Minister of International Trade - Briefing book

May 2025
Published: September 3, 2025

Disclaimer: This briefing book was developed prior to the formation of the new Cabinet, based on existing ministerial mandates as outlined in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act.

A. Your Role and Responsibilities

1. Strategic Overview

Issue

International trade is fundamental to Canada’s prosperity, and you will play an important role in advancing the government’s trade policy and promotion agenda. Supporting Canadian companies and growing the Canadian economy through international trade is at the core of the portfolio’s mandate.
Trade with the United States will always be an important part of a prosperous Canadian economy, but their unjustified tariffs on Canadian goods and departure from rules-based trade pose a major challenge to the Canadian economy. The International Trade portfolio plays an important role in managing Canada’s response to U.S. trade measures.
While it continues to be a significant destination for some Canadian export sectors, trade relations with China are facing increasing tension in recent years (e.g. tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and retaliatory tariffs against Canadian agricultural products). [REDACTED].
Trade diversification and economic security will continue to be important areas of focus as Canada pursues greater economic resiliency in an increasingly unstable, unpredictable and protectionist global economic environment.

Background

As Minister of International Trade, your legislated responsibilities are to: build and safeguard an open rules-based global trading system; support Canadian enterprises in their international business development; negotiate and oversee the implementation of trade agreements; manage trade disputes; attract foreign direct investment; and support international science, technology and innovation collaboration. Your responsibilities will need to be fulfilled in accordance with the Government of Canada’s integrated approach to foreign policy, trade, and international assistance. This will require working closely with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of International Development who oversee some policies and programs that impact international commerce and Canada’s economic security.

Decades of globalization and economic integration are now being re-ordered by the Trump administration, a trend that risks an escalation of harmful trade measures. As a trade-dependent country, Canada will be impacted directly and indirectly. It will be your role to navigate three primary challenges in the near to medium-term: (i) the Canada-U.S. trading relationship, (ii) adapting trade policy and promotion to advance trade diversification and economic resiliency in a shifting global trade environment, and (iii) protecting economic prosperity and security from risks, including economic coercion and non-market trading practices.

Canada-U.S. trade

The Canada-U.S. trade relationship is fundamental to our economic well-being but is being tested with unjustified U.S. tariffs and intense U.S. protectionism to the detriment of integrated supply chains with trading partners. In 2024, 76% of Canada’s goods exports went to the United States, and roughly 70% are incorporated into U.S. supply chains, benefitting both countries’ economic security and resilience. During this same period, 50% of Canada’s services exports went to the U.S. Canada is the top merchandise export market for 32 U.S. states and ranks among the top three for 45 states. Small and medium-sized businesses, which make up about 40% of the value of Canada’s goods exports, are highly oriented to trade with the United States, which can be a stepping stone to new international markets.

However, the new U.S. administration has been highly critical of the global trading system that it perceives to be unfair to the United States. It has implemented tariffs on trading partners, including Canada, using a wide range of justifications, primarily around national security arguments. The negative economic consequences for Canada from the U.S. tariffs are highly significant in terms of jobs, GDP, and investment. Addressing the U.S. tariffs and finding a new equilibrium for Canada-U.S. trade will be an important priority. As part of this, preserving the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) and its market access and benefits, in the context of a mandated review of the agreement or potential renegotiation, will be a critical component.

Trade Diversification

While Canada’s trade is concentrated with the United States, it also has strong trading relationships with other partners, especially the European Union (6% exports and 10% imports), the United Kingdom, Japan, Mexico, and the Republic of Korea, underpinned by free trade agreements (FTAs) with all of these economies. Increasing the utilization of these agreements, along with Canada’s smaller FTAs, will help advance trade diversification efforts in addition to bringing into force agreements recently concluded with Indonesia and Ecuador. Canada can continue to expand market access through new trade agreements, including more flexible, targeted approaches – such as sectoral agreements or more flexible models – to advance diversification efforts and supply chain resilience in priority sectors while considering national and economic security issues.

Defending – and where possible – modernizing the rules-based trading system, including the WTO, will also be necessary. Canada has prospered in this system, and as a trade-dependent economy, it benefits from preserving international rules and global trade institutions. A rules-based system promotes a level playing field, addresses systemic challenges, and allows Canadian companies to reach a wider range of partners. This is especially relevant to trading partners with which Canada does not have an FTA: China, for example, is a market of significant importance to some Canadian industries – accounting for 3.8% of total Canadian exports, mainly energy, natural resources, and agricultural products – in spite of growing risks associated with this market. However, in some areas, current WTO rules are insufficient to meet evolving and emerging challenges in the global trading environment (e.g., China’s non-market policies and practices) and advancing multilateral cooperation in the current political climate will be challenging.

From a trade promotion and facilitation perspective, the Trade Commissioner Service and portfolio agencies, such as Export Development Canada, Canadian Commercial Corporation, and Invest in Canada, support Canadian exporters and help attract foreign direct investment into Canada. The focus and allocation of these resources can be recalibrated to support the government’s trade and investment agenda.

Enhancing trade infrastructure is another opportunity to support trade diversification and economic prosperity. This will require addressing challenges such as expanding and modernizing our physical infrastructure (ports, rails, roads, intermodal, pipelines). Ensuring that Canada’s import and export clearance processes are more technologically advanced and digitalized will be important to reduce costs and inefficiencies at our border, and make Canada more competitive as an exporting country. Collaboration with other ministers and federal-provincial-territorial and industry partners will be required to advance work on this front.

Economic Security

Outside of the recent and immediate threats to Canada’s economic security posed by the United States, threats to Canada’s economic security and resilience from other actors have been growing in recent years. This includes sophisticated efforts by hostile actors to exploit pathways into the Canadian economy via trade and investment or research partnerships. Events like the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have shown weaknesses in supply chains. Such risks have necessitated greater interventions by governments, in contrast to what had for decades been a tendency toward openness and market-based solutions. Certain states have also pursued more harmful economic strategies as geopolitical competition intensifies. For instance, there have been increasing episodes of economic coercion wherein states have leveraged economic interdependencies to punish or to pressure various outcomes. China’s industrial overcapacity is a growing concern, as it has used non-market policies and practices, including pervasive subsidization and insufficient labour and environment standards, at a vast scale to build its advantages in strategic sectors, such as clean technologies and advanced manufacturing. [REDACTED].

Over recent years, the government has adopted new measures and policies to bolster Canada’s economic security toolkit to defend against these threats and coercive trade practices. This includes surtax measures taken last year against Chinese goods under s.53 of the Customs Tariff, the adoption of the Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern (STRAC) policy, and the modernization of the Investment Canada Act. New approaches and measures will need to be considered in light of the unfolding trade war dynamics; these dynamics are leading countries around the world to reorient trade and investment relationships and launch new industrial strategies, some of which may entail new risks for Canada. Economic security initiatives will require close engagement with other Ministers to align economic tools and international engagements to advance efforts to strengthen Canada’s economic security and resilience. This includes strong international partnerships with and coordination among allies and reliable trading partners. Canada’s G7 presidency is being used to advance Canada’s economic security interests in various domains, including non-market policies and practices, critical minerals supply chain resilience, economic coercion, and cyber, research and investment security. You will play an important role in advancing this agenda.

2. Upcoming Ministerial High-level Events

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May 15-16: Ministers Responsible for Trade Meeting (MRT) Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Jeju Island, Korea
- The APEC MRT will gather Ministers from APEC member economies to negotiate the Ministers Responsible for Trade Statement, which will take stock of the year’s activities, set out areas of focus for the remainder of the year, and inform Leaders’ and Ministers’ year-end outcome documents. Opportunities for bilateral meetings with many APEC Trade Ministers, as well as a Korea bilateral program will be possible.
May 17: Canada’s National Day at Expo 2025 Osaka, Japan
- Canada’s participation in Expo 2025 Osaka is a signature initiative of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Under the theme “Regeneration”, the Canada Pavilion will showcase Canadian innovation, creativity and diversity, and promote sustainable development.
May 25-30: Team Canada Trade Mission (TCTM) to Thailand and Cambodia
- TCTMs are a key initiative under the Indo Pacific Strategy trade pillar. This sixth TCTM will bring up to 100 Canadian organizations to Thailand (May 25-28) and Cambodia (May 29-30), focusing on Agri-food, Cleantech, Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) (Thailand only), and Life sciences (Thailand only).
May 29-June 1: 2025 Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) Annual Conference and Trade Show, Ottawa
- Canada’s largest pan-Canadian gathering of elected officials. Program will include plenary on Canada-U.S. with possible U.S. Conference of Mayors, National Association of Counties/National League of Cities attendees.
June 3-4: 2025 Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development Ministerial Council Meeting (OECD MCM), Paris, France
- The MCM is the OECD’s highest-level forum, attended by Ministers of Finance, Economy, Trade and other high-level representatives from OECD member and partner countries, as well as representatives of International Organizations. Costa Rica is Chair of the 2025 MCM and Australia, Canada and Lithuania are Vice Chairs.
June 15-17: G7 Summit, Kananaskis, Alberta
- G7 Leaders’ Summit hosted by Canada’s Prime Minister as Chair of the G7 for 2025. Ministers may form part of the Prime Minister’s delegation.
June 16-19: 2025 BIO conference in Boston, United States
- The BIO International Convention is the largest and most comprehensive event for biotechnology, representing the full ecosystem of biotech with 20,000 industry leaders from across the globe. Opportunity for high-level engagement with U.S. influencers (e.g., Governors, private sector leaders). Organizers typically invites Premiers to attend this event.
July (post G7): Fifth CUSMA Free Trade Commission (FTC) Meeting, TBC
- The CUSMA Free Trade Commission (FTC) is the body under CUSMA that oversees matters relating to the administration and operation of the Agreement and is comprised of government representatives of each Party at the level of ministers or their designees.
July 10-11: Ukraine Recovery Conference and the Ministerial Meeting of the Ukraine Multi-donor Coordination Platform, Rome, Italy
- URC2025 is a high-level annual political event dedicated to Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction, reform progress for EU accession. URC brings together government, civil society, and private sector stakeholders. A Ministerial meeting of the Ukraine Donor Platform will be held on the margins.
July 20-24: Pacific NorthWest Economic Region (PNWER) 34th Annual Summit in Bellevue, Washington, United States
- Legislators, business leaders, academics, and policymakers from the U.S. and Canada will gather to discuss regional economic best practices and trade concerns. Expect Governors and State Legislators from Washington, Oregon, Alaska, Idaho and Montana.
September 22-28 (TBC): Association of Southeast Asian Nations Economic Ministers (AEM) Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
- Annual meeting between Dialogue Partners and Association of Southeast Asian Nations Economic Ministers to discuss issues of mutual interest related to trade and investment.
September 28-October 2: Joint Economic Commission in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; and Trade Mission to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates
- The Joint Economic Commission is a bilateral treaty between Canada and KSA, signed in 1987, which commits both sides to meet regularly to promote bilateral trade and investment. A meeting has not been held since 2016.
October 10: G20 Trade and Investment Ministers Meeting (Gqeberha, South Africa)
- The G20 Trade and Investment Ministers Meeting (TIMM) will be held in person in Gqeberha, South Africa, on October 10. South Africa’s priorities are to advance outcomes achieving 1) Trade and Inclusive Growth; 2) Collective Responses to Challenges of Global Commons; 3) Green Industrialisation; and 4) WTO Reform.
October 27-November 1: APEC Economic Leaders Week (AELW), Gyeongju, Korea
- Korea will culminate its Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) host year, “Building a Sustainable Tomorrow: Connect, Innovate, Prosper” at the APEC Economic Leaders Week (AELW). The Leaders Meeting is an important opportunity to deliver top-line messaging to a leader-level audience on Canada’s priorities and engagement in the region, that includes countries in the Indo-Pacific Strategy and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

*Note: High-level events only. Ministerial participation to be confirmed. 

B. Key Issues

1. United States Commercial Relations

Issue

The current U.S. administration’s shift towards more aggressive, protectionist trade policies – as exemplified by its various tariff measures - has taken Canada-U.S. relations to a low point and poses significant risk to Canada’s economy.
Ending the unjustified tariffs and finding a new, stable equilibrium for bilateral trade is the main priority.

Background

Canada and the United States share one of the world’s most productive and mutually beneficial bilateral relationships, shaped over nearly four decades by free trade agreements, most recently the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) (in effect since July 2020). This agreement supports integrated North American trade and investment and drives regional trade growth.

The United States is Canada’s top trading partner, largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI), and main export market. Key sectors include automotive, defense, agrifood, life sciences, and Information and Communications Technologies (ICT). In 2023, Canada was the second largest source of FDI in the United States and remains its top foreign energy supplier. Maintaining and expanding U.S. market access is a key Canadian priority, pursued through continuous engagement and advocacy with U.S. officials.

With 70.3% of Canada’s exports going to the United States— and over 70% of those are used in the manufacturing of other goods — both economies benefit from this deep integration. Approximately 8 million U.S. jobs depend on trade with Canada while roughly 1 in 5 Canadian jobs are linked to trade with the United States.

