Minister of International Trade - Briefing book

March 2025
Published: July 15, 2025

Table of contents

1. Your Role
   1. Strategic Overview
   2. Upcoming ministerial high-level events
2. Key issues
   1. United States
   2. China
   3. Economic security
   4. Canada's G7 Prsidency: Trade priorities
3. Additional Overviews
   1. State of Canada’s trade
   2. Trade policy and negotiations
   3. World Trade Organization
   4. Crown Corporations & Agencies
   5. Federal-Provincial-Territorial Engagement
   6. Trade Commissioner Service
   7. Approach to investment trade policy
   8. International Trade litigation
4. The Department
   1. Minister of International Trade’s key portfolio responsibilities
   2. The Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act
   3. The department at a glance
   4. Deputy ministers and Assistant deputy ministers
   5. Organizational structure
   6. Network map

A. Your Role

1. Strategic Overview

ISSUE

• International trade is fundamental to Canada’s prosperity, and you will play an important role in advancing our trade policy and promotion agenda.
• Canada has trading relationships across the global economy, however, the international trade environment is becoming unstable and risky.
• Export diversification and economic security will be important areas of focus as Canada pursues greater economic resiliency and growth.

As Minister of International Trade, your legislated responsibilities are to: build and safeguard an open rules-based global trading system; support Canadian enterprises in their international business development; negotiate and oversee the implementation of trade agreements; manage trade disputes; attract foreign direct investment; and support international science, technology and innovation collaboration.

Decades of globalization and economic integration are now being abandoned, a trend that risks an escalation of harmful trade measures. As a trade dependent country, Canada will be impacted. It will be your role to navigate three primary challenges in the near to medium-term: (i) the Canada-U.S. trading relationship, (ii) adapting trade policy and promotion to advance export diversification in a shifting global trade environment, and (iii) protecting economic security from risks, including economic coercion and non-market trading practices.

(i) Canada-U.S. trade

The Canada-U.S. trade relationship is fundamental to our economic wellbeing but is being tested with threats of tariffs and other pressures that intertwine trade, economic and security policies. Over 75% of Canada’s exports go to the U.S. and roughly 70% of these are incorporated into U.S. supply chains, benefitting both countries’ economic security and resilience. Canada is the top merchandise export market for 32 U.S. states and ranks among the top three for 45 states. Small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs), which make up about 40% of the value of Canada’s goods exports, are highly oriented to trade with the U.S., which for them is a stepping stone to new international markets. The case for continued integration is strong: North American industries are highly integrated, Canada has long been a stable strategic partner for the U.S. and we have a mutual interest in economic security.

However, the new U.S. administration has been highly critical of the global trading system on the grounds that it is unfair to the United States. It has repeatedly threatened tariffs on trading partners, including Canada, using a wide range of justifications, [REDACTED]. The economic consequences for Canada of a loss of tariff-free access to the U.S. market are highly significant, measured in both jobs and GDP. Navigating these bilateral perspectives and pressures will be a major element of your responsibilities, as well as maintaining a constructive relationship with Mexico.

In addition to the threat of tariffs, the President has instructed, through the America First Trade Policy Memorandum, various U.S. departments and agencies to undertake studies and investigations and to advance recommendations in respect of a wide range of U.S. trade policies. April 2 looms a particularly critical date in this regard. This work includes recommendations regarding the operation of the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) in advance of a review of the Agreement mandated for 2026, which will now likely to begin earlier in 2025. Preserving the CUSMA agreement is critical to our longer-term ability to foster economic growth and attract the required investment.

(ii) Export Diversification

[REDACTED]. While Canada’s trade is concentrated with the U.S., we also have strong trading relationships with other partners, especially the European Union (6% exports and 10% imports), United Kingdom, Japan, Mexico, and South Korea, under pinned by free trade agreements with all of these economies (Canada-Europe Trade Agreement – CETA, Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership CPTPP, and the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) and the Canada-Korean Free Trade Agreement. Efforts need to be made to increase the utilization of these agreements, while expanding access to new markets through more flexible forms of trade agreement, including sectoral agreements, will help advance diversification efforts and supply chain resilience in priority sectors.

Defending – and where possible – modernizing the rules-based trading system, including the World Trade Organization (WTO), will also be important. Canada has prospered in this system and as a trade-dependent economy, preserving international rules and global trade institutions remains advantageous for Canada for promoting a level playing field, addressing systemic challenges, and reaching a wide range of partners. However, current WTO rules are insufficient in some areas to meet challenges in the global trading environment (e.g. China’s non-market practices) and advancing multilateral cooperation in the current political climate will be challenging.

From a trade promotion and facilitation perspective, the Trade Commissioner Service and portfolio agencies such as Export Development Canada, Canadian Commercial Corporation, and Invest in Canada, support Canadian exporters and help attract foreign direct investment into Canada. [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

(iii) Economic Security

Threats to Canada’s economic security and resilience have been growing in recent years. This includes sophisticated efforts by hostile actors to exploit pathways into the Canadian economy via trade and investment or research partnerships. Events like the pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine have also shown weaknesses in our supply chains. Such risks have necessitated greater interventions by governments, in contrast to what had for decades been a tendency toward openness and market-based solutions. Certain states have also been pursuing more harmful economic strategies as geopolitical competition intensifies. For instance, there have been increasing episodes of economic coercion wherein states have leveraged economic interdependencies to punish or to pressure various outcomes. [REDACTED].

The government has therefore been adjusting its toolkit of trade and economic measures to defend against imminent economic security threats and coercive trade practices. Measures were taken last year against Chinese goods under the Customs Tariff Act, [REDACTED]. In its 2024 Fall Economic Statement, the government listed some of the policy areas it wanted to advance, including mitigating risks posed by foreign entities of concern in strategic supply chains, as well as to enhancing Canada’s Forced Labour Import Ban. More broadly, protecting Canada’s economic security will require strong international partnerships with and coordination among allies and like-minded. [REDACTED].

2. Upcoming ministerial high-level events

*Note: High-level events only. Subject to change after discussions with the Minister.

Text version

Minister of International Trade upcoming ministerial high-level events

March 30 to April 1: Hannover Messe, Hannover, Germany

April 23-26: APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) Meeting 2, Toronto, Ontario

May 15-16: Ministers Responsible for Trade Meeting (ART) APEC, Jeju Island, Korea

May 25-30: Team Canada Trade Mission (TCTM) to Thailand and Cambodia

June 3-4: 2025 Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development Ministerial Coucil Meeting (OECD MCM), Paris, France

June 15-17: G7 Summit, Kananaskis, Alberta

July (post G7): Fifth CUSMA Free Trade Commission (FTC) Meeting, TBC

Annex: Minister of International Trade

Upcoming ministerial high-level events - Descriptions

March 30 to April 1: Hannover Messe, Hannover, Germany

• Hannover Messe is the world’s largest industrial trade fair. In 2022, Germany invited Canada to be Partner Country for the fair’s 2025 edition. Over 240 Canadian companies are registered to exhibit. Hannover Messe is normally jointly opened by the German Chancellor and the Leader of the Partner Country.

April 23-26: APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) Meeting 2, Toronto, Ontario

• The APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) brings a private sector perspective to APEC’s work; hosting the second ABAC meeting in Toronto will draw influential Asia-Pacific business leaders to Canada, which will contribute to the implementation of Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.

May 15-16: Ministers Responsible for Trade Meeting (MRT) APEC, Jeju Island, Korea

• The APEC Ministers Responsible for Trade Meeting (MRT) will gather Ministers from APEC member economies to negotiate the Ministers Responsible for Trade Statement, which will take stock of the year’s activities, set out areas of focus for the remainder of the year, and inform Leaders’ and Ministers’ year-end outcome documents.

May 25-30: Team Canada Trade Mission (TCTM) to Thailand and Cambodia

• TCTMs are a key initiative under the Indo Pacific Strategy trade pillar. The Minister will lead a delegation of up to 130 Canadian organizations to Thailand (May 25-28) and Cambodia (May 29-30) for the sixth TCTM, focusing on Agri-food, Cleantech, ICT (Thailand only), and Life sciences (Thailand only).

