Minister of International Trade appearance before the Committee of the Whole – Issues binder

June 10, 2025
Published: October 2, 2025

Table of contents

• Scenario note
• Trade negotiations
• Trade diversification
• Canada-U.S. commercial relations
• Canada-U.S. trade issues
• Canada-China trade relationship
• Canada-India trade relationship
• Economic security issues
• G7 trade track
• Responsible business conduct and inclusive trade issues
• Key trade statistics
• 2025-26 main estimates overview - Year-over-year changes
• Organizational estimates- GAC
• Statistics document
  • Export controls
  • Export Development Canada
  • Foreign direct investment
  • Foreign Trade Agreements with Latin American partners
  • Invest In Canada
  • Team Canada trade missions
• Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement tracker
• Team Canada Trade Missions placemat
• Supplemental estimates questions and answers document
• Indo-Pacific Engagement Initiative
• Standalone document
  • Asia Pacific Secretariat Cooperation (APEC)
  • APEC Business Advisory Council
  • Can Export
  • International Energy Agency
  • Canadian Trade Gateway in Southeast Asia
  • International Renewable Energy Agency
  • Nuclear Energy Agency
  • Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
• Bill C-202 supply management
• The Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Business Conduct (CORE)
• Canadian arms exports to Israel

Scenario note

House of Commons (6:30-7pm for up to (4) four hours)

In person

Context

• You will appear before a Committee of the Whole meeting of the House of Commons on the Main Estimates 2025-26 for a four-hour session on the evening of Tuesday, June 10, following adjournment proceedings (roughly 6:30-7pm for a maximum of up to (4) four hours). Expected Minister appearing alongside you is Minister Champagne (Finance).
• You will appear in-person before the House of Commons. Deputy Minister Rob Stewart will sit at a table on the floor of the House Chamber close to you, so that he is able to pass you talking points if needed. The Deputy Minister will be in contact with departmental officials in case additional information is required.

Format

• MPs are granted 15-minute speaking slots, which alternate between political parties. We anticipate roughly half of the speaking slots will go to the Government, with the other half mainly to the Official Opposition with four reserved for other parties.
• For their speaking slots, government MPs typically make use of the full ten minutes of allowed speech time, followed by five minutes of questions to ministers. Using the maximum allowable speaking time allows ministers time to prepare between opposition segments. Note that during speaking slots allocated to ministers, the five minutes of questions come from members of their caucus.
• Most Opposition MPs are expected to devote their full 15-minute segments for questions to ministers. As with Question Period, ministers are expected to calibrate the length of their response to match the length of the question. MPs will frequently adopt different styles of questioning that keep ministers engaged: some will ask a series of short, rapid-fire questions, pressing ministers to respond in kind; others will unexpectedly and frequently change topics, challenging ministers to keep up. Opposition members may also divide their time with MPs within their party.

Topics

• Topics of discussion should only cover files falling under your purview. However, it is possible that questions on broader topics – such as U.S trade generally—may arise.

Trade negotiations

• Trade agreements with new partners support stability and predictability and provide new opportunities for Canadian businesses and workers in a time of mounting protectionism.
• Canada has an active trade negotiations agenda focused on deepening ties and expanding our access to markets in the Indo-Pacific and Latin America, in particular.

Supplementary messages

• The Government stands ready to engage with the United States and Mexico if there is a push to revisit CUSMA before the planned July 2026 start.  
• While the United States remains central to our international trade priorities, recent U.S. actions reinforce the need for Canada to diversify our trade including through the negotiation of trade agreements with new partners.
• We are actively working to expand our access to the Indo-Pacific region, including by negotiating an FTA with ASEAN, exploring an FTA with the Philippines, considering the addition of new economies to the CPTPP, and moving towards the signature and ratification of the Canada-Indonesia CEPA following the conclusion of negotiations in December 2024.
• In the Latin America region, we are working towards the signature and ratification of the Canada-Ecuador FTA following the conclusion of negotiations in January 2025, and are exploring the resumption of FTA negotiations with Mercosur, a group that includes G20 members Argentina and Brazil as well as Paraguay and Uruguay.

Background 

Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA)

CUSMA includes a commitment to jointly review the Agreement starting on the sixth anniversary of its entry into force (July 1, 2026), a forum that also provides the opportunity for the Parties to make specific proposals to amend the Agreement. Canada is ready to engage the United States and Mexico on the review, including areas of potential adjustment, at any time. Priorities for Canada will be to keep the review as narrow and targeted as possible, preserve market access into the United States, to target areas that are in Canada’s interest to modernize (e.g. economic security), and to secure a prompt 16-year extension of the Agreement’s term.

Canada-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)

The CEPA will improve market access conditions for Canada’s goods exports in the eighth-largest economy in the world through tariff elimination for a majority of goods and addressing non-tariff measures and other issues adversely affecting Canada’s exports (e.g. sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, and good regulatory practices). The CEPA will also provide greater predictability and transparency for Canadian service providers and investors across a range of sectors. The conclusion of the CEPA comes at a critical time when Canadian businesses are seeking to diversify their exports and enter new markets.

Canada-ASEAN FTA

Canada and the ten ASEAN member states (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) launched FTA negotiations in 2021. A comprehensive FTA would provide Canada with new preferential market access to key economies in Southeast Asia, including Thailand and the Philippines, bolstering existing trade and investment, and promoting further integration into global supply chains for Canadian businesses. In 2024, annual two-way merchandise trade between Canada and ASEAN was CA$41.9 billion, an increase of 8% from CA$38.8 billion in 2023.

Canada-Philippines FTA Exploratory Discussions

On December 5, 2024, Canada and the Philippines announced the launch of exploratory discussions for a potential FTA. The objective of these exploratory discussions is to explore how a potential Canada-Philippines FTA could build upon the outcomes of an FTA with ASEAN and allow for the further elimination of barriers to trade between our countries. The Philippines was Canada’s third largest export market in ASEAN in 2024, with bilateral trade reaching CA$3.1 billion, of which CA$1.4 billion in exports and CA$1.7 billion in imports.

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)

The CPTPP is the most comprehensive, high-standard trade agreement in the Asia-Pacific region, comprised of 12 members: Canada, Australia, Brunei, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam. The CPTPP creates a trade bloc of 594 million consumers and 14.4% of the global economy.   The CPTPP is designed to evolve and expand over time, including through a periodic review of the Agreement’s implementation and the accession of new economies. Canada has committed to initiate the implementation process for the ratification of the United Kingdom’s CPTPP Accession Protocol, but this process has not been initiated. Following the Policy on Tabling of Treaties in Parliament, the first step of the implementation process would require the Government to table the protocol in Parliament for at least 21 sitting days. This process would then be followed by the introduction of implementing legislation in the House of Commons. Accession negotiations are ongoing with Costa Rica, during which it must demonstrate compliance with the CPTPP’s existing rules and provide meaningful market access. China, Ecuador, Indonesia, Taiwan, Ukraine, and Uruguay have also applied for accession.

Canada-UK Trade Continuity Agreement (TCA) and Paused Canada-UK FTA Negotiations

The TCA entered into force in April 2021, following the UK’s exit from the European Union and the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The TCA does not expire and provides tariff free access for 99% of tariff lines.

Negotiations towards a new Canada-UK bilateral FTA were held from 2022 to January 2024. [REDACTED]

Canada-Ecuador FTA

Conclusion of the Canada-Ecuador FTA negotiations was announced on February 4, 2025. This FTA will further bolster an already burgeoning bilateral trade relationship between Canada and Ecuador, which has been steadily increasing in recent years, reaching nearly CA$1.9 billion in 2024. Canadian companies are among the largest foreign investors in Ecuador, with Canadian direct investment totalling CA$4.3 billion in 2024. Officials are working on the legal review and translation of the agreement, with a commitment to bringing the agreement into force as soon as possible.

Canada-Mercosur FTA

Mercosur is a trading bloc and customs union consisting of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay (though Bolivia is implementing the group’s internal rules until 2028 and is not party to FTA negotiations with Canada). Together, the bloc represents a collective real Gross Domestic Product of over US$3.0 trillion, and a combined population of 282 million as of 2024. FTA negotiations were launched in March 2018 with seven rounds of negotiations held, the most recent taking place in Ottawa in August 2019. There has been no further engagement since 2020. Brazil is Mercosur’s permanent coordinator for FTA negotiations with Canada and will hold the bloc’s pro-tempore presidency from July to December 2025. 

Trade diversification

• Securing Canada’s future prosperity will require expanding and diversifying our trade with reliable partners around the globe.
• The Government is working to expand Canada’s network of free trade agreements, which already cover economies representing 61% of global GDP.
• The Government is working to connect Canadian businesses with new opportunities through Team Canada Trade Missions, and by ensuring effective support by Canada’s Trade Commissioner Service and Export Development Canada.

Supplementary messages

• Trade represents two-thirds of Canada’s GDP. Exports support nearly 3.3 million – or 1 in 6 – Canadian jobs. It is essential that Canadian companies can maximize their international growth potential, including in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region.
• As Canada navigates the shift in U.S. trade and economic policy, we will look to maximize the benefits of existing free trade agreements like CETA and CPTPP, and advance free trade negotiations with partners such as ASEAN and Mercosur.
• Since 2023 and as part of Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, Team Canada Trade Missions have connected over 800 Canadian organizations with opportunities in 9 markets across the Indo-Pacific.

Update

 The Prime Minister’s May 21 mandate letter to the Ministry identified “strengthening our collaboration with reliable trading partners and allies around the world” as a key priority. The letter also noted that Canada must build new infrastructure to “diversify our trading relationships”. The Speech from the Throne noted that “the Government is working to strengthen its relationships with reliable trading partners and allies around the world”.

Supporting facts and figures

• Canadian exports to non-US markets increased over 50% between 2017 and 2024. However, Canadian exports remain concentrated in the US market: 70% of Canada’s goods and service exports went to the US in 2024.
• Canada’s Trade Commissioner Service served over 10,000 Canadian businesses in 2024-25. 80% of services were for markets outside of North America. In 2024, Export Development Canda (EDC) served over 1,500 customers and facilitated $13 billion in business in the Indo-Pacific region.
• The Indo-Pacific is the world’s fastest-growing economic region and accounts for two-thirds of the global population. The Indo-Pacific is likely to make up two-thirds of the middle class by 2030, and over half of global GDP by 2040.
• The CPTPP provides Canada with preferential access to a market of 594 million consumers. Since entry into force in 2019, Canada’s merchandise trade increased by 42.9% with the CPTPP’s seven Indo-Pacific markets; merchandise exports to these countries increasing by 24.3%.
• The CEPA with Indonesia will level the playing field for Canadian business vis-à-vis some competitors and provide first mover advantage vis-à-vis others (EU and US). Canadian merchandise exports to Indonesia were $2.3 billion in 2024, making in Canada’s largest export market in Southeast Asia.
• ASEAN represents an economy of 600 million people across ten countries, positioning it as the fifth largest economic bloc worldwide, and is Canada’s fourth largest merchandise trading partner. Merchandise trade between Canada and ASEAN was $41.9 billion in 2024. A free trade agreement with ASEAN is expected to add US$2.54 billion to Canada’s GDP.
• The Mercosur bloc represents over US$3.0 trillion in GDP and 282 million consumers. Canada’s merchandise trade with Mercosur totalled $15.8 billion in 2024.