America First Trade Policy Approach and U.S. Tariffs

The Trump administration’s approach to trade is unapologetically protectionist and focused on American reshoring of advanced manufacturing and strategic sectors, revenue generation, and leveraging tariffs to improve U.S. market access abroad, without any regard to disrupting relations with allies and partners. The United States has imposed a number of tariffs that directly implicate Canada, to which Canada has responded in kind:

On March 4, the United States imposed a 10% tariff on imports of Canadian energy or energy resources (since amended to also include potash) and a 25% tariff on imports of other Canadian goods under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). In response, Canada immediately imposed a 25% tariff on imports of American goods valued at $30 billion.
On March 6, the United States provided an exemption from these tariffs for goods imported from Canada that qualify for duty-free preferential treatment under CUSMA. Canada announced it would maintain its 25% tariffs on imports of American goods valued at $30 billion until the complete removal of the United States’ unjustified tariffs on Canada.
On March 12, the United States imposed global 25% tariffs on steel and aluminum imports, including derivative products, under Section 232. On March 13, Canada imposed retaliatory tariffs on a dollar-for-dollar approach on a list of steel products worth $12.6 billion and aluminum products worth $3 billion, as well as on additional imported U.S. goods worth $14.2 billion, for a total of $29.8 billion.
On April 2, the United States announced that it would impose reciprocal tariffs on imports from all countries, except Canada and Mexico. On April 9, President Trump announced a 90 day pause on the country-specific tariffs, keeping the global 10% tariff in place, and increasing the China-specific reciprocal tariff rate to 145% as a response to that country’s retaliatory tariffs. Since Canada is not directly impacted by U.S. reciprocal tariffs at this time, Canada has not announced countermeasures in response to U.S. reciprocal tariffs.
On April 3, the United States imposed 25% tariffs under Section 232 for U.S. imports of passenger vehicles and light trucks. The tariffs on automobiles apply to the non-U.S. content of vehicles imported under CUSMA, and to the full value of vehicles not imported under CUSMA. The U.S. also provided guidance on the application of tariffs of 25% on non-CUSMA compliant auto parts, which entered into force on May 3, stating, CUSMA compliant auto parts will not be subject to 25% tariffs until the Department of Commerce establishes a process to apply the tariffs exclusively to the non-U.S. content of auto parts. Guidance issued by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 64913145: Import Duties on Certain Automobile Parts, was released on May 1 that confirms that no tariffs will be added to imports of auto parts under CUSMA at this time.
On April 29, President Trump signed an executive order (EO) that will reduce the impact of U.S. tariffs on automakers by avoiding the stacking of U.S. IEEPA (fentanyl) tariffs with 232 tariffs on autos, auto parts, steel and aluminum. Changes necessary to implement this EO will be made by May 16 and will apply retroactively to March 4. Canada’s vehicle exports to the United States are not currently subject to multiple U.S. tariffs given that they benefit from the IEEPA exemption for CUSMA-compliant goods. As Canada’s vehicle exports to the United States are only subject to U.S. auto 232 tariffs, the April 29 executive order does not benefit Canadian autos exported to the United States.
On April 29, President Trump issued a Proclamation giving automobile original equipment manufacturers an import adjustment offset worth up to 3.75% in Year 1 and up to 2.5% in Year 2 of the aggregate manufacturer’s suggested retail price of vehicles assembled in the United States, allowing them some relief from the Section 232 tariffs applicable on the non-CUSMA compliant auto parts they rely on. The offset is reduced to zero in year 3 and beyond. This Proclamation does not impact Canadian auto parts as U.S. imports of CUSMA-compliant auto parts from Canada remain exempt from U.S. auto 232 and IEEPA tariffs.
Canadian exports of non-CUSMA compliant auto parts to the U.S. would benefit from both the EO (only the U.S. auto 232 tariffs would apply) and the Proclamation (U.S. auto manufacturers will be eligible for reimbursement of some tariffs paid).
On April 9, in response to U.S. tariffs on automobiles, Canada imposed retaliatory tariffs of 25% on non-CUSMA compliant vehicles imported into Canada from the United States and 25% tariffs on non-Canadian and non-Mexican content of CUSMA compliant vehicles imported into Canada from the United States.
Canada has requested consultations under the dispute settlement mechanisms of the CUSMA and WTO for the IEEPA, Section 232 steel and aluminum, and Section 232 autos tariffs.

The U.S. Economy

The U.S. economy remains the world's largest, with a per capita GDP of approximately US$85,793 (GDP of US$29 trillion and 340 million people), though growth is likely expected to slow to 2.2% in 2025 due to high interest rates and inflation, probably as a result of tariffs.

Canada-U.S. Merchandise Trade

Despite trade tensions, U.S.-Canada commerce remains robust, with daily trade reaching $3.6 billion in 2023. In 2024, the United States remained Canada’s largest merchandise trading partner. Canada exported $596 billion in goods to the United States (down 0.3%) and imported $376 billion (up 0.5%). Top Canadian exports included mineral fuels, vehicles, and industrial machinery, while key imports from the United States were vehicles, machinery, and electronics.

Canada-U.S. Trade Balance (using U.S. Department of Commerce data)

In 2024, the United States had a US$64.2 billion merchandise trade deficit with Canada—driven entirely by energy imports. Without energy, the U.S. had a US$34.3 billion merchandise surplus. The United States also maintains long-standing trade surpluses with Canada in services (US$31.7 billion in 2023) and manufactured goods (US$23.7 billion in 2024), making Canada unique among top trade partners. Over 70% of U.S. imports from Canada support American manufacturing jobs.

Diplomatic Representation

Canada has a strong diplomatic network in the United States, with an embassy in Washington, D.C., 12 consulates general, 3 trade offices, and 14 honorary consuls. The United States maintains an embassy in Ottawa and consulates in 7 Canadian cities. In April 2025, Pete Hoekstra was confirmed as U.S. Ambassador to Canada by a 60–37 Senate vote, with support from all Republicans and 8 Democrats.

Considerations

With respect to Canada, the tariff situation remains fluid. While Canada’s exclusion from President Trump’s April 2 reciprocal tariffs is a positive outcome, Canada continues to be subject to significant U.S. tariffs, including tariffs under the IEEPA, related to purported border and fentanyl concerns, as well as Section 232 tariffs focused on steel and aluminum and automobiles and auto parts. Further Section 232 tariffs have been threatened on imports of critical minerals, timber, lumber and derivative products, semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals. The Government has taken a proportionate response to the U.S. tariffs with a suite of counter-tariffs. Canada will need to find a new equilibrium for its trading relationship with the United States in the face of a U.S.-led shift in the global trading order and in the context of the upcoming CUSMA joint review.

Annex: Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement and bilateral trade issues

Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA)

CUSMA came into force on July 1, 2020, for an initial sixteen-year term. In addition to preserving the core of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which eliminated virtually all tariffs between Canada, the United States and Mexico, it includes new chapters on good regulatory practices, customs administration, North American competitiveness and small and medium-sized enterprises. It modernizes disciplines for trade in goods and agriculture and for rules of origin, such as those for passenger vehicles and trucks. This agreement supports integrated North American trade and investment and drives regional trade growth.

For over 30 years, North America has benefited from continental free trade under the NAFTA and the CUSMA. Under CUSMA, Mexico and Canada have become the U.S’ two largest trade partners, with significant supply chain and economic integration in key sectors, such as the auto and agri-food industries. While Canada and Mexico are important bilateral trade partners for one another, the key trade dynamic for each country is their respective relationships with the United States. In 2024, more than 80% of Mexico’s exports and over 75% of Canada’s exports went to the United States.

Total trilateral trade in goods and services under CUSMA was worth $2.5 trillion in 2024, an increase of 35% (up $654 billion) since 2019 and the Agreement’s entry into force. During the same period, trade in goods and services between Canada and the United States increased by 31% to $1.3 trillion, including $1.1 trillion in goods.

The Trump administration’s trade policies and approaches are putting pressure on regional collaboration, with the United States acting unilaterally on both trade and political issues. In addition to the imposition of multiple tariffs, and repeated threats of new tariffs, on Canadian and Mexican imports, there is uncertainty regarding how the United States will approach the upcoming joint review of CUSMA.

The 2026-scheduled Joint Review & Bilateral Trade Irritants

CUSMA includes a commitment to jointly review the agreement starting on the sixth anniversary of its entry into force (July 1, 2026), a forum that also provides the opportunity for the Parties to make specific proposals to amend the agreement to ensure its long-term effectiveness. Should there be no consensus to extend the agreement’s term in 2026, the next joint review would be held the following year, in 2027, and so on every year until 2036. During each review, the Parties are given the opportunity to extend the Agreement for a new 16-year term. Should there be no consensus to extend the Agreement by 2036, the Agreement would expire.

[REDACTED] it has signalled its interest in renegotiating aspects of the CUSMA, flagging interest in seeing changes, such as stronger autos and aerospace rules of origin, expanded market access—including for dairy exports to Canada, and action to address alleged discriminatory practices, such as in Mexico’s energy sector. The United States also contends that Canada’s digital regulations (Digital Services Tax, Online News Act, Online Streaming Act) are discriminatory, and Canada’s Zero Plastic Waste Agenda and Quebec’s Bill 96 appear on the latest – March 31, 2025 – National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, which details what the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative perceives as Canadian trade barriers. In addition, the U.S. lumber industry has repeatedly alleged that Canadian softwood lumber is unfairly subsidized and dumped as a pretext to seek protection under U.S. trade remedy law from fair competition from high-quality Canadian imports. While the United States could seek to address these issues in the context of the CUSMA review, it could also elect to pursue them separately.

It is not clear what timelines the U.S. administration has in mind for engaging on the CUSMA joint review. Canada is set to host the fifth meeting of the CUSMA Free Trade Commission (ministerial-level meeting) in 2025. The agenda and timing will depend on a number of factors, including the status of the CUSMA review and of U.S. tariffs on Canada and Mexico.

2. Trade Diversification: Indo-Pacific and Europe

Issue

Canada’s historic trade relationship with the United States will continue to be key for Canada’s economic prosperity.
Geopolitical uncertainty has increased the risks associated with market concentration and has strengthened the rationale for Canada to reduce dependencies on the United States through trade diversification. Global Affairs Canada is working with Canadian companies to strengthen Canada’s trade relationships with the Indo-Pacific and Europe, by building upon existing comprehensive trade agreements and other partnerships and agreements.

Background

International trade is crucial for Canada's economic prosperity and resilience. It supports one in six jobs and is equivalent to two-thirds of GDP, making Canada much more trade reliant than the U.S. Trade diversification is a means to mitigate the economic impact of concentrating trade with any single market. Despite previous efforts to diversify Canada’s trade, the share of Canada's exports (goods and services) destined for the United States has hovered around 70-80% for decades. The U.S. market’s proximity, size and similarities have made it an attractive destination for Canadian exporters.

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Graphic showing U.S. share of Canadian exports over the last four decades: 65% in 1981 (lowest share); 76% in 1994 (NAFTA); 81% in 2000 (highest share); 70% in 2019 (pre-pandemic); and 70% in 2024 (latest).

Recent U.S. tariffs against Canada have abruptly diminished the competitiveness of Canadian exports to the United States, spurring many enterprises to consider opportunities to diversity. Additionally, the Trump administration’s trade actions have threatened the viability of the Canada-United States-Mexico agreement (CUSMA), damaging business confidence.

Considerations

Canada’s free trade agreements can help mitigate these challenges. Canada is one of the world's most connected economies, with 15 free trade agreements (FTAs) spanning 51 countries and covering 61% of global GDP. Supported by its network of FTAs, the trade promotion efforts of Canada’s Trade Commissioner Service (TCS) and the impact of Export Development Canada (EDC), Canada has increased its exports to non-U.S. markets by almost 50% since 2018. However, this has not impacted export concentration to the United States, which remains above 70%.

Growth of Canada's non-U.S. exports (goods and services)

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Chart showing the growth of Canada's non-U.S. exports (goods and services) against the Export Diversification Strategy’s target of $292 billion by 2025, starting at $195 billion in 2017 and reaching $296 billion in 2024.

Most notable has been Canada's export performance in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Since entry into force of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in 2019, Canada’s merchandise trade has increased 42.9% with the seven CPTPP Indo-Pacific markets, with merchandise exports to these countries increasing 24.3%. Canada's trade with Europe grew just as significantly following the signing of Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) in 2017. Since its signing, two-way merchandise trade with EU countries has expanded by 59.8%, with merchandise exports to the EU increasing 50.9%.

Opportunities in the Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific is the world’s fastest-growing economic region and accounts for two-thirds of the global population. It is Canada’s second-largest regional export market after the United States, with strong and expanding trade relationships. Canada's top 10 export markets are China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, Indonesia, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam, accounting for 92.2% of the total export to the region (2024).

The Indo-Pacific is also home to some of the world’s most critical supply chains, including semiconductors, rare earth minerals, and advanced manufacturing hubs. As economies in the region strengthen their economic ties, regional groups and agreements such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), APEC, and the CPTPP play an increasing role in shaping trade and investment dynamics.

Within the region, China remains a key market for Canadian exporters, a destination for 3.8% of Canada's overall goods exports and ranking as Canada’s second-largest single-country destination for goods exports. Due to a host of challenges however (see China Commercial Relations brief), Canadian exporters as well as Canadian companies operating in China are encouraged to exercise caution and to diversify elsewhere in the region, including with CPTPP members and South Korea, with whom Canada has an FTA.

Building on the market access of the CPTPP and Canada-Korea FTA, Canada is negotiating new agreements in the region. In December 2024, Canada concluded FTA negotiations with Indonesia and launched exploratory discussions with the Philippines. Meanwhile negotiations between Canada and the ASEAN – Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam – are continuing. In addition, the CPTPP is designed to expand over time through accessions, with negotiations ongoing for Costa Rica and several economies (notably China, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Uruguay) having applied to join as well.

As the world’s 5th largest economy, India offers significant opportunities over the medium term, despite it being a challenging market for exporters. Discussions on a bilateral partnership agreement were paused in 2023.

Opportunities with Europe

The EU Single Market is Canada’s second-largest goods and services export market after the United States, and the U.K. is the third. The EU is the third-largest economy in the world (after the United States and China), and four European economies are in the top ten (Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy).