June 3-4: 2025 Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development Ministerial Council Meeting (OECD MCM), Paris, France

• The MCM is the OECD’s highest-level forum, attended by Ministers of Finance, Economy, Trade and other high-level representatives from OECD member and partner countries, as well as representatives of International Organizations. Costa Rica is Chair of the 2025 MCM and Australia, Canada and Lithuania are Vice Chairs.

June 15-17: G7 Summit, Kananaskis, Alberta

• G7 Leaders Summit hosted by Canada’s Prime Minister as Chair of the G7 for 2025. Foreign Ministers sometimes form part of the Prime Minister’s delegation.

July (post G7): Fifth CUSMA Free Trade Commission (FTC) Meeting, TBC

• The CUSMA Free Trade Commission (FTC) is the body under CUSMA that oversees matters relating to the administration and operation of the Agreement and is comprised of government representatives of each Party at the level of ministers or their designees.

B. Key Issues

1. United States

ISSUE

• Canada and the U.S. have created one of the most productive, collaborative, and mutually beneficial bilateral relationships in the world. However, the threat of tariffs and the new administration’s reframing of its role in the world have taken relations to a low point.
• Canada and the U.S. have a deeply integrated economic partnership, with the U.S. being Canada’s top trading partner, largest source of foreign direct investment, and primary export market across a number of key sectors.
• [REDACTED]

Overview

No two nations depend more on each other for their mutual prosperity and economic security than the U.S. and Canada. For nearly four decades, Canada-U.S. trade has been shaped by successive free trade agreements, most recently Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), which took effect in July 2020. CUSMA provides the foundation for integrated North American trade and investment and has helped to fuel intra-regional trade growth, including post-pandemic.

The U.S. remains Canada’s top trading partner, largest source of foreign direct investment, and primary export market for Canadian businesses. Key sectors include automotive, defence, agrifood, life science and information communications technologies. Additionally, Canada is the largest foreign supplier of energy to the U.S. Ensuring continued and expanded market access to the U.S. is a top priority for Canada. This goal is pursued through ongoing engagement and advocacy with U.S. officials at all levels.

With over 75% of Canada’s exports going to the U.S.—and 79% of those feeding into U.S. supply chains—both economies benefit from deep integration. However, this partnership faces challenges from tariff threats and policy pressures. Continued cooperation is essential, especially in advanced manufacturing and the energy transition, where Canada has extensive critical mineral resources.

America First Trade Policy Approach

[REDACTED]

President Trump articulated his vision for an America First Trade Policy via a memorandum directing U.S. officials to investigate a number of areas related to allegedly unfair and unbalanced trade with findings due by April 1, 2025. In the memo, the Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of Homeland Security were also instructed to assess the unlawful migration and fentanyl flows from Canada (plus Mexico and China), which provided the basis for the White House’s February 1 executive order imposing 25% tariffs on all Canadian goods, with energy at 10% (the tariffs came into effect on March 4, 2025).

The tariff situation remains fluid. On March 5, President Trump announced a 30-day delay in the imposition of the 25% tariffs for the automotive industry. Additional tariffs of 25% on steel and aluminum are scheduled to take effect on March 12. Further tariffs have been threatened against automobiles, semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals, in addition to new investigations being launched under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act related to imports of copper, timber, lumber and derivative products, that also could result in new tariffs. In addition, the U.S. is seeking submissions on “unfair trade practices” that will inform the potential imposition of wide-scale reciprocal tariffs against trading partners, scheduled for April 2.

[REDACTED]

BACKGROUND

The U.S. Economy

The U.S. economy remains the world's largest, with a per capita GDP of approximately US$85,793 (GDP of US$29 trillion and 340 million people), though growth is expected to slow to 2.2% in 2025 due to high interest rates and inflation. Despite trade tensions, U.S.-Canada commerce remains robust, with daily trade reaching $3.6 billion in 2023.

Canada-U.S. Merchandise Trade

In 2024, the U.S. remained Canada’s top merchandise trading partner. Canada’s total merchandise exports to the U.S. in 2024 stood at $596 billion, a slight 0.3% decrease over the previous year. In that year, top exports to the U.S. were mineral fuel and oils ($177.4 billion); vehicles and parts ($72.4 billion); industrial machinery ($44.3 billion); plastics ($20.0 billion) and electrical machinery and equipment ($19.0 billion). For the same year, Canada’s total merchandise imports from the U.S. stood at $376.0 billion, an increase of 0.5% over the previous year. The top imports from the U.S. were vehicles and parts ($71.0 billion); industrial machinery ($53.2 billion); mineral fuels and oils ($37.0 billion); electronics ($20.3 billion); and plastics ($18.0 billion).

Canada-U.S. Trade Balance

Canada and the U.S. share a deeply integrated trade relationship, in addition to military cooperation and energy exchanges. The U.S. had a $64.2B merchandise trade deficit with Canada in 2024, entirely due to energy products. Excluding energy, the U.S. held a $34.3B trade surplus with Canada. This deficit is smaller than those with China ($295.4B) and Mexico ($171.8B). The U.S. has run a services trade surplus with Canada for over 20 years, reaching $31.7B in 2023. Since 2007, the U.S. has also maintained a surplus in manufactured goods with Canada, standing at $23.7B in 2024—making Canada the only top five trade partner with which the U.S. enjoys such a surplus. Additionally, U.S. trade with Canada supports manufacturing jobs.

Canada–U.S. trade strengthens American industry by supplying key inputs—over 79% of U.S. imports from Canada are used in further manufacturing,

Foreign Direct Investment

Canada ranks as the second-largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the U.S. In 2023, the U.S. ranked as the largest investor country of FDI stock in Canada. FDI stock from the U.S. stood at $697 billion, an increase of $42 billion from 2022. The U.S. remains the top destination for Canadian direct investment abroad, accounting for 49.7% of all holdings at the end of 2023 while Canadian investment in the U.S. makes up roughly 12.5% of all foreign investment. In 2023, over 63% of American FDI in Canada concentrated in 3 sectors, as per immediate investor basis:

1. management of companies and enterprises (36.7% or $226.8 billion),
2. manufacturing (15.5% or $95.6 billion), and
3. finance and insurance (11.3% or $77 billion).

Trade Portfolio Support to Canadian Exporters in U.S. Markets

The Trade Commissioner Service (TCS) (see note C6) operates in 16 missions, supporting international business development with approximately 180 employees. In 2023-24, the TCS served 2,391 clients in the U.S.

Two Crown corporations in the international trade portfolio – Export Development Canada (EDC) and the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC) – play an important role in supporting Canadian companies operating in U.S. markets. As Canada’s export credit agency, EDC has offices in Atlanta, Chicago and Dallas and uses its vast U.S. network to facilitate business opportunities for Canadian companies through a broad range of financial solutions (including insurance, financing and equity), business connections and market intelligence. In 2024, EDC supported 4,306 Canadian companies operating in the U.S., effectively facilitating over CAD$62 billion in business. In response to U.S. tariffs, EDC will deploy up to $5 billion in capacity over two years through its Trade Impact Program to support Canadian companies affected by tariffs and the resulting market uncertainty.

The CCC is Canada’s government-to-government contracting agency. Its key mandate is the administration of the Canada-U.S. Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA), a bilateral defence trade agreement with the U.S., first signed in 1956, that allows Canadian companies to compete for U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) contracts on the same terms as domestic suppliers. The DPSA is a cornerstone of Canada-U.S. defence trade and underscores a highly integrated North American defence industrial base that reinforces the bilateral relationship by serving the broad economic and strategic interests of both countries. In 2023-24, the value of Canadian exports contracted through the DPSA was CAD$1.1 billion.

Diplomatic representation

Canada has a strong diplomatic presence in the U.S., with an embassy in Washington, D.C., 12 Consulates General, 3 trade offices, and 14 Honorary Consuls.

The U.S. maintains an embassy in Ottawa and consulates in seven Canadian cities.

Canada's Ambassador to the U.S. is Kirsten Hillman (appointed March 26, 2020). President Trump’s nominee for U.S. Ambassador to Canada, Peter Hoekstra, awaits Senate confirmation (as of February 26, 2025).