Background

Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Team Canada Trade Missions: Launched in November 2022, Canada’s IPS addresses a wide range of strategic priorities for this strategically important region, including defence and security, trade and economic cooperation, international assistance, as well as environment and climate change. The Strategy includes new investments and paid-in capital totalling $2.3 billion and comprising 24 initiatives across 17 government departments and agencies. A key component of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, Team Canada Trade Missions (TCTMs) are large, diverse, and multi-sectoral Minister-led delegations that also welcome representation from all levels of government, generating significant impact and demonstrating the “Team Canada” approach to supporting Canadian exporters and innovators access new and important markets. Full-scale TCTMs have been led to nine markets so far. These missions have already yielded immediate or short-term successes and promising outcomes, such as the signature of sales contracts, MOUs, and NDAs that have been reported by companies, and with more anticipated to develop over time.

CPTPP

The CPTPP is designed to evolve and expand. The CPTPP is in force between Canada and all CPTPP countries except the UK (pending ratification action by Canada). To date, China, Taiwan, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Ukraine and Uruguay have applied. Parties are currently negotiating Costa Rica’s potential accession.

ASEAN

Canada and the ten ASEAN member states (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) are seeking to conclude FTA negotiations as soon as possible. An FTA with ASEAN enjoys broad support in Canada (across provinces and territories as well as stakeholders from various industries) and offers significant opportunities for Canadian businesses across a broad range of sectors, including agriculture and agri-food, fish and seafood, natural resources, manufacturing, and financial services.

Mercosur

The South American Common Market (Mercosur) is a trading bloc and customs union consisting of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Canada and Mercosur launched FTA negotiations in March 2018. Negotiations have been on hold since 2020. Brazil is Mercosur’s permanent coordinator for FTA negotiations with Canada and will hold the bloc’s pro-tempore presidency from July to December 2025 (note: Bolivia, currently undergoing implementation of the group’s internal rules until 2028, is not party to the FTA negotiations).

Canada-U.S. commercial relations

• The Prime Minister and President Trump have begun defining a new economic and security relationship between Canada and the U.S., rooted in mutual respect and founded on common interests, to deliver transformational benefits for both sovereign nations.
• Canada and the U.S. share the world’s most integrated and mutually beneficial trade partnership, exchanging nearly $3.6 billion in goods and services daily.
• We will continue to work to maintain CUSMA benefits, mitigate future tariff threats, and secure market access for Canadian exports to the United States.

Supplementary messages

• Nearly 8 million U.S. jobs depend on trade with Canada, while 2.6 million Canadian jobs depend on exports to the U.S.
• S. tariffs against Canada hurt American consumers and American manufacturers.

Update

The United States under President Trump has introduced several unilateral trade actions. Amid evolving U.S. trade policies Canada is advancing its trade diversification strategy and in parallel defining a new economic and security cooperation relationship. Canada continues to reinforce bilateral cooperation with the United States through high-level engagement, joint initiatives, and enhanced support for Canadian exporters and investors. Efforts remain focused on ensuring market access, regulatory alignment, and resilient supply chains across North America.

Supporting facts and figures

• In 2024, Canada exported $596B in merchandise to the U.S.
• Canada imported $376B in merchandise from the U.S. in 2024.
• S. had a $64.2B trade deficit with Canada in 2024 due to energy; surplus of $34.3B excluding energy.
• The U.S. ranked as the largest recipient country of Canadian direct investment abroad (CDIA) stock in 2024, receiving 52% of CDIA stock on Immediate investing Country (IIC) basis.
• S. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Canada in 2024: 51% of total FDI stock Ultimate investment country (UIC) basis.
• 66% of U.S. FDI in Canada concentrated in three sectors: management, finance and manufacturing.
• Over 70% of Canadian exports go to the U.S.
• Canada operates 16 missions with 180 TCS employees in the U.S.; TCS served 2,391 clients in 2023–24.

Background 

Canada and the United States maintain one of the closest and most integrated economic relationships in the world, underpinned by the CUSMA. The U.S. is Canada’s largest trading partner, principal export destination, and top source of foreign direct investment (FDI). Canadian exports to the U.S. span several key sectors, including automotive, defence, agriculture and agri-food, information and communication technologies, and life sciences. Approximately 70.3% of Canadian exports are destined for the U.S., and over 70% of those exports are integrated into American manufacturing supply chains. Bilateral trade supports nearly 8 million U.S. jobs, underscoring the mutual benefits of the relationship.

The second Trump administration has introduced a series of policy shifts that are reshaping the global trade environment. A renewed focus on economic nationalism and protectionist measures has created new risks for Canada–U.S. commercial relations. These developments have implications not only for trade and investment, but also for cooperation on climate change, research, defense, and cross-border security.

Canada is increasingly concerned about the potential for unilateral U.S. actions that may conflict with Canadian interests, including in the Arctic and along the shared border. The administration's stance presents ongoing challenges to Canada’s economic resilience and strategic sovereignty.

The administration’s “America First” doctrine seeks to withdraw the U.S. from certain global leadership roles and prioritize strategic competition with China. This approach is designed to realign trade relationships in favour of U.S. interests, often at the expense of multilateral rules and norms. For Canada and other like-minded countries, this creates both challenges and an opportunity to reinforce international cooperation and rule-based trade.

While Canada–U.S. commercial ties remain strong, the evolving U.S. trade posture requires ongoing diplomatic engagement, risk mitigation, and strategic planning. Canada remains committed to preserving the benefits of CUSMA, strengthening supply chain resilience, and enhancing trade diversification to reduce exposure to future disruptions.

Canada-U.S. trade issues 

• Canada continues to face unjustified U.S. tariffs related to alleged border/fentanyl issues as well as Section 232 tariffs on steel, aluminum, and autos.
• Recognize possibility that United States may push to review CUSMA earlier than July 2026; Canada ready to engage trilaterally.
• We will continue to strongly defend Canadian interests and support Canadian businesses and exporters, including in the steel, autos, and lumber sectors, which are central to the Canadian economy.

Supplementary messages

• Encouraged by the decision of the U.S. Court of International Trade that the tariffs applied by the United States under the IEEPA are invalid, including those imposed against Canada due to alleged border/fentanyl concerns. We will continue to monitor developments.
• Resources for Canadian exporters are available on the Trade Commissioner Service website, through a dedicated 1-800 support line and from the network of Trade Commissioners across the U.S. market.
• We are aware that the U.S. administration is conducting a series of Section 232 investigations on the grounds of national security. Imports from Canada do not threaten, but rather enhance, economic and national security of United States, and we have conveyed this position in formal submissions.
• Disappointed by continued U.S. duties on Canadian softwood lumber, and U.S. decision to significantly increase them later this year. 

Supporting facts and figures

• In 2024, Canada’s exports of autos and light trucks to the United States were valued at C$46.4 billion (93.2% of global exports of vehicles by value) representing 1,134,274 units (85% of global exports of vehicles by quantity). Canada’s exports of auto parts to the U.S. were valued at C$35.2 billion (88.8% of global exports of auto parts).
• $18 billion in steel goods are traded annually between Canada and the U.S.; Canada is the fourth largest aluminum producer in the world with an annual capacity of roughly 3.3 million tonnes. Approx. 89% of total Canadian production is exported, 95% of which is destined for the U.S. Canada supplies 60% of U.S. primary aluminum demand.
• In 2024, Canada exported $7.6 billion in softwood lumber products to the United States; most Canadian companies currently subject to 14.40% combined duty rate.

Background 

U.S. Tariffs

The United States has imposed unjustified tariffs against Canadian goods, in violation of WTO and CUSMA obligations.

IEEPA tariffs

Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), on March 4 the United States imposed a 25% tariff on imports from Canada, with 10% on energy products including critical minerals and potash. Effective March 7 (no end date identified), U.S. tariffs were paused for imports from Canada that qualify for preferential treatment under the CUSMA (i.e. are “CUSMA compliant”).

Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum

Global 25% tariffs under Section 232 on steel and aluminum imports, including derivative products, effective March 12. There is no exemption for CUSMA compliant goods in these sectors. On May 30, President Trump threatened to increase these to 50% effective June 4.

Section 232 tariffs on autos

Global 25% tariffs under Section 232 on imports of automobiles and on non-CUSMA compliant auto parts, effective April 3. The tariffs on automobiles apply to the non-U.S. content of vehicles imported under CUSMA, and to the full value of vehicles not imported under CUSMA. CUSMA compliant auto parts are currently not subject to 25% tariffs, until the Department of Commerce establishes a process to apply the tariffs exclusively to the non-U.S. content of auto parts.

Canada has responded appropriately and will maintain its retaliatory tariffs until the United States withdraws its unjustified tariffs against Canada. On May 28, the United States Court of International Trade (CIT) declared all the IEEPA tariffs invalid and granted a permanent injunction; on May 29, the Federal Circuit granted an administrative stay, with a ruling on the issue of a stay of the injunction pending appeals by mid-June.

Section 232 investigations

Since February 2025, the U.S. administration has initiated seven investigations under Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962:

• timber/lumber;
• copper;
• pharmaceuticals;
• semiconductors;
• medium and heavy trucks;
• critical minerals;
• commercial aircrafts; and
• jet engines.

CUSMA review

CUSMA includes a commitment to jointly review the Agreement around July 1, 2026. The United States may push for an earlier review, and has noted rules of origin, market access expansion (dairy), and Mexico’s energy sector as priorities for “renegotiation”, among other alleged irritants. Canada’s priorities are to keep the review as targeted as possible, preserve market access into the United States, to target areas that are in Canada’s interest to modernize (e.g. economic security), and to secure a prompt 16-year extension of the Agreement’s term.

Softwood lumber

The United States has been imposing anti-dumping and countervailing duties on Canadian softwood lumber since 2017. Commerce intends to increase the combined duty rate applicable to most companies to about 35% by mid-October. In addition to duties, the Canadian softwood lumber industry is facing challenges related to fibre constraints, labour shortages, transportation issues, and the threat of additional U.S. tariffs (i.e. Section 232). Canada believes a negotiated outcome is in both countries’ best interest. Canadian lumber supports well-paying jobs across the country and complements U.S. production to meet the needs of U.S. homebuilders. Canada is continuing to pursue legal challenges against U.S. duties through various international dispute settlement fora.  

Canada-China trade relationship

• Canada and China have a broad and expansive trade relationship; however these trade relations have been strained in recent years.
• Canada has longstanding concerns with Chinese trade practices, and we seek continued dialogue with China to ensure it abides by its existing obligations.
• Our government will – at all times – stand up for Canadians and defend them from the harmful effects of unfair trade practices.

Supplementary messages 

• We are committed to ensuring a level playing field for Canadian businesses. This includes addressing China’s non-market policies and practices that undermine the principles of fair, rules-based trade.
• Canada’s surtaxes respond to China’s unfair trade practices, including problematic labour and environmental standards, that lower production costs and lead to significant market distortions. 
• On June 3, I met with Minister Wang and raised Canada’s concern on Chinese trade barriers affecting Canadian agricultural, agri-food, and fish and seafood products, including China’s recent decision to apply unjustified tariffs.
• Canada will continue to engage constructively and pragmatically with China to protect Canadian interests.