Canada is well positioned to become a trusted supplier of energy, critical minerals and technology essential to Europe’s security and competitiveness; however, improvements to domestic infrastructure are needed to unlock Canada’s full potential. Additional impetus to deepen the trade relationship has resulted from the U.S.’ imposition of tariffs. In response, Canada and the EU are exploring how to make better use of existing bilateral mechanisms and considering new measures to increase our respective economic resilience.

Although CETA has been provisionally applied since 2017, with most parts of the agreement in force, an important element for Canada’s diversification efforts will be helping Canadian businesses take advantage of CETA, complemented by continued advocacy to ensure that the remaining 10 member states that have yet to ratify the CETA do so for the agreement to fully enter into force. The other three FTAs in-force in the region are: the Canada-U.K. Trade Continuity Agreement (TCA) (in force since 2021 after the United Kingdom left the EU), the Canada-European Free Trade Association Agreement (EFTA) (goods only agreement with Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland; 2009) and the Canada-Ukraine FTA (modernized in 2023).

Global Affairs Canada’s Role in Trade Diversification

The goal of enhancing trade diversification has implications across the government, such as domestic investments in trade-facilitating infrastructure and policies to ensure Canadian firms remain competitive. Global Affairs Canada’s portfolio, which includes the TCS and EDC, the Canadian Commercial Corporation and Invest in Canada, is working to better support Canadian businesses in diversifying their trade to mitigate the effects of U.S. trade actions and growing protectionism. This includes through programs and initiatives like the TCS CanExport funding programs and Canadian Technology Accelerator (CTA) initiative. As part of Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, the TCS also organizes Minister-led Team Canada Trade Missions (TCTMs) to the region to showcase Canadian businesses and facilitate long-term trade and investment opportunities.

Although the decision to diversify is ultimately a business’ prerogative, diplomacy, advocacy and promotional activities by Canada can help create an enabling environment and ensure more opportunities are available to Canadian exporters.

3. China Commercial Relations

Issue

China is an important export market for Canada accounting for 3.8% of total merchandise exports – comparable to the United Kingdom (3.6%) and slightly higher than Japan (1.9%) – but with a significant concentration in certain key sectors.
Trade relations have been strained in recent years. China banned Canadian canola seed (2019 to 2022), beef (2021) and pet food products (2022), and more recently, trade actions by both Canada and China (e.g., tariffs on Chinese EVs and steel and aluminum; China’s retaliatory measures on Canadian canola, seafood and pork) have further deteriorated the relationship.
The U.S.-China dynamic, including their tariff brinkmanship, will need to be carefully considered by Canada.

Background

China’s Economic Situation

Under President Xi Jinping, China’s economic strategy has shifted from a focus on rapid growth fueled by exports to one prioritizing technological self-reliance and innovation. However, economic growth has been hindered in recent years. China has evolved from decades of booming growth to a slower growing economy where foreign companies are increasingly stifled by heavy regulation and a less friendly business environment. China reached its 5.0% gross domestic product growth target in 2024 (based on its own statistics), due to a fall fiscal stimulus package. However, China still relies heavily on exports to compensate for a weak domestic outlook. Continued U.S. policy actions (e.g. export controls, investment restrictions) and Chinese retaliation against U.S. tariffs further complicate China's growth prospects. Most recently, the United States and China have entered a new level of trade tensions, marked by the introduction of U.S. reciprocal tariffs on April 2, 2025. This has ignited a full-scale trade war, with both nations imposing tit-for-tat tariffs, with recent developments indicating some prospects for de-escalation.

Bilateral Trade Statistics

In 2024, China’s merchandise trade with Canada totaled $118.4 billion (1.1% lower than 2023). Canadian merchandise exports to China were $29.8 billion, accounting for 3.8% of total Canadian merchandise exports and mainly composed of energy, natural resources, agricultural products and advanced manufacturing goods. In 2024, two-way service trade totaled $12 billion, with Canada exporting $7.9 billion worth of service to China and importing $4.2 billion of service from China.

In 2023, China was the 5th largest country in foreign investment stock into Canada and 20th destination for Canadian direct investment abroad stock. The stock of China’s direct investment into Canada was $37 billion (down from $37.4 billion in 2022), while the stock of Canada’s direct investment into China was $14.9 billion (up from $14.2 billion in 2022).

Since China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, two-way merchandise trade has grown by approximately 600% but so has the trade deficit, despite rising wealth and production costs in China.

China’s Business Environment and Challenges for Canada

The operating environment in China (e.g. investment restrictions, intellectual property theft, arbitrary restrictions on goods) makes it a challenging market for Canadian businesses. As such, there are significant risks to doing business with China in sectors that are key to Canada’s economic security and prosperity. The Trade Commissioner Service has focused on a “prudent promotion” approach that focuses on opportunities that support Canada’s long-term economic competitiveness, [REDACTED] into the broader Indo-Pacific. Canada continues to advocate for fair access to the Chinese market in other sectors considered less risky, like processed food products.

Canada’s Trade and Investment Policy Towards China

China leverages its dominant market position and control of global supply chains in strategic sectors to advance its policy goals, including through the weaponization of trade dependencies in import and exports. For example, Canada’s canola industry was the target of China’s economic coercion between 2019 and 2022 following the arrest of the Chief Financial Officer of Huawei.

China’s use of unfair and trade distortive practices – including pervasive subsidization, insufficient environmental and labour standards (forced labour), and other measures to artificially lower production costs – create global market distortions which have exacerbated level playing field issues. In response to these threats, in October 2024, the Government of Canada applied a 100% surtax on electric vehicles and 25% surtax on steel and aluminum imports from China.

In response, China launched WTO dispute settlement consultations, a domestic anti-discrimination investigation against Canada’s surtax measures, and anti-dumping investigations into imports of canola seed (from Canada) and halogenated butyl rubber (from Canada, India, Japan). On March 20, 2025, based on findings from its anti-discrimination investigation, China imposed 100% tariffs on Canadian canola products (oil and meal) and peas, and 25% on a list of 49 aquatic products and 15 pork products. In response, Canada initiated WTO consultations, the first step in the dispute settlement process.

Other bilateral trade irritants continue to persist, including the omission of Canada as an approved destination for group travel and ongoing bans on imports of Canadian beef and dry pet food containing poultry ingredients.

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4. Economic Security

Issue

Economic security refers to protecting Canada from economic-based threats and ensuring economic resilience. This entails a particular focus on safeguarding strategic sectors of the economy, including but not limited to critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, emerging/nuclear/bio tech, health, and defence sectors. These sectors are vital for Canada’s national security and future prosperity in a rapidly changing world; however, all sectors can be the target of economic-based threats or coercion.
Strengthening Canada’s economic security and ensuring its long-term prosperity is a shared effort across government. It involves cooperation with domestic and international stakeholders and partners to respond to evolving threats and challenges, including those that can arise through trade, such as coercion and non-market policies and practices.
These issues are also at the forefront of international discussions including in the G7, [REDACTED].

Background

In an environment of heightened geopolitical competition, Canada’s future prosperity relies on a foundation of security and resilience, and economic prosperity is required to build and strengthen national security capabilities. Economic-based vulnerabilities and threats were significantly exposed by shocks including the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, highlighting the need for greater resilience and government intervention in critical supply chains. Economic-based threats are ever more apparent in efforts by some countries to dominate strategic sectors (e.g. through non-market policies and practices, such as pervasive subsidies, as well as efforts to re-shore critical production), economic coercion (e.g. weaponizing import and export dependencies and controls), and ongoing attempts to illegally or illicitly obtain Canadian resources, knowledge, and technology.

The government has significantly updated its toolkit to respond to economic security threats and challenges. For example:

Updated provisions of the Investment Canada Act came into force in September 2024, enabling the national security review process to be more agile, and enhancing transparency of the Act’s administration. In March 2025, the Act was further updated to recognize the importance of economic security in assessments of Canada’s national security concerns.
The government also imposed under existing authorities a surtax of 100% on imports of electric vehicles as well as a 25% surtax on steel and aluminum imported from China in October 2024 to respond to China’s unfair trade policies and practices in these sectors.
In February 2025, Public Safety Canada released its sensitive technology list to inform broader economic security efforts, including investment screening, research security, supply chain protection and export controls.

Critical minerals are an important aspect of Canada’s economic security and major area of contestation related to geopolitical competition, as they are building blocks for semi-conductors, clean tech, health technologies, defence and security applications upon which future prosperity and security will depend. Canada is well positioned to be a leader in the responsible and sustainable production of critical minerals, as a leading mining nation with considerable deposits at home and significant investments abroad. [REDACTED]. Projects also face complex approvals processes and infrastructure deficits that act as disincentives. The 2022 Critical Minerals Strategy, led by Natural Resources Canada, has sought to address this challenge with over $3.8 billion in funding to secure value chains at home and globally, [REDACTED].

Canada has prioritized coordination on economic security and resilience as well as critical minerals in its international engagement with partners, including during its G7 presidency. It has been working, to advance effective action on shared challenges, to create stronger markets, and to reduce the potential for inflicting unintended harms amongst G7 partners, [REDACTED].

Considerations

Economic security risks are rapidly evolving, especially as U.S.-China geopolitical dynamics unfold daily. [REDACTED].

Economic security concerns are a major focus for the U.S. administration, which is aiming to use tariffs not only as a source of revenue, but to drive re-industrialization and draw in foreign direct investment in manufacturing. The United States is seeking to maintain its global dominance vis-à-vis China but is also taking a more coercive and less cooperative approach to working with allies. [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]. There will likely continue to be interest from other partners – in the G7 and beyond – in enhancing mutual resilience against common economic security threats, but at the same time, widespread tariffs have the potential to lead to greater divergences between allies in terms of trade, investment and security relationships, especially should Canada’s close partners look to deepen cooperation elsewhere.

The U.S. administration has identified the lack of a reliable, diversified and affordable supply of critical minerals (which they define as an energy resource) as posing an imminent and growing threat to U.S. prosperity and national security, [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

5. Canada’s G7 Presidency: Trade Priorities

Issue

As Canada holds the Presidency of the G7 in 2025, Canada is leveraging the G7 Trade Track to advance its international trade interests and foster collaboration, including at the ministerial level, on areas of common interest.
The work of the Trade Track has been articulated under three themes: enhancing economic security, resilience and prosperity; navigating challenges in the global trading landscape; and building inclusive, resilient supply chains.
Canada has been facilitating discussions with other G7 countries on these themes as well as promoting greater stability in international trade and a modernized and responsive rules-based multilateral trading system.
Canada is seeking to convene a meeting of G7 trade ministers on the margins of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Ministerial Council Meeting scheduled on June 3-4, 2025. [REDACTED].

Background

The G7 is an informal consensus-based grouping, established in 1975, that includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and the EU Council and Commission (Russia joined in 1997 and was suspended in 2014, after it invaded Crimea). It is underpinned by shared values and advances shared economic and foreign policy interests by raising awareness, coordinating positions and catalyzing action.

Recent achievements include the coordinated response to Russia’s war in Ukraine; COVID-19 vaccine delivery and investment in vaccine manufacturing capacity across developing world; and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) to mobilize US$600 billion by 2027 (2022).

Canada’s 2025 G7 Presidency

Canada holds the Presidency of the G7 in 2025, marking the 50th anniversary of the group. The Prime Minister’s Personal Representative (Sherpa) for the G7 and G20 Summits is Deputy Minister Cindy Termorshuizen. Canada’s G7 agenda is currently focused on three priorities:

Making communities safe and the world secure, including fostering peace and security in Ukraine, countering foreign interference, addressing transnational crime, and fighting wildfires;
Promoting prosperity, including by driving energy security and the digital transition, including resilient critical mineral supply chains, tackling non-market policies and practices, promoting AI access and adoption and accelerating the development of quantum technologies; and
Investing in partnerships of the future, including by helping mobilize the private sector to support priorities like infrastructure development.

To deliver on this agenda, Canada will convene G7 Leaders in Kananaskis, Alberta from June 15-17, 2025. [REDACTED]. It hosted the foreign ministers’ meeting from March 12-14 in Charlevoix and will host the finance ministers’ meeting from May 20-22 in Banff. [REDACTED]. Existing working groups, which provide in-depth technical analysis on key issues, will continue their collaboration at the technical level even if ministerial meetings are not planned.

G7 Trade Track

Since 2021, the G7 Trade Track has facilitated discussions on global economic issues and international competitiveness. At the 2024 G7 Apulia Summit, Leaders reinforced their commitment to rules-based, fair multilateral trade and agreed to address market distortions and excess capacity from non-market policies and practices, with Trade Ministers emphasizing trade's role in growth and development. The Trade Track has played a crucial role in fostering channels of communication, sharing best practices, discussing emerging risks and approaches to strengthen critical supply chains against threats and potential disruptions, and advancing areas of common interest in the WTO and the OECD.

[REDACTED]

Way Forward

The Trade Working Group has met three times in 2025, in February, March and April, will meet again in May, and in the fall as appropriate. [REDACTED] work is ongoing to explore the possibility of a trade ministerial meeting on the margins of the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting in Paris from June 3-4. [REDACTED].

C. Additional Overviews

1. State of Canadian Trade

Text version

Canada’s Recent Trade Performance

Graph representing Goods Trade comparison of Imports and Exports in billions of dollars between 2020 and 2025.

Goods trade : quick recovery from the pandemic, followed by stagnation in the last two years.

Graph representing Services Trade comparison of Imports and Exports in billions of dollars between 2020 and 2025.

Services trade: a slower recovery from the pandemic but growth momentum lasted longer, all the way until the end of 2023 before stagnating.

Canada is highly reliant on trade in general, and on trade with the U.S. specifically.

The U.S. tariffs and tariff threats have injected uncertainty into the global commercial system. Diversifying away for the U.S. is a strategic option, using Canada's vast network of free trade agreements. However, global competition in other markets is expected to intensify as other countries do the same.