ANNEX A: CUSMA AND BILATERAL TRADE ISSUES

For over 30 years, North America has benefited from continental free trade under the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and now the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), promoting regional stability, economic prosperity, and competitiveness. Mexico and Canada are the United States’ two largest trade partners, with significant supply chain and economic integration in key sectors, such as the auto and agri-food industries. While Canada and Mexico are important bilateral trade partners for one another, the key trade dynamic for each country is their respective relationships with the United States. In 2024, more than 80% of Mexico’s exports and 77% of Canada’s exports went to the United States.

[REDACTED]. In addition to the multiple, overlapping and repeated threats of tariffs on Canadian and Mexican imports, there is uncertainty regarding how the United States will approach the upcoming joint review of CUSMA.

CUSMA and the 2026-scheduled Joint Review

The Agreement

CUSMA came into force on July 1, 2020, for an initial sixteen-year term. In addition to preserving the core of the NAFTA, which eliminated virtually all tariffs between Canada, the United States and Mexico, it includes new chapters on good regulatory practices, customs administration, North American competitiveness and small and medium-sized enterprises. It modernizes disciplines for trade in goods and agriculture and for rules of origin, such as those for passenger vehicles and trucks.

CUSMA is the foundation for integrated North American trade and investment and has helped fuel robust North American intra-regional trade growth, including following the shocks of the global pandemic. In 2023, trilateral merchandise trade amounted to 1.9 trillion, a 30.4% increase ($448.5 billion) since CUSMA entered into force.

The state-to-state dispute settlement mechanism in CUSMA is an improvement over its predecessor in that it requires the Parties to agree on a roster to facilitate the creation of panels and ensures that panels are established automatically upon request. Almost all of the obligations in the Agreement, including those related to labour and the environment, are now subject to this dispute settlement mechanism.

The CUSMA Joint Review

CUSMA includes a commitment to jointly review the Agreement starting on the sixth anniversary of its entry into force, a forum that also provides the opportunity for the Parties to make specific proposals to amend the Agreement to ensure its long-term effectiveness. Should there be no consensus to extend the Agreement’s term in 2026, the next joint review would be held the following year, in 2027, and so on every year until 2036. During each annual review, the Parties will be given the opportunity to extend the Agreement for a new 16-year term. Should there be no consensus to extend the Agreement by 2036, the Agreement would expire.

In the America First Trade Policy Memorandum issued on January 20, President Trump instructed the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to initiate domestic consultations regarding CUSMA, assess the impact of the Agreement on the United States, and then report back on its’ findings by April 1, 2025, including a recommendation on whether the United States should continue to participate in the Agreement. USTR’s recommendations could include that the joint review be initiated earlier than its scheduled date (July 1, 2026), and that the Agreement be revisited in specific areas.

Global Affairs Canada conducted public consultations on CUSMA via the Canada Gazette (August 17-October 31, 2024), is engaged with provincial and territorial governments through the CUSMA Consultative Committee and is leading inter-departmental coordination with negotiating leads in preparation for the review. Officials will continue consultations and engagement with provincial and territorial governments, stakeholders and Canadians on Canada's interests and priorities, to help inform next steps regarding the CUSMA joint review, including engagement with our CUSMA partners.

Upcoming events

Canada is scheduled to host the fifth meeting of the CUSMA Free Trade Commission (ministerial-level meeting) in 2025. The agenda and timing of the FTC meeting will depend on a number of factors, including the status of the joint review and of U.S. tariffs on Canada and Mexico.

Canada-U.S. Trade Irritants

Canada and the United States share one of the largest trading relationships in the world, with nearly $3.6 billion worth of goods and services crossing the border each day in 2023. The majority of this trade has flowed smoothly to our mutual benefit; however, some irritants have arisen. The United States, for example, has raised concerns regarding Canada’s dairy policies (including Tariff Rate Quota administration, milk pricing and export thresholds); Digital Services Tax Act; [REDACTED]. The United States also has a different interpretation than Canada and Mexico of the CUSMA rules of origin (ROO) for automotive goods – more specifically the regional value content (RVC) requirements for core parts used in the production of vehicles. In addition, while not specifically related to the operation of CUSMA, the U.S. lumber industry has repeatedly alleged that Canadian softwood lumber is unfairly subsidized and dumped as a pretext to seek protection under U.S. trade remedy law from fair competition from high-quality Canadian imports. Canada has also voiced concern with the U.S. government procurement policies, including the Build America, Buy America Act (BABA) which established domestic content procurement preferences for iron and steel, manufactured products, and construction materials used in federally-funded infrastructure projects at the state and municipal levels. More generally, President Trump has complained that the U.S. trade in goods deficit with Canada represents an unfair “subsidy” and must be addressed.

2. China

ISSUE

• China is the destination of 3.8% of Canada’s exports and remains an important export destination due to the size of its market. However, the operating environment in China (e.g. investment restrictions, intellectual property theft, and use of forced labour) also makes it a challenging market for Canadian businesses.
• China's economy faces significant challenges including an aging population, weak real estate and labour markets, and low domestic consumption. As a result, the country is largely relying on strong exports to compensate and spur economic growth.
• China has relied on non-market practices, such as heavily subsidized production and forced technology transfer to drive export growth, the result of which has impaired Canadian and other market economies’ competitiveness and hollowed out strategic sectors.
• Canada’s trade relationship with China will be influenced by the state of the U.S. and China rivalry and its impact on the global order. [REDACTED].

BACKGROUND

China’s Economic Situation

Under President Xi Jinping, China has shifted its focus to emphasize “new productive forces”, technological self-reliance and innovation. However, economic growth has been hindered by contraction of the real estate market, local government debt, an aging population, and weak domestic consumption. While China reached its 5.0% gross domestic product growth target in 2024 (based on its own statistics), this was partly due to China’s fall fiscal stimulus package. China relies on strong exports to compensate for a weak domestic outlook but continued U.S. policy actions against China (e.g. export controls, investment restrictions) further complicate China's growth prospects.

Opportunities and Challenges for Canada

China is a country that presents both challenges and opportunities for trade. In terms of trade promotion, certain sectors require caution and Trade Commissioner Services have focused on diversifying away from China, into the broader Indo-Pacific. Other sectors, like processed food products, are less risky, and Canada continues to compete for fair access to the Chinese market. Recent progress on the bilateral air services negotiations, which incrementally increased passenger flights to and from China, is an example of such pragmatic collaboration.

In 2024, China remained one of Canada’s major merchandise trading partners, totaling $117.4 billion in trade (1.9% lower than 2023). Canadian exports to China were $29.8 billion, accounting for 3.8% of total Canadian exports and mainly composed of energy, natural resources and agricultural products. [REDACTED].

China was the 5th largest country in foreign investment stock into Canada and 20th destination for Canadian direct investment abroad stock in 2023. The stock of China’s direct investment into Canada was $37.0 billion (down from $37.4 billion in 2022), while the stock of Canada’s direct investment into China was $15.0 billion (up from $14.2 billion in 2022). Over 78% of Chinese foreign direct investment in Canada is concentrated in two sectors: 1) mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction (51%), and 2) management of companies and enterprises (27%).

Canada’s Trade and Investment Policy Towards China

China also leverages its dominant market position in strategic sectors to advance its policy goals, including through the leveraging of trade dependencies in import and exports and where it holds a critical place in global supply chains. Canada has been the target of China’s economic coercion, where our domestic canola industry was targeted between 2019 and 2022 amid the Two-Michaels/Meng Wanzhou affair.

China’s pervasive use of unfair/non-market practices – including subsidization, forced technology transfers, and insufficient labour standards (forced labour) and environmental standards – creates global market distortions which have eroded the level playing field. This has led to structural overcapacity in some sectors, including steel, aluminum and electric vehicles. As a result of these pervasive practices, in October 2024, the Government took extraordinary measures by applying 100% surtax on electric vehicles and 25% surtax on steel and aluminum imports from China, to protect Canada’s domestic industry and jobs in those sectors.