Supporting facts and figures

• In 2024, China’s merchandise trade with Canada totaled $118.4 billion (1.1% lower than 2023).
• China’s foreign direct investment into Canada was $37 billion (down from $37.4 billion in 2022), while the stock of Canada’s direct investment into China was $14.9 billion (up from $14.2 billion in 2022).
• Canadian merchandise exports to China were $29.8 billion, accounting for 3.8% of total Canadian merchandise exports.
• In 2024, two-way service trade totaled $12 billion, with Canada exporting $7.9 billion worth of service to China and importing $4.2 billion of service from China.
• China’s action against Canada targets 72 tariff lines, affecting $3.6 billion of Canadian exports, equivalent to 5.6% of China’s total imports from Canada in 2024.  
• 8 tariff lines subject to 100% duties (e.g., canola oil, meal, and peas) ($1.4 billion) 
• 64 tariff lines subject to 25% duties (pork, fish seafood) ($2.2 billion).  
• There are 49 affected fish and seafood products, including crab, shrimp, prawn, clams, lobster, sea cucumber, geoduck, and halibut. In 2024, Canadian exports of these products totaled approximately $1.3 billion. 

Background  

While China remains an important market for Canadian businesses, commercial engagement with China carries risks, including arbitrary application of regulatory and market access barriers; forced technology transfer; intellectual property theft; market-distorting actions of state-owned enterprises; the use of forced labour; economic coercion; and harmful industrial subsidies. Canada continues to seek avenues of mutual interest to expand and enhance commercial opportunities through the removal of Chinese market access barriers and prudent promotion.

On August 26, 2024, Canada announced that it would implement a 100% surtax on Chinese-made electric vehicles (EVs), effective October 1, 2024, and a 25% surtax on steel and aluminum products from China, that came into effect October 22, 2025. Canada’s measures were taken as an exceptional response to the threat posed by unfair competition from Chinese producers, who benefit from China’s intentional, state-directed policy aimed at achieving global dominance in strategic sectors, as well as its lack of rigorous labour and environmental standards. These unfair Chinese practices benefit Chinese-made EVs, steel and aluminum and have an adverse impact on Canadian businesses, workers and consumers.   

In response, China initiated a number of trade actions, including requesting WTO dispute settlement consultations (DS627) on Canada’s surtaxes on Chinese EVs, steel and aluminum. On April 7, Canada and China engaged in WTO dispute settlement consultations, which did not resolve the dispute. On May 23, Canada blocked China’s first request for the establishment of a dispute settlement panel at the WTO. The panel will be established following China’s second request for a panel, which will likely be on June 23, 2025. 

On September 26, 2024, China launched a domestic “anti-discrimination” investigation against Canada under its Foreign Trade Law. This is the first time China has undertaken such an investigation under this law. Following the conclusion of the investigation on March 8, China announced it would impose 100% tariffs on Canadian canola oil, canola meal, and peas, as well as 25% tariffs on 49 fish and seafood products, and 15 pork products, effective March 20, 2025. Canada initiated a WTO dispute settlement process (DS 636) against China’s actions on March 20. Consultations took place on April 23, 2025, but failed to resolve the matter. On June 5, 2025, Canada made its first request to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to establish a panel.  

To support the agricultural sector producers affected by current trade disruptions, enhancements were made to the AgriStability Program, including increasing the compensation rate from 80% to 90% and raising the payment cap from $3 million to $6 million for the 2025 program year. 

On June 3, 2025, Minister Sidhu met with China’s Minister Wang (MOFCOM), on the margins of the WTO Mini-Ministerial Meeting in Paris.  Ministers agreed to take steps to reengage in constructive dialogue. They agreed to convene the Joint Economic and Trade Commission (JETC), to provide a forum for officials to resolve bilateral trade irritants. On June 5, PM Carney spoke with China’s Premier Li. They agreed to regularize channels of communication between Canada and China, and noted Trade Ministers’ commitment to reconvene the JETC to address outstanding trade issues. 

Canada-India trade relationship

• India is an important partner for Canada. Our shared history, commercial interests, and people-to-people ties run deep.
• The Government of Canada remains committed to supporting the well-established commercial ties between Canada and India, and two-way trade has continued to increase.

Supplementary messages

• Both India and Canada have publicly stated that current bilateral tensions should not obstruct our long-standing commercial ties.
• If asked about trade negotiations: Canada is not currently negotiating a trade agreement with India.

Update 

If anticipated meeting with India’s Commerce and Industry Minister Goyal comes together on margins of 3-4 June 2025 OECD Ministerial meeting, that could inform an update.

Supporting facts and figures

• Trade flows overview: Canada’s exports of goods and services to India grew 6.3% in 2024 to reach $20.5 billion, while imports grew by 8.6% to reach $9.5 billion.
• Trade flows breakdown (goods): Goods exports to India were $5.4 billion in 2024, up 2.9% from 2023. Goods imports from India were $5.9 billion in 2024, up 7.5% from 2023.
• Trade flows breakdown (services): Services exports to India were $14.1 billion (mainly travel spending) in 2023 up 55.7% from 2022. Services imports from India were $3.2 billion (mainly commercial services) in 2023 down 3.2% from 2022.
• Direct investment: In 2024, the Canadian direct investment position in India was $5.6 billion, up 16.3% from 2023. The direct investment position from India in Canada was $1.7 billion, down 22.2% from 2023.
• Portfolio investment: In 2024, the Canadian portfolio investment in India was $47.3 billion, up 16.7% from 2023.

Background 

The Trade Commissioner Service continues to work closely with partners, including Export Development Canada, Canadian provincial offices in India and business chambers to offer services to Canadian companies and organisations and support investment attraction activities.

Canada has held trade negotiations with India on and off since 2010. Most recently, Canada and India paused trade negotiations in August 2023.

The Sixth Ministerial Dialogue on Trade and Investment (MDTI) biennial forum was hosted in Canada in May 2023. Noteworthy deliverables included a coordinated investment promotion MOU, intended to preferably be concluded in fall 2023; a MINT-led Team Canada trade mission to India scheduled for October 2023; and the re-establishment of a Canada-India CEO Forum, all now paused.

There have been no discussions with India about the next MDTI which, under normal circumstances would take place in 2025.

Economic security issues

• Economic security threats can harm our national security, compromise our supply chains, hollow out strategic sectors, and hurt Canadian competitiveness, jobs, and prosperity.
• Government has broad and flexible tools and is adapting approaches to address evolving challenges.
• Canada well placed as a reliable and strategic trading partner, building on strengths in energy, technology, and innovation.

Supplementary messages – Forced labour import ban 

• Forced labour is an abhorrent human rights abuse that affects millions of men, women, and children around the world.  
• In 2020 Canada introduced a prohibition on goods produced with forced and compulsory labour, becoming the second country to do so after the U.S.  
• The Government of Canada remains committed to eliminating forced labour from global supply chains including by strengthening Canada’s import ban on goods made with forced labour. 

Supporting facts and figures

• Canada has many economic security tools (e.g., export and import controls, foreign investment reviews, trade remedies, surtaxes, policies on research security and sensitive technology, and a ban on import of goods produced by forced labour).
• Canada cooperates closely with key partners (e.g., US, EU, UK, Japan, Korea, Australia). Economic security and resilience a theme of Canada’s G7 presidency.
• Global Affairs Canada held public consultations on potential new measures to advance and defend Canada’s economic security interests in Aug-Sept 2024.
• According to the International Labour Organization, in 2023 there were approximately 28 million people in situations of forced labour worldwide.   
• Since 2021 CBSA has intercepted and detained approximately 50 shipments over potential forced labour concerns. Of these interceptions, 33 took place in 2024, one of which was determined to be produced by means of forced labour and was therefore prohibited entry into the Canadian marketplace. 

Background 

The concept of economic security is broad and evolving. It refers to protecting Canada from economic-based threats and ensuring economic resilience, which is becoming increasingly complex in the face of heightened geopolitical competition and strains on global rules and norms. Protecting Canada from threats requires safeguarding strategic sectors of the economy, such as critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, emerging tech, health, and defence sectors, as these are vital for Canada’s national security and future prosperity. Economic security threats include:

• efforts to exploit pathways into the Canadian economy (e.g., foreign investments and research partnerships that are risks to of economic assets, technology and innovation, cyber and critical infrastructure risks);
• risks from overdependencies and concentrations in trade, which represent potential chokepoints for coercion and exposure to shocks; and,
• efforts by some states to create market dominance, such as using unfair trade practices that can distort markets and hollow out strategic sectors.

Threats are increasing coming from non-traditional sources (states and entities), including recent actions by the U.S. Protecting against these threats will be essential to support a new era of Canadian growth, efforts to become an energy superpower, and development of nation-building projects. A whole-of-government effort to ensure Canada’s economic security includes:

• Strengthening and coordinated use of targeted tools (e.g. investment screening, export controls, surtaxes) to address evolving risks and close gaps;
• Diversification of trade and investment with reliable trading partners;
• Coordinating efforts with partners bilaterally and in key fora (e.g. G7) to minimize inadvertent harms and support rules-based trade; and

Forced labour

To meet Canada’s commitments under CUSMA, in July 2020 Canada introduced an import ban under the Customs Tariff on goods mined, manufactured or produced by forced labour. The import ban was updated in March 2023 with the passing of the Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act, which requires certain entities and government institutions to report on steps taken to prevent and reduce risks of forced labour in their supply chains. The Act came into force on January 1, 2024. 

[REDACTED]

G7 trade track   

• On June 4, I was pleased to host a G7 Trade Ministers’ meeting in Paris for productive discussions on the global trade environment and to explore ways to foster collaboration in support of economic growth, jobs and long-term prosperity.
• As part of its G7 Presidency, Canada is leveraging the G7 Trade Track to advance its international trade interests and to foster collaboration and convergence among G7 members on areas of common interest.
• Canada’s priority is to promote stability, transparency and fair competition as businesses continue to face the pressures of global economic uncertainty and trade disruptions.

Supplementary messages

• In the G7 Trade Track, we are working closely with our G7 partners to address non-market policies and practices that distort trade and investment, and harm workers and businesses.
• Partners have also shared best practices to strengthen and secure more inclusive and resilient supply chains, including from the perspective of small and medium sized enterprises, eliminating the use of forced labour in global supply chains, and addressing environment-related illicit trade.
• Canada believes that lasting prosperity depends on a shared commitment to open markets and a rules-based trading system – one that ensures businesses of all sizes can compete on equal footing and access stable and diverse markets. 
• To that end, Canada will continue to strengthen collaboration with international partners to protect and improve the global trading system for the benefit of Canadian businesses and workers, and the broader global economy.

Background 

Under Canada's leadership, the G7 Trade Track is focusing on advancing constructive engagement on shared interests under three themes:

• Enhancing Economic Security, Resilience and Prosperity: Canada is concerned about non-market policies and practices (NMPPs) that distort trade and investment and harm workers and businesses. We see value in continued G7 collaboration to better understand and address NMPPs, fostering a level playing field.
• Navigating Challenges in the Global Trading Landscape: Canada promotes open, predictable, transparent, and rules-based global trade. We are leveraging the G7 to maintain dialogue on current challenges facing the system and on efforts to modernize the WTO.
• Building Inclusive, Resilient Supply Chains: The Trade Track is sharing best practices on how governments can support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in diversifying supply chains. Canada is leading technical discussions on forced labour and environment-related illicit trade in sectors like wildlife, timber, and minerals – a global illicit sector with trade estimated at USD 110-281 billion and growing annually. 

