Minister of International Trade appearance before the Standing Committee on International Trade (CIIT) on Canada-U.S. Trade

October 2, 2025
Published: November 28, 2025

Table of Contents

Tab A - Overview material

1. Scenario Note
2. Standing Committee on International Trade – Membership

Tab B – Top-Lines Messages and Contextual Material

3. Trade Negotiations
4. Trade Diversification
5. Economic Security Issues (including Forced Labour)
6. Sector-Specific Issues (Canola; Steel/Aluminum; Supply Management)
7. Other Countries' FTAs
8. Key Trade Statistics

01. SCENARIO NOTE

October 2, 2025

House of Commons International Trade Committee (3:30-4:30pm)

In Person

Context

• You will appear before the House of Commons International Trade Committee for one (1) hour the evening of Thursday, October 2, from 3:30pm- 4:30pm. Canada-US Trade Minister Sidhu, Deputy Minister Rob Stewart, and senior GAC officials will be appearing alongside you. Departmental officials will be appearing during the meeting’s second hour.

Format:

You will be given five (5) minutes to deliver opening remarks, at which point you will receive questions from CIIT members. Six (6) minutes will be allocated for the first questioner of each party as follows:

First Round:

• Conservative Party (CPC), six (6) minutes
• Liberal Party (LPC), six (6) minutes
• Bloc Quebecois (BQ), six (6) minutes

Second and Subsequent Rounds:

• Conservative Party, five (5) minutes
• Liberal Party, five (5) minutes
• Bloc Québécois, two and a half (2.5) minutes
• Conservative Party, five (5) minutes
• Liberal Party, five (5) minutes.

Background:

• This will be the first meeting of CIIT’s nine (9) meeting study on Canada-US Trade. Industry Minister Joly has also been invited to appear for the study at a date TBD.
• GAC provided a briefing on the status of CUSMA to CIIT members on Wednesday, August 6, at the request of the committee. Questions were technical and focused on sectoral impacts of tariffs and the status of trade diversification and US negotiations.
• GAC’s Chief Negotiator Aaron Fowler appeared before the committee on September 22 for an ongoing study on Canada’s Free Trade Agreements. Questions, at times confrontational, focussed on:
• Canada’s transparency during trade negotiations (specifically for CUSMA);
• The Government's consultation process for FTAs (in the context of BQ Bill C-228 to mandate parliamentary study of all new treaties);
• non-tariff barriers to trade in Canada’s FTAs (e.g. within CETA); and
• Canada-China Trade (Canola, EVs, Forced Labour).
• Opposition members also requested CUSMA consultation documents from the department and asked whether Canada’s recognition of Palestinian statehood will impact CUSMA renegotiation.

02. STANDING COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE – MEMBERSHIP

HON. JUDY A. SGRO

CHAIR
(LPC—HUMBER RIVER-BLACK CREEK, ON)

ELECTION TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Elected: 1999

Re-Elected: 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2019, 2021, and 2025

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND

Municipal Politics: North York City Council (1987 – 1994); Toronto City Council (1994 – 1999); At the municipal level, Sgro focused on poverty and crime reduction.

POLITICAL AND PARLIAMENTARY ROLES

Former Parliamentary Secretary: Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Works and Government Services (2003)

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

Chair: Standing Committee on International Trade CIIT (2020 – Present); Liaison Committee (2016 – Present); Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities TRAN (2016 – 2019)

Vice-Chair: Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology (2013 – 2015)

Member: Special Committee on the COVID-19 Pandemic (2020)

POINTS OF INTEREST TO GAC

CIIT: In accordance with conventions concerning the role of committee Chairs, MP Sgro is often impartial and asks few questions during CIIT meetings.

Human Rights Advocacy: During House of Commons proceedings, often refers to human rights abuses in Hong Kong (Jimmy Lai) as well as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

ADAM CHAMBERS

VICE-CHAIR

(CPC – SIMCOE NORTH, ON)

ELECTION TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Elected: 2021

Re-Elected: 2025

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND

Education: Holds a law degree and MBA from the University of Western Ontario (2011)

Insurance: Former Assistant Vice President, Virtual Advice, at Canada Life (2019-2021)

Political: Former Director of Policy to Finance Minister Jim Flaherty (2014)

Entrepreneur: Runs an online education business, Ontariolawexam.com

POLITICAL AND PARLIAMENTARY ROLES

CPC Critic for International Trade (2025- Present)

Legislation: CPC Critic for Government Bill C-5, Free Trade and Labour Mobility Act

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

Vice-Chair: Standing Committee on International Trade CIIT (2025 – Present)

Member: Standing Committee on Finance FINA (2021-2025)

POINTS OF INTEREST TO GAC

CIIT: On July 11, Chambers sent a letter to the CIIT Chair, signed by all CPC CIIT members, that the committee reconvene given President Trump’s tariff announcement of 35% tariffs on Canadian imports starting August 1. Instead, a GAC and AAFC briefing on CUSMA was provided to members.

Can-U.S.: During House debate for MINT’s Committee of the Whole appearance in June 2025, Chambers focused questions on the Digital Services Tax (DST), Chinese electric vehicle mandate, the status of Can-U.S. trade negotiations, tariffs and counter-tariff measures.

Trade Mobility: Frequently advocates for interprovincial trade liberalization.

SIMON-PIERRE SAVARD-TREMBLAY

VICE-CHAIR

(BQ—SAINT-HYACINTHE-BAGOT, QC)

Trade

ELECTION TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Elected: 2019

Re-Elected: 2021, 2025

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND

Studies: Bachelor’s degree in political sciences, master’s degree in Sociology, and a PhD in Sociology and development

Columnist: Columnist at Radio VM (2015 – 2019); Columnist at Le Mag (2017 – 2019); Columnist at Cogéco 106,9 Fm Mauricie (2016 – 2019); Columnist at La Vie Agricole (2017 – 2019)

Blogger: Blogger at Le Journal de Montréal (2016 – 2019)

POLITICAL AND PARLIAMENTARY ROLES

BQ Critic for International Trade and National Defence

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

Vice-Chair: Standing Committee on International Trade CIIT (2020 – Present); Standing Committee on National Defense NDDN (2025- Present)

POINTS OF INTEREST TO GAC

Softwood Lumber: Has spoken often about softwood lumber and the U.S.’ increased countervailing and anti-dumping duties. 

Streel and Aluminum: Often raises the impact of U.S. tariffs on the Quebec steel, aluminum, and manufacturing sectors.

Forced Labour in Supply Chains: Has consistently urged the government to introduce legislation to address the issue of Canada’s CUSMA commitment to monitor and prevent the import of forced-labour goods from China. Introduced a motion at CIIT for the committee to study the issue- study will begin this Fall.

Canada-China relations: during recent CIIT meetings, focused several questions on Canada-China relations, including on trade agreements,

Transparency during Trade negotiations: Is supportive and has discussed at committee the BQ Bill S-228, requiring all treaties to receive parliamentary scrutiny before their ratification.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): In committee, often discourages the inclusion of ISDS provisions in Trade agreements and poses questions to gauge public opinion on dispute settlement mechanisms.