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Why: Benefits of Trade

Trade (exports plus imports) is equivalent to 65% of Canadian GDP.
Trade supports the high standard of living enjoyed by Canadians.
Trade helps to control rising prices and makes life for Canadians more affordable.
1 in 6 jobs in Canada are related to exports.
Exporters pay wages 14% higher than non-exporters.
Traders are more productive, more innovative, and invest more in R&D than purely domestic firms.

Where: Geography of Trade

Goods and Services Trade, 2024

	Exports	Imports
United States	70.3%	60.8%
European Union	5.9%	10.3%
China	3.8%	6.6%
United Kingdom	4.0%	2.1%
Mexico	1.3%	3.5%
Rest or World	14.6%	16.8%

Who: By firm size

Around 130,000 firms in Canada export goods or services.

Only 15.1% of SMEs export and most are very small with a small number of exporters accounting for most export value.

Goods Exports, 2023

Number of Exporters	Value of Exports (% share)
1263 Large Enterprises	60%
35,564 SMEs	38%

Who: By ownership characteristics

Share of Women–owned Businesses that Export

Year	Percentage
2011	5%
2023	15%

Women-owned businesses still only account for 18% of SMEs and they tend to be smaller on average.

Immigrant-run businesses are much more likely to export.

Indigenous SMEs are less likely to export than national average and face heightened barriers to growing their businesses and exporting.

What: Composition of Trade

Goods and Services Exports

	Share 2024	Change 2023-24
Agri-food	5.9%	-4.1%
Energy	17.8%	1.7%
Resources & Resource-based	17.7%	4.8%
Chemicals	4.3%	0.5%
Electronics & Machinery	8.5%	0.6%
Motor Vehicles	9.5%	-7.2%
Aircraft & Other Transport Eq't	3.2%	5.6%
Consumer Products	9.2%	6.3%
Travel	6.8%	10.3%
Transport Services	2.4%	4.3%
Commercial Services	12.6%	1.8%
All Other	2.3%	-1.6%

How: Use of Trade Agreements

Preference Utilization for Canadian Exports

CETA

Year	Percentage
2018	52%
2024	61%

CUSMA

In 2024, 40% of all Canadian goods exports to the U.S. made use of CUSMA preferences. Going forward, companies are incentivized to make greater use to avoid tariffs.

CPTPP

In 2023, CPTPP utilization rates for MFN-dutiable Canadian exports to Japan was 88%, up from 85% in 2019.

Strategic Challenges

Global Trade War

Early 2025, the U.S. introduced a series of tariffs affecting every country; Canada responded to protect its interests.

The U.S. actions are re-writing trade rules of engagement around the world and bringing a high degree of uncertainty. Business support in navigating this could require a multi-faceted approach.

Dependence on the U.S

Canadian trade is among the least diversified globally: 76% of merchandise exports and 49% of merchandise imports with the U.S.

Services are a bright spot for diversification, with around 50% of Canada's exports going to the U.S. and 56% of services imports coming from the U.S.

Competitiveness

Canada’s share of global trade has fallen from 4.0% in 2000 to 2.5% in 2023 for merchandise trade and from 2.4% in 2005to 1.9% for commercial services.

Canada has lost share in most major markets and exports growing more slowly than many comparator economies.

Economic Security

[REDACTED]

Global Trading System

Canada is reliant on a global trading system, which is under pressure and is having difficulty adapting to changing economic environment.

There are rising incidence of nationalistic industrial policies in many trading partners.

Technological Change

Canada is well-recognized for innovation, but rates poorly for commercialization.

Canadian companies are slow to adapt digital technologies.

Many Canadian trade sectors face potential for disruption.

2. Trade Policy and Negotiations

Issue

Trade accounts for two-thirds of Canada’s GDP, and along with investment, is critical to our prosperity. In addition to the multilateral trade agreements under the WTO which underpin our trade with other countries, the government has negotiated other types of trade agreements to secure market access and to increase predictability for Canadian businesses in markets worldwide.
The United States remains central to Canada’s international trade, but recent U.S. actions have reinforced the need to further diversify trade and strengthen alliances with other key partners.

Background

The government’s international trade policy – led by Global Affairs Canada, in consultation with other government departments – includes various types of agreements. Below, a short overview of three types of agreements is provided, namely: trade and investment agreements; investment-specific chapters and agreements; and, air transportation agreements. Additionally, Global Affairs Canada is responsible for numerous other areas of trade policy, such as litigation and dispute settlement, resolving bilateral market access irritants, and other areas that are not covered in this brief.

1. Trade and Investment Agreements

Successive governments have pursued trade and investment agreements to support trade liberalization and diversification, which complement Canada’s commitment to the rules-based multilateral trading system underpinned by the WTO. In light of mounting threats to the rules-based trading system and global supply chains, including economic coercion and non-market policies and protectionism, there is value in greater trade diversification. However, Canada’s traditional comprehensive and ambitious model for free trade agreements has largely exhausted its utility, as most remaining potential negotiating partners are not prepared to fully adopt these existing models. As a result, new instruments such as phased agreements and tailored models will become more relevant in advancing the trade diversification interests of Canada and supporting its economic resiliency. 

Currently, Canada has 15 active FTAs with 51 countries covering two-thirds of global GDP, which offer predictable rules and preferential market access to most of Canada’s largest trading partners, including the European Union (Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement [CETA]), the United Kingdom (Trade Continuity Agreement) and Japan (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership [CPTPP]). Canada also has bilateral FTAs with other partners, including Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the European Free Trade Association (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland), Israel, Jordan, Peru, the Republic of Korea and Ukraine.   

Completed Agreements

The CPTPP is a comprehensive FTA between Canada and 11 other countries, including Australia, Brunei, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United Kingdom and Vietnam. Accession negotiations have been launched with Costa Rica. The Government has signed but not ratified the United Kingdom’s CPTPP Accession Protocol.

The CETA was provisionally applied on September 21, 2017. Ten EU Member States have yet to ratify the Agreement; provisions related to investment protection will take effect only once all ratify.

The Government recently concluded a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Indonesia (December 2024) and an FTA with Ecuador (February 2025). Respective domestic procedures for signature and implementation are underway.

Ongoing FTA exploratory discussions and negotiations

Canada – ASEANFTA negotiations: Negotiations with ASEAN, composed of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, are progressing but, given the challenge of negotiating with a disparate group of countries with different levels of development, are not on track to conclude in 2025, which was the timeline previously agreed by Ministers.
Canada – Philippines FTA Exploratory Talks: In December 2024, Canada and the Philippines announced the launch of exploratory discussions toward a potential FTA. The Philippines is a member of ASEAN.
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2. Investment Chapters in Free Trade Agreements and International Investment Agreements

Canada exports significantly more capital than it imports and seeks to support those investments through international investment agreements, including both investment chapters in FTAs, as well as standalone Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs). These treaties protect Canadian investment abroad through legally binding rights and obligations, enforced by an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. FIPAs are designed to ensure that Canadian investors and their investments are treated in a fair and non-discriminatory manner.

Canada has 39 FIPAs in force and seven ongoing negotiations (Argentina, Georgia, Pakistan, Qatar, Tanzania, United Arab Emirates and Zambia). Engagement with potential partners to explore possibilities to launch new FIPA negotiations is ongoing.

3. Air Transport Agreements

Air Transport Agreements (ATAs) treaties permit scheduled international air services (passenger and cargo) from one country to another. ATAs are a shared responsibility between Global Affairs Canada and Transport Canada, with the Minister of International Trade and the Minister of Transport jointly responsible for their negotiation. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is responsible for overseeing Canada’s domestic adoption of ATAs. Canadian airlines are facing several key challenges in the current global context, including competitiveness concerns resulting from airspace issues arising from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Canadian airlines are also reducing capacity to the United States due to lower demand from Canadian travelers. In the last year, the government expanded its ATAs with Argentina, Australia, Qatar, and Senegal, concluded a first-time ATA with Ghana, and flights between Canada and China incrementally increased in line with passenger demand. Canada’s international air policy priorities for fall/winter 2025 are under review.

3. World Trade Organization

Issue

The World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the rules on international trade, which contribute to providing openness, predictability and transparency.
WTO rules remain invaluable but are insufficient in some areas to meet current challenges, for example, China’s non-market practices.
[REDACTED]

Background

Since 1947, the WTO and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), have been the framework for global trade, serving as vehicles for Canada to build alliances, create new rules and advance our trade interests where we would otherwise have less leverage. The WTO’s functions include administering its agreements, serving as a negotiating forum between its 166 members, and providing dispute settlement. The WTO’s rules also underpin Canada’s free trade agreements (FTAs) and govern Canada’s trade relationships with countries where no FTAs are in place, including major economies such as China, India, and Brazil.

More recently, WTO Members have been able to conclude and implement significant agreements amongst themselves, including on trade facilitation, trade in information technology goods, and fisheries subsidies. However, the organization faces important challenges. Negotiations of major interest such as agriculture have long been stalemated. A handful of obstructive Members led by India routinely block outcomes negotiated and desired by most Members. The system of dispute settlement that grants the WTO rules enforceability is not fully functioning owing to actions by the Unites States. Further, the current WTO rules also need to be improved to better deal with the challenges we face, notably the impact of China’s non-market policies and practices. [REDACTED].

Canada and the WTO

As one of the architects of the WTO/GATT system, Canada has a long-standing tradition of exercising influence and leadership within the organization. Recent leadership roles include:

Convenor of the Ottawa Group, an informal grouping of 14 like-minded WTO Members (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the European Union, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Singapore and the United Kingdom) for WTO reform;
Co-convenor (with Costa Rica) of the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD); and,
Initiator and lead facilitator of an informal WTO dialogue on trade and industrial policy to build knowledge and exchange views to lay the groundwork for possible future negotiations.

Considerations

WTO Negotiations

While progress in recent years has been limited, negotiations continue on agriculture and fisheries subsidies. Members were able to conclude a partial Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies in 2022, which marked a global environmental milestone. Given challenges in concluding or initiating negotiations among all Members, plurilateral negotiations – involving subsets of Members – have been seen as a more effective vehicle. Plurilateral negotiations have recently concluded on services domestic regulation (2021), investment facilitation for development (2023) and e-commerce (2024). Opposition to plurilateral agreements persists and attaining the consensus required to implement them remains challenging.

The WTO Appellate Body (AB) Impasse

The WTO dispute settlement system lends WTO rules the weight of enforceability. The system has two tiers, with the right for a party to a dispute to appeal the initial decision to a group of three AB members before a final decision is adopted. The United States has longstanding concerns about the system and blocked attempts to fill AB member vacancies, resulting in the loss of the AB’s quorum in December 2019. This undermines enforceability of WTO rules by allowing Members to “appeal into the void” and stall the process. Binding dispute settlement has facilitated the resolution of many Canadian trade disputes, especially with the United States. In the interim, Canada and 53 other WTO Members participate in the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA), which provides for binding dispute settlement and access to appeal review in disputes amongst its participants.

14th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC14)

The Ministerial Conference, at which Canada is represented by the Minister of International Trade, normally meets every two years. The next ministerial meeting is expected to take place in Cameroon from March 26-29, 2026.

4. Crown Corporations & Agencies

Issue

The Minister of International Trade is responsible to Parliament for two Crown corporations, Export Development Canada (EDC), and its subsidiary corporation FinDev, and the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC). The Minister of International Trade is also responsible for the departmental corporation Invest in Canada (IIC).
EDC supports Canadian exporters through insurance and financing solutions and manages the Canada Account, a mechanism for supporting transactions outside of EDC’s risk capacity. CCC supports the Canada-U.S. Defense Productions Sharing Agreement and helps Canadian exporters sell to foreign government buyers through government-to-government contracting. IIC promotes investment and supports foreign investors by acting as a single window for transformational projects.
Crown corporations operate at arm’s length from government, are governed by Boards of Directors, and led by Chief Executive Officers (CEO). The Minister is responsible for providing strategic direction to the Boards, and for monitoring the performance of the corporation. However, the Minister does not intervene in decisions pertaining to specific transactions.

Background

Crown Corporation Governance

The Minister is accountable for providing direction to the Boards of Directors. Global Affairs Canada supports the Minister in this task by working with the Crown corporations to implement ministerial direction, as well as to monitor their performance. EDC and CCC are each governed by Boards of Directors which are appointed by the Governor in Council (GIC) and report to Parliament through the Minister. Board members are responsible for overseeing a Crown corporation’s business activities and management, with the responsibility to act in the best interests of the corporation. Responsibility for day-to-day operations of Crown corporations is vested in a CEO, who is appointed by the GIC to hold office during pleasure and is accountable to the Board of Directors for the overall management and performance of the corporation.

The Minister’s responsibilities include: providing the Boards of Directors with strategic direction through the annual provision of a Statement of Priorities and Accountabilities letter; recommending to the Treasury Board the approval of annual Corporate Plans detailing planned business activities of the corporations; recommending to Cabinet the appointment of Chairs, members of the Boards of Directors and CEOs; recommending performance review ratings for the CEOs to the Privy Council Office; and, authorizing certain categories of transactions or contracts which fall outside the scope of the Corporations’ authorities.

Export Development Canada

EDC was established in 1944 pursuant to the Export Development Act as Canada’s export credit agency. Its mandate is to help Canadian companies of all sizes succeed globally by providing them with a range of financial solutions and connections to grow their business abroad, resulting in more jobs and opportunities in Canada. EDC supports Canadian exporters through trade financing; credit insurance; bonding and guarantees; equity investments; and knowledge products. In 2023, EDC facilitated $131.4 billion in business. All EDC support is conducted on commercial terms; it is not permitted to provide grants or subsidies.