Responsible business conduct and inclusive trade issues

• The Government expects Canadian companies operating abroad to abide by all relevant laws, to respect human rights in their operations, and to adopt best practices and internationally respected guidelines on responsible business conduct (RBC).
• The Government is committed to engaging with Indigenous partners on international trade issues.
• Our government is dedicated to embedding diversity and inclusion at the heart of international trade policy because building a more equitable global economy is essential to securing a better future for all.

Supplementary messages

• The government is committed to an approach for promoting RBC that is robust and fit-for-purpose.
• RBC by Canadian companies helps maintain a strong national brand, enhance competitiveness in global markets, mitigate operational and investment risks, and supports the long-term security and sustainability of supply chains.
• The Government actively engages with Indigenous partners through the Indigenous Working Group on Trade (I-Trade) and Indigenous Peoples Advisory Groups (IPAGs).
• Through sustainable and inclusive trade policies, Canada aims to unlock economic opportunities for underrepresented groups and support Canadian businesses from every community to build Canada strong.
• With respect to the Canada Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise (CORE), the government looks forward to confirming a future direction for it in due course.

Update 

The term of the CORE, Masud Husain, concluded on 20 May 2025. While the position is currently vacant, the office of the CORE remains open. The previous government announced a review of the operations and effectiveness of the office of the CORE in fall 2024.

Supporting facts and figures

Through its network of over 1,000 Trade Commissioners at offices in Canada and at diplomatic missions around the world, the Government of Canada actively promotes RBC best practices and provides advice on RBC to Canadian companies.

Background 

Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) is the integrated management of risks to the environment, people and society within the core of business activities. Canada’s RBC Abroad Strategy, launched in 2022, includes preventative measures, legislation in select areas, and access to non-judicial dispute-resolution mechanisms: the National Contact Point (NCP) and the CORE. The Strategy applies to all Canadian companies active abroad, regardless of size, sector or scope. It sets priorities for the Government of Canada to support Canadian companies abroad in managing risks and adopting world leading responsible business practice (such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights).

In terms of consultations with Indigenous partners on international trade issues, the Indigenous Working Group on Trade (I-Trade) was established in September 2017 to inform the development of Canada’s trade policy and its positions in international trade negotiations. Participation in I-Trade includes national and provincial/territorial Indigenous organizations; modern treaty and self-governing nations; tribal councils and nations; and Indigenous economic development, business, and financial institutions. The Government also continues to collaborate with Indigenous partners to advance Indigenous trade interests through the Indigenous Peoples Economic and Trade Cooperation Arrangement (IPETCA)—a unique cooperation arrangement that is Indigenous-led and government-enabled endorsed by Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and Chinese Taipei.

Across all its FTAs, Canada seeks to include provisions aimed at ensuring that more Canadians have access to the benefits and opportunities that flow from international trade and investment. This includes provisions that commit Parties to cooperate as well as promote transparency, stakeholder participation, and responsible business conduct. For example, Canada’s most recently concluded FTA with Ecuador includes provisions on trade and gender equality, supporting women’s economic participation and Indigenous Peoples’ economic development. Similarly, the Canada-Indonesia CEPA commits the Parties to promote women’s economic empowerment.

Canada’s National Contact Point (NCP) for responsible business conduct

As a member of the OECD, Canada is an adherent to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct (the “Guidelines”). The Guidelines are a set of voluntary standards on RBC recommended by 52 adherent countries to multinational enterprises operating in or from their territories.

Each adherent has committed to maintain an NCP to promote uptake of the Guidelines by enterprises. This includes a mandate to help parties resolve complaints about enterprise conduct through facilitated dialogue and mediation. The NCP reports publicly on its handling of complaints and can issue non-binding recommendations to enterprises. Canada’s NCP is part of a global network of NCPs designed to cooperate in advancing a common set of RBC principles.  

Canada’s NCP is currently structured as a committee of eight federal departments supported by a small secretariat in Global Affairs Canada. Canada’s NCP has handled 31 cases since the modern NCP system was established in 2000.

Key trade statistics

General facts

• Trade (exports plus imports) is equivalent to 65% of GDP.
• 1 in 6 jobs in Canada are related to exports.
• Partners’ Share of Canada’s Trade in Goods and Services, 2024:
  • United States
    • Exports: 70.3%
    • Imports: 60.8%
  • European Union
    • Exports: 5.9%
    • Imports: 10.3%
  • China
    • Exports: 3.8%
    • Imports: 6.6%
  • United Kingdom
    • Exports: 4.0%
    • Imports: 2.1%
  • Mexico
    • Exports: 1.3%
    • Imports: 3.5%
  • Rest of the world
    • Exports: 14.6%
    • Imports: 16.8%

For example, 70.3% of Canadian exports of goods and services go to the U.S., while 60.8% of our imports come from the U.S. in 2024.

Trade performance

• Top 3 goods and services exports in 2024 compared to 2023 (share of total exports):
  1. Energy: 17.8%
  2. Resource and resource-based products: 17.7%
  3. Commercial services: 12.5%
• Strongest export growth in goods and services in 2024 compared to 2023 is seen in:
  1. Travel services: +10.3%
  2. Consumer products: +6.3%
  3. Aircrafts: +5.6%
• Largest export declines in goods and services in 2024 compared to 2023 are:
  1. Motor Vehicles: -7.2%
  2. Agri-food: -4.1%

Inclusive trade and SMEs

• There are around 130,000 exporting firms in Canada of goods or services in 2024, but only 35,000 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are involved in exporting.
• In 2023, 5% of women-owned businesses exported goods or services, up from 5.0% in 2011.
• Immigrant-run businesses are much more likely to export.
• Indigenous SMEs are less likely to export (7.2% in 2020) than national average (12.1%) and face heightened barriers to growing their businesses. However, Indigenous SMEs have 4 times more plans for international expansion compared to the national average.

Summary of trade performance for Canada top 5 partners*

• * Data for 2024 if not stated otherwise.
• Data: Statistics Canada Tables 36-10-0023-01, 12-10-0157-01, 12-10-0095-01,
• 36-10-0007-01, 36-10-0433-01, 36-10-0008-01, Canada customs.
• Notes: CDIA is on an Intermediate Investing Country; FDI is on an Ultimate Investing Country.
• Calculations by Global Affairs Canada’s Office of the Chief Economist.

Canada's top 10 bilateral trade partners in goods and services

Partners’ share of Canada’s total two-way trade, 2024 (includes goods and services)

• The 2025-26 Main Estimates were tabled in Parliament in May 2025, and the related Appropriation Act is expected to receive Royal Assent in June 2025.
• The Department’s total funding requested in the 2025-26 Main Estimates is $8.4B, which represents a net decrease of $0.4B over the 2024-25 Main Estimates of $8.8B.
• The net decrease is mainly due to a decrease in the funding for International Assistance Innovation Program, 2021-26 International Climate Finance Commitment, to help developing countries address the impact of climate, International Climate Finance and Biodiversity Programs for 2021-22 to 2025-26, International Biodiversity Program, offset by the increase in funding received for International Humanitarian Assistance, and the Presidency of the 2025 G7 Summit in Canada.

Supporting facts and figures

Visit the Government Expenditure Plan and Main Estimates (Parts I and II) to view the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development estimates.

• Significant funding decreases include:
• $170.6M for the International Assistance Innovation Program;
• $169.0M for Implementation of Canada's 2021-26 International Climate Finance Commitment;
• $150.0M for funding to help developing countries address the impact of climate;
• $128.7M for Canada’s International Climate Finance and Biodiversity Programs for 2021-22 to 2025-26; and
• $100.0M for Canada's International Biodiversity Program.
• Significant funding increases include:
• $200.0M for additional international humanitarian assistance priorities; and
• $112.4M for Presidency of the 2025 G7 Summit in Canada

Background

• The Main Estimates present Global Affairs Canada’s reference levels which are broken down by the nature of the funding (Vote) and according to the Departmental Results Framework (DRF). Adjustments to Main Estimates to account for new programming or for programs that were approved after the process for including items in the Main Estimates, will be received through Supplementary Estimates.
• Supplementary Estimates are part of the normal Parliamentary approval process to ensure that previously planned government initiatives receive the necessary funding to move them forward. They present information to Parliament on the Government of Canada’s spending requirements that were not sufficiently developed in time for inclusion in the Main Estimates.

2025-26 main estimates overview - Year-over-year changes

The Department’s total funding requested in the 2025-26 Main Estimates is $8.4B, which represents a net decrease of $0.4B over the 2024-25 Main Estimates of $8.8B.

• Significant funding decreases include:
  • $170.6M related to the International Assistance Innovation Program;
  • $169.0M related to Implementation of Canada's 2021-26 International Climate Finance Commitment;
  • $150.0M related to funding to help developing countries address the impact of climate;
  • $128.7M related to Canada’s International Climate Finance and Biodiversity Programs for 2021-22 to 2025-26;
  • $100.0M related to Canada's International Biodiversity Program;
• These funding decreases are offset by significant funding increases:
  • $200.0M related for additional international humanitarian assistance priorities;
  • $112.4M related to Presidency of the 2025 G7 Summit in Canada.

Supplementary messages

Significant funding decreases include:

• $170.6M in the 2025-26 related to Canada’s International Assistance Innovation Program.
  • Following Budget 2024, the Government decided to return $689.8M over five years and 116.9M ongoing to the fiscal framework for this program.
  • As part of the Refocusing Government Spending initiative from Budget 2025, $561.2M over five years and $133.3M ongoing were returned to the fiscal framework for this program.
• $169.0M related to the funding for Implementation of Canada's 2021-26 International Climate Finance Commitment.
  • [REDACTED] At the 2021 G7 Leaders’ Summit, Prime Minister announced a doubling of Canada’s climate finance, from $2.7B to $5.3B over the next five years. Budget 2021 provided the associated Record of Decision on June 15, 2021, and the financial authority for Canada’s new $5.3B climate finance commitment.  
• $150.0M related to funding to help developing countries address the impact of climate.
  • The Budget 2023 announced funding of 760.0 M$ over three years starting in 2023-24 to help developing countries address the impact of climate.
• $128.7M related to Canada’s International Climate Finance and Biodiversity Programs for 2021-22 to 2025-26.
  • The Budget 2021 allocated $5.4B for Canada’s 2021-2026 International Climate Finance, including $5.2B to Global Affairs Canada and $165.6M to Environment and Climate Change Canada.
• $100.0M related to Canada's International Biodiversity Program.
  • The Budget 2023 announced funding of $349.7M over 3 years starting in 2023-24 to implement the Global Biodiversity Framework.

The funding decreases are offset by the following significant increases:

• $200.0M related for Additional international humanitarian assistance priorities.
  • The Budget 2024 announced funding of $350.0M over 2 years, distributed as $150.0M for 2024-25 and $200.0M for 2025-26, to support humanitarian responses to global crises
• $112.4M related to Presidency of the 2025 G7 Summit in Canada.
  • The G7 Presidency was announced in the Budget 2024. [REDACTED]

Supporting facts and figures

• The main items that contributed to year-over-year changes are shown below:

Annex A - 2025-26 main estimates

Organizational estimates - GAC

To view the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development estimates, visit:

• 2025–26 Organizational Expenditure Plan and Main Estimates (Parts I and II)
• 2025–26 Estimates - Items for inclusion in the Proposed Schedules to the Appropriation Bill
• 2025–26 Budgetary Expenditures by Standard Object
• 2025–26 Estimates - Listing of Statutory Authorities
• 2025–26 Main Estimates by Purpose
• 2025–26 Estimates (dollars) - Loans – International Financial Assistance Act

Statistics document

Export controls

• Canada has one of the strongest export controls systems in the world, and respect for human rights is enshrined in our export controls legislation.
• Each year, the Minister of Foreign Affairs tables two reports in Parliament to promote transparency around Canadian exports of controlled goods and technology.