In retaliation, China took certain measures against Canada by launching World Trade Organization dispute settlement consultations, canola and halogenated butyl rubber anti-dumping investigations and an anti-discrimination investigation against Canada’s electric vehicles measures. On March 8, China’s Ministry of Commerce formally announced the conclusion of China’s anti-discrimination investigation. The announcement stated that, as of March 20, 100% tariffs will be imposed on a list of eight products, including canola oil, canola meal (cake), and peas, and 25% on a list of 49 aquatic products and 15 pork products.

There are also other bilateral trade irritants that continue to persist, including the omission of Canada as an approved destination for group travel and ongoing bans on imports of Canadian beef and dry pet food containing poultry ingredients. [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

The 2024 Fall Economic Statement announced the government’s intention to impose additional surtaxes on imports of certain solar products and critical minerals from China in early 2025, and on semiconductors, permanent magnets, and natural graphite from China beginning in 2026. It also announced new measures that would provide the government with additional tools to further protect Canada’s economic security through amendments to Canada’s import and export permits regime, reciprocal procurement policies, and by addressing supply chain risks related to forced labour. The government already prohibits the importation of goods that are mined, manufactured, or produced wholly or in part by forced labour through the Customs Tariff Act. Clients of the Trade Commissioner Service who are sourcing from or seeking to engage in the Xinjiang market are also required to sign a Xinjiang Integrity Declaration prior to receiving services and support.

3. Economic security

ISSUE

• Economic security refers to protecting Canada from economic-based threats and ensuring its resilience in the face of economic shocks. This entails a particular focus on safeguarding strategic sectors of the economy, including critical minerals, since these are vital for Canada’s national security and future prosperity in a rapidly changing world.
• Strengthening Canada’s economic security and ensuring its long-term prosperity is a shared effort across government. You will be working with your domestic and international counterparts to respond to evolving threats and challenges, including those that can arise through trade, such as coercion, and non-market practices.
• These issues are also at the forefront of international discussions including in the G7, [REDACTED].

BACKGROUND

Canada has been bolstering its economic security and resilience by reducing vulnerabilities and sharpening responses to economic-based threats. These threats include non-market practices (e.g. excessive subsidies, intentional overcapacity), economic coercion (e.g. weaponizing trade dependencies), and longstanding attempts by hostile actors to illegally or illicitly obtain Canadian resources, knowledge, and technology through trade, investment and research partnerships. Further vulnerabilities were also exposed by recent shocks including the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, highlighting the need for greater resilience and government intervention in critical supply chains. Canada’s economic security is also increasingly being threatened by certain countries as they more aggressively pursue geopolitical advantage.

Critical minerals are central to economic security as they are building blocks for semi-conductors, clean tech, health technologies, defence and security applications. As one of the world’s leading mining nations, Canada has considerable deposits of critical minerals and is well positioned to be a leader in their responsible and sustainable production. [REDACTED]. The 2022 Critical Minerals Strategy, led by Natural Resources Canada, seeks to address this challenge with over $3.8 billion in funding to secure value chains at home and globally. [REDACTED] with China being the dominant player, making critical mineral supply chains vulnerable to geopolitical competition and conflicts.

Considerations

The Government of Canada has been working with urgency to respond to economic security threats and challenges. For example, in the past six months, a modernization of the Investment Canada Act came into force to facilitate earlier reviews for investments in strategic sectors. Finance Canada imposed a surtax of 100% on imports of electric vehicles as well as a 25% surtax on steel and aluminum imported from China to urgently respond to its industrial overcapacity in these sectors. Public Safety also released lists of sensitive technologies and research areas to safeguard partnerships.

The government also held public consultations on potential new economic security measures, which helped to inform the 2024 Fall Economic Statement. Further measures could include trade-related initiatives to address the role of foreign entities of concern (i.e. companies operating in third countries that are owned or controlled by jurisdictions of concern) and strengthening the forced labour importation ban. Canada has also prioritized coordination on economic security and resilience in its international engagement with partners, including during its G7 Presidency, to inform effective action on shared challenges and reduce the potential for inflicting unintended harms among G7 partners.

Economic security concerns are also a major focus for the new U.S. administration and potentially an area for collaboration. [REDACTED]. There will nonetheless continue to be interest from other partners in collaborating on these issues and enhancing resilience against common economic security threats.

In particular, the new U.S. Administration has identified the lack of a reliable, diversified, and affordable supply of critical minerals (which they define as an energy resource) as posing an imminent and growing threat to U.S. prosperity and national security. [REDACTED] but our mutual interests in critical minerals may offer opportunities for future cooperation.

[REDACTED]

4. Canada’s G7 Presidency: Trade priorities

ISSUE

• Canada holds the G7 Presidency in 2025 and will host the Leaders' Summit from June 15-17, 2025 in Kananaskis, Alberta. [REDACTED].
• [REDACTED]
• [REDACTED]
• [REDACTED]

BACKGROUND

The G7 is an informal consensus-based grouping, established in 1975, that includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.K., the U.S. and the EU Council and Commission (Russia joined in 1997 and was suspended in 2014, after it invaded Crimea). It is underpinned by shared values and advances shared economic and foreign policy interests by raising awareness, coordinating positions and catalyzing action. Recent achievements include the $600B Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, Just Energy Transition Partnerships, Ukraine war response, and COVID-19 initiatives.

Canada’s 2025 G7 Presidency

Canada holds the Presidency of the G7 in 2025, marking the 50th anniversary of the group. [REDACTED]:

1. [REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]
3. [REDACTED]

To deliver on this agenda, Canada will convene G7 Leaders in Kananaskis, Alberta on June 15-17, 2025. [REDACTED]. It will host the Foreign Ministers Meeting from March 12-14 in Charlevoix and the Finance Ministers Meeting from May 20-22 in Banff. [REDACTED]. Existing working groups, which provide in-depth technical analysis on key issues, will continue their collaboration at the technical level even if ministerial meetings are not planned.

G7 Trade Track

Since 2021, the G7 Trade Track has facilitated discussions on global economic issues and international competitiveness. At the 2024 Apulia summit, Leaders reinforced their commitment to rules-based, fair multilateral trade and they also agreed to address market distortions and excess capacity from non-market policies and practices, with Trade Ministers emphasizing trade's role in strengthening growth and development. The Trade Working Group played a crucial role in strengthening channels of communication, including sharing best practices, discussing emerging risks and approaches to strengthen critical supply chains against threats and potential disruptions, and advancing areas of common interest in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

[REDACTED]

Way Forward

[REDACTED]

CONSIDERATIONS

International positions

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Summit and ministerial guests

The prime minister can invite guests to the summit, just as ministers can include outreach partners in their ministerial meetings. [REDACTED].

C. Additional Overviews

1. State of Canada's trade

2. Trade policy and negotiations

ISSUE

• Given that trade represents two thirds of our GDP, Canada relies on trade and investment for its prosperity. The government has been negotiating trade agreements to secure market access and to increase predictability for Canadian businesses in markets worldwide.
• The U.S. remains central to Canada’s international trade, but recent U.S. actions have further destabilized the uncertain global trade environment, reinforcing the need to further diversify trade and strengthen alliances with other key partners.
• At the same time, the Government can no longer solely rely on traditional comprehensive models of free trade agreements and will need to explore new approaches (e.g. sectoral agreements) to advance its trade diversification interests and ensure resiliency.

BACKGROUND

The government’s trade policy, including negotiation and implementation of all international trade, investment and air transportation agreements, and the resolution of bilateral market access irritants and litigation and dispute settlement, is led by Global Affairs Canada (GAC). GAC also works with other federal departments and provincial/territorial governments, and engages in active dialogue with industry, civil society, and Indigenous groups. The government also continues to use negotiations, litigation, and advocacy to protect Canada’s trade interests, including through dispute settlement mechanisms within trade agreements.

Successive governments have typically prioritized trade liberalization through rules-based trade as well as the diversification Canada’s global trade coverage as key aspects of Canada’s bilateral and regional trade and investment agreement and negotiation agenda. Most recently, with growing risks to the rules-based trading system and global supply chains, including economic coercion and non-market policies and protectionism, the Government has been adjusting its toolkit to defend its economic security interests. Canada’s commitment to the rules-based multilateral trading system underpinned by the World Trade Organization and its various agreements and bodies should remain a key aspect of our trading agenda. The Government should also consider pursuing trade agreements beyond the “comprehensive FTA model” and explore a more targeted approach to achieve trade diversification, while taking into account issues of national and economic security.