YASIR NAQVI
(LPC—OTTAWA CENTRE, ON) 

ELECTION TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Elected: 2021

Re-Elected: 2025

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND

Education: McMaster University (BA, BSc), University of Ottawa (LLB), Carleton University (MA), Rotman School of Management

Legal & Academic: Lawyer specializing in international trade law; former CEO of the Institute for Canadian Citizenship

Provincial Politics: Ontario MPP for Ottawa Centre (2007–2018); served as Attorney General, Minister of Labour, and Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services

POLITICAL AND PARLIAMENTARY ROLES

Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of International Trade and to the Secretary of State (International Development) (2025- Present)

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

Member: Standing Committee on International Trade (2025- Present)

POINTS OF INTEREST TO GAC

CUSMA negotiations: In recent CIIT meetings, raised concerns over US non-compliance with CUSMA rules exempting Canadian vehicles from US tariffs.

Multilateral Engagement: Active in parliamentary diplomacy across Europe, Asia, and Africa.

Free Trade Advocate: Introduced a motion for CIIT to undertake a study on the importance of free and ethical trade, to be studied in September 2025.

Civic Inclusion: Advocates for democratic participation and newcomer integration.

MATT JENEROUX
(CPC—CYPRESS HILLS-GRASSANDS, SK)

ELECTION TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Elected: 2015

Re-Elected: 2019, 2021 and 2025

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND

Studies: Bachelor of Arts from the University of Alberta

Provincial Politics: MP of the Progressive Conservative Party at the Legislative Assembly of Alberta (2012 – 2015)

Public Service: Advisor, Strategic Policy and Planning at Health Canada (2008 – 2012)

Mental Health: Founder of the Hi Dad Foundation to raise awareness for the importance of men’s mental health for families (2022 – Present)

POLITICAL AND PARLIAMENTARY ROLES

CPC Critic for Supply Chain Issues

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

Member: Standing Committee on International Trade CIIT (2023 – Present), Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities TRAN (2023- 2025)

POINTS OF INTEREST TO GAC

Supply chains: Has spoken at committee on the importance of stronger and more resilient domestic and foreign supply chain networks and infrastructure. Small business advocate.

Softwood Lumber: At CIIT, Jeneroux frequently discusses the impacts of U.S. softwood lumber tariffs on Canadian forestry workers and the sector at large.

Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms (CBAM): Has been critical of the government’s consultation process regarding the implementation of CBAMs.

CBSA CARM System: At committee, critical of the government’s implementation of CBSA new border customs collection initiative.

PETER FONSECA
(LPC—MISSISSAUGA EAST—COOKSVILLE, ON) 

ELECTION TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Elected: 2015

Re-Elected: 2019, 2021, 2025

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND

Athletics: Former Olympic marathon runner (1996 Atlanta Games)

Management Consultant and Entrepreneur

Provincial Politics: Ontario MPP (2003–2011); Minister of Labour and Tourism

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

Chair: Standing Committee on Finance (2021 – 2025)

Member: Standing Committee on International Trade (2025- Present)

POINTS OF INTEREST TO GAC

EU & US Trade: Active in CETA and CUSMA discussions in the House

Border Security: During Bill C-5, One Canadian Economy Act, debate, spoke in support of government efforts to intercept illegal goods to Canada.

SME Development: Strong advocate for small business access to global markets.

Trade policy: In recent CIIT meetings, MP Fonseca asked about Team Canada’s role in negotiations, and trade policy goals.

JASON GROLEAU
(CPC—BEAUCE, QC)

ELECTION TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Elected: 2025

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND

Business Leader: Owner of grocery stores, restaurants and bars in Saint-Georges and Saint-Éphrem, Quebe.

Athletics: Former Professional Hockey Player

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

Member: Standing Committee on International Trade CIIT (2025-Present)

POINTS OF INTEREST TO GAC:

Automotive Sector: Opposed restrictions on gas-powered vehicle sales.

Industrial Infrastructure and Critical Minerals: Critical of the lack of industrial infrastructure to extract Canadian natural resources and critical minerals. Has advocated for large-scale battery recycling industrial infrastructure.

Francophone Engagement: Active in Assemblée parlementaire de la Francophonie.

Trade barriers: Critical of interprovincial trade barriers, recommending harmonization of CFIA standards in recent CIIT meetings.

Trade agreements: asked questions on GAC consultation process on trade agreements, and on negotiations with the US.

As a new MP, Groleau has made limited public statements.

JACOB MANTLE
(CPC— YORK—DURHAM, ON)

Critic for International Trade

ELECTION TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Elected: 2025

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND

Education: Queen’s University (Political Science & Law)

Legal: International trade lawyer at Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt

Municipal Politics: Uxbridge, ON, City Councillor (2010–2014)

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

Member: Standing Committee on International Trade CIIT (2025-Present)

POINTS OF INTEREST TO GAC

Trade Law: Specializes in economic regulations and sanctions.

Can-US: During MINT’s June 2025 Committee of the Whole appearance, Mantle posed several questions on softwood lumber duty rates.

At CIIT, Mantle has focused his questions for the government on trade negotiation transparency and consultation processes, as well as the impact of Canada’s recognition of the State of Palestine on upcoming CUSMA negotiations. He sought from the government public submissions made during the recently initiated CUSMA renegotiation public consultation. He has also focused on technical barriers to trade under Canada’s FTAs.

Mantle frequently asks “yes or no” questions of GAC officials during appearances before committee.

LINDA LAPOINTE
(LPC— RIVIERE-DES-MILLE-ILES, QC) 

ELECTION TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Elected: 2015

Re-Elected: 2025

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND

Business: Former owner of Provigo Lapointe et Fille

Provincial Politics: Assemblée Nationale Du Quebec MNA for Groulx (2007–2008)

Community Leadership: President of Boisbriand Business Association

POLITICAL AND PARLIAMENTARY ROLES

Deputy Government Whip (2018–2019)

President: Liberal Women’s Caucus (2025 – Present)

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

Vice-Chair: Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics ETHI (2025- Present)

Member: Standing Committee on International Trade CIIT (2025- Present)

POINTS OF INTEREST TO GAC

Trade Agreements: Active in CETA, CPTPP, and CUSMA discussions during House proceedings. In recent CIIT meetings, focused on how US tariffs have influenced Canada’s negotiation approach, as well as agricultural trade priorities. 

Trade Diversification: During Debate on Bill C-5, One Canadian Economy Act, spoke in support of Canada diversifying trade relationships

Ethics & Privacy: Advocates for digital transparency and consumer protection

STEEVE LAVOIE

(LPC—BEAUPORT—LIMOILOU, QC) 

ELECTION TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Elected: 2025

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND

Business Leadership: Former President and Chief Executive Officer for the Quebec Chamber of Commerce and Industry (2020-2024)

Banker: Former Associate Vice-President, Enterprises for Banque Nationale (2018-2020). Various Positions at Banque Nationale (2000-2020)

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

Member: Standing Committee on International Trade (2025 – Present)

POINTS OF INTEREST TO GAC

Community Engagement: Advocate for regional economic development.