FinDev Canada

FinDev is a subsidiary corporation of EDC that helps developing countries by providing financial services and technical assistance consistent with Canada’s international development priorities. According to the Export Development Act, the Minister of International Trade is responsible for FinDev Canada and is ultimately accountable for FinDev Canada to Parliament. However, in practice, the Minister of International Development shares responsibility for guiding the organization.

Canada Account

The Canada Account is a mechanism allowing the Government to support transactions outside of EDC’s risk capacity, but that are determined by the Minister of International Trade, with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance, to be in the national interest. Canada Account transactions are fully separate from EDC’s corporate account, though they are managed and administered by EDC in the same manner. The Government assumes all financial risks and costs for Canada Account transactions via the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Transactions are reported in the Public Accounts separately from those made on EDC’s corporate account.

Canadian Commercial Corporation

CCC was established in 1946 pursuant to the Canadian Commercial Corporation Act as Canada’s government-to-government contracting agency. CCC has three core business lines: (1) administration of the Canada-U.S. Defence Production Sharing Agreement, which does not generate fee revenue and is covered by an annual appropriation; (2) International Prime Contracting, which is fee-generating government-to-government sales across all sectors, but particularly in defence and infrastructure; and (3) Sourcing, which draws on CCC’s procurement expertise to provide contracting services to federal government partners such as the Department of National Defence. In 2023-24, CCC helped 559 Canadian exporters secure $3.2 billion in new export contracts with 62 countries, which supported 14,639 jobs across Canada.

Invest in Canada

IIC, established as a departmental corporation on March 12, 2018, promotes and facilitates foreign direct investment (FDI) in Canada and coordinates efforts with the government, private sector, and other stakeholders. IIC shares its mandate for FDI promotion with the Trade Commissioner Service (TCS) and reports to Parliament through the Minister of International Trade.  

IIC is overseen by a Board of Directors whose members are Governor-in-Council appointees, except for the Deputy Minister of International Trade who is an ex officio member. The Board sets the organization's direction and priorities, while the CEO handles daily operations. IIC's status as a departmental corporation grants it greater operational flexibility, enabling it to market Canada as an FDI destination and form partnerships for key events.

5. Federal-Provincial-Territorial Engagement

Issue

Regular and sustained Federal-Provincial-Territorial (FPT) engagement will be critical to delivering on the Minister of International Trade’s mandate and to ensuring that regional interests are considered when advancing the Government’s international trade agenda.
Addressing economic uncertainty caused by the U.S. administration’s tariffs and trade policy agenda is the top priority for most provinces and territories (PTs).
PTs are very active internationally, including some via their own international office networks.

Background

PTs collaborate closely with Global Affairs Canada to enhance their international trade and diplomatic efforts. This collaboration is essential for aligning PTs’ economic and political interests with national foreign policy objectives. This approach ensures that the diverse economic priorities of Canada's regions are understood and advanced, and that commitments made at the federal level reflect input from other jurisdictions, which in turn supports effective implementation at the subnational level.

The federal government is responsible for negotiating and entering into international trade agreements, as well as implementing related trade policies. PTs are consulted during the negotiation and implementation phases. Although the federal government holds the primary jurisdiction over international relations and trade, PTs have authority to regulate trade and commerce within their respective territories. Alignment and coordination between both levels of government is thus required.

FPT engagement mechanisms

Global Affairs Canada plays a coordinating role to ensure an effective two-way exchange of information with PTs. These efforts include the organization of regular and ad hoc trade policy consultations, outreach, and FPT roundtables at the Ministerial, Deputy Ministerial, Assistant Deputy Ministerial, and working levels. These meetings are an opportunity to share information and cooperate on shared priorities, including Canada-U.S. relations. The Minister of International Trade engages with PT counterparts bilaterally as well as multilaterally. The last FPT Roundtable for Ministers Responsible for International Trade was held in September 2023.

International representation

Provincial governments have steadily increased their international representation. Provinces have 62 international offices co-located in Canadian missions abroad, and 36 standalone offices. British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, Québec, New Brunswick and Newfoundland and Labrador each have international representation. Québec has the largest presence abroad with 35 offices in 19 countries. Manitoba will open its first international office in Washington, D.C. in 2025.

Considerations

Canada-U.S. relations

PTs’ current international focus is on Canada-U.S. relations and more specifically, on how to navigate the evolving tariffs and tariff threats from the new U.S. administration. The Premiers have generally presented a unified front and have stated their support for “appropriate action by the federal government in response to any U.S. tariffs imposed on imports from Canada". However, different priorities and perspectives exist behind the scenes and require active management. For example, Alberta and Saskatchewan have opposed the idea of restricting energy exports to the United States.

In response to the tariffs, PTs have each implemented non-tariff measures within their own jurisdictions; for example, removing U.S. alcohol from provincial liquor stores. PTs have also placed a renewed focus on promoting trade diversification, eliminating barriers to internal trade, expediting regulatory approvals on natural resource projects, and encouraging Canadians to prioritise buying Canadian goods and services. Some PTs have put forward response plans and support programs (e.g., contingency funds, loan programs, tax deferrals, payroll premium relief) in their 2025-2026 budgets to protect local businesses, workers, and communities from the impacts of tariffs.

Since the U.S. election, Global Affairs Canada has organized virtual FPT roundtable discussions at the Deputy Minister (December 2024) and Assistant Deputy Minister (November 2024) level. At the working-level, Global Affairs Canada hosts a monthly FPT Canada-U.S. Update virtual meeting, and it has re-engaged its monthly Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) FPT Consultations Committee.

Other international priorities

Looking beyond the United States, Global Affairs Canada has established FPT working groups to engage PTs on a wide range of international files.

6. The Trade Commissioner Service

Issue

The Trade Commissioner Service (TCS) is a departmental program which contributes to Canadian prosperity by helping businesses increase exports and diversify markets; working to attract foreign direct investment; supporting science, technology and innovation partnerships; and advocating for Canadian commercial and economic interests.
Through a suite of services and numerous events and activities organized around the world, approximately 1,000 departmental employees in nearly 150 cities worldwide provide clients with expert advice, business intelligence, opportunities, and contacts to help them advance their international business objectives.
TCS priorities, activities and resources are targeted to help client companies diversify their businesses, as well as attract investment to Canada and support other economic partnerships that would be beneficial to Canada.

Background

Trade Commissioner services are available at no cost to Canadian companies that meet established criteria, which include their readiness for and commitment to international business, and their potential to contribute to economic growth in Canada (e.g. exporting made in Canada products and/or creating jobs in Canada). The TCS supports business-to-business relationships between Canadians and foreign counterparts; it does not conduct sales or marketing for clients.

Officials work closely with partners at all levels of government, as well as with organizations in the portfolio of the Minister of International Trade (such as Export Development Canada, Canadian Commercial Corporation, and Invest in Canada).

A 2018 study by Global Affairs Canada’s Office of the Chief Economist concluded that on average, TCS clients export 19.8% more in value and to 24.8% more markets compared to non-clients. It has been estimated that every dollar invested in the TCS results in $26 in increased exports.

Sector-based strategies are implemented across six Regional Offices in Canada and Canada’s extensive network of diplomatic missions abroad. About two-thirds of employees abroad are locally hired experts.

The TCS delivered the most services to Canadian businesses in 2023-2024 in the following sectors: information and communications technology; agrifood; cleantech; life sciences; and education.

The sectors in which businesses reported the highest dollar-value commercial outcomes, achieved with the support of the TCS, were: cleantech, automotive, information and communications technology, infrastructure, and life sciences.

Export Promotion and Diversification

The TCS supports Canada’s trade diversification efforts, which have helped Canada increase its exports to non-U.S. markets by almost 50% since 2018. The TCS is positioned to provide strong support for export diversification with 85% of Trade Commissioners located in countries other than the United States.

In 2023-2024, almost 11,000 Canadian businesses received services from the TCS, facilitating over 1,200 business deals, with an estimated value of $6.4 billion, based on client reporting. 92.2% of clients reported being “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with the support provided. Over 93% of clients were small and medium-sized enterprises.

Investment Attraction

The TCS plays a leading role in attracting job-creating foreign direct investment, with a focus on filling supply-chain gaps while also taking account of Canada’s national security interests. Working with foreign companies interested in investment in Canada, the TCS facilitated 134 investments in 34 municipalities across nine provinces in 2023-24. With an estimated value of over $27.1 billion, these investments are expected to create approximately 9,600 new jobs.

Science, Innovation and Technology Partnerships

The TCS helps Canadian small and medium-sized enterprises establish international innovation partnerships and access technology and venture capital. Partnership objectives include developing new products or technology, adapting Canadian products to new markets, and validating uncommercialized products. In 2023-24, the TCS facilitated 184 partnerships for 154 Canadian companies and research organizations and helped to inject $48 million in venture capital into Canada’s startup ecosystem.

Advocating for Canadian Interests: Trade Policy / Market Access

The TCS helps companies resolve in-market issues such as customs disputes, highlights the advantages of free trade agreements (FTAs) that Canada has signed, and engages with host governments by advocating for Canadian interests when they are impaired by local laws and regulations. In 2023-2024, the TCS delivered 118 FTA promotion initiatives across its domestic and international networks.

Programs and Initiatives

The TCS administers grants and contributions programs, known collectively as CanExport, that provide funding to approved applicants. The largest of these by value, CanExport SMEs, covers up to 50% of certain costs for Canadian small and medium enterprises seeking to enter new international markets; in 2023-24, a total of $38 million was provided to 1,757 companies. CanExport Innovation offers grants to Canadian organizations to assist them in establishing and formalizing new R&D partnerships with pre-identified foreign partners. In 2023-24, a total of $1.27 million was provided to 75 projects. CanExport also provided $5.2 million to help 54 business associations support their members’ international business efforts, and $4.1 million to Canadian cities seeking to attract foreign direct investment.

The Canadian Technology Accelerator (CTA) initiative helps high-potential Canadian technology firms scale up by connecting them with export, investment, and partnership opportunities in 12 global innovation centres. In 2023-24, 167 companies from life sciences, cleantech, and digital sectors participated. To date, they have reported over $106 million in new capital raised, $40 million in new revenue generated, and the creation of over 250 jobs.

The TCS organizes Minister-led Team Canada Trade Missions (TCTMs) to the Indo-Pacific region to showcase Canadian businesses and facilitate long-term trade and investment opportunities. Since launching in Singapore in February 2023, the Minister of International Trade has led full-scale TCTMs to seven markets: Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines and Australia. Those TCTMs have allowed more than 1,600 delegates from over 720 Canadian organizations in more than 23 sectors to gain market exposure and pursue commercial opportunities and partnerships.

Throughout its programs, the TCS promotes ethical business practices and the adoption of Responsible Business Conduct by Canadian businesses operating abroad. The TCS also assists qualified clients from under-represented groups, such as with the Business Women in International Trade program and the organization of delegations to Indigenous business events abroad.

Source: Trade Commissioner Service, Tools, Analysis and Performance Division (TTB)

Text version

Map depicting Trade Commissioner Service services delivered around the world 2023-24

Country	Services Delivered
Canada	5,737
Europe	10,599
Indo-Pacific	20,699
United States & Mexico	8,082
Middle East & North Africa	4,433
Latin America & Caribbean	5,279
Sub-Saharan Africa	2,534

Source: Trade Commissioner Service, Tools, Analysis and Performance Division (TTB)

Text version

Map depicting Trade Commissioner Service clients across Canada 2023-24

Province	Services Delivered
Yukon	29
Northwest Territories	8
Nunavut	6
British Columbia	1,875
Alberta	1,169
Saskatchewan	314
Manitoba	299
Ontario	3,487
Quebec	2,097
New Brunswick	175
Newfoundland and Labrador	159
Prince Edward Island	66
Nova Scotia	387

7. Approach to Investment Trade Policy

Issue

Clear and balanced investment rules and an effective dispute settlement mechanism are key to a stable and attractive investment environment and complement the broader investment agenda.
Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) in treaties carefully balance investor protections with the right to regulate in the public interest.
Unlike the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) does not include ISDS between Canada and the United States, and it remains to be seen whether this will be revisited in the upcoming review.

Background

Investment trade policy complements the broader investment agenda, which also includes efforts to attract foreign direct investment. It is also a key element in a broader trade diversification agenda aimed at supporting Canadian businesses by providing certainty and predictability, while diversifying access to foreign markets for Canadian goods, services and investment.

Canada is a significant net exporter of capital. In 2023, Canadian direct investment abroad was $2.17 trillion while Canadian assets abroad totalled over $8.8 trillion. Canada has supported those investments through standalone foreign investment promotion and protection agreements (FIPAs), as well as investment chapters in free trade agreements (FTAs). These agreements provide legally binding rights and obligations, enforced by ISDS, that are designed to ensure investors are treated in a fair and non-discriminatory manner based on internationally recognized standards.

FIPAs and FTAs

Based on standing policy authority to negotiate FIPAs, Canada has implemented 39 FIPAs with other countries, and one foreign investment promotion and protection arrangement with Taiwan. The government is currently engaged in eight FIPA negotiations¹ and is exploring future negotiations with several countries.

In 2021, the government released a modernized and inclusive FIPA model, including clearer ISDS rules and enhancing access to benefits for women, Indigenous peoples and SMEs, following a comprehensive three-year review process. This included broad public engagement, consultations with other government departments, provinces and territories, experts and stakeholders, and an internal departmental technical review. The reaction from stakeholders and partners to the new model has been broadly positive, with experts praising it as an example of a high quality, modern treaty.

In most FTA negotiations, the government has looked to include an investment chapter generally based on the FIPA model.