Canada has 15 active Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with 51 countries, representing 63% of the world’s GDP, which offer predictable rules and preferential market access to most of Canada’s largest trading partners, including the U.S. (Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement), the European Union (Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement), the United Kingdom (Trade Continuity Agreement) and Japan (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership1). Canada also has bilateral FTAs with other partners including Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the European Free Trade Association (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland), Israel, Jordan, Peru, South Korea and Ukraine.

Status of FTA Agenda

The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is a high-standard FTA between Canada and [11] other countries in the Indo-Pacific region to reduce trade barriers and facilitate trade, helping create more jobs, strengthen economic relations and boost Canada’s trade. Accession negotiations have been launched with Costa Rica. The Government has signed but not ratified the United Kingdom’s CPTPP Accession Protocol.

The Canada – European Union (EU) Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) was provisionally applied on September 21, 2017, bringing into force most of its economically significant parts (such as tariffs, services and temporary entry, labour and environment). Advocacy is ongoing with the 10 EU Member States who have yet to ratify the Agreement; provisions related to investment protection will take effect only once all ratify.

The Government has concluded FTA negotiations with Indonesia (December 2024) and Ecuador (February 2025). Legal review is underway, to be followed by respective domestic procedures for signature and implementation.

Ongoing FTA exploratory discussions and negotiations:

• Canada – ASEAN2 FTA negotiations: Seeking substantive conclusion of an FTA by end of 2025.
• Canada – United Kingdom FTA negotiations: Negotiations for an enhanced bilateral FTA were launched in March 2022 and paused by the U.K. in January 2024.
• Canada – Philippines FTA Exploratory Talks: In December 2024, Canada and the Philippines announced the launch of exploratory discussions toward a potential FTA.

Investment Trade Policy and International Investment Agreements

Canada exports significantly more capital than it imports and seeks to support those investments through international investment agreements, both through investment chapters in FTAs, as well as standalone Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs). These treaties protect Canadian investment abroad through legally binding rights and obligations, enforced by an investor-State dispute settlement mechanism. FIPAs are designed to ensure that Canadian investors and their investments are treated in a fair and non-discriminatory manner.

Canada’s FIPA model, updated in 2021, serves as the basis for negotiations. Canada has 39 FIPAs in force and seven ongoing negotiations (Argentina, Georgia, Pakistan, Qatar, Tanzania, United Arab Emirates and Zambia). Canada continues to engage with potential partners to explore possibilities to launch new FIPA negotiations.

Air Transport Agreements

Air Transport Agreements (ATAs) are treaties that permit scheduled international air services (passenger and cargo) from one country to another. ATAs are a shared responsibility between Global Affairs Canada and Transport Canada. Canadian airlines face several key challenges in the current global context, including the post-COVID decrease in passenger demand and competitiveness concerns resulting from airspace issues arising from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In the last year, Canada expanded its ATAs with Argentina, Australia, and Qatar and flights between Canada and China incrementally increased in-line with passenger demand. The government is negotiating new and/or expanded ATAs with several partners, including in Africa, and assessing ATA expansion requests from several partners, including in the Middle East.

3. World Trade Organization

ISSUE

• The World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the rules of international trade, which contribute to providing openness, predictability and transparency.
• WTO rules remain invaluable but are insufficient in some areas to meet challenges in the global trading environment, for example industrial policy, agricultural domestic support, e-commerce and China’s non-market practices.
• [REDACTED]

BACKGROUND

Since 1947, the WTO and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, have been the framework for global trade, serving as vehicles for Canada to build alliances, create new rules and advance our trade interests where we would otherwise have less leverage as a medium-sized economy. The WTO’s basic functions include administering its agreements, serving as a negotiating forum between its 166 members, and providing a dispute settlement process to address disputes. The WTO’s rules also underpin Canada’s free trade agreements (FTAs) and govern Canada’s trade relationships with countries where no FTAs are in place, including major economies such as China, India, and Brazil.

More recently, WTO Members have been able to conclude and implement economically significant agreements amongst themselves, including on trade facilitation, trade in information technology goods, fisheries subsidies, and services regulation. However, the organization faces significant challenges. Negotiations of major interest, such as agriculture, have long been stalemated. [REDACTED]. Further, the system of dispute settlement that grants the WTO rules enforceability is not fully functioning, other than for Members who are parties to an interim arrangement, the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA). The MPIA includes Canada, the European Union, China, and Japan but not the United States or India.

Notwithstanding their value, the current WTO rules are insufficient to deal with the emerging challenges we face, notably the impact of China’s non-market policies and practices. The WTO and its rules need to be modernized to ensure the organization is better able to respond to new challenges and has rules that are more effective, for example with regard to industrial policy, agricultural domestic support, and e-commerce.

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Canada and the WTO

As a founding member of the WTO and a trade-dependent nation, Canada has a long-standing tradition of exercising influence and leadership on key issues within the organization. Recent leadership roles include:

• Convenor of the Ottawa Group, an informal grouping of 14 like-minded WTO Members1 that meets regularly to share information and coordinate on mutual priorities, with an initial focus on WTO reform;
• Co-convenor (with Costa Rica) of the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD); and,
• Initiator of an informal WTO dialogue on trade and industrial policy to build knowledge and exchange views to lay the groundwork for possible future negotiations.

CONSIDERATIONS

While progress in recent years has been limited despite strong efforts and creativity, active negotiations continue on agriculture and fisheries subsidies. Members were able to conclude a partial Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies in 2022, which marked a global environmental milestone. Given challenges in concluding or initiating negotiations among all Members, plurilateral negotiations – involving subsets of Members – have been seen as a more effective vehicle. Plurilateral negotiations have recently concluded on services domestic regulation (2021, implemented in 2024), investment facilitation for development (concluded in 2023), and e-commerce (concluded in 2024). Opposition to plurilateral agreements persists and attaining the consensus required to implement them remains challenging.

The WTO Appellate Body (AB) Impasse

The WTO dispute settlement system lends WTO rules the weight of enforceability. The system has two tiers, with the right for a party to a dispute to appeal the initial decision to a group of three AB members before a final decision is adopted. The U.S. has longstanding concerns about the system and blocked attempts to fill AB member vacancies, resulting in the loss of the AB’s quorum in December 2019. This undermines enforceability of WTO rules by allowing Members to “appeal into the void” and stall the process. Binding dispute settlement has facilitated the resolution of many Canadian trade disputes, especially with the United States. In the interim, Canada and 53 other WTO Members participate in the Multi- Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA), which provides for binding dispute settlement and access to appeal review in disputes amongst its participants.

14th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC14)

The Ministerial Conference, at which Canada is represented by the Minister of International Trade, normally meets every two years and is the highest WTO decision-making body. The next ministerial meeting is expected to take place on March 26-29, 2026, in Cameroon.

4. Crown Croporations & Agencies

ISSUES

• The Minister of International Trade is responsible to Parliament for two Crown Corporations: Export Development Canada (EDC) and the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC).
• EDC supports Canadian exporters through insurance and financing solutions. CCC helps Canadian exporters sell to foreign government buyers through government-to-government contracting.
• Crown corporations operate arm’s length from government, governed by Boards of Directors, and led by Chief Executive Officers (CEO). The Minister is responsible for providing strategic direction to the Boards, and for monitoring the performance of the corporation. However, the Minister does not intervene in decisions pertaining to specific transactions.

BACKGROUND

Crown Corporations Governance

The Minister is accountable for providing direction to the Boards of Directors. The Department supports the Minister in this task by working with the Crown corporations to implement ministerial direction, as well as to monitor their performance. EDC and CCC are each governed by Boards of Directors which are appointed by the Governor in Council (GIC) and report to Parliament through the Minister. Board members are responsible for overseeing a Crown corporation’s business activities and management, with the responsibility to act in the best interests of the corporation. Responsibility for day-to-day operations of Crown corporations is vested in a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), who is appointed by the GIC to hold office during pleasure and is accountable to the Board of Directors for the overall management and performance of the corporation.