Access to global markets: In recent CIIT meetings, asked about barriers faced by small and medium-sized enterprises in accessing global markets.

As new MP, Lavoie has made limited public statements.

03. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

• Trade agreements with new partners support stability and predictability and provide new opportunities for Canadian businesses and workers in a time of mounting protectionism.
• Canada has an active trade negotiations agenda focused on deepening ties and expanding our access to markets in the Indo-Pacific and Latin America, in particular.

SUPPLEMENTARY MESSAGES 

• While the United States remains central to our international trade priorities, recent U.S. actions reinforce the need for Canada to diversify our trade including through the negotiation of trade agreements with new partners.
• We are actively working to expand our access to the Indo-Pacific region, including by negotiating an FTA with ASEAN, exploring an FTA with the Philippines, considering the addition of new members to the CPTPP, and moving forward with the ratification of the Canada-Indonesia CEPA following signature of the Agreement in September 2025.
• In the Latin America region, we are working towards the signature and ratification of the Canada-Ecuador FTA following the conclusion of negotiations in January 2025, and are working towards resuming FTA negotiations with Mercosur, a group that includes G20 members Argentina and Brazil as well as Paraguay and Uruguay.
• We also continuously monitor Canada’s Air Transport Agreements with foreign partners to ensure these treaties support and enhance Canada’s international air connectivity – connectivity that underpins our growing commercial and people-to-people ties abroad. Since last fall, Canada has concluded expanded Agreements with Australia, Qatar and Senegal and a first-time Agreement with Ghana. Work is underway to identify new priority air services markets for future growth.
• If asked how the government ensures transparency and public engagement during the negotiation process:
  • The Government of Canada undertakes public consultations, including engagement with business, Provinces and Territories, Indigenous rights holders, and Canadians, to inform Canada’s priorities and interests in potential negotiations for trade and investment agreements.
  • Public consultations are initiated through a Canada Gazette notice and are supplemented by direct outreach.
  • Engagement is continuous throughout negotiations:
  • public reports are published on Global Affairs Canada’s website after negotiating rounds;
  • targeted debriefs are provided to Indigenous partners and stakeholders with specific interest; and,
  • provinces and territories are briefed regularly (through the Federal-Provincial-Territorial Committee on Trade, after every negotiating round, and on request) and have access to the negotiating text.
• If asked how the government meets its commitments under the Policy on Tabling Treaties in Parliament for FTAs
  • The government is committed to transparency with respect to trade negotiations and agreements.
  • For free trade agreement negotiations, under the Policy on Tabling of Treaties in Parliament, a “Notice of Intent” is published and issued to Parliament at least 90 days prior to the commencement of formal FTA negotiations
  • In addition, at least 30 days prior to the commitment of negotiations, the government publishes and notifies Parliament of its “Negotiating Objectives”
  • The Policy also requires the Minister of Foreign Affairs to table treaties in the House of Commons for 21 sitting days following their adoption (by signature or otherwise) and prior to Canada taking actions to express its consent to be bound at international law.

BACKGROUND 

Canada-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)

The CEPA will improve market access conditions for Canada’s goods exports in Southeast Asia’s largest economy through tariff elimination for a majority of goods and addressing non-tariff measures and other issues adversely affecting Canada’s exports (e.g. sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, and good regulatory practices). Once fully implemented, over 95% of Canada’s current exports to Indonesia will receive preferential tariff treatment. The CEPA will also provide greater predictability and transparency for Canadian service providers and investors across a range of sectors. The signature of the CEPA in September 2025 comes at a critical time when Canadian businesses are seeking to diversify their exports and enter new markets.

Canada-ASEAN FTA

Canada and the ten ASEAN member states (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) launched FTA negotiations in 2021. A comprehensive FTA would provide Canada with new preferential market access to key economies in Southeast Asia, including Thailand and the Philippines, bolstering existing trade and investment, and promoting further integration into global supply chains for Canadian businesses. In 2024, annual two-way merchandise trade between Canada and ASEAN was $41.9 billion, an increase of 8% from $38.8 billion in 2023.

Canada-Philippines FTA Exploratory Discussions

On December 5, 2024, Canada and the Philippines announced the launch of exploratory discussions for a potential FTA. The objective of these exploratory discussions is to explore how a potential Canada-Philippines FTA could build upon the outcomes of an FTA with ASEAN and allow for the further elimination of barriers to trade between our countries. The Philippines was Canada’s third largest export market in ASEAN in 2024, with bilateral trade reaching $3.1 billion, of which $1.4 billion in exports and $1.7 billion in imports.

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)

The CPTPP is the most comprehensive trade agreement in Asia, comprised of 12 members representing 14.4% of the global economy: Canada, Australia, Brunei, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam. The CPTPP is designed to evolve and expand over time, including through a periodic review of the Agreement’s implementation and the accession of new economies. Accession negotiations are ongoing with Costa Rica. China, Ecuador, Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, and Uruguay have also applied for accession. The Government has committed to commence implementation of the United Kingdom’s Protocol of Accession to the CPTPP; the Protocol was tabled in Parliament on September 18, 2025.

Canada-UK Trade Continuity Agreement (TCA) and Paused Canada-UK FTA Negotiations

The TCA entered into force in April 2021, following the UK’s exit from the European Union and the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The TCA does not expire and provides tariff free access for 99% of tariff lines.

Negotiations towards a new Canada-UK bilateral FTA were held from 2022 to January 2024. Negotiations proved difficult. The United Kingdom indicated no flexibility to address Canada’s main objectives, particularly in the agriculture sector. For example, the Canadian beef sector has long held the position that the UK’s ban on hormone treated beef is an unjustified trade barrier.

Canada-Ecuador FTA

Conclusion of the Canada-Ecuador FTA negotiations was announced on February 4, 2025. This FTA will further bolster an already burgeoning bilateral trade relationship between Canada and Ecuador, which has been steadily increasing in recent years, reaching nearly $1.9 billion in 2024. Canadian companies are among the largest foreign investors in Ecuador, with Canadian direct investment totalling $4.3 billion in 2024. Officials are working on the joint legal review and translation of the agreement, with a commitment to bringing the agreement into force as soon as possible.

Canada-Mercosur FTA Negotiations

Mercosur is a trading bloc and customs union consisting of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay (though Bolivia is implementing the group’s internal rules until 2028 and is not party to FTA negotiations with Canada). Together, the bloc represents a collective real Gross Domestic Product of over US$3.0 trillion, and a combined population of 282 million as of 2024. FTA negotiations were launched in March 2018 with seven rounds of negotiations held, the most recent taking place in Ottawa in August 2019. Negotiations were paused following that round, and there has been no further engagement since 2020. Brazil has expressed an interest in resuming negotiations with Canada during its tenure of the bloc’s Pro-Tempore presidency (July to December 2025). A comprehensive FTA with Mercosur would increase Canada’s access to a US$3 trillion market. As announced during your official visit to Brazil in August 2025, an initial stocktaking meeting will take place between senior trade officials from Canada and Mercosur countries in October 2025 to discuss the parameters for resuming FTA negotiations.

Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements

Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs) are bilateral treaties designed to protect Canadian investments abroad through reciprocal, legally binding rights and obligations. Canada’s FIPA model guarantees non-discriminatory treatment, safeguards against uncompensated expropriation and provides access to a depoliticised dispute settlement mechanism.

Canada is currently engaged in eight FIPA negotiations (Argentina, Georgia, Pakistan, Qatar, Tanzania, the United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, and Zambia). Canada and the United Arab Emirates are now going through respective legal review processes before final signature and implementation of the Agreement. Canada continues to explore launching FIPA negotiations with other partners.

Air Transport Agreements

Air Transport Agreements (ATAs) are treaties that permit scheduled international air services (passenger and cargo) from one country to another. Mandates to negotiate new or expanded ATAs are a shared responsibility between you and the Minister of Transport. Canadian airlines are facing several key challenges in the current global context, including competitiveness concerns resulting from airspace issues arising from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Canadian airlines are also reducing capacity to the United States due to lower demand from Canadians travellers. In the last 12 months, the Government expanded its ATAs with Australia, Qatar, and Senegal, and concluded a first-time ATA with Ghana. You recently signed an Action Memo which recommended negotiations for a number of new or expanded ATAs. The Minister of Transport is expected to receive the same Action Memo for decision soon.

04. TRADE DIVERSIFICATION

• Canada’s future prosperity depends on expanding and diversifying our trade around the globe.
• The Government is working to grow Canada’s trade across diverse sectors and overseas markets.
• The Government is preparing to launch a Trade Diversification Strategy that will focus government efforts for maximum impact in helping Canadian businesses diversify in today’s context.

SUPPLEMENTARY MESSAGES

• Trade represents two-thirds of Canada’s GDP. Exports support nearly 4 million – or 1 in 5 – Canadian jobs. It is essential that Canadian companies maximize their international growth potential.
• As Canada navigates shifts in U.S. trade and economic policy, we are looking to strengthen the enabling environment that supports and incentivises Canadian businesses to diversify their trade. Reinforcing relationships with international partners – and building new trade-enabling infrastructure here at home – are key elements of this agenda.
• Trade diversification is a whole-of-Government effort - Global Affairs Canada and its federal partners are working to elevate collaboration and high-impact support for Canadian industry.
• The Government’s forthcoming Trade Diversification Strategy will build on supports announced earlier this year to support export diversification in Canada’s forestry and agriculture sectors.

UPDATE

On September 5, the Prime Minister announced new measures to protect, build and transform Canadian strategic industries and help address the impacts of shifts in U.S. trade policy. These included:

• a new Strategic Response Fund ($5 billion) to help Canadian firms in all sectors impacted by tariffs adapt, diversify and grow
• assistance to Canada’s canola and agriculture producers, including $75 million / 5 years for Canada’s AgriMarketing Program to support export diversification

The Prime Minister also announced that the Government would soon launch a new “Trade Diversification Strategy”.

SUPPORTING FACTS AND FIGURES

• Canadian exports to non-US markets increased over 50% between 2017 and 2024. However, Canadian exports remain concentrated in the US market: 70% of Canada’s goods and service exports went to the U.S. in 2024.
• From Q1 to Q2 2025, Canada’s goods and services exports to the United States decreased by 18.7% on a seasonally adjusted basis, from $189.7 billion to $154.2 billion, reflecting the impact of new U.S. trade measures.
• Canada’s Trade Commissioner Service (TCS) served over 10,000 Canadian businesses in 2024-25. 80% of services were for markets outside of North America. Since 2019, the TCS has facilitated 6,132 international business development opportunities overseas for its Canadian clients, worth a total of $37.6 billion.
• In 2024, Export Development Canda (EDC) facilitated $13 billion in business in the Indo-Pacific region and $23.4 billion in business in Europe.
• The Indo-Pacific is the world’s fastest-growing economic region and accounts for two-thirds of the global population. The Indo-Pacific is expected to account for two-thirds of the world’s middle class by 2030, and over half of global GDP by 2040.
• The CPTPP provides Canada with preferential access to a market of 594 million consumers. Since entry into force in 2019, Canada’s merchandise trade increased by 42.9% with the CPTPP’s seven Indo-Pacific markets; merchandise exports to these countries increasing by 24.3%.
• The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Indonesia signed on September 24 will level the playing field for Canadian business vis-à-vis some competitors and provide first mover advantage vis-à-vis others (EU and US). Canadian merchandise exports to Indonesia were $2.3 billion in 2024, making it Canada’s largest export market in Southeast Asia. Signature of the CEPA was accompanied by an $825-million Market Leader Partnership Agreement between EDC and the Indonesia Investment Authority.
• ASEAN represents an economy of 600 million people across ten countries, positioning it as the fifth largest economic bloc worldwide, and is Canada’s fourth largest merchandise trading partner (at $41.9 billion in 2024). A free trade agreement with ASEAN is expected to add US$2.54 billion to Canada’s GDP.
• The Mercosur bloc represents over US$3.0 trillion in GDP and 282 million consumers. Canada’s merchandise trade with Mercosur totalled $15.8 billion in 2024.

BACKGROUND

Canada’s forthcoming Trade Diversification Strategy: On September 5, the Prime Minister announced that the Government would soon launch “Canada’s new Trade Diversification Strategy”. The strategy will build on initiatives in recent months to reinforce economic ties with overseas partners, including new or renewed strategic partnerships with the EU, UK, Poland, and Mexico, as well as agreements such as the Canada-Indonesia CEPA.

CPTPP: The CPTPP is in force between Canada and all CPTPP countries except the UK (pending ratification action by Canada). The CPTPP is designed to evolve and expand. To date, China, Taiwan, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Ukraine and Uruguay have applied. Parties are currently negotiating Costa Rica’s potential accession.

ASEAN: Canada and the ten ASEAN member states (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) are seeking to conclude FTA negotiations as soon as possible. The prospect of an FTA with ASEAN enjoys broad support in Canada (across provinces and territories as well as stakeholders from various industries) and offers significant opportunities for Canadian businesses across a broad range of sectors, including agriculture and agri-food, fish and seafood, natural resources, manufacturing, and financial services.

Mercosur: The South American Common Market (Mercosur) is a trading bloc and customs union consisting of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Canada and Mercosur launched FTA negotiations in March 2018. Negotiations were put on hold in 2020, but a resumption was announced in summer 2025. Brazil is Mercosur’s permanent coordinator for FTA negotiations with Canada and will hold the bloc’s pro-tempore presidency from July to December 2025 (note: Bolivia, currently undergoing implementation of the group’s internal rules until 2028, is not party to the FTA negotiations).

05. ECONOMIC SECURITY AND FORCED LABOUR

• We share many common concerns with the United States and Mexico. Economic security threats can harm our national security, compromise our supply chains, hollow out strategic sectors, and hurt Canadian competitiveness, jobs, and prosperity.
• Canada is well placed to work with allies as a reliable and strategic trading partner, building on strengths in energy, technology, innovation and critical supply chains.
• Through the forced labour import ban in the Customs Tariff and the Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act (S. 211), Canada is the only country in the world to have both an import ban and supply chain transparency legislation in force.