On May 30, 2025, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (tabled two annual reports in Parliament in relation to the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA):

1. the Annual Report on Strategic Goods and Technologies Pursuant to Section 27 of the EIPA, and
2. the Report on the Operations of the EIPA, with a particular focus on statistics related to economic permitting.

The Report on Strategic Goods and Technology found that Canada’s defence, security and aerospace industries exported approximately $2.50 billion of controlled military goods and technologies in 2024 (excluding sales to the U.S.). The top ten non-U.S. destinations in 2024 in terms of value exported were:

• Saudi Arabia
• Germany
• Ukraine
• Türkiye
• United Kingdom
• South Korea
• Poland
• Sweden
• Australia
• Italy

Export Development Canada

CEBA ACCENTURE

• In 2024, EDC facilitated $123.4 billion in business, of which $23.4 billion was in emerging markets, and served 27, 873 customers.
• The Canada Emergency Business Account (CEBA) was a crucial lifeline for small businesses during the COVID-19 pandemic. Almost 900,000 loans were disbursed through the CEBA program, resulting in an injection of over $49 billion into the economy.
• EDC accepted the Auditor General’s recommendations and is working to strengthen its vendor performance and contract management practices for remaining CEBA contracts.

Foreign direct investment

• In 2024, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into Canada recorded a robust 36.2% increase from 2023 to reach $85.5 billion. The 2024 figure stands above the average for the past decade (2014 – 2023: $54.8 billion).
• With respect to source countries in 2024, the United States remained the largest investor in Canada accounting for 57.5% ($49.2 billion) of total FDI inflows, followed by Switzerland (12.7% or $10.9 billion), China (6.3% or $5.4 billion), Luxembourg (4.3% or $3.7 billion) and Germany (3.1% or $2.7 billion).

Free Trade Agreements with latin american partners

Canada-Chile FTA (CCFTA) – 1997

Bilateral merchandise trade (2024): $2.97B (+231% or $2.1B since 1996)

From 1996 to 2024, Canada’s exports to Chile have grown by 42% and imports by 537%, with the CCFTA’s utilization rates of Canadian exports to Chile standing at 61% (2023) and of Canadian imports from Chile at 69.4% (2024) respectively.

Canada-Costa Rica FTA (CCRFTA) – 2002

Bilateral merchandise trade (2024): $1.1B (+267% or $802M since 2001)

From 2001 to 2024, Canada’s exports to Costa Rica have grown by 223% and imports by 293%, with the CCRFTA’s utilization rate for imports standing at 28.1% in 2024. 

Canada-Peru FTA (CPFTA) – 2009

Bilateral merchandise trade (2024): $8.1B (+178% or $5.2B since 2008)

From 2008 to 2024, Canada’s exports to Peru have grown by 322% and imports by 150%, with the CPFTA’s utilization rates of Canadian exports to Peru standing at 72.9% (2023) and of imports from Peru at 82.1% (2024) respectively.

Canada-Colombia FTA (CCoFTA) – 2011 

Bilateral merchandise trade (2024): $2.8B (+77% or $1.2 B since 2010)

From 2010 to 2024, Canada’s exports to Colombia have grown by 68% and imports by 87%, with the CCoFTA’s utilization rate of Canadian exports to Colombia standing at 74.7% (2023) and of imports from Colombia at 72.3% (2024) respectively.

Canada-Panama FTA (CPaFTA) – 2013

Bilateral merchandise trade (2024): $145 M (-19% or -$34 M since 2012)

From 2012 to 2024, Canada’s exports to Panama have grown by 126% and imports have fallen by 87%, with the CPaFTA’s utilization rate for imports standing at 60.3% in 2024.

Canada-Honduras FTA (CHFTA) – 2014

Bilateral merchandise trade (2024): $629 million (+124% or $348 M since 2013)

From 2013 to 2024, Canada’s exports to Honduras have grown by 16% and imports by 145%, with the CHTA’s utilization rate for imports standing at 50.6% in 2024.

Canada-Ecuador FTA

Negotiations concluded in January 2025 under the administration of Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa (reelected in April 2025)

Both Canada and Ecuador are now working on legal review and translation of the agreement, as well as preparation for subsequent domestic approval and ratification procedures.

CPTPP (Chile, Peru, Mexico) – 2018

From 2018 to 2024, Canada’s exports to Mexico have grown by 0.1% and imports by 29% (Dec 30, 2018, entry into force).

From 2020 to 2024, Canada’s exports to Peru have grown by 85% and imports by 68% (Sept 19, 2021, entry into force).

From 2022 to 2024, Canada’s exports to Chile have fallen by 39% and imports have fallen by 11% (Feb 21, 2023, entry into force).

Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) – 2020

From 2019 to 2024, Canada’s exports to Mexico have grown by 80% and imports by 28% (July 1, 2020, entry into force).

Canada - MERCOSUR FTA

Launched March 2018; Unofficially paused by Mercosur March 2023 following a cancelled senior official stocktaking meeting.

Invest in Canada

• Invest in Canada’s 2025-26 budgetary spending as indicated in Main Estimates is $32,755,156. This includes $26,218,845 in planned spending for its core responsibility, foreign direct investment attraction, and $6,536,311 for its internal services.
• In FY2024-25, Invest in Canada facilitated 26 investment wins, representing approximately $8 billion in anticipated capital expenditure. Invest in Canada was also involved in the currently paused investment of Honda, representing $13.4 billion in anticipated capital expenditure.
• Since its inception, IIC has supported an inflow of investments across sectors supporting energy production, advanced manufacturing, agribusiness, life science, and more.
• Working with departments and agencies across the federal government, IIC is coordinating complex and transformative investments that will create new jobs and opportunities for Canadians in sectors central to Canada’s economy.

Team Canada trade missions

• Since 2023, TCTMs have covered nine markets (Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, South Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, Australia, Thailand, and Cambodia).
• Allowed more than 1,740 representatives from over 810 Canadian organizations in more than 15 sectors gain market exposure and pursue commercial opportunities and partnerships.
• Over 4,100 tailored B2B meetings were arranged between Canadian SMEs and potential buyers, partners, or investors in the seven markets visited.
• 68% of participating organizations were SMEs, and 33% were owned by under-represented groups.
• TCTMs have already yielded a number of successes and promising outcomes for Canadian companies, such as confirmed sales contracts and the signature of MOUs and NDAs.
• In addition to these full-scale TCTMs, smaller trade missions were also conducted to the Indo-Pacific region, including Minister-led business delegations to Singapore and Brunei.

Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements tracker

May 2025 Edition

A Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) is a bilateral treaty designed to protect Canadian investment abroad through reciprocal legally binding rights and obligations. Canada’s model FIPA incorporates several key principles:

• treatment that is non-discriminatory and that meets a minimum standard;
• protection against expropriation without compensation and restraints on transfer of funds; and
• dispute settlement procedures.

FIPAs also send a positive signal to our negotiating partners about the openness of Canada to foreign investment.

Annexes provide an overview of the status of Canada’s FIPA outreach, following the engagement strategy set out in the New Model FIPA memo (BPTS#04097-2020).

Canada’s implemented FIPAs (total of 39)

• Argentina (1993)
• Armenia (1999)
• Barbados (1997)
• Benin (2014)
• Burkina Faso (2017)
• Cameroon (2016)
• China (2014)
• Costa Rica (1999)
• Côte d’Ivoire (2015)
• Croatia (2001)
• Czech Republic (2012)
• Ecuador (1997)^{Footnote 1}
• Egypt (1997)
• Guinea (2017)
• Hong Kong (2016)
• Hungary (1993)
• Jordan (2009)
• Kosovo (2018)
• Kuwait (2014)
• Latvia (2011)
• Lebanon (1999)
• Mali (2016)
• Moldova (2019)
• Mongolia (2017)
• Panama (1998)^{Footnote 2}
• Peru (2007)^{Footnote 3}
• Philippines (1996)
• Poland (1990)
• Romania (2011)
• Senegal (2016)
• Serbia (2015)
• Slovak Republic (2012)
• Tanzania (2013)^{Footnote 4}
• Thailand (1998)
• Trinidad and Tobago (1996)
• Ukraine (1995)^{Footnote 5}
• Uruguay (1999)
• USSR (1991)
• Venezuela (1998)

Annex 1 – Priority negotiations

Canada’s implemented other bilateral investment instruments

Taiwan

• On December 28, 2023, the foreign investment promotion and protection arrangement between the Canadian Trade Office in Taipei and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Canada came into effect.

Ongoing priority negotiations

Argentina

• Canada’s FIPA with Argentina came into force in 1993 and is in need of modernization. As a result, it was included in the FIPA negotiating strategy that MINT approved as part of Canada’s 2021 model FIPA.
• On that basis, Canada and Argentina held three technical discussions in May and July 2024.
• MINT approved an action memo on September 26, 2024 to launch formal negotiations with Argentina.
• Round 1 took place December 16-20 in Buenos Aires. Significant progress was made on definitions and substantive obligations.
• (New developments) Round 2 is confirmed for July 7-11 in Ottawa.

Georgia

• Round 7 took place in Tbilisi on January 29-31, 2024.
• [REDACTED] Parties exchanged written comments on May 27, 2024 on Canadian proposed compromise package. [REDACTED]

Pakistan

• Following an exchange of diplomatic notes in which Pakistan expressed interest in a FIPA, Parties held three virtual preliminary meetings during the last quarter of 2023.
• Both Parties presented their respective FIPA/BIT models. [REDACTED] MINT approved an action memo on September 26,2024 to launch formal negotiations with Pakistan.
• On April 23, Pakistan sent a note verbale extending an invitation to host the first round of negotiations in Islamabad at Canada’s earliest convenience. A round could be scheduled sometime during the summer or early fall.

Qatar

• Round 5 of Canada-Qatar FIPA negotiations took place in Doha in May 2024, where the Parties advanced the agreement by incorporating newly agreed text on substantive obligations and clarifying their respective positions on outstanding issues so as to inform internal consultations.
• Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to these negotiations as a priority, while recognising that substantial work remains before finalising the agreement.
• Following Round 5, the Parties agreed to hold two virtual intersessional discussions:
  • on taxation measures, which took place in July 2024 led by Finance Canada and Qatari tax authorities; and
  • on Investor-State Dispute Settlement.

• [REDACTED] Round 6, which was supposed to be held in Ottawa on April 23-25, was postponed due to the writ period.

• (New developments) Canada is reaching out to Qatar to re-schedule in the fall.