The Minister’s responsibilities include: providing the Boards of Directors with strategic direction through the annual provision of a Statement of Priorities and Accountabilities letter; recommending to the Treasury Board the approval of annual Corporate Plans detailing planned business activities of the corporations; recommending to Cabinet the appointment of Chairs, members of the Boards of Directors. and CEOs; recommending performance review ratings for the CEOs to the Privy Council Office; and authorization of certain categories of transactions or contracts which fall outside the scope of the Corporations’ authorities.

Export Development Canada

EDC was established in 1944 pursuant to the Export Development Act as Canada’s export credit agency. Its mandate is to help Canadian companies of all sizes succeed globally by providing them with a range of financial solutions and connections to grow their business resulting in more jobs and opportunities in Canadas. EDC supports Canadian exporters through trade financing; credit insurance; bonding and guarantees; equity investments; and knowledge products. In 2023, EDC facilitated $131.4 billion in business. All EDC support is conducted on commercial terms; it is not permitted to provide grants or subsidies.

FinDev Canada

FinDev is a subsidiary corporation of EDC that helps developing countries by providing financial services and technical assistance consistent with Canada’s international development priorities. According to the Export Development Act, the Minister of International Trade is responsible for FinDev Canada and is ultimately accountable for FinDev Canada to Parliament. However, in practice the Minister of International Development shares responsibility for guiding the organization.

Canada Account

The Canada Account is a mechanism allowing the Government to support transactions outside of EDC’s risk capacity, but that are determined by the Minister of International Trade, with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance, to be in the national interest. Canada Account transactions are fully separate from EDC’s corporate account, though they are managed and administered by EDC in the same manner. The government assumes all financial risks and costs for Canada Account transactions via the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Transactions are reported in the Public Accounts separately from those made on EDC’s corporate account.

Canadian Commercial Corporation

CCC was established in 1946 pursuant to the Canadian Commercial Corporation Act as Canada’s government-to-government contracting agency. CCC has three core business lines: (1) administration of the Canada-U.S. Defence Production Sharing Agreement, which does not generate fee revenue and is covered by an annual appropriation; (2) International Prime Contracting, which is fee-generating government-to-government sales across all sectors, but particularly in defence and infrastructure; and (3) Sourcing, which draws on CCC’s procurement expertise to provide contracting services to federal government partners, such as to Department of National Defence. In 2023-24, CCC helped 559 Canadian exporters secure $3.2 billion in new export contracts with 62 countries, which supported 14,639 jobs across Canada.

5. Federal-Provincial-Territorial Engagement

ISSUE

• Regular and sustained Federal-Provincial-Territorial (FPT) engagement will be critical to delivering the Minister of International Trade’s mandate, including to ensure regional interests are considered when advancing Canada’s international trade agenda.
• Addressing economic uncertainty caused by the U.S. administration’s tariff threats and trade policy agenda is the top priority for most provinces and territories (PTs).
• PTs are very active internationally, including some via their own international office networks.

BACKGROUND

PTs collaborate closely with Global Affairs Canada (GAC) to enhance their international trade and diplomatic efforts. This collaboration is essential for aligning PTs’ economic and political interests with national foreign policy objectives. This approach ensures that the diverse economic priorities of Canada's regions are understood and advanced, and that commitments made at the federal level reflect input from other jurisdictions, which in turn supports effective implementation at the subnational level.

The federal government is responsible for negotiating and entering into international trade agreements, as well as implementing related trade policies. PTs are consulted during the negotiation and implementation phases. Although the federal government holds the primary jurisdiction over international relations and trade, PTs have authority to regulate trade and commerce within their respective territory. Alignment and coordination between both levels of government is thus required.

FPT engagement mechanisms

GAC plays a coordinating role to ensure an effective two-way exchange of information with PTs. The department organises regular and ad hoc trade policy consultations, outreach, and FPT roundtables at the Minister, Deputy Minister, Assistant Deputy Minister, and working levels. These meetings are an opportunity to share information and cooperate on shared priorities, including Canada-U.S. relations. The Minister of International Trade engages with PT counterparts bilaterally as well as multilaterally. The last FPT Roundtable for Ministers Responsible for International Trade was hosted in September 2023.

International representation

Provincial governments have steadily increased their international representation. Provinces have 62 international offices co-located in Canadian missions abroad, and 36 standalone offices. British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, Québec, New Brunswick and Newfoundland and Labrador each have international representation. Québec has the largest presence abroad with 35 offices in 19 countries. Manitoba will open its first international office, in Washington, in early 2025.

CONSIDERATIONS

Canada-U.S. relations

PTs’ current international focus is on Canada-U.S. relations and, more specifically, on how to navigate the evolving tariff threats from the new U.S. administration. Since January 2025, Prime Minister Trudeau has chaired weekly virtual First Ministers’ Meetings with the Premiers to ensure that PTs are meaningfully engaged in the Team Canada approach to strategic advocacy and potential response measures. The Premiers have generally presented a unified front and have stated their support for “appropriate action by the federal government in response to any U.S. tariffs imposed on imports from Canada". However, different priorities and perspectives exist behind the scenes and require active management. For example, Alberta and Saskatchewan have opposed the idea of restricting energy exports to the U.S.

In response to the tariff threats, PTs have each explored non-tariff measures that they could potentially implement within their own jurisdiction if tariffs were to come into effect; for example, removing U.S. alcohol from provincial liquor stores. PTs have also placed a renewed focus on promoting trade diversification, eliminating barriers to inter-provincial trade, expediting regulatory approvals on natural resource projects, and encouraging Canadians to prioritise buying Canadian goods and services.

On February 12, 2025, all 13 Premiers travelled to Washington, D.C. as part of a Council of the Federation joint mission, which sought to establish and reinforce relationships with bipartisan members of Congress, White House advisors, as well as American and Canadian business leaders.

Since the U.S. election, the department has held a Deputy Minister-level FPT roundtable discussion in December 2024. The department also convened an Assistant Deputy Minister-level call in November 2024 and provided updates to FPT colleagues at the scheduled C-Trade (quarterly trade policy) meeting in February 2025. At the working-level, the department hosts a monthly FPT Canada-U.S. Update virtual meeting, and it has also re-engaged its monthly Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) FPT Consultations Committee, a separate body established specifically to support FPT coordination in respect of the implementation and operation of the CUSMA.

Other international priorities

Looking beyond the U.S., the department has established FPT working groups to engage PTs on a wide range of international files, including trade policy and negotiations; foreign direct investment attraction; international business development; science, technology and innovation; geographic issues.

The department has been closely coordinating with PTs on developing its pragmatic approach to China, notably in relation to addressing unfair Chinese trade practices, as well as monitoring its anti-dumping investigations against imports of Canadian canola. Further engagement could prioritise outreach and coordination with PTs and other partners, increasing knowledge, capacity, and resilience to foreign influence and interference. From a trade promotion standpoint, PTs value trade missions organized the Trade Commissioner Service, which aims to open doors for Canadian companies seeking commercial opportunities in specific regions and diversifying export markets.

6. Trade Commissioner Service

ISSUE

• The Trade Commissioner Service (TCS) is a Global Affairs Canada program which contributes to prosperity by helping businesses increase exports and diversify markets; attracting foreign direct investment; supporting science, technology and innovation partnerships; and advocating for Canadian commercial and economic interests.
• TCS priorities, activities and resources are helping to address the current challenging international economic environment and are aligned to support diversification of Canada’s international trade and investment, with further program enhancements being introduced.

BACKGROUND

As outlined in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act, the TCS is the main departmental program for the expansion of Canada’s international trade and commerce. Program activities are guided by the Departmental Plan, which seeks increased and more diverse trade and investment to raise the standard of living for all Canadians, and to enable Canadian businesses to grow internationally and to create economic opportunities.

The TCS supports business-to-business relationships between Canadians and foreign counterparts; it does not conduct sales and marketing for clients. The program is available on demand, at no cost, to companies that meet published criteria, which include their readiness for international business and their potential to contribute to economic growth in Canada (e.g. exporting made in Canada products and creating jobs in Canada). Through defined services and numerous events and activities organized around the world, TCS officials provide clients with advice, business intelligence, opportunities, and contacts to help them make better, less risky, more cost-effective decisions that advance their international business objectives.