ISDS

One of the key objectives of the ISDS mechanism is to depoliticize disputes between a foreign investor and the host state. Essentially, investors who are aggrieved by a host state’s measures can access a third-party dispute settlement mechanism, normally via arbitration. Canadian investors abroad have taken advantage of this mechanism in Canada’s FIPAs and FTAs to enforce their rights. The 2021 FIPA model made some improvements to the ISDS mechanism, including: strengthened options to resolve disputes without going to arbitration (e.g. improved mediation); more transparent proceedings; an arbitrator code of conduct; consent-based expedited arbitration for small claims; and stronger rules on third-party funding of claims.

Under NAFTA, Canada faced multiple claims and paid over $200 million in damages and settlements. However, this represents a very small portion of the billions of dollars claimed by foreign investors and awarded to Canadian investors abroad. To date, Canadian investors abroad have been awarded Can$3.275 billion in damages and settlements.

United States

CUSMA is the first agreement since the original Canada-U.S. FTA where Canada has accepted investment obligations without an ISDS mechanism. The original NAFTA ISDS mechanism continued to apply for three years after termination of the Agreement, until June 30, 2023, for investments made while NAFTA was in force (i.e., up to July 1, 2020). That transition period has ended, so no new ISDS claims can be initiated under NAFTA. Some earlier cases are still ongoing that involve important jurisdictional issues, meaning careful coordination with the United States and Mexico is sometimes required. While no new ISDS cases can be initiated under NAFTA, the State-to-State dispute settlement mechanism under CUSMA is available to the Parties to resolve investment-related disputes. It is unclear whether the United States will revisit the exclusion of ISDS with Canada in the upcoming CUSMA review.

Considerations

ISDS

[REDACTED]

FIPAs and FTAs challenges

[REDACTED]

8. International Trade Litigation

Issue

Canada is involved in three different types of international trade litigation: State-to-State disputes, Investor-State disputes, and trade remedies disputes.
More than $10 billion is at stake for Canada and Canadian businesses in these disputes.

Background

There are three main types of international trade disputes:

State-to-State Disputes: States can challenge the measures (i.e., laws, regulations, policies or practices) of another State at the WTO or under a free trade agreement (FTA). Challenges are heard by an international panel. The remedy is prospective and usually requires the withdrawal of the offending measures. If the violating State does not comply, the injured State can be authorized to take appropriate countermeasures.
Investor-State Disputes: Foreign investors can bring claims against a State for violations of the investment provisions of certain FTAs or Foreign Investment Protection Agreements (FIPAs). Claims are submitted to international arbitration. The remedy is typically monetary damages.
Trade Remedies Disputes: States can impose duties under domestic law based on a determination that products are being subsidized or dumped (i.e., sold for less than the price of the product in the market of the exporting country). Challenges to duties are typically heard in domestic courts, but under the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), parties may challenge such determinations before an international panel.

Considerations

State-to-State Disputes

WTO: Canada – Measures on Certain Products of Chinese Origin

On September 6, 2024, China requested consultations with Canada with respect to surtaxes imposed on Chinese-made electric vehicles and on certain imports of steel and aluminum. Consultations took place on April 7, 2025.

CUSMA: Canada – Digital Services Tax

Canada’s Digital Services Tax Act (DSTA) entered into force on June 28, 2024. The United States requested CUSMA consultations in August 2024, alleging that the tax violates Canada’s national treatment obligation. [REDACTED].

WTO and CUSMA: United States – Additional Import Duties on Goods from Canada

On March 4, 2025, Canada requested consultations at the WTO and under CUSMA with the United States regarding 25% import duties on Canadian non-energy goods and 10% duties on energy goods imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Consultations are being scheduled.

WTO and CUSMA: United States – Additional Import Duties on Steel and Aluminum Articles from Canada

On March 12, 2025, Canada requested consultations at the WTO and under CUSMA with the United States regarding 25% import duties on certain steel and aluminum articles imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Consultations are being scheduled.

WTO: China – Agricultural and Fishery Products

On March 20, 2025, Canada requested consultations with China related to import duties imposed on a range of Canadian agricultural and fishery products following an “antidiscrimination investigation” under Chinese law into Canada’s surtaxes on Chinese-made electric vehicles and certain Chinese steel and aluminum products. Consultations were held on April 23, 2025.

WTO and CA-U.S. Autos Side Letter: United States – Additional Duties on Imports of Automobiles and Automobile Parts from Canada

On April 3, 2025, Canada requested consultations with the United States regarding tariffs of 25% on all imports of automobiles and auto parts imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Canada requested these consultations at the WTO and under the Canada-U.S. Section 232 Autos Side Letter, a legally binding agreement that incorporates the CUSMA dispute settlement mechanism.

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP): Canada – Dairy TRQ Allocations

In September 2023, a CPTPP Panel found that Canada violated its CPTPP obligations to New Zealand with respect to the allocation of dairy tariff rate quotas (TRQs). Canada published modified TRQ allocation measures on May 1, 2024. [REDACTED]. New Zealand could seek to suspend benefits against Canada.

Investor-State Disputes

NAFTA: Windstream v. Canada

Windstream is challenging measures related to the February 2020 termination of its Feed-in Tariff Contract in Ontario. It is seeking Can$560 million. The Tribunal’s award is expected in 2025.

NAFTA: Geophysical Service Inc. (GSI) v. Canada

GSI is challenging Canada’s regulatory measures concerning marine seismic data for oil and gas producers. It is seeking US$506.9 million. The Tribunal’s Award is expected in 2025.

CUSMA: Ruby River v. Canada

Ruby River is challenging the rejection of its proposed liquified natural gas (LNG) terminal and pipeline by Québec and Canada. Canada is arguing the claim should be dismissed due to a lack of jurisdiction because the CUSMA Legacy Annex does not allow for claims related to measures adopted after the termination of NAFTA. The Claimant is seeking US$1 billion. A hearing will be held in December 2025.

USSR-Canada FIPA: Volga-Dnepr Airlines v. Canada

Volga-Dnepr is challenging Canada’s February 2022 prohibition on Russian aircraft in Canadian airspace, and the subsequent seizure of its aircraft. It is seeking US$100 million. The Tribunal was recently constituted. [REDACTED].

CPTPP: Riversdale Resources and Hancock Prospecting v. Canada

Two Australian companies are challenging various measures by Alberta relating to the proposed Grassy Mountain metallurgical coal mine and provincial coal policies. They are seeking Can$2 billion. The Tribunal is being constituted.

Trade Remedies Disputes

U.S.: Softwood Lumber

The United States has imposed duties, alleging that Canadian softwood lumber is subsidized and dumped. Canada has requested the establishment of 12 CUSMA binational panels to review the U.S. decisions. [REDACTED]. Canada has also successfully challenged the U.S. determinations before the WTO. [REDACTED]. Finally, Canadian Parties have challenged one of the decisions in the U.S. Court of International Trade.

U.S.: Corrosion-Resistant Steel Products

On February 10, 2025, the United States published its preliminary countervailing duty determination. Then, on April 4, 2025, the United States published its preliminary anti-dumping determination. As a result, it has begun collecting duty deposits from U.S. importers. Final duty determinations are expected in the summer. [REDACTED]. Canada is actively participating in the U.S. investigations and supporting Canadian industry.

China: Canola

China is conducting an anti-dumping investigation into imports of canola seed from Canada. Canada is supporting Canadian industry in this investigation and has also made several submissions. China has taken no further steps in this investigation, [REDACTED].

9. Strategic Export Controls 

Issue

Canada’s strategic export controls framework balances the importance of supporting Canadian trade of controlled items (military and dual-use goods and technologies) while appropriately considering Canada’s political, foreign and defence policies and national security interests.
Strategic export permit applications are assessed in the context of evolving international developments and can become at times a bilateral irritant.
An effective export controls system facilitates Canadian participation in military and dual use supply chains through predictable and speedy scrutiny. It is a legal requirement that contributes to regional and international security and stability by denying inappropriate exports. It also promotes transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of military and dual-use goods and technologies.

Background

As of March 14, 2025, the Minister of International Trade became legally responsible for the administration of the Export and Import Permits Act that governs export and import controls. Previously, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was the designated Minister, but the Minister of International Trade was delegated responsibility for non-strategic trade items. The Act gives the Minister, or officials acting under their authority, broad discretion to grant or deny permits, including those based on foreign and defence policy, and national security interests.

Export control regimes

Most strategic items controlled for export derive from Canada’s commitments to partner countries that participate in the following multilateral export control regimes: the Wassenaar Arrangement (military and dual-use items); the Nuclear Suppliers Group; the Missile Technology Control Regime; and the Australia Group (chemical and biological weapons).

Arms Trade Treaty

In 2019, the Act was amended to reflect the requirements of the Arms Trade Treaty. Under the amended Act, the Minister must deny a permit if there is sufficient evidence of certain potential negative results, such as human rights abuses or violations of international humanitarian law.

Permit Process and Consultations

All permit applications for controlled goods and technologies are received and processed through an online export controls system. Permits are assessed on a case-by-case basis through a risk assessment framework, regardless of the country of destination. Assessments evaluate the risks and implications of the proposed exports with respect to mandatory assessment criteria and specific country policies.

Depending on the nature of the goods and technology, and the context of the export transaction, consultations may be conducted within Global Affairs Canada, Canada’s network of missions abroad, or other government departments. In 2024, approximately 5,000 permits were issued for military, dual-use and strategic items. It is not possible to determine the total value of actual exports of controlled goods and technology per year, but the 2024 State of Canada’s Defence Industry Report indicates that total defence industry exports from Canada for 2022 were $7.04 billion.

Annual Reporting to Parliament

The Minister tables two reports annually on the administration of the export controls system: the Annual Report to Parliament on the Administration of the Export and Import Permits Act and the Report on Exports of Military Goods.

Considerations

Increased public scrutiny

Canada’s export controls policy is under sustained and intense scrutiny by Parliamentarians, industry, civil society, and the media. Concerns have focused on the possible use of controlled goods and technologies in certain countries to commit human rights abuses or serious violations of international humanitarian law. Public scrutiny has been heightened by various judicial reviews.

United States

As part of the America First Trade Policy Executive Order, the U.S. is conducting a review of its export control system. [REDACTED].

Israel/Gaza

[REDACTED]

Russia and Belarus

[REDACTED]. Canada has also imposed sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

China

In December 2024, China implemented new export control regulations that introduced a unified control system, simplified licensing processes, and stricter oversight of high-tech sectors. In February 2025, China imposed additional controls on the export of certain critical minerals that are used to produce semiconductors and batteries as well as dual-use and military technologies. On April 4, 2025, China imposed export controls on certain rare earth elements as a response to U.S. tariffs. Those measures will also impact supply chains to other countries, including Canada.

Concerns from Industry

While engagement with exporters is generally positive, [REDACTED].

D. The Department

1. Minister of International Trade’s Key Portfolio Responsibilities

Issue

The Minister of International Trade is supported by experts across Global Affairs Canada. This includes dedicated expertise in the International Trade Branch, as well as staff in bilateral geographic and functional branches and an international network of trade commissioners and other staff in missions abroad.
The portfolio includes the Trade Commissioner Service (see Trade Commissioner Service brief), a world-leading export credit agency (Export Development Canada), the Government of Canada’s government-to-government contracting agency (Canadian Commercial Corporation) and Canada’s foreign direct investment promotion agency (Invest in Canada).

Background

Trade is equivalent to 65% of Canadian GDP. In 2024, Canada exported over $996 billion and imported more than $1 trillion worth of goods and services. The total stock of foreign direct investment in Canada reached over $1.5 trillion.

The Minister of International Trade’s role is to promote the expansion of Canada’s international trade and commerce.

Portfolio Organizations:

Export Development Canada (EDC) and its subsidiary, FinDev Canada

EDC’s mandate is to help Canadian companies of all sizes succeed globally by providing them with a range of financial solutions and connections to grow their businesses internationally, resulting in more jobs and opportunities in Canada. FinDev is a subsidiary corporation of EDC that helps developing countries by providing financial services and technical assistance consistent with Canada’s international development priorities (See Crown Corporations and Agencies brief). The President and CEO of the EDC is Alison Nankivell who began her appointment in February 2025.

Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC)

CCC is Canada’s government-to-government contracting agency that helps Canadian exporters sell to foreign government buyers (See Crown Corporations and Agencies brief). The CCC is governed by a Board of Directors whose representatives come primarily from the private sector. The current President and CEO of the CCC is Robert Kwon

Invest in Canada (IIC)

IIC is a departmental corporation, formally established under the 2018 Invest in Canada Act, mandated to promote, attract and facilitate foreign direct investment (FDI) in Canada. It coordinates the efforts of the government, the private sector and other stakeholders with respect to FDI in Canada, in conjunction with the Trade Commissioner Service. IIC is currently led by Chief Executive Officer Laurel Broten, appointed in September 2022.

As a departmental corporation, IIC functions with greater autonomy from the core public administration than line departments. However, it must still comply with any general or special direction given by the Minister in carrying out its mandate, and it also prepares its departmental planning and reporting documents within the same framework as line departments.

Statutory obligations / Parliamentary actions:

The Minister is typically responsible for introducing the implementing legislation for free trade agreements in Parliament (the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement having been an exception). The Minister is also normally designated under implementing legislation for free trade agreements as Canada’s principal representative on the Commissions of Free Trade Agreements. The Minister of International Trade is also responsible for all strategic export controls, including items that are military, dual-use or strategic in nature (See Strategic Export Controls brief).

Forced Labour Import Ban

As part of the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) obligations, Canada’s forced labour import ban came into force in 2020. The Minister of International Trade is the Competent Authority to provide policy guidance to the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)’s enforcement of the ban.