Tanzania

• Tanzania terminated its FIPA with Canada on December 9, 2023, but expressed its interest in negotiating a new FIPA with Canada.
• The previous FIPA will remain in force for existing investments for a 15-year period (i.e., until December 9, 2038), and any new investment made after December 9, 2023, will not benefit from FIPA protection.
• Round 1 was held from February 26-29, 2024, in Dar es Salaam,[REDACTED]Parties met for Round 2 in Ottawa on June 26-28, 2024 [REDACTED] Parties agreed to schedule virtual intersessional and in-person rounds, with a view to making significant progress by the end of 2024.
• A virtual intersessional on taxation measures was held on November 19, 2024 between Finance Canada and Tanzania tax authorities.
• Round 3 was held from February 24-28, 2025, in Dar es Salaam, during which Parties closed three and removed bracketed text in several other articles.
• Two intersessionals originally scheduled for March and April were postponed due to the writ period.
• Round 4 tentatively scheduled in Ottawa for mid-September 2025.

UAE

• [REDACTED ]On February 11, MINT held a meeting with her counterpart, during which both Ministers agreed that in-person sessions could be beneficial in resolving the remaining issues.
• On February 28, officials met with the UAE ambassador to answer his technical questions as he works to help resolve the remaining issues.
• Canadian officials invited their UAE counterparts to Ottawa for an in-person meeting. UAE officials signaled willingness to come to Ottawa but insisted that Canadian officials share a written counterproposal on the taxation measures article before scheduling the meeting. Finance Canada subsequently undertook to consider preparing such a proposal.
• (New developments) On June 5, departmental officials briefed oMINT on the negotiations. The briefing focused on updates to the two key outstanding issues to resolve before Canada would be in a position to announce an agreement in principle on the FIPA:
  • taxation measures; and
  • coverage of pre-establishment investment. During the briefing, oMINT signalled it would do some outreach with PMO on the FIPA pre-establishment issue.
• (New developments) On June 6, Finance Canada officials shared with departmental officials a proposal to narrow the scope of the taxation measures article by removing coverage for MFN (but not National Treatment) for future non-income tax measures. Departmental officials sent the proposal to UAE officials the same day and are awaiting a response.

Uruguay

• At Uruguay’s request, a first technical meeting was held on September 16, 2024 to discuss the modernization of the Canada-Uruguay FIPA (1999).
• The second technical meeting was held on November 14, 2024 to address Uruguay’s questions about Canada’s model FIPA.
• A third technical meeting took place on February 3, during which both countries discussed Uruguay’s bilateral investment treaty practice.
• Formal negotiations were launched in March.
• Round 1 was held virtually from May 14-16 and focused on definitions.
• (New developments) Virtual intersessional meetings are planned for August and September ahead of an in person Round 2 in Montevideo in early October.

Zambia

• MINT approved the launch of negotiations in 2024, further to Zambia’s request for a FIPA with Canada.
• Round 1 was held in March 2024, in Lusaka.
• A virtual intersessional took place in August 2024. The FIPA is now 95% closed.
• [REDACTED]

Annex 2 – Exploratory discussions

Annex 3 – Older FIPAs in need of modernization

Group 1 [REDACTED]

• Barbados (1997)
• Croatia (2001)
• Egypt (1997)
• Latvia (2011)
• Philippines (1996)
• Romania (2011)
• Venezuela (1998)

Group 2 [REDACTED]

• Costa Rica (1999)
• Lebanon (1999)
• Uruguay (1999)

Group 3 [REDACTED]

• Argentina (1993)
• Czech Republic (2012)
• Hungary (1993)
• Poland (1990)
• Slovak Republic (2012)
• USSR (1991)

Team Canada Trade Missions (TCTMs) placemat

This placemat summarizes Team Canada Trade Missions (TCTMs) key results and success stories. The data comes from TRIO, the TCS client relationship management system, as well as the Post-TCTM Feedback Survey and the 6-Month Post-TCTM Outcomes Questionnaire. All data shown in this placemat is as of June 10, 2025.

Overall statistics

Key statistics

• TCTMs have visited a total of 9 markets:
  • Japan in October 2023
  • Malaysia and Vietnam in March 2024
  • South Korea in April 2024
  • Indonesia and the Philippines in December 2024
  • Australia in February 2025, and
  • Thailand and Cambodia in May 2025
• Over 4,100 tailored B2B meetings have been arranged
• Over 810 organizations have participated (includes duplicates of organizations that participated in more than one TCTM)
• Over 1,740 delegates have participated (includes duplicates of individuals that participated in more than one TCTM)

Regional and sectoral representation

The participating organizations showed a diverse regional and sectoral representation.

 Regionally, Ontario led with 38%, followed by British Columbia at 20%, Quebec at 17%, Alberta at 13%, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland & Labrador each at 3%, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Prince Edward Island each at 2%, New Brunswick and Yukon each at 1%, and Nunavut accounting for less than 1%.

In terms of sectors, Agriculture and Processed Foods represented the largest share at 19%, followed by ICT at 17%, Clean Technologies at 14%, Professional Services, Life Sciences, and Infrastructure each at 5%, Education at 4%, Arts and Cultural Industries, Energy, and Creative Industries each at 3%, Transportation, Consumer Products, Aerospace, and Financial and Insurance Services each at 2%, Fish and Seafood, Oil and Gas, Forestry and Wood Products, Defence and Security, and Ocean Technologies each at 1%, with Industrial Machinery and Tourism representing less than 1%.

TCTM average

TCTM applicants and participants

• On average, each TCTM received 238 applications and involved 137 organizations with 214 delegates.

Other statistics

• 141 outcomes confirmed by Trade Commissioners from TCTM to Japan, Malaysia/Vietnam, South Korea, Indonesia/Philippines, and Australia
  • An outcome from the Trade Commissioner Service (TCS) is the pursuit and/or completion of a commercial transaction facilitated by the actions of trade commissioners (TC) in Canada and/or abroad that brings economic benefit to Canada.
• 33% of organizations self-reported that they are owned by underrepresented groups
• 68% of organizations are SMEs
• 28% of organizations joined more than one TCTM

Early economic impact of TCTMs

[REDACTED]

Next steps

• 6-Month Post TCTM Outcome Questionnaires will be distributed for other TCTMs as follows:
  • TCTM to Philippines and Indonesia: Early June 2025
  • TCTM to Australia: End of August 2025
  • TCTM to Thailand and Cambodia: Early December 2025
• Ongoing monitoring of TCTM outcomes and follow-ups by regional offices and missions with participants will continue beyond the 6-month survey to ensure comprehensive data collection and result analysis.

Testimonials

• “The Team Canada Trade Mission to Korea helped our early-stage company punch above our weight class. We were able to initiate and deepen key relationships in Korea that will be beneficial in the future, relationships we could not have made without the Team Canada Trade Mission. I highly recommend all early-stage companies, no matter the sector, to apply. Well worth the experience. “ [REDACTED]
• “Our participation in the trade mission has enabled us to reach potential international partners and understand local markets. This is providing us with information on how to position our products and services.” [REDACTED]
• This was worthwhile at many different levels. It gave our company entry into the market with companies who are genuinely interested in our product and want to partner with us.” [REDACTED]

Success stories

These stories are illustrative examples of the types of outcomes that organizations can expect from participation in TCTMs.

Clarius

Global Hypergrowth Project firm

• Province: British Columbia
• Sector: Life Sciences
• TCTM Participation: All TCTMs
  • During the TCTM to Japan, Clarius received tailored B2B meetings with key local contacts.
  • They signed several NDAs with Japanese distribution partners and entered advanced contract discussions.
  • Following this successful participation, Clarius took part in both subsequent TCTMs and anticipates participating in more.
  • Recently they hired an executive in the Indo-Pacific region to facilitate new market opportunities directly resulting from their TCTM experience.

SinoVeda

• Province: Alberta
• Sector: Life Sciences / Agriculture and Processed Foods
• TCTM Participation: Malaysia/Vietnam, and South Korea
  • During the TCTM to Malaysia and Vietnam, SinoVeda met with Digiworld, a potential local partner identified by the TCS, which led to mutual and ongoing discussion towards an agreement for the distribution of Canadian nutraceutical products in Vietnam.
  • SinoVeda also anticipates signing an NDA with a Korean contact engaged during the pre-arranged B2B meetings during the TCTM to Korea

CoPilot

• Province: Manitoba
• Sector: Arts and Cultural Industries / Information and Communications Technologies
• TCTM Participation: South Korea
  • CoPilot participated in a pre-arranged B2B meeting with SMD Solution, a Seoul-based medical hardware company.
  • CoPilot and SMD Solution signed an NDA which will allow the parties to proceed to detailed discussions about the partnership and sales rights in North America.
  • The partnership will enable CoPilot to utilize their marketing and creator skills, expanding their business portfolio into a consulting-like business.

Canadian Down & Feather Company

• Province: Ontario
• Sector: Consumer Products
• TCTM Participation: Japan
  • The TCS facilitated introductions and B2B meetings with key local contacts.
  • As a result, Canadian Down & Feather Company launched its own online store on Rakuten Ichiba, an e-commerce platform, allowing the company to sell products directly to Japanese consumers.
  • Following this new contract, the company began working closely with a new in-market partner on the development of the Rakuten store, an introduction also facilitated by the TCS during the mission.

WaterShed Monitoring

• Province: Quebec
• Sector: Clean Technologies
• TCTM Participation: Malaysia/Vietnam
  • The TCS facilitated the introduction to KLC Group, a potential local partner interested in water management and sustainable development projects in Vietnam.
  • As a result, WaterShed Monitoring and KLC Group entered into a MOU and NDA to launch a pilot project implementing WaterShed’s technology in the Mekong Delta, with the aim of eventually covering all of Vietnam’s waterway.

PragmaClin

• Province: Newfoundland and Labrador
• Sector: Life Sciences
• TCTM Participation: Malaysia/Vietnam, and South Korea
  • During the TCTM to Malaysia and Vietnam, PragmaClin engaged in B2B meetings organized by the TCS, where Vietcare Solutions Co., Ltd was identified as a potential partner due to its strong presence in Vietnam’s healthcare sector
  • The initial meeting led to promising discussions that continued after the mission, resulting in the signing of a NDA.
  • Both companies have been working towards an agreement for Vietcare Solutions to import and distribute PRIMS, PragmaClin’s technology.

Supplemental estimates questions and answers document

Q1: Items with large variance year-over-year

• The Department is requesting $8.4 billionin the 2025–26 Main Estimates, representing a net decrease of $0.4 billion compared to the 2024–25 Main Estimates of $8.8 billion.
• Related to the Trade Portfolio, the reduction in Grants and Contributions represent $0.6M compared to 2024-25 Main Estimates which relates to currency revaluation on assessed contributions, mainly the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Q2: Information on line items

Q2.1: Grants for International Multilateral Events Program ($3,625,000)

• Global Affairs Canada (GAC) is requesting $112.4 million in 2025–26 through the Annual Reference Level Update (ARLU) to support Canada’s Presidency of the 2025 G7 Summit, to be held in Kananaskis, Alberta, from June 15–17, 2025. [REDACTED] As part of this funding, $3.625 million is specifically allocated to grants, which will support international engagement and outreach activities aligned with Canada’s G7 priorities. These grants are a key tool to foster collaboration with global partners and amplify Canada’s leadership on the international stage.

Q2.2: Contributions for the Canadian International Innovation Program ($16,120,000) (15 partnerships around the world)

• CIIP is a contribution program that supports Canadian companies in the development of technologies with potential for commercialization in collaboration with international partners in Brazil, China, India, Israel and South Korea.
• Support is provided to Canadian companies through Partnership Development Activities (PDAs), which facilitate the identification of specific partners in the CIIP targeted countries for industrial research and development (R & D) cooperation and by funding collaborative R & D projects between Canadian companies and partner organizations from CIIP targeted countries.