SUPPLEMENTARY MESSAGES – FORCED LABOUR IMPORT BAN 

• Forced labour is an abhorrent human rights abuse that affects millions of men, women, and children around the world.
• In 2020 Canada introduced a prohibition on goods produced with forced and compulsory labour, becoming the second country to do so after the U.S.
• In 2024 the Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act came into force, which requires certain entities and government institutions to report on steps taken to prevent and reduce risks of forced labour in their supply chains.
• Through the import ban and the Supply Chains Act, Canada has taken concrete actions towards eradicating forced labour in international supply chains.

SUPPORTING FACTS AND FIGURES 

• Canada has many economic security tools (e.g., export and import controls, foreign investment reviews, trade remedies, surtaxes, policies on research security and sensitive technology, and a ban on import of goods produced by forced labour).
• Canada cooperates closely with key partners (e.g., US, EU, UK, Japan, Korea, Australia). Economic security and resilience is a theme of Canada’s G7 presidency.
• According to the International Labour Organization, in 2023 there were approximately 28 million people in situations of forced labour worldwide.
• Since 2021 CBSA has intercepted and detained approximately 50 shipments over potential forced labour concerns. So far in 2025, the CBSA intercepted and detained one shipment. Of these interceptions, 33 took place in 2024, one of which was determined to be produced by means of forced labour and was therefore prohibited entry into the Canadian marketplace. 

BACKGROUND 

Economic Security: The concept of economic security is broad and evolving. It refers to protecting Canada from economic-based threats and ensuring economic resilience, which is becoming increasingly complex in the face of heightened geopolitical competition and strains on global rules and norms. Protecting Canada from threats requires safeguarding strategic sectors of the economy, such as critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, emerging tech, health, and defence sectors, as these are vital for Canada’s national security and future prosperity. Economic security threats include:

• efforts to exploit pathways into the Canadian economy (e.g., foreign investments and research partnerships that are risks to of economic assets, technology and innovation, cyber and critical infrastructure risks);
• risks from overdependencies and concentrations in trade, which represent potential chokepoints for coercion and exposure to shocks; and,
• efforts by some states to create market dominance, such as using unfair trade practices that can distort markets and hollow out strategic sectors.

Threats are increasingly coming from non-traditional sources (states and entities). Protecting against these threats will be essential to support a new era of Canadian growth, efforts to become an energy superpower, and development of nation-building projects. A whole-of-government effort to ensure Canada’s economic security includes:

• Strengthening and coordinated use of targeted tools (e.g. investment screening, export controls, surtaxes) to address evolving risks and close gaps;
• Diversification of trade and investment with reliable trading partners;
• Coordinating efforts with partners bilaterally and in key fora (e.g. G7) to minimize inadvertent harms and support rules-based trade; and

Forced Labour: To meet Canada’s commitments under CUSMA, in July 2020 Canada introduced an import ban under the Customs Tariff on goods mined, manufactured or produced wholly or in part by forced labour. The import ban was updated in March 2023 with the passing of the Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act, which requires certain entities and government institutions to report on steps taken to prevent and reduce risks of forced labour in their supply chains. The Act came into force on January 1, 2024. 

ATIP PROTECTED BACKGROUND 

 [REDACTED]

06. SECTOR-SPECIFIC ISSUES (CANOLA; STEEL/ALUMINUM; SUPPLY MANAGEMENT)

Canola

• Canada’s priority is to secure the removal of Chinese tariffs on Canadian agricultural and seafood exports, while protecting our domestic industrial sectors in the face of an uncertain and complex global trading environment.

Steel/Aluminum

• Have taken exceptional and targeted measures to protect the steel industry from global excess capacity and address unprecedented market circumstances.
• In particular, Canada implemented a surtax on steel and aluminum from China, as well as a surtax on imports that contain steel melted and poured, or aluminum smelted and cast, in China.
• Additionally, Canada has implemented a steel import tariff rate quota to address the risk of trade diversion further to U.S. global tariffs on steel imports.

Dairy/Supply Management

• We always stand up for the Canadian dairy industry and the farmers, workers, and communities it supports, and we will continue to do so.

SUPPLEMENTARY MESSAGES 

Canola

• Constructively engaging with China to advance Canadian economic and trade interests.
• We are also maintaining regular communication with Canadian stakeholders impacted by China’s tariffs and have taken steps to support the canola sector to help mitigate supply chain risks and enable trade diversification.

Steel/Aluminum

• The government has longstanding concerns regarding China’s non-market policies and practices that lead to global market distortions and excess capacity in the steel and aluminum sectors that harm Canadian producers and workers and undermine Canada’s economic security.
• Further to global tariffs imposed by the United States earlier this year, other countries are seeking alternative markets for their steel products. Canada is uniquely exposed to this risk given the integration of Canada-U.S. steel markets and has imposed import tariff rate quotas (TRQs) to stabilize the domestic steel market in the face of potential diversion.
• These exceptional measures are not taken lightly and are justified under Canada’s international obligations.

RESPONSIVE LINES 

Canola

What is Canada doing about tariffs on canola? What have been the results of high-level meetings with China so far?

• We are pursuing a two-track approach to address Chinese tariffs – direct bilateral engagement with China and a WTO dispute challenging China’s tariffs on our agricultural and seafood exports.
• In the short term, expecting engagement with China on the margins of upcoming international meetings.
• The main result is the opportunity to build trust with China and to build our case incrementally and through repeated interactions. These are multi-dimensional and complex trade issues that will take time to resolve.

If asked further details on Finance’s review of the surtaxes on EVs, steel, and aluminum:

• When surtaxes were imposed on Chinese electric vehicles, steel and aluminum in October 2024, the government committed to review these surtaxes within a year.
• Work is now underway to complete this review. The review will assess whether there have been developments with respect to China’s non-market policies and practices that led to Canada’s tariffs, as well whether the scope and design of the tariffs remain appropriate.

Dairy (Supply Management)

U.S. complaints on dairy

• Canada is confident that our practices align with our obligations under CUSMA, and we’ll continue to stand up for supply management and our dairy sector.

United States International Trade Commission (USITC) Section 332 Investigation

• Canada will continue to participate in the investigation, in close collaboration with industry to tell the Canadian dairy story. In short, supply management is focused on serving the Canadian dairy market and we export a negligible amount of dairy solids-non fat (SNF) to the United States and other markets.

Bill C-202

• With the entry into force of Bill C-202, the Government’s commitment to preserve, protect and defend all three pillars of Canada’s supply management system is strengthened.

CPTPP dairy TRQs dispute

• As a result of the mutually satisfactory resolution of the dairy TRQs dispute under the CPTPP, Canada published some minor technical changes to its TRQ administration policies on October 1, of which industry was supportive.