Appointments

The Minister of International Trade is responsible for the following Governor in Council (GIC) appointments:

Board of Directors and CEO of EDC;
Board of Directors and CEO of the CCC;
Board of Directors and CEO of IIC;
Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise; and
Appointments to the Panel of Arbitrators and Panel of Conciliators of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.

The Minister of International Trade is also responsible for ministerial appointments. These appointments are made directly by the Minister and do not involve the Privy Council Office. They include:

Canadian seats on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Business Advisory Council (the Minister of International Trade recommends candidates for appointment by the Prime Minister).

The Minister of International Trade is responsible for several GIC and Ministerial appointments to bodies related to Canada’s free trade agreements, including:

Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)
Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA)
Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement
Canada-U.K. Trade Continuity Agreement (TCA)

2. The Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act

Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act

3. The Department at a Glance

Issue

The department is responsible for managing Canada’s foreign policy, trade, consular relations, and most of its international development assistance with a view to advancing the security and prosperity of Canadians. Since 2013, these functions exist under a single roof.
The scope of the department’s mandate and footprint is wide, with over 13,000 active employees in Canada and abroad, and a total budget of $9.2 billion in fiscal year 2024-2025.

Background

What the Department Does

At its core, the work of the department is geared towards Canada’s and Canadians’ security and prosperity through the management of the government’s relations with foreign governments, international organizations, and other stakeholders. The department is part of a broader ecosystem of other players who advance Canadian interests abroad, including other federal government departments, provinces and territories, and private citizens and businesses.

People and skills

Global Affairs Canada (GAC) employees have a range of skills and functions. Employees include foreign service officers, whose career is geared towards representing Canada in work related to diplomacy, trade promotion, international development assistance, and consular services. It also includes senior executives and heads of mission, who provide leadership at headquarters, in regional offices, and at Canada’s embassies, high commissions, consulates and trade offices abroad. There are approximately 1,350 foreign service officers and executives working abroad and in our regional offices. The work of representing Canada in the world is supported by approximately 5,500 locally engaged staff (these are employees hired under local labour laws). At headquarters, there are also approximately 6,500 staff comprising policy officers, programming specialists, communications specialists, and the legal, administrative, financial, and IT support staff needed to keep a complex organization running.

The department has 6 regional offices in Canada, notably to engage with Canadian businesses. They are located in Vancouver, Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto, Montreal, and Halifax.

The international platform

A unique aspect of the department’s work is its responsibility for the government’s presence abroad, which includes a portfolio of properties and assets around the world. Working in 181 missions in 112 countries, the department’s international platform supports the work abroad of other government departments, agencies, Crown corporations, provinces and foreign government partners co-located within Government of Canada mission premises. While some missions are more focused on tracking political developments, and some others have a trade promotion or international development assistance focus, all require office space, human resources, and material support often in complex operating environments.

Core work

A core part of the work of the department’s officials abroad concerns advocating and promoting Canada’s interests (as defined by the government). This takes place through building and maintaining bilateral and multilateral relationships; leading on global issues and negotiations; and encouraging respect for international law, including through the use of sanctions.

The department promotes expanded trade and investment for the benefit of all Canadians, including by fostering the success of Canadian exporters and innovators through the Trade Commissioner Service. It also works to safeguard an open rules-based global trading system, negotiate trade agreements, and manage international trade disputes.

In order to ensure the safety of Canadians abroad, the department provides travel information and consular services. This includes visits to places of detention; deployment of staff to evacuate Canadians in crisis situations (up 3.4 times over the past 5 years); and provision of emergency documentation.

The department also has legal responsibilities and is the principal source of advice on public international law as well as international trade and investment law, and treaty negotiation, for the government.

Various funding envelopes support the government’s international work, with total budget amounting to $9.2 billion in 2024-25. The most significant is the International Assistance Envelope of which GAC administers almost 80%. In 2024-25, this envelope was targeted towards: supporting poverty reduction; alleviating suffering in humanitarian crises; mitigating the impact of climate change; reinforcing opportunities for economic growth; promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment; and improving health and education outcomes. The envelope also supported activities that bolster peace and security, for example by countering violent extremism and terrorism, supporting the building of capacity to counter crime, and supporting peace operations and conflict management.

Considerations

GAC has three Deputy Ministers and one Associate Deputy Minister, who work to support ministerial mandates. The department has recently undergone transformation efforts that include a new organizational structure and governance model, as part of a wider 3-year transformation agenda focused on 5 pillars: organizational culture, people, global presence, policy, and tool and processes. Currently at its midway point, this multi-year organizational transformation effort aims to position GAC as a best-in-class foreign affairs, international development, trade and consular services department where employees are proud to work and are equipped. This is in recognition that the department needs to evolve to better serve Canadians both at home and abroad, to face changing global contexts.

Twelve branches are headed by assistant deputy ministers, reporting to the deputy ministers. These assistant deputy ministers work with ministers, their own staff, and external partners to deliver on government priorities, with their responsibilities ranging from geographic regions to functional and corporate issues.

A departmental plan provides an overview of policy priorities, core responsibilities, planned results and associated resource requirements for the coming fiscal year. It is approved by the ministers and normally tabled in Parliament in February/March. The plan also presents the performance targets against which the department will report results. A departmental results report is then tabled in Parliament in the fall for the previous fiscal year.

The department’s total 2024-25 budget to date is $9.2 billion. This amount includes:

Operating costs: $2.4 billion
Capital costs: $212.9 million
Grants and contributions: $6.1 billion
Locally engaged staff pension, insurance, social security programs: $113.0 million
Statutory items (e.g., direct payments to international financial institutions; contributions to employee benefit plans): $389.0 million.

Text version

Budget distribution by core responsibility of the department in 2024-25:

International Advocacy and Diplomacy: $1039 million

Trade and Investment: $421 million

Development, Peace and Security Programming: $5885 million

Help for Canadians abroad: $74 million.

Support for Canada’s presence abroad: $1335 million

Internal services: $478 million

4. Deputy Ministers and Assistant Deputy Ministers

Deputy ministers

USS – David Morrison, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

On October 12, 2022, David Morrison was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Prior to this, Mr. Morrison served as Deputy Minister of International Trade. He was also Foreign and Defence Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister (2019-2022), the Personal Representative of the Prime Minister for the G7 Summit (2018-2023) and held roles such as Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (2017-2019) and Assistant Deputy Minister of the Americas Branch at Global Affairs Canada (2013-2017).

Earlier, Mr. Morrison was Senior Vice-President at the former Canadian International Development Agency (2012-2013). He was also Executive Secretary of the UN Capital Development Fund (2008-2012) and Director of Communications at the UN Development Programme (2004-2008). He began his career with the UN Development Programme in North Korea and held various diplomatic and leadership roles.

Mr. Morrison holds a Master of Philosophy from Oxford and a BA from Yale.

DMT – Rob Stewart, Deputy Minister of International Trade

Rob Stewart was appointed Deputy Minister of International Trade in October 2022. Before this, he served as Deputy Minister of Public Safety for three years, providing leadership on national security, community safety, and emergency management.

Mr. Stewart spent most of his career at the Department of Finance Canada, starting in 1993. He was the Government of Canada's finance deputy for the G7, G20 and the Financial Stability Board (2016-2019) and held roles such as Assistant Deputy Minister of International Trade and Finance (2010-2014) and Assistant Deputy Minister of Financial Sector Policy (2008-2010). Before joining the Department of Finance Canada, Mr. Stewart worked at Export Development Canada and in the Canadian sport system.

He holds a BA from Carleton University and an MBA from the University of Ottawa.

DME – Christopher MacLennan, Deputy Minister of International Development

Christopher MacLennan was appointed Deputy Minister of International Development in January 2022. Prior to his current role, he was the personal representative of the Prime Minister for the G20 Summit (2020-2024) and the Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (2020-2022). As Assistant Deputy Minister at Global Affairs Canada, he led Canada's international development assistance efforts and served as Canada’s G7 foreign affairs sous-sherpa (2017-2020).

Mr. MacLennan has held various roles in the Privy Council Office, including Acting Assistant Secretary for Priorities and Planning and Assistant Deputy Minister of Policy Innovation (2015-2017). He also held executive roles in the former Canadian International Development Agency, such as Director General, Health and Nutrition (2013-2015), and Director General, Thematic and Sectoral Policy Directorate (2009-2013).

Mr. MacLennan holds a Ph.D. from Western University, specializing in constitutional development and international human rights.

DMA – Sandra McCardell, Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Sandra McCardell was appointed Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in July 2024. Prior to this, she was Assistant Deputy Minister of the International Affairs Branch of Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC). She has held several senior positions such as Assistant Deputy Minister of Europe, Arctic, Middle East, and Maghreb Branch at Global Affairs Canada (2020-2023) and Director General of the Middle East Bureau (2019-2020).

Ms. McCardell served as High Commissioner of Canada to South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Mauritius, and Madagascar (2015-2019), Ambassador of Canada to Morocco and Mauritania (2012-2015) and Ambassador of Canada to Libya (2009-2011). In line with her commitment to a healthy workplace, Sandra has been the co-champion for values and ethics at ECCC and champion for women at GAC (2020-2023).

Ms. McCardell holds a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Alberta.

Assistant Deputy Ministers

Functional branches

CFM – Tara Denham, ADM, Emergency Management, Legal and Consular Affairs Branch and Senior Official for Hostage Affairs

Tara Denham is the Assistant Deputy Minister of Emergency Management, Legal and Consular Affairs (CFM) & Senior Official for Hostage Affairs. Previously, Ms. Denham was the Director General for Human Rights, Freedoms and Inclusion at Global Affairs Canada and the Senior Official on cyber, digital and emerging technology policy issues.

IFM – Richard Arbeiter, ADM, International Security and Political Affairs Branch and Political Director

Richard Arbeiter is currently the Political Director and Assistant Deputy Minister for International Security and Political Affairs. From 2018 to 2024, Mr. Arbeiter served as Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, New York.

RFM – Catherine Jobin, ADM, Strategy, Policy and Public Affairs Branch

Catherine Jobin is Assistant Deputy Minister, Strategy, Policy and Public Affairs. Earlier in her career, Catherine worked at the Privy Council Office’s Priorities and Planning Secretariat, with the Canadian International Development Agency, and was posted at the Canadian Embassy to Afghanistan.

TFM – Sara Wilshaw, Senior ADM, International Trade Branch and Chief Trade Commissioner

Sara Wilshaw is currently Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, International Trade and Chief Trade Commissioner. Prior to this, Ms. Wilshaw served as Director of Operations, Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat at the Privy Council Office.

YFM – Leslie Norton, ADM, International Assistance Partnerships and Programming Branch

Leslie E. Norton is the Assistant Deputy Minister of the International Assistance Partnerships and Programming Branch. Prior to this, she was appointed Canada’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

Geographic branches

EGM – Alexandre Lévêque, ADM, Europe, Middle East and Arctic Branch

Alexandre Lévêque is the Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for Europe, the Middle East, and the Arctic. Previously, he was the Assistant Deputy Minister for Strategic Policy at Global Affairs Canada and Assistant Secretary to Cabinet at the Privy Council Office’s Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat. He also served as High Commissioner of Canada in Tanzania, with concurrent accreditation in the Republic of the Seychelles, and Ambassador to the Union of the Comoros.

NGM –Shalini Anand, ADM, Americas Branch

Shalini Anand is the Assistant Deputy for the Americas. Prior to this, she was the Director General of the Trade and Export Controls Bureau, Trade Policy and Negotiations Branch. She served abroad during three postings in Asia, across foreign policy and trade promotion portfolios, including as Consul and head of the political section at the Consulate General of Canada in Hong Kong.

OGM – Weldon Epp, ADM, Indo-Pacific Branch

Weldon Epp is the Assistant Deputy Minister for Indo-Pacific. Prior to this, he was the Director General of the Northeast Asia Bureau. Abroad, he has served as Consul General in Guangzhou and in Shanghai, and has had assignments in Jakarta, Taipei, and Beijing.

WGM/GFM – Cheryl Urban, ADM, Africa Branch and ADM, Pan-geographic Affairs Branch

Cheryl Urban is the Assistant Deputy Minister for Africa and Pan-Geographic Affairs branches. Prior to this, she was Director General for Economic Development, leading the department’s engagement with international financial institutions. Ms. Urban was also Director General of Corporate Planning, Performance and Risk Management; Program Director, Southeast Asia; and Policy Director with the Afghanistan Task Force, which included field assignments in Kabul and Kandahar.

Corporate branches

ACM – Stéphane Cousineau, Senior ADM, International Platform Branch

Stéphane Cousineau is leading the International Platform Branch as Senior Assistant Deputy Minister since January 2022. Prior to this, he served as Senior Assistant Deputy Minister of Corporate Services at Shared Services Canada for nearly four years. His previous roles include Assistant Deputy Minister of Corporate Management Services and Chief Financial Officer at the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada.

SCM – Shirley Carruthers, ADM, People and Corporate Management Branch and Chief Financial Officer

Shirley Carruthers is the Senior Assistant Deputy Minister of the People and Corporate Management Branch, and Chief Financial Officer (CFO).  Between 2021 and 2023, Shirley occupied the position of ADM, Corporate Management and Services Sector, and CFO at Natural Resources Canada (NRCan), where she was responsible for finance, human resources, information management, information technology, real property, and security.

Special bureaus

DMFT – Antoine Chevrier, Chief Transformation Officer

Antoine Chevrier is the Chief Transformation Officer of the department. Prior to this, he was Director General for Pan-African Affairs and subsequently Assistant Deputy Minister for Intergovernmental Affairs at the Privy Council Office, before assuming the position of Assistant Deputy Minister for Sub-Saharan Africa.