Q3: Overview of multilaterals (GAC v. other government departments)

Q3.1 World Customs Organization

• To pay Canada’s assessed contribution to the WCO, an independent intergovernmental body whose mission is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of customs administrations.
• As a member of the WCO, Canada has taken a key role in areas such as trade facilitation, revisions to the Harmonized System, capacity building, combatting counterfeiting and the development and implementation of the Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade.
• As a member of the WCO, Canada can help set the international customs cooperation agenda through high-level participation at key WCO committees. Attendance helps the Government of Canada stay abreast of current and emerging customs issues, which helps to define Canada’s international footprint.
• Membership at the WCO advances Canada’s interests internationally, particularly given the importance of international trade for the Canadian economy.

Q3.2: Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

• To pay Canada’s assessed contribution to the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the OECD, which is responsible for maintaining and further developing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through international cooperation.
• The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) is an intergovernmental agency that facilitates co-operation among countries with advanced nuclear technology infrastructures to seek excellence in nuclear safety, technology, science, environment and law.
• Operates within the framework of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the NEA focuses on nuclear energy policy, safety, research, and regulation among OECD member countries.
• The NEA helps governments develop informed nuclear policies, promotes scientific collaboration, and encourages the safe and sustainable use of nuclear energy.

GAC is responsible for the full payment and reporting of Canada’s assessed contribution to the NEA

Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) leads Canada’s engagement with the NEA, consistent with its responsibilities for energy policy, innovation, and international cooperation. NRCan is responsible for developing Canada's nuclear energy policies, ensuring sustainable development, and overseeing the responsible use of nuclear energy. Global Affairs Canada (GAC) supports this engagement by providing advice on foreign policy and treaty matters and managing Canada’s assessed contributions.

Assessed Contributions increase of $0.1M:

• $0.1M related to the change in the organisation’s budget.

Q3.3: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Secretariat

• To pay Canada’s assessed contribution to sustain Canadian influence on economic integration and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region (e.g. trade liberalization and facilitation, economic development, human security).
• Active engagement in APEC ensures that Canada maintains the necessary visibility and credibility to be a valued Asia-Pacific partner in support of Canada’s interests in the region.
• Canada is not a member of other Asian organizations.

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a regional economic forum established in 1989. It consists of 21 member economies located around the Pacific Ocean, with the main goal of promoting economic growth, cooperation, trade, and investment in the Asia-Pacific region.

APEC main objectives:

• Facilitate trade and investment among members.
• Promote sustainable and inclusive economic growth.
• Strengthen economic and technical cooperation.
• Encourage innovation and digitalization within member economies.

Assessed contributions decrease of $0.2M:

• ($0.9M) related to the change in the organisation’s budget; and
• $0.7M related to the change in the rate of exchange.

Q4: Main estimates grants and contributions under the trade portfolio

Q4.1 List and descriptions 

Q4.2: Grants and contributions with large variance and reason

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Secretariat (APEC)

• To pay Canada’s assessed contribution to sustain Canadian influence on economic integration and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region (e.g. trade liberalization and facilitation, economic development, human security).
• Active engagement in APEC ensures that Canada maintains the necessary visibility and credibility to be a valued Asia-Pacific partner in support of Canada’s interests in the region. Canada is not a member of other Asian organizations.

Assessed Contributions decrease of $0.2M:

• ($0.9M) related to the change in the organisation’s budget; and
• $0.7M related to the change in the rate of exchange.

World Trade Organization (WTO)

• The WTO is a cornerstone of Canada’s trade policy, providing a common set of rules, rights and obligations for the trade policies of its 164 members and a forum for Canada to advance its trade interests on the broadest possible basis.
• The WTO provides Canada with the opportunity to build alliances, influence rules and secure concessions on issues where it would otherwise have little leverage. Several such issues, including agriculture subsidies and various regulatory issues (e.g. sanitary and phytosanitary measures) are more effectively addressed multilaterally.
• The WTO also has a robust dispute settlement system, of which Canada is a regular user. Through the ongoing work of its many committees, the WTO provides a forum for Canada to raise and resolve a range of trade irritants and market access issues.
• Finally, WTO is also an active forum for trade policy monitoring and surveillance.
• There are several ongoing WTO negotiations in which Canada participates, including negotiations to address harmful fisheries subsidies, as well as plurilateral negotiations on e-commerce, domestic negotiation for services, investment facilitation and MSMEs. Canada is also leading a representative group of WTO members called the “Ottawa Group” with the objective of identifying concrete, realistic and pragmatic ideas to reform the organization.

Assessed Contributions decrease of $0.4M:

• ($0.2M) related to the change in the organisation’s budget;
• ($0.5M) related to the change in the Canada’s assessed share; and
• $0.3M related to the change in the rate of exchange.

Grants and Contributions in support of the CanExport Program (formerly Global Commerce Support Program (GCSP) and Trade and Investment Support Program (TISP))

• The CanExport Program and related pillars support businesses looking to reach new overseas markets.
• CanExport and related pillars were rebranded using one consistent nomenclature that clearly articulate each component’s respective roles in helping small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to mitigate risk in diversifying their exports.

In 2019, the Trade and Investment Support Program (TISP) was renamed CanExport Program and the TISP’s four pillars, formally known as CanExport, Going Global Innovation (GGI), Global Opportunities for Associations (GOA) and, Invest Canada – Community Initiatives (ICCI), were respectively renamed as:

• CanExport – Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs);
• CanExport - Innovation;
• CanExport - Associations; and
• CanExport – Community Investment.

Grants increase of $3.0M:

• $3.0M related to CanExport internal reallocation from Contributions to Grants.

Contributions decrease of $3.0M:

• ($3.0M) related to CanExport internal reallocation from Contributions to Grants.

Indo-Pacific Engagement Initiative

• The Indo-Pacific Engagement Initiative (IPEI) is comprised of five programs designed to connect Canadian stakeholders with regional counterparts and to accelerate Canada’s ability to develop influential networks.
• Each of the five programs have ties to trade, bilateral relations, people-to-people ties, and regional security.
• The IPEI supports the development of trade related competencies in the public service and supports trade related projects in the Canadian non-governmental sector.

Supplementary messages

While the initiative does not provide support to the Candian private sector directly, the program does positively impact Canada’s trade relationships through stronger people to people ties and trade related projects. 

Update 

The IPEI is now in its second year of implementation.  All five programs have been operationalized and launched. Most recently, in June 2025, the Department launched a Call for Proposals to Canadian universities and research organizations to apply for Scholarships and Fellowships projects. 

Supporting facts and figures

• Of the 21 projects approved under the Regional Connectivity Envelope (RCE), 10 are related to trade. Examples include providing $250K in support of the Australia-Canada Economic Leadership Forum 2025 in Sydney and providing $74K to the University of Victoria to organize a two-part symposium to strengthen Indigenous communities' capacity to implement IPETCA in Canada and Taiwan.
• The Regional Engagement Envelope (REE) has funded nine (9) trade related initiatives, including support to the Philippine Nuclear Energy Mission to Canada; a four-day program that strengthened collaboration in nuclear energy, and provided support to the 2024 ASEAN Business Leaders Series which enhanced Canada’s visibility and credibility as a trade partner with ASEAN.
• The Asia Competency Initiative (ACI) offers participants training opportunities. For example, GAC employees took part in the Queen’s University Institute on Trade Policy that brings together trade professionals, policymakers, and academics to deepen their expertise in international trade policy and negotiation.
• Commissioned Research (CR) has supported four (4) trade related research projects, including a report entitled “Competitive Analysis of China’s Commercial Engagement in Africa – Identifying Gaps and Opportunities for Canadian Companies” and an in-depth study of Japan’s creative industries aimed at identifying critical opportunities and barriers for Canadian exporters.

Background 

Launched in April 2024, the IPEI ($40.1M) is a combination of two external programs, and three programs that are internal to the Government of Canada. They are:

• RCE ($11.7M): Provides contributions to Canadian non-governmental stakeholders to undertake events in the Indo-Pacific region and Canada. Launched in October 2024 with $4M committed, second call for proposals is planned for early July 2025.
• Indo-Pacific Scholarships and Fellowships for Canadians ($10M): Provides contributions to Canadian universities and research organization to provide graduate level scholarships and research fellowships. Call for proposals launched June 2025 with scholars set to go to the region in early 2026.
• REE ($4.16M): Provides support to GAC missions and HQ to fund initiatives, in the region and domestically. Internally launched in April 2024, over $975k disbursed.
• ACI ($3.2M): supports the strengthening and expansion of Asia competencies within the GoC through creating new professional development and training opportunities. Launched in April 2024, over $384k disbursed.
• CR ($2.89M): funds targeted, evidence-based research to inform policy development and implementation of the IPS Launched in April 2024 with $565k disbursed.

Standalone document

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

• Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), founded in 1989, is the leading economic forum in the Asia-Pacific, promoting sustainable growth, trade, and investment among its 21 member economies. It operates through non-binding commitments and open dialogue.
• As a founding member, Canada uses APEC to strengthen regional trade ties, share best practices, and support inclusive trade and economic growth. APEC also helps advance Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), with 15 APEC members also being IPS economies. It plays a key role in shaping regional economic dialogue and is a strategic space for influence.
• Canada engages in APEC through a whole-of-government approach, with departments addressing priorities including trade diversification, finance, food security, AI, oceans, and health. These efforts align with Canada’s goals in other global forums such as the WTO, G20, G7, and OECD.
• As 2025 APEC host, Korea’s host year theme “Building a Sustainable Tomorrow” captures its commitment to creating a better future for the next generation with areas of focus including structural reform, energy, labour, and education. Korea is prioritizing digital innovation and demographic shifts for leader-level outcome documents.

APEC Business Advisory Council

• The APEC Business Advisory Council is APEC’s private sector arm, providing the business perspective on specific areas of cooperation to APEC Leaders, Ministers and Senior Officials.
• The second APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) meeting of 2025 was held in Toronto (April 23–26), fulfilling a PM commitment from the 2024 APEC Summit. Primarily funded by GAC, hosted by Canada’s ABAC members, with support from the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada, the event featured strong corporate sponsorship (Manulife, CIBC, Invest Alberta, etc.).

Key benefits included:

1. Showcasing Canada’s strengths in AI, deep tech, critical minerals, and cultural industries.
2. Advancing the Indo-Pacific Strategy by engaging business leaders from 20 APEC economies.
3. Deepening ties with Korea, including a roundtable on critical minerals, clean energy, semiconductors, and defense.

Assessed financial contributions

• Canada contributes SGD 680,300 annually to APEC’s regular budget, representing 9.07% of the total. Canada’s contribution is determined according to a formula that takes into account economies’ sizes and GDP per capita.
• Canada is the third top contributor after the Unites States and Japan.
• APEC’s regular budget covers the operational costs of the APEC Secretariat, based in Singapore.
• The main role of the Secretariat is to support the work of APEC’s various committees and working groups, in addition to Ministerial and Summit meetings. 
• Canada also makes an assessed contribution of USD 52,800 to the ABAC Secretariat, based in the Philippines, which manages the work of the APEC Business Advisory Council.