SUPPORTING FACTS AND FIGURES 

Canola

• Canada is the world’s largest canola producer, at 19.2 million tonnes in 2024, down marginally from 19.4 million tonnes in 2023.
• Canola generated $12.9 billion in farm cash receipts in 2024, making it the most valuable field crop in Canada, representing 34 percent of the sector’s total.
• Canola seed exports to China in 2024 totaled 5.9 million tonnes, representing about 68 percent of total exports to all markets.

Steel

• Canada is the 16th largest steel producer in the world. Its largest steel producing companies are ArcelorMittal Dofasco, Algoma Steel, and Stelco.
• The Canadian steel industry is concentrated largely in Ontario and produces about 12 million metric tonnes (mmt) per year, which is just slightly below Canadian demand of 13 mmt. Canada’s annual steelmaking capacity has remained stable at 16 mmt in recent years, after slowly declining from 18 mmt in 2010.
• Canada’s exports of steel and aluminum goods to the U.S. that are subject to Section 232 have declined by 64% and exports, and exports of derivatives of steel and aluminum subject to Section 232 have declined by 25%.

Aluminum

• Canada is the fourth largest primary aluminum producer in the world with an annual capacity of roughly 3.3 mmt and operating at full capacity. Nearly 90% of Canada’s aluminum production is exported to the United States.
• Production is concentrated in Quebec, but there is one smelter in B.C. The 3 primary aluminum producers are Alcoa, Alouette and Rio Tinto.

BACKGROUND 

Canola

China’s trade measures impacting Canadian canola: In retaliation to Canada’s October 2024 imposition of a 100% surtax on electric vehicles and 25% surtaxes on steel and aluminum from China, China applied 100% tariffs on Canadian canola oil, canola meal, and peas. In addition, on August 12, 2025, China imposed provisional duties of 75.8% on imports of canola seed from Canada, under its self-initiated anti-dumping investigation. Given the complexity of the case, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) recently extended the deadline for the completion of the investigation to March 9, 2026.

Government support announced for canola sector:

On September 5, the government announced a package of support for the Canola industry that includes:

• $370M over 2 years to assist domestic producers and restructure their value chains, with a particular focus on biofuels with an eye to pivoting the industry to be able to serve the Canadian market, and as such includes changes to the Canadian Clean Fuels Regulation to incentivize the use of Canadian canola based biofuels.
• Double the size of the Advance Payments Program loan to Canola exporters for 2025-2026, from $250,000 to $500,000
• $75M over five years (starting in 2026-2027) to expand the Agri Marketing program and other Trade Diversification initiatives (branding campaigns, exporter training, advocacy)

This is in addition to the $1 billion Regional Tariff Response Initiative fund announced in March, which would support Canola SMEs directly or indirectly impacted by tariffs.

Engagement with China in 2025

Thus far, in 2025, Canada and China have had multiple engagements at the officials and political levels, including:

• On June 3, 2025, Minister Maninder Sidhu had an introductory meeting with PRC’s Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao on the margins of the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting, in Paris. Both ministers agreed to restore stability and predictability in channels of communications, with a view to address trade irritants and explore future cooperation and to convening the JETC in 2025.
• During a call on June 5, PM Carney and China’s Premier, Li Qiang, exchanged views on bilateral relations, including the importance of engagement, agreed to regularize channels of communication between Canada and China and committed to holding the JETC at an early date.
• Economic Partnership Working Group met in Beijing on August 8. DG-level meeting which covered: agricultural market access, Canadian surtaxes on Chinese steel, aluminum and EVs, challenges for business (DeepSeek, China Telecom, Hikvision, Tik Tok), Chinese tariffs on Canadian ag and seafood exports, and areas of cooperation (energy, modern wood construction, green development, e-commerce).
• Joint Economic and Trade Commission (JETC) met in Ottawa on August 26. DMT Stewart and Vice Minister Li chaired the meeting; both sides raised key irritants and discussed areas of cooperation; key result to agree on engaging on technical issues through working groups (e.g. IPWG)
• Premier Moe and Parliamentary Secretary Blois along with a delegation of Saskatchewan officials visited China over 3 days on September 6. Meetings were cordial and a signal Canada is engaging seriously on bilateral trade issues.
• PM meeting with Premier Li on the margins of UNGA on September 23.

WTO DS Cases with China (DS636, DS627, DS641)

• DS627: In response to Canada’s 2024 surtax measures against China, China requested WTO dispute settlement consultations on Canada’s surtaxes on imports of EVs, steel and aluminum from China on September 6, 2024. Case is currently in the panel selection phase.
• DS636: Following the imposition of China’s “anti-discrimination” tariffs on Canadian agricultural and seafood exports, Canada requested WTO dispute settlement consultations on March 20, 2025. Case is currently in the panel selection phase.
• DS641: Following announcements on Canada’s “country of melt/country of smelt” (COM/CSC) surtaxes on imports of steel and aluminum originating in China, and steel import TRQs, China requested WTO dispute settlement consultations on August 15, 2025. Canada responded to China’s request on August 21.

Steel and Aluminum

Canadian steel and aluminum measures: In fall 2024, Canada implemented surtaxes of 25% on imports of steel and aluminum from China. On August 1, 2025, Canada implemented surtaxes of 25% on certain imports of steel and aluminum products from all countries (excluding the U.S.) which contain steel melted and poured, or aluminum smelted and cast, in China.

Separately, beginning in June 2025 Canada implemented measures to stabilize the steel industry and prevent harmful trade diversion due to global U.S. measures. Specifically, Canada implemented a steel import tariff rate quota (TRQ) set at 50% of 2024 volumes for non-FTA countries, and 100% of 2024 volumes for non-CUSMA FTA partners. A 50% surtax applies on steel imports beyond those levels.

U.S. steel and aluminum measures: On March 12, 2025, the U.S. imposed global tariffs of 25% under Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act on imports of certain steel and aluminum products and their derivatives from Canada and all other countries. In response, Canada imposed retaliatory surtaxes on a list of certain steel and aluminum products imported from the U.S. valued at $15.5 billion in 2024 and other goods valued at $14.3 billion. On June 4, the U.S. increased its tariffs on steel and aluminum products and their derivatives to 50%. On August 18the U.S. Department of Commerce amended the scope of Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum to include 407 additional products. These newly designated “steel and aluminum derivative products” are now subject to a 50% Section 232 tariff on the non-U.S. steel and aluminum content only.

Dairy (Supply Management)

U.S. complaints on dairy: The U.S. Administration, members of Congress and the U.S. dairy industry remain concerned with Canadian implementation of its market access obligations under CUSMA (i.e., TRQ administration, alleged circumvention of CUSMA export thresholds). U.S. concerns also relate to certain aspects of Canada’s domestic milk pricing, which U.S. industry contends create unfair competition in export markets. It is expected that the U.S. Administration will continue to push for changes to Canada’s dairy policies and explore all avenues to address their concerns, including via the CUSMA joint review, the CUSMA dairy review, or other avenues. Canada provided the United States with unprecedented and tangible dairy market access through new CUSMA TRQs (in addition to pricing disciplines and novel export thresholds), which provide for duty-free in-quota imports. Canada’s TRQ administration is fully in-line with obligations in the Agreement, as confirmed by the most recent panel ruling. The dairy trade balance is overwhelmingly in favour of the United States.