Officials work closely with similarly mandated partners at all levels of government, as well as with organizations in the portfolio of the Minister (such as Export Development Canada and Invest in Canada). The program is delivered by 930 employees (over two-thirds are locally hired experts) in nearly 150 international locations. Services are also available from 141 employees at regional offices across Canada, with support and other functions performed by about 420 officials at Global Affairs Canada headquarters.

A 2018 study by the Office of GAC’s Chief Economist concluded that, on average, TCS clients export 19.8% more in value and to 24.8% more markets compared to non-clients. It has been estimated that every dollar invested in the TCS results in $26 in increased exports.

Export Promotion and Diversification

In 2023-24, 10,903 Canadian businesses received 57,402 services from the TCS, facilitating 1,232 business deals. Clients report the estimated value of these deals was $6.4 billion. Regular client surveys help improve service; 92.2% of clients reported being satisfied or very satisfied with the support provided. Over 93% of clients were small and medium-sized enterprises.

Investment Attraction

The TCS plays a leading role in attracting job-creating foreign direct investment while considering Canada’s national security interests. Working with foreign companies that had Canada as a potential investment destination, in 2023-24 the TCS facilitated 134 investments in 34 municipalities across nine provinces. With an estimated value of over $27.1 billion they are expected to create approximately 9,600 new jobs.

Innovation

The TCS helps Canadian small and medium enterprises establish international innovation partnerships and access technology and venture capital. Partnership objectives include development of new products or technology, adaptation of Canadian products to new markets, and validation of uncommercialized products. In 2023-24, the TCS facilitated 184 partnerships for 154 Canadian companies and research organizations and helped inject $48 million in venture capital into Canada’s startup ecosystem.

Trade Policy / Market Access

The TCS assists companies in resolving in-market issues such as customs disputes, highlights the advantages of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that Canada has signed, and engages host governments by advocating for Canadian interests when they are impaired by local laws and regulations.

Programs and Initiatives

The TCS administers grants and contributions programs, known collectively as CanExport, that provide funding to approved applicants. The largest of these by value, CanExport SMEs, covers up to 50% of certain costs for Canadian small and medium enterprises seeking to enter new international markets; in 2023-24, a total of $38. million was provided to 1,757 companies. CanExport Innovation offers grants to Canadian organizations to assist them in establishing and formalizing new research and development (R&D) partnerships with pre-identified foreign partners. In 2023-24, a total of $1.27 million was provided to 75 projects. CanExport also provided $5.2 million to help 54 business associations support their members’ international business efforts, and $4.1 million to Canadian cities seeking to attract foreign direct investment.

The Canadian Technology Accelerator (CTA) initiative helps high-potential Canadian technology firms scale up by connecting them with export, investment, and partnership opportunities in 12 global innovation centres. In 2023-24, 167 companies participated, from the life sciences, cleantech, and digital sectors. As a result, they have reported to date over $106 million in new capital raised, $40 million in new revenue generated, and the creation of over 250 jobs.

The TCS organizes Minister-led Team Canada Trade Missions (TCTMs) to the Indo-Pacific region to showcase Canadian businesses and facilitate long-term trade and investment opportunities. Since launching in Singapore in February 2023, the Minister of International Trade has led full-scale TCTMs to seven markets: Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines and Australia. Those TCTMs have allowed more than 1,600 delegates from over 720 Canadian organizations in more than 23 sectors gain market exposure and pursue commercial opportunities and partnerships.

CONSIDERATIONS

The TCS supports the government’s Export Diversification Strategy, which is on track to achieve its goal of increasing Canada’s overseas exports by 50% by 2025. The TCS is positioned to provide strong support for export diversification with 85% of Trade Commissioners located in countries other than the U.S. Further supporting these diversification efforts will be a minister-led TCTCM planned for Thailand and Cambodia in May 2025.

The TCS is also fully engaged on sector-specific initiatives such as promoting and advocating on behalf of Canadian mining interests abroad, thereby assisting to diversify and strengthen supply chains and critical mineral access.

Lastly, TCS programming is also adapting to address these export diversification efforts. While 74% of 1,675 projects funded in 2024-25 included the U.S. as a target market, changes to application guidelines for 2025-26 aim to allocate a greater proportion of funding to support SMEs that are seeking to enter non-U.S. markets. There is excess demand from companies for CanExport SMEs funding; 64% of applications in 2024-25 were refused.

Source: Trade Commissioner Service, Tools, Analysis and Performance Division (TTB)

Source: Trade Commissioner Service, Tools, Analysis and Performance Division (TTB)

7. Approach to investment trade policy

ISSUE

• Clear and balanced investment rules and an effective dispute settlement mechanism are key to a stable investment environment in which to encourage investment attraction.
• Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) in treaties carefully balance investor protections with the right to regulate in the public interest.
• Unlike the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) does not include ISDS between Canada and the U.S., and it remains to be seen whether this will be revisited in the upcoming review.

BACKGROUND

Canada is a significant net exporter of capital. Canadian direct investment abroad was $2.27 trillion in 2023 while total Canadian assets abroad totalled over $7.4 trillion in Q4 2023. Canada has supported those investments through standalone foreign investment promotion and protection agreements (FIPAs), as well as investment chapters in free trade agreements (FTAs). These agreements provide legally binding rights and obligations, enforced by ISDS, that are designed to ensure investors are treated in a fair and non-discriminatory manner, based on internationally recognized standards.

FIPAs and FTAs

The department has standing policy authority from Cabinet to negotiate FIPAs. Canada has implemented 39 FIPAs with countries around the world, and one foreign investment promotion and protection arrangement with Taiwan. The government is currently engaged in seven FIPA negotiations and is exploring future negotiations with several countries.

In 2021, the government released a modernized and inclusive FIPA model following a comprehensive three-year review process. This included broad public engagement, consultations with other government departments, provinces and territories, experts and stakeholders, and an internal departmental technical review. The reaction from stakeholders and partners to the new model has been broadly positive, with experts praising it as an example of a high quality, modern treaty.

In most FTA negotiations, the Government of Canada has looked to include an investment chapter that is generally based on the FIPA model.

ISDS

One of the key objectives of the ISDS mechanism is to depoliticize disputes between a foreign investor and the host state. Essentially, investors who are aggrieved by a host state’s measures can access a third-party dispute settlement mechanism, normally via arbitration. Canadian investors abroad have taken advantage of the ISDS mechanism in Canada’s FIPAs and FTAs to enforce their rights. The 2021 FIPA model made some improvements to the ISDS mechanism, including: strengthened options to resolve disputes without going to arbitration (e.g. improved mediation); more transparent proceedings; an arbitrator code of conduct; consent-based expediated arbitration for small claims; and stronger rules on third-party funding of claims.

Under NAFTA, Canada faced multiple claims and paid over $200 million in damages and settlements to date. However, this represents a very small portion of the billions of dollars claimed by foreign investors and awarded to Canadian investors abroad. To date, Canadian investors abroad have been awarded over $3 billion in damages and settlements.

United States

CUSMA is Canada’s first international trade treaty that does not include an ISDS mechanism. The original NAFTA ISDS mechanism continued to apply for three years after termination of the Agreement, until June 30, 2023, for investments made while NAFTA was in force (i.e., up to July 1, 2020). That transition period has ended, so no new ISDS claims can be initiated under NAFTA. Some earlier cases are still ongoing that involve important jurisdictional issues, meaning careful coordination with the United States and Mexico is sometimes required. While no new ISDS cases can be initiated under NAFTA, the State-to-State dispute settlement mechanism under CUSMA is available to the Parties to resolve investment-related disputes. It is unclear whether the United States will revisit the exclusion of ISDS with Canada in the upcoming CUSMA review.

CONSIDERATIONS

ISDS

[REDACTED]

FIPAs and FTAs challenges

[REDACTED]

8. International Trade litigation

ISSUE

• Canada is involved in three different types of international trade litigation: State-to-State disputes, investor-State disputes, and trade remedies disputes.
• More than $10 billion is at stake for Canada and Canadian businesses in these disputes.

BACKGROUND

There are three main types of international trade disputes:

1. State-to-State Disputes: States can challenge the measures (i.e. laws, regulations, policies or practices) of another State at the World Trade Organization (WTO) or under a free trade agreement (FTA). Challenges are heard by an international panel. The remedy (usually requires the withdrawal of the offending measures. If the violating State does not comply, the injured State can be authorized to take appropriate countermeasures.
2. Investor-State Disputes: Foreign investors can bring claims against a State for violations of the investment provisions of certain FTAs or Foreign Investment Protection Agreements (FIPAs). Claims are submitted to international arbitration. The remedy is typically monetary damages.
3. Trade Remedies Disputes: States can impose duties under domestic law based on a determination that products are being subsidized or dumped (i.e. sold for less than the price of the product in the market of the exporting country). Challenges to duties are typically heard in domestic courts, but under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)/Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), Parties may challenge such determinations before an international panel.

CONSIDERATIONS

Canada's most significant, active trade disputes include:

State-to-State Disputes

WTO/CUSMA - US 25% Tariff

On March 4, 2025, Canada requested consultations with the United States under both CUSMA and at the WTO with respect to the 25% tariffs imposed by President Trump on all Canadian goods.

WTO: Canada – Measures on Certain Products of Chinese Origin

On September 6, 2024, China requested consultations with Canada with respect to surtaxes imposed on Chinese-made electric vehicles and on certain imports of steel and aluminum. China has yet to further pursue its claim.

CUSMA: Canada – Digital Services Tax

Canada’s Digital Services Tax Act (DSTA) entered into force on June 28, 2024. The United States requested CUSMA consultations in August 2024, alleging that the tax violates Canada’s national treatment obligation. Consultations were held on October 16, 2024. The matter was not resolved, and the U.S. can now request the establishment of a panel.

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP): Canada – Dairy TRQ Allocations

In September 2023, a CPTPP Panel found that Canada violated its CPTPP obligations to New Zealand with respect to the allocation of dairy tariff rate quotas (TRQs). Canada published modified TRQ allocation measures on May 1, 2024. [REDACTED]. New Zealand could seek to suspend benefits against Canada.

Investor-State Disputes

NAFTA: Windstream v. Canada

Windstream is challenging measures related to the February 2020 termination of its Feed-in Tariff Contract in Ontario. It is seeking CA$560 million. The Tribunal’s Award is expected in 2025.

NAFTA: Geophysical Service Inc. (GSI) v. Canada

GSI is challenging Canada’s regulatory measures concerning marine seismic data for oil and gas producers. It is seeking US$506.9 million. A hearing will be held in March 2025.

CUSMA: Ruby River v. Canada

Ruby River is challenging the rejection of its proposed liquified natural gas (LNG) terminal and pipeline by Québec and Canada. Canada is arguing the claim should be dismissed due to a lack of jurisdiction because the CUSMA Legacy Annex does not allow for claims related to measures adopted after the termination of NAFTA. The Claimant is seeking US$1 billion. A hearing will be held in December 2025.

USSR-Canada FIPA: Volga-Dnepr Airlines v. Canada

Volga-Dnepr is challenging Canada’s February 2022 prohibition on Russian aircraft in Canadian airspace, and the subsequent seizure of its aircraft. It is seeking US$ 100 million. The Tribunal was recently constituted.

CPTPP: Riversdale Resources and Hancock Prospecting v. Canada

Two Australian companies are challenging various measures by Alberta relating to the proposed Grassy Mountain metallurgical coal mine and provincial coal policies. They are seeking CA$2 billion. The Tribunal is being constituted.

Trade Remedies Disputes

U.S.: Softwood Lumber

The U.S. has imposed duties, alleging that Canadian softwood lumber is subsidized and dumped. Canada has requested the establishment of 13 NAFTA/CUSMA binational panels to review the U.S. decisions. Of these panels, none have reached final resolution, and six are yet to be composed due to delays caused by the U.S. Canada has also successfully challenged the U.S. determinations before the WTO. However, the U.S. has effectively frustrated these cases by appealing the panel reports to a non-functioning Appellate Body. Finally, Canadian Parties have challenged one of the decisions in the U.S. Court of International Trade.

U.S.: Corrosion-Resistant Steel Products

On February 10, 2025, the U.S. published its preliminary countervailing duty determinations, and it has begun collecting deposits from U.S. importers. The preliminary dumping determination is expected on April 3, and final duty determinations are expected in the summer. Should the U.S. International Trade Commission find injury to the U.S. domestic industry, duties will be applied for at least five years. Canada is supporting Canadian industry and is participating in the U.S. investigations.

China: Canola

On September 9, 2024, China initiated an anti-dumping investigation on imports of canola from Canada. Canada is supporting Canadian industry in this investigation and has also responded to certain aspects. China has taken no further steps in this investigation, though it is expected to apply anti-dumping duties against Canadian canola in retaliation for Canada’s surtaxes.

D. The Department

1. Minister of International Trade’s key portfolio responsibilities

ISSUE

• The Minister of International Trade is supported by a department staffed with expert trade practitioners, an international network of trade commissioners, as well as a portfolio that includes a world-leading export credit agency (Export Development Canada) and the Government of Canada’s government-to-government contracting agency (Canadian Commercial Corporation).

BACKGROUND

Taken together, trade accounts for 67% of Canadian GDP. In 2023, Canada exported over $978 billion and imported more than $976 billion worth of goods and services. The total stock of foreign direct investment in Canada reached $1.4 trillion.

As outlined in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act (2013), the Minister of International Trade’s role is to “assist the Minister of Foreign Affairs in carrying out his or her international trade responsibilities, and to promote the expansion of Canada’s international trade and commerce.”

CONSIDERATIONS

Experts across the department support the Minister’s international trade mandate. This includes dedicated expertise in the International Trade Branch, as well as staff in bilateral and functional branches and missions abroad.

Export Development Canada (EDC) and its subsidiary, FinDev Canada

EDC has the mandate to help Canadian companies of all sizes succeed globally by providing them with a range of financial solutions and connections to grow their business resulting in more jobs and opportunities in Canada. FinDev is a subsidiary corporation of EDC that helps developing countries by providing financial services and technical assistance consistent with Canada’s international development priorities. See related brief on Trade Portfolio (Crown Corporations/Agencies).

Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC)

CCC is Canada’s government-to-government contracting agency and helps Canadian exporters sell to foreign government buyers. See related brief on Trade Portfolio (Crown Corporations/Agencies).

Invest in Canada (IIC)

Invest in Canada (IIC) is a departmental corporation mandated to promote, attract and facilitate foreign direct investment (FDI) in Canada. It coordinates the efforts of the government, the private sector and other stakeholders with respect to FDI in Canada, in conjunction with the Trade Commissioner Service. IIC is currently led by Chief Executive Officer Laurel Broten, appointed in September 2022.

As a departmental corporation, IIC functions with greater autonomy from the core public administration than departments. It must still comply with any general or special direction given by the Minister in carrying out its mandate and prepare its departmental planning and reporting documents within the same framework as line departments.

IIC was formally established under the Invest in Canada Act in March 2018. In fiscal year 2023-24, it supported 30 new major investments or reinvestments, providing investor services to 130 companies.

Forced Labour Import Ban

As part of the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) obligations, Canada’s forced labour import ban came into force in 2020. The Minister of International Trade is the Competent Authority to provide policy guidance to the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)’s enforcement of the ban.

Other Statutory obligations / Parliamentary actions

The Minister is typically responsible for introducing the implementing legislation for free trade agreements in Parliament (the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement having been an exception). The Minister is also normally designated under implementing legislation for free trade agreements as Canada’s principal representative on the Commissions of Free Trade Agreements.

Appointments

The Minister of International Trade is responsible for the following Governor in Council (GIC) appointments:

1. Board of Directors and CEO of EDC;
2. Board of Directors and CEO of the CCC;
3. Board of Directors and CEO of IIC;
4. Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise; and
5. Appointments to the Panel of Arbitrators and Panel of Conciliators of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.

The Minister of International