CanExport

• The CanExport SMEs program provides financial assistance to small and medium sized enterprises to help them explore and enter new export markets.
• Last fiscal year, the program approved $38 million for 1,731 Canadian businesses.
• Already, 92% of those small and medium sized businesses have confirmed that our funding helped them expand internationally, and they have reported over $100 million in new exports with the help of this funding.

CanExport recipients are located across Canada and operate in many business sectors. For example, Animikii is an Indigenous-owned digital services provider who, with CanExport funding, participated in the Reservation Economic Summit and other activities, and signed a contract with the Open Environmental Data Project in Alaska. Also: Todd Burns, President of Winnipeg-based Cypher Environmental, credited CanExport funding as a key support in the company’s international growth.

International Energy Agency

• Canada’s contributions to the International Energy Agency helps keep our energy supply reliable and affordable through strategic oil reserve commitments, data collection and analysis.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) is an autonomous body established in 1974 within the framework of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It was created by major OECD oil-consuming countries in response to the 1973 oil crisis, with the goal of ensuring reliable and affordable energy. Its founding treaty, the Agreement on an International Energy Program (IEP), requires OECD membership and the ability to meet specific domestic obligations such as stockholding reserves and demand restraint measures.  While energy security remains central to its mandate, the IEA has expanded its focus to support global clean energy transitions and now engages actively with a broader range of non-OECD partner countries. Through its platforms, members and partners coordinate on international energy policy and collaborate on the development and deployment of clean energy technologies. The IEA Secretariat is widely recognized as a leading source of global energy data and analysis.

Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) leads Canada’s engagement with the IEA, consistent with its responsibilities for energy policy, innovation, and international cooperation. Global Affairs Canada (GAC) supports this engagement by participating in the IEA’s Committee on Budget and Expenditures, providing advice on foreign policy and treaty matters and managing Canada’s assessed contributions.

GAC is responsible for the full payment and reporting of Canada’s assessed contribution to the IEA, in coordination with the OECD contribution process. In 2025, Canada’s total assessed contribution to the IEA was $1,608,296.05.

Canadian Trade Gateway in Southeast Asia / Nuclear Development Arm of the Gateway

• The Canadian Trade Gateway in Southeast Asia was an initiative proposed by my predecessor in 2022 as a way to facilitate the entry of SMEs into the fast-growing market of the ASEAN region.
• Since then, we have led Team Canada Trade Missions (8) of the ten (10) ASEAN member states, launched free trade negotiations and opened AAFC and EDC offices in the region.
• As we continue to consider how best to deploy those tools and resources, I would note that we have Trade Commissioners active in every market across the region, working with businesses from across Canada, in all sectors, every single day.Through its network of over 1,500 trade professionals at offices in Canada and at diplomatic missions around the world, the Government of Canada, including through its Trade Commissioner Service, actively supports Canadian exporters, attracts job-creating direct investment and facilitates innovation partnerships across all sectors.

Announced in November 2022 as an element of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, the Canadian Trade Gateway in Southeast Asia was intended to act as a market entry point and catalyst for Canadian businesses to grow their engagement and presence in the region, linking businesses to existing incubators and accelerators and increasing their awareness of Indo-Pacific markets. It was initially allocated $21.4M over five years starting in 2023-24, along with $2.6M in ongoing funding.

In November 2024, the previous Government announced Canada’s desire to strengthen nuclear partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region through a nuclear energy development arm of the Canadian Trade Gateway. The proposal aimed to lay the foundation for market entry by the nuclear sector by focusing on professional and regulatory training offered by Canadian institutions, and business development and market research. A portion of the Canadian Trade Gateway’s funding was announced in February 2025 to fund the nuclear arm - $7.3 million over five years and $1.3 million ongoing. None of the funding mentioned above has been accessed.

A recommendation from Global Affairs Canada is coming to the Minister of International Trade shortly regarding the future of the above-mentioned initiatives.

Since 2022, Team Canada Trade Missions have been deployed to eight (8) ASEAN markets: Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, Thailand and Cambodia.

Canada has launched negotiations towards a free trade agreement (FTA) with ASEAN and a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Indonesia. 

Opened in Manila in February 2024, Canada’s Indo-Pacific Agriculture and Agri-Food Office (IPAAO) aims to grow Canada’s export opportunities and increase the demand for Canadian products by leveraging Canada’s expertise as a world leader in food safety and sustainability. In May 2025, Export Development Canada (EDC) opened an office in Bangkok, Thailand, marking its 12^th Indo-Pacific representation.

International Renewable Energy Agency

• Canada’s contributions to the International Renewable Energy Agency protect our environment by advancing the global transition to low-carbon energy.

The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) is a treaty-based intergovernmental organization established in 2011, headquartered in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. With 170 members, including the European Union, it is the largest global body dedicated to advancing the adoption and sustainable use of renewable energy. IRENA serves as the principal platform for international cooperation on renewable energy. It supports countries in their energy transitions by promoting innovation, providing policy advice, facilitating knowledge sharing, and enabling capacity building. Canada formally joined IRENA on January 9, 2019.

Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) leads Canada’s engagement with IRENA, in line with its mandate to support clean technology innovation and deployment across Canada's natural resource sectors, including energy. NRCan also engages in international cooperation on energy-related issues and technologies. NRCan coordinates with other federal departments—such as Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC), and Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED)—to ensure Canada’s positions reflect cross-government priorities when IRENA initiatives intersect with their mandates. GAC supports this engagement by providing foreign policy and treaty-related advice to NRCan. It also administers Canada’s financial contributions to IRENA.

Canada’s assessed contributions to IRENA are cost-shared between NRCan and GAC, with each department responsible for 50% of the net amount. NRCan transfers its 50% share to GAC’s reference levels. GAC then manages the full payment and assumes responsibility for all financial reporting, removing reporting obligations from NRCan.

In 2025, Canada’s total assessed contribution to IRENA was $780,565.74. Under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) guidelines, 66% of IRENA contributions qualify as Official Development Assistance (ODA).

Nuclear Energy Agency

• The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) is an intergovernmental agency that facilitates co-operation among countries with advanced nuclear technology infrastructures to seek excellence in nuclear safety, technology, science, environment and law.
• Operating within the framework of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the NEA focuses on nuclear energy policy, safety, research, and regulation among OECD member countries.

Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) leads Canada’s engagement with the NEA, consistent with its responsibilities for energy policy, innovation, and international cooperation. NRCan is responsible for developing Canada's nuclear energy policies, ensuring sustainable development, and overseeing the responsible use of nuclear energy. Global Affairs Canada (GAC) supports this engagement by providing advice on foreign policy and treaty matters and managing Canada’s assessed contributions.

GAC is responsible for the full payment and reporting of Canada’s assessed contribution to the NEA, in coordination with the OECD’s annual assessed contributions process. In 2025, Canada’s assessed contribution to the NEA was $897,000.

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)

• Canada’s contributions to the OECD advance Canadian prosperity, by informing Canadian policy with evidence-based policy analysis and benchmarking, and by promoting a level playing field and open and transparent international markets.

The OECD is an international organization with 38 members, plus the European Union, established in 1961 with Canada as a founding member. The OECD is a unique international organization composed of like-minded states committed to individual liberty, democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and open, transparent market-based economic policies. This sets it apart from other organizations such as the G20, UN or WTO, all of which have more politically diverse memberships. The likeminded nature of the organization plus the credibility of its objective, data-driven analysis make the OECD a valuable platform to advance many of the Government’s priorities as set out in the Mandate Letter.  The OECD generally adopts a soft-law approach to norm setting by establishing policy recommendations and offering peer review and performance benchmarking. In this way, the OECD provides a venue for likeminded countries to set out policy guidance to promote a level playing field in areas, such as corporate governance of state-owned enterprises. The OECD’s international credibility appeals to many non-member countries, and many sign on to and implement OECD policy instruments.

Each year, over 1000 Canadian delegates from three levels of government, including 25 federal government departments/agencies, are involved in OECD work. GAC leads Canada’s overall engagement at the OECD.

GAC is responsible for Canada’s main assessed contribution to the OECD, but other departments and agencies are responsible for making payments for the OECD sub-bodies they lead on (e.g. Finance Canada pays the assessment for the Financial Action Task Force; Transport Canada pays the assessment for the International Transport Forum). In 2025 GAC’s assessed contribution to the OECD was $18,995,194.

Bill C-202 supply management

Media lines – Qs & As

Private Member’s Bill C-202: An Act to Amend the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act (Supply Management)

Key messages – Responsive only

• Bill C-202 is consistent with the Government’s longstanding policy to protect the integrity of Canada’s supply management system in trade negotiations.
• Canada’s supply management system provides stable, fair and predictable prices for famers and ensures a stable supply of high-quality products for Canadians.

Questions/Answers

1. How has Canada protected supply management in its free trade negotiations to date?

• Canada has not undertaken market access concessions on supply-managed products in any of its free trade agreements with the exception of limited access provided under the Canada-EU CETA, the CPTPP and CUSMA.
• The Canada-United Kingdom Trade Continuity Agreement provides no additional market access for cheese or any other supply-managed products.

2. Will Bill C-202 negatively impact Canada’s trade diversification efforts?

• Canada will continue opening new markets and opportunities for Canadian businesses and consumers, while vigorously defending and protecting Canada’s supply management system.
• Canada’s approach on supply management in international trade has not impacted its ability to negotiate ambitious agreements.
• Canada has concluded 17 FTAs that cover 53 countries, all while preserving Canada’s supply management system.

The Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Business Conduct (CORE)

Latest media lines approved for May 29th and June 5th Globe and Mail media call.

Maybe 29^th

• Masud Husain’s term as Canada Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise (CORE) concluded on 20 May 2025. The position is currently vacant. The office of the CORE remains open.
• The position of CORE is a Governor-in-Council appointment, and within its mandate has an advisory role to Canada’s Minister of International Trade. 
• The previous government announced a review of the operations and effectiveness of the office of the CORE in fall 2024. As part of the review, Global Affairs Canada has received written submissions from a range of stakeholders.
• This government looks forward to confirming a future direction for the office in due course, as part of ensuring that Canada’s approach and tools for promoting responsible business conduct remain robust and fit-for-purpose.

June 5^th follow-up

• The future of the CORE remains under review. No Notice of Appointment Opportunity has been posted for the position.

Canadian arms exports to Israel

Latest approved media lines used for media calls on arm exports to Israel.

Key points

• Since January 8th, 2024, Canada has not approved new arms export permits to Israel that could be used in the current conflict in Gaza.
• Canada also suspended approximately 30 export permits for military items destined to Israel in 2024.  
• All permits suspended in 2024 remain suspended and cannot be used to export to Israel.
• Canada continues to assess all permit applications on a case-by-case basis under Canada’s risk assessment framework, including the criteria set out in the Arms Trade Treaty and enshrined in the Export and Import Permits Act.

If asked about specific contracts 

• I cannot comment on individual permits or permit applications due to an obligation to protect confidential information about the commercial activities of individual companies

On the two recently tabled reports

• Two reports were tabled on May 30 regarding the Export and Import Permits Act.
• The first was a report on exports of strategic goods and technologies pursuant to section 27 of the Export and Import Permits Act.
• The second was a report on the broader operation of the Act, with a particular focus on statistics related to economic permitting.
• As outlined in these reports, for 2024, the total value of exports of controlled items from Canada to Israel was approximately $18.9 This figure represents exports under permits issued before January 8, 2024.