Lennox and Addington – Tyendinaga)

Critic

Election to the House of Commons

Professional background

Areas of interest to Global Affairs Canada

Arctic sovereignty

Russian incursions and NATO response

Haiti

Trade and tariff policy

Defense, NATO, and NORAD

Arctic sovereignty

Canada–Ukraine relations and humanitarian response

Bill BlairLPC – Ontario (Scarborough Southwest)

Election to the House of Commons

Professional background

Offices and roles as a parliamentarian

Global Affairs Canada-relevant committee memberships

Areas of interest to Global Affairs Canada

Arctic sovereignty

Russian incursions and NATO response

Haiti

Arctic sovereignty and international relations

Mona FortierLPC – Ontario (Ottawa—Vanier—Gloucester)

Election to the House of Commons

Professional background

Ahmed Hussen (Chair)
LPC – Ontario (Etobicoke – York South – Weston)

Michael D. Chong (Vice-Chair)
CPC – Ontario (Wellington – Halton Hills)

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe (Vice-Chair)
BQ – Québec (Lac-Saint-Jean)

Ziad Aboultaif
CPC – Alberta (Edmonton - Manning)

Lianne Rood
CPC – Ontario (Middlesex – London)

Shelby Kramp-Neuman
CPC – Ontario (Hastings – Lennox and Addington – Tyendinaga)

Bill Blair
LPC – Ontario (Scarborough Southwest)

Mona Fortier
LPC – Ontario (Ottawa—Vanier—Gloucester)

Robert Oliphant
LPC – Ontario (Don Valley West)

Anita Vandenbeld
LPC – Ontario (Ottawa West – Nepean)