USITC 332 investigation: In May 2025, at the request of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the USITC initiated a fact-finding investigation under Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930 on the global non-fat milk solids industry (also called Solids Non-Fat (SNF) in Canada), which will include investigating Canada and other countries’ production, consumption and export of SNF. Canada, in close consultation with industry, are participating in the process emphasizing supply management’s core tenet, managing Canadian supply for the Canadian domestic marketplace. This in turn ensures that Canada has very limited SNF exports. The USITC is expected to submit its report to USTR by March 23, 2026.

Bill C-202: On May 29, 2025, Bloc Québécois leader Yves-François Blanchet introduced Private Member’s Bill C-202, An Act to amend the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act (DFATD) (supply management) which prohibits the Government of Canada from making any commitment in an international trade agreement that would have the effect of increasing TRQ volumes or reducing over-quota tariff rates for dairy products, poultry or eggs. The Bill received Royal Assent on June 26, at which time the amended DFATD Act entered into force.

Resolution of CPTPP dairy TRQs dispute: In July 2025, Ministers announced the resolution of the CPTPP dairy TRQs dispute that New Zealand initiated in 2022. This agreement, negotiated in close consultation with Canadian dairy stakeholders, will result in certain minor policy changes to Canada’s TRQ administration, and does not amend Canada’s market access commitments. These technical policy changes are limited to quotas administered under the terms of the CPTPP, and will not negatively impact Canada’s dairy industry or supply management. With these changes, New Zealand has confirmed that it will not take further action under the CPTPP dispute settlement process. The policy changes were published on October 1.

07. Other Countries' FTAs 

TOP LINE MESSAGES 

• Canada is the only G7 country with comprehensive FTAs in force with all other G7 countries.
• Canada’s network of 15 free trade agreements covering 51 countries gives Canadian exporters a competitive edge, helps them to reach new consumers.
• Reduces costs for Canadian businesses and opens new pathways for diversification and growth.

BACKGROUND

The following is a list of G20 countries’ in-force preferential free trade agreements (FTAs). Important to note that these agreements vary widely in terms of scope, level of ambition, enforceability and title, and are therefore not directly comparable. 

Canada

• Canada has 15 in-force FTAs with 51 partners: Chile (1997); Israel (1997); Costa Rica (2002); Peru (2009); EFTA (2009 – Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland); Colombia (2011); Jordan (2012); Panama (2013); Honduras (2014); South Korea (2015); Ukraine (2017); CPTPP (2018); United Kingdom (2021); CETA (provisional; 2017); CUSMA (2020).

United States

• The United States has 14 in-force FTAs with 20 partners:
• USMCA: Canada, Mexico (2020); CAFTA-DR (2006 - Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic); Oman (2009), Bahrain (2006), Morocco (2006), Australia (2005), Singapore (2004), Chili (2004), Jordan (2001), Israel (1985) and TPAs with Colombia (2012), South Korea (2012), Panama (2012), Peru (2009).^[4]

Mexico

• Mexico has 16 in-force FTAs with 53 partners:
• T-MEC/CUSMA (2020); CPTPP (2018); Mexico-Central America FTA: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica (2013); Pacific Alliance: Chile, Colombia, Peru (2012); European Free Trade Area (EFTA): Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein (2001); Mexico-European Union FTA: 27 European Union countries (2001); FTA’s with the United Kingdom (2021), Panama (2015), Japan (2005), Uruguay (2004), Bolivia (2010), Israel (2000), Peru (2012), Chili (1999), Colombia (1995), Costa Rica (1995).

China

• China had 22 in force FTAs with 29 partners: Maldives (2025), Ecuador (2024), Nicaragua (2023), Serbia (2024), Regional Comprehensive Economic (2022: Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam); Cambodia (2022); Mauritius (2021); Georgia (2018); Australia (2015); South Korea (2015); Switzerland (2014); Iceland (2014); Costa Rica(2011); Peru 2010); Singapore (2009); New Zealand (2008); Pakistan (2007); Chile (2006); ASEAN (2005).

United Kingdom

• The United Kingdom has 40 in-force FTAs with 72 partners (including the European Union).
• The United Kingdom was a member of the European Union until January 2020. In force FTAs that were bilaterally rolled over from the European Union between 2020 and 2021: Albania, Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru), CARIFORUM (Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago), Cameroon, Canada, Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama), Chile, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, European Union, Faroe Islands, Georgia, Ghana, Iceland, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Kosovo, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Mexico, Morocco, North Macedonia, Norway, Palestinian Authority, Pacific (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Solomon Islands), SACUM (Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Mozambique), Serbia, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine and Vietnam.
• Non-rollover FTAs: Japan (2021), Australia (2023), New Zealand (2023) and the CPTPP (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam) (2024).

European Union

• The European Union has 45 in-force (including provisionally applied) FTAs with 79 partners: Albania (2009), Algeria (2005), Andean Community (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru) (2024), Andorra (1991), Armenia (1999), Azerbaijan-Bosnia and Herzegovina (2015), Central America (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador) (2024), Chile (2005), Egypt (2004), Faroe Islands (1997), Georgia (2016), Iceland (1994), Israel (2000), Japan (2019), Jordan (2002), Kenya (2024), Lebanon (2006), Liechtenstein (1995), Mexico (2000), Moldova (2016), Montenegro (2010), Morocco (2000), New Zealand (2024), North Macedonia (2004), Norway (1994), European Union's Overseas Countries and Territories (2001), Palestinian Authority (1997), San Marino (2002), Serbia (2013), Singapore (2019), South Africa (2004), South Korea (2015), Switzerland (1973), Syria (1977), Tunisia (1998), Turkey (1995), Ukraine (2017), United Kingdom (2021), Vietnam (2020), Canada (2017), Cameroon (2014), CARIFORUM States (Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago) (2008), Côte d'Ivoire (2016), Eastern and Southern Africa States (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zimbabwe) (2012), Ghana (2016), Pacific States (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands) (2009), South African Development Community (SADC) members (Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Eswatini) (2016).

Indonesia

• Indonesia has 17 in force FTAs with 28 partners:
• ASEAN FTAs: ASEAN Free Trade Area (1998; 2010), Korea (2007), Japan (2008), Australia–New Zealand (2010; 2025), China (2010), India (2010), Hong Kong (2019), RCEP (2023)
• Bilateral FTAs: Japan (2008), Developing-8 (2011), Pakistan (2013), Chile (2019), Australia (2020), EFTA (2021), Mozambique (2022), Korea (2023), UAE (2023)

Brazil, Argentina

• Brazil and Argentina have 15 in-force FTAs with 18 partners. As members of Mercosur, they have jointly entered into the following free trade agreements: Mercosur–Chile (1996); Mercosur–Bolivia (1997); Mercosur–Mexico (Auto Sector) (2003); Mercosur–Mexico (2006); Mercosur–Guyana (2004); Mercosur–Suriname (2006); Mercosur–India (2009); Mercosur–Southern African Customs Union (SACU, comprising Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa) (2016); Mercosur–Cuba (2017); Mercosur–Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela (2017); Mercosur–Peru (2006); Mercosur–Egypt (2017); Mercosur–Israel (2010); Mercosur–Colombia (2017); Mercosur–Chile (Modernized Agreement) (2022).
• Brazil and Argentina are members of Mercosur. This customs union requires all trade negotiations with third countries to be conducted jointly by its member states (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay), ensuring a common external tariff and unified trade policy.