DSMX – Daniel Desfossés, ADM, Summits Management Office

Daniel Desfossés was appointed Assistant Deputy Minister, Summits Management Office. Prior to this, Mr. Desfossés served as Regional Director General for Québec and Atlantic at Environment and Climate Change Canada. He was also Director General Planning, Summits Management Office, for the 2018 G7 Summit, at Global Affairs Canada (2017-2019).

5. Organizational Structure

Text version

Global Affairs Canada Executive Organizational Structure (HQ)

Level 1 – Deputy Ministers

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs – David Morrison (USS)

Deputy Minister of International Trade – Rob Stewart (DMT)

Deputy Minister of International Development – Christopher MacLennan (DME)

Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs – Sandra McCardell (DMA)

Level 2 – Assistant Deputy Ministers and Special Direct Reports

Functional Branches:

ADM, Emergency Management, Legal and Consular Affairs Branch and Senior Official for Hostage Affairs – Tara Denham (CFM)

ADM International Security and Political Affairs Branch and Political Director – Richard Arbeiter (IFM)

AADM, International Security and Political Affairs Branch – Larisa Galadza (IFMA)

ADM, Strategy, Policy and Public Affairs Branch – Catherine Jobin (RFM)

AADM, Strategy, Policy and Public Affairs Branch and Head of Communications – Marie-Elise Rancourt (RFMA)

Senior ADM and Chief Trade Commissioner, International Trade Branch – Sara Wilshaw (TFM)

AADM and Chief Trade Negotiator, International Trade Branch – Aaron Fowler (TFMA)

AADM, International Trade Branch – Michelle Cooper (TFMB)

ADM, International Assistance Partnerships and Programming Branch – Leslie Norton (YFM)

AADM, International Assistance Partnerships and Programming Branch – Patricia Peña (YFMA)

Geographic Branches:

ADM, Europe, Middle East and Arctic Branch – Alexandre Lévêque (EGM)

ADM, Americas Branch – Shalini Anand (NGM)

ADM, Asia Pacific Branch – Weldon Epp (OGM)

ADM, Africa Branch and ADM, Pan-geographic Coordination Branch – Cheryl Urban (WGM/GFM)

Corporate Branches:

ADM, International Platform Branch – Stéphane Cousineau (ACM)

AADM, International Platform Branch – Robin Dubeau (ACMA)

ADM, People and Corporate Management Branch and Chief Financial Officer – Shirley Carruthers (SCM)

AADM, People and Talent Management Branch and Chief Human Resources Officer – Vera Alexander (HCM)

Legal Bureaus:

Legal Adviser and Director General, International Law – Louis-Martin Aumais (JLD)

DG, Trade Law Bureau – Shane Spelliscy (JLT)

Special Direct Reports:

Chief Transformation Officer, Transformation Team Bureau – Antoine Chevrier (DMFT)

ADM, Summits Management Office – Daniel Desfossés (DSMX)

Executive Director and Senior General Counsel, Justice Special Bureau – Jolene Harvey (JUS)

Chief Audit Executive, Office of the Chief Audit Executive and Special Investigations – Natalie Lalonde (VBD)

Chief of Protocol of Canada, Office of Protocol – Sébastien Carrière (XDD)

Well-being Ombud & Inspector General, Office of the Ombud, Workplace Well-being and Inspector General – Ayesha Rekhi (ZID)

6. Network Map

Text version

The world map serves as a visual representation of the global network of diplomatic missions as of March 31, 2025 and displays the distribution of 181 missions across 112 countries, as well as 6 Regional Offices in Canada. The map includes the number of positions abroad of 2,400 Canada-based staff and 5,928 Locally engaged-staff. It also displays the missions per designation with 84 Embassies, 23 High Commissions, 19 Offices, 2 Representative Offices, 12 Multilateral Missions, 26 Consulates General, 9 Consulates, and 6 Consular Agencies.

List of Canada's missions abroad and Canadian regional offices by designation, as of March 31st, 2025

Office	Country	Office Designation
Calgary	Canada	Canadian Regional Office
Halifax	Canada	Canadian Regional Office
Montréal	Canada	Canadian Regional Office
Toronto	Canada	Canadian Regional Office
Vancouver	Canada	Canadian Regional Office
Winnipeg	Canada	Canadian Regional Office
Acapulco	Mexico	Consular Agency
Cancun	Mexico	Consular Agency
Playa del Carmen	Mexico	Consular Agency
San José del Cabo	Mexico	Consular Agency
Mazatlan	Mexico	Consular Agency
Puerto Vallarta	Mexico	Consular Agency
Auckland	New Zealand	Consulate
Barcelona	Spain	Consulate
Dusseldorf	Germany	Consulate
Guadalajara	Mexico	Consulate
Houston	United States	Consulate
Milan	Italy	Consulate
Munich	Germany	Consulate
Nagoya	Japan	Consulate
Punta Cana	Dominican Republic	Consulate
Atlanta	United States	Consulate General
Bengaluru	India	Consulate General
Boston	United States	Consulate General
Chandigarh	India	Consulate General
Chicago	United States	Consulate General
Chongqing	China	Consulate General
New York	United States	Consulate General
Dallas	United States	Consulate General
Denver	United States	Consulate General
Detroit	United States	Consulate General
Dubai	United Arab Emirates	Consulate General
Guangzhou	China	Consulate General
Hong Kong	China	Consulate General
Ho Chi Minh City	Vietnam	Consulate General
Istanbul	Türkiye	Consulate General
Los Angeles	United States	Consulate General
Miami	United States	Consulate General
Mumbai	India	Consulate General
Minneapolis	United States	Consulate General
Monterrey	Mexico	Consulate General
Rio de Janeiro	Brazil	Consulate General
Seattle	United States	Consulate General
San Francisco	United States	Consulate General
Shanghai	China	Consulate General
Sao Paulo	Brazil	Consulate General
Sydney	Australia	Consulate General
Lagos	Nigeria	Deputy High Commission
Abu Dhabi	United Arab Emirates	Embassy
Abidjan	Côte d'Ivoire	Embassy
Addis Ababa	Ethiopia	Embassy
Algiers	Algeria	Embassy
Amman	Jordan	Embassy
Ankara	Türkiye	Embassy
Astana	Kazakhstan	Embassy
Athens	Greece	Embassy
Buenos Aires	Argentina	Embassy
Beijing	China	Embassy
Bern	Switzerland	Embassy
Beirut	Lebanon	Embassy
Baghdad	Iraq	Embassy
Bogota	Colombia	Embassy
Belgrade	Serbia	Embassy
Bamako	Mali	Embassy
Bangkok	Thailand	Embassy
Budapest	Hungary	Embassy
Berlin	Germany	Embassy
Brasilia	Brazil	Embassy
Bratislava	Slovakia	Embassy
Brussels	Belgium	Embassy
Bucharest	Romania	Embassy
Cairo	Egypt	Embassy
Copenhagen	Denmark	Embassy
Caracas	Venezuela	Embassy
Dakar	Senegal	Embassy
Damascus	Syria	Embassy
Doha	Qatar	Embassy
Dublin	Ireland	Embassy
Guatemala City	Guatemala	Embassy
Hague, The	Netherlands	Embassy
Hanoi	Vietnam	Embassy
Havana	Cuba	Embassy
Harare	Zimbabwe	Embassy
Helsinki	Finland	Embassy
Jakarta	Indonesia	Embassy
Juba	South Sudan	Embassy
Kabul	Afghanistan	Embassy
Khartoum	Sudan	Embassy
Kinshasa	Democratic Republic of Congo	Embassy
Kuwait City	Kuwait	Embassy
Kyiv	Ukraine	Embassy
Lima	Peru	Embassy
Lisbon	Portugal	Embassy
Manila	Philippines	Embassy
Madrid	Spain	Embassy
Moscow	Russia	Embassy
Montevideo	Uruguay	Embassy
Mexico City	Mexico	Embassy
Oslo	Norway	Embassy
Ouagadougou	Burkina Faso	Embassy
Panama City	Panama	Embassy
Paris	France	Embassy
Phnom Penh	Cambodia	Embassy
Prague	Czechia	Embassy
Port-au-Prince	Haiti	Embassy
Quito	Ecuador	Embassy
Rabat	Morocco	Embassy
Riga	Latvia	Embassy
Reykjavik	Iceland	Embassy
Rome	Italy	Embassy
Riyadh	Saudi Arabia	Embassy
Santo Domingo	Dominican Republic	Embassy
Seoul	Republic of Korea	Embassy
San José	Costa Rica	Embassy
San Salvador	El Salvador	Embassy
Santiago	Chile	Embassy
Stockholm	Sweden	Embassy
Tallinn	Estonia	Embassy
Tel Aviv	Israel	Embassy
Tokyo	Japan	Embassy
Tripoli	Libya	Embassy
Tunis	Tunisia	Embassy
Ulaanbaatar	Mongolia	Embassy
Vatican	Vatican City State	Embassy
Vienna	Austria	Embassy
Vilnius	Lithuania	Embassy
Vientiane	Laos	Embassy
Warsaw	Poland	Embassy
Washington, DC	United States	Embassy
Yerevan	Armenia	Embassy
Yangon	Myanmar	Embassy
Zagreb	Croatia	Embassy
Abuja	Nigeria	High Commission
Accra	Ghana	High Commission
Bridgetown	Barbados	High Commission
Bandar Seri Begawan	Brunei	High Commission
Colombo	Sri Lanka	High Commission
Canberra	Australia	High Commission
New Delhi	India	High Commission
Dhaka	Bangladesh	High Commission
Dar es Salaam	Tanzania	High Commission
Georgetown	Guyana	High Commission
Islamabad	Pakistan	High Commission
Kigali	Rwanda	High Commission
Kuala Lumpur	Malaysia	High Commission
Kingston	Jamaica	High Commission
Maputo	Mozambique	High Commission
Nairobi	Kenya	High Commission
Pretoria	South Africa	High Commission
Port of Spain	Trinidad and Tobago	High Commission
Singapore	Singapore	High Commission
Suva	Fiji	High Commission
Wellington	New Zealand	High Commission
Yaoundé	Cameroon	High Commission
London	United Kingdom	High Commission
Belo Horizonte	Brazil	Office of the Embassy
Fukuoka	Japan	Office of the Embassy
Osaka	Japan	Office of the Embassy
Porto Alegre	Brazil	Office of the Embassy
Palo Alto	United States	Office of the Embassy
Recife	Brazil	Office of the Embassy
Sapporo	Japan	Office of the Embassy
Ahmedabad	India	Office of the High Commission
Chennai	India	Office of the High Commission
Hyderabad	India	Office of the High Commission
Johannesburg	South Africa	Office of the High Commission
Kolkata	India	Office of the High Commission
Karachi	Pakistan	Office of the High Commission
ASEAN	Indonesia	Permanent Mission
Brussels NATO	Belgium	Permanent Mission
Brussels EU	Belgium	Permanent Mission
Geneva PERM	Switzerland	Permanent Mission
Geneva WTO	Switzerland	Permanent Mission
Paris UNESCO	France	Permanent Mission
Paris OECD	France	Permanent Mission
Addis AU	Ethiopia	Permanent Mission
New York PERM	United States	Permanent Mission
Washington OAS	United States	Permanent Mission
Vienna OSCE	Austria	Permanent Mission
Vienna PERM	Austria	Permanent Mission
Cotonou	Benin	Program Office of the Embassy
La Paz	Bolivia	Program Office of the Embassy
Managua	Nicaragua	Program Office of the Embassy
Tegucigalpa	Honduras	Program Office of the Embassy
Lusaka	Zambia	Program Office of the High Commission
Ramallah	West Bank and Gaza	Representative Office
Taipei	Taiwan	Representative Office

Date modified:: 2025-09-03

Minister of International Trade - Briefing book

Table of contents

A. Your Role and Responsibilities

1. Strategic Overview

Issue

Background

Canada-U.S. trade

Trade Diversification

Economic Security

2. Upcoming Ministerial High-level Events

B. Key Issues

1. United States Commercial Relations

Issue

Background

America First Trade Policy Approach and U.S. Tariffs

The U.S. Economy

Canada-U.S. Merchandise Trade

Canada-U.S. Trade Balance (using U.S. Department of Commerce data)

Diplomatic Representation

Considerations

Annex: Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement and bilateral trade issues

Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA)

The 2026-scheduled Joint Review & Bilateral Trade Irritants

2. Trade Diversification: Indo-Pacific and Europe

Issue

Background

Considerations

Growth of Canada's non-U.S. exports (goods and services)

Opportunities in the Indo-Pacific

Opportunities with Europe

Global Affairs Canada’s Role in Trade Diversification

3. China Commercial Relations

Issue

Background

China’s Economic Situation

Bilateral Trade Statistics

China’s Business Environment and Challenges for Canada

Canada’s Trade and Investment Policy Towards China

4. Economic Security

Issue

Background

5. Canada’s G7 Presidency: Trade Priorities

Issue

Background

Canada’s 2025 G7 Presidency

G7 Trade Track

Way Forward

C. Additional Overviews

1. State of Canadian Trade

2. Trade Policy and Negotiations

Issue

Background

1. Trade and Investment Agreements

Completed Agreements

2. Investment Chapters in Free Trade Agreements and International Investment Agreements

3. Air Transport Agreements

3. World Trade Organization

Issue

Background

Canada and the WTO

Considerations

WTO Negotiations

The WTO Appellate Body (AB) Impasse

14th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC14)

4. Crown Corporations & Agencies

Issue

Background

Crown Corporation Governance

Export Development Canada

FinDev Canada

Canada Account

Canadian Commercial Corporation

Invest in Canada

5. Federal-Provincial-Territorial Engagement

Issue

Background

FPT engagement mechanisms

International representation

Considerations

Canada-U.S. relations

Table of contents 

9. Strategic Export Controls 