Australia

• Australia has 18 in-force FTAs with 30 partners: New Zealand (1983); Singapore (2003); United States (2005); Thailand (2005); Chile (2009); ASEAN^[1] (AANZFTA) (2010); Malaysia (2013); Korea (2014); Japan (2015); China (2015); CPTPP^[2] (2018); Hong Kong (2020); Peru (2020); Indonesia (2020); Samoa, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Tonga, Soloman Islands, Niue, Vanuatu, Cook Islands (PACER) (2020); RCEP^[3] (2022); India (2022); United Kingdom (2023)

India

• India has 18 in-force FTA with 33 partners: Afghanistan (2003), Australia (2022), APTA (Bangladesh, China, South Korea, Laos, Sri Lanka)(2013), ASEAN (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam)(2015), Bhutan (2006), Chile (2007), EFTA (Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Norway and Iceland)(2025), Japan (2011), Malaysia (2011), Mauritius (2021), Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), Singapore (2005), Nepal (2009), SAFTA (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka)(2006), SAPTA (Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka)(1995), South Korea (2010), Sri Lanka (2000), Thailand (2006) and United Arab Emirates (2022).

Japan

• Japan has 21 in-force FTAs with 28 partners: Mexico (2005); Chile (2006); Philippines (2006); Malaysia (2006); Singapore (2007); Thailand (2007); Indonesia (2008); Brunei (2008); ASEAN (2008); Vietnam (2009); Switzerland (2011); India (2011); Peru (2011); Australia (2014); Mongolia (2015); CPTPP (2018); European Union (2018); United States (partial) (2020); RCEP (2022); United Kingdom (2024).

Russia

• Russia has 10 in-force FTAs with 13 partners: Serbia (2006), Turkmenistan (1993), Uzbekistan (1993), Azerbaijan (1993), Georgia (1994), Eurasian Economic Union (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan) (2015), EAEU-Iran (2025), EAEU-Serbia (2021), EAEU-Vietnam (2016), Commonwealth of Independent States (Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan) (2012).

Saudi Arabia

• Saudia Arabia has 4 in-force FTAs with 22 partners.
• Saudia Arabia is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a political and economic alliance of six Middle Eastern countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar). The GCC formed a free trade area by signing their Economic Agreement in 1981. The GCC has agreements with Singapore (2008) and EFTA (2009).
• Saudi Arabia is also a member of the Pan-Arab Free Trade Area (1998), which includes Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

South Africa

• South Africa has 8 in-force FTAs with 90 partners.
• South Africa is a signatory to the African Continental Free Trade Area (2019). South Africa is a member of the South African Customs Union (2004), which includes Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa. The SACU has trade agreements with EFTA (2008), the European Union (2016), Mercosur (2016), and the United Kingdom and Mozambique (2021).
• South Africa is a member of the Southern African Development Community (2000 – goods, 2022 – services), which includes Angola, Botswana, Comoros, DR Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
• South Africa has a bilateral agreement with the European Union (2000).

South Korea

• South Korea has 22 in-force FTAs with 59 countries: Chile (2004), Singapore (2006), EFTA (2006), ASEAN (2007), India (2010), European Union (2011), Peru (2011), United States. (2012), Türkiye (2013), Australia (2014), Canada (2015), China (2015), New Zealand (2015), Vietnam (2015), Colombia (2015), Central America (Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama) (2021), United Kingdom (2021), RCEP (2022), Israel (2022), Cambodia (2022), Indonesia (2023), Philippines (2024).

Türkiye

• Türkiye has 27 in-force bilateral FTAs with 64 partners: EFTA (modernized - 2021), Egypt (2007), the European Union (1996), South Korea (2015 – goods, 2018 – services), Albania (2008), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2021), Chile (2011), Faeroe Islands (2017), Georgia (2008), Israel (1997), Kosovo (2019), Malaysia (2015), Mauritius (2013), Moldova (2016), Montenegro (2010 – goods, 2022 – services), Morocco (2006), North Macedonia (2000), Palestine (2005), Serbia (2010 – goods, 2019 – services), Singapore (2017), Syria (2007), Tunisia (2005), the United Arab Emirates (2023), Venezuela (2020), and the United Kingdom (2021).
• Türkiye is a member of the Economic Cooperation Organization (1992) which includes Iran, Pakistan and Türkiye.
• Türkiye is a member of the Protocol on Trade Negotiations (1973), which includes Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Israel, South Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Serbia, Tunisia, Türkiye, and Uruguay.

08. Key Trade Statistics

TOP LINE MESSAGES

 Despite U.S. tariffs, Canadian exports have held up relatively well.

• Total Canadian merchandise exports increased by 1.8% over the January to July period in 2025 compared with the same period in 2024.
• Over the same period, total services exports edged up 0.3%.

SUPPLEMENTARY MESSAGES

• Significant growth in merchandise exports to the United Kingdom (primarily gold), the European Union (energy and oilseeds), ASEAN (energy), and China (energy and mineral ores) compensated for a large decline in exports to the U.S. (energy, motor vehicles and parts, and iron and steel).
• A significant rise in commercial services exports was largely offset by a decline in travel services exports.
• The decline in travel services exports largely reflects reduced international student spending in Canada.

BACKGROUND

• Canada’s trade (exports plus imports) is equivalent to 65% of GDP.
• Nearly 1 in 5 jobs in Canada are supported by exports.
• Canada’s bilateral goods and services trade surpassed $2 trillion in 2024.
  • Exports: $997 billion total — $779 billion in goods and $218 billion in services.
  • Imports: Over $1 trillion total — $786 billion in goods and $219 billion in services.
• In 2024, Canada’s top 5 single-country trading partners were the United States, China, the United Kingdom, Mexico, and Japan.
• Canada’s top 5 goods and services exports in 2024 (share of total exports):

1. Energy (17.8%)
2. Commercial services (12.6%)
3. Metal and non-metallic mineral products (10.3%)
4. Motor vehicles and parts (9.5%)
5. Consumer goods (9.2%)

• In 2024, 70% of Canadian goods and services exports, and 76% of merchandise exports went to the U.S.
  • Top 5 merchandise exports to the U.S. in 2024 were: energy (30% of total), motor vehicles and parts (12%), machinery (7%), plastics (3%), and electronics (3%).
• There were around 130,000 exporting firms in Canada of goods or services in 2023 (latest year of data available), with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) making up 99% of exporters.
• In 2023, 5% of women-owned businesses exported goods or services, up from 5.0% in 2011.
• Immigrant-run businesses are much more likely to export.
• Indigenous SMEs are less likely to export (7.2% in 2020) than national average. However, Indigenous SMEs are 4 times more likely to have plans for international business expansion compared to the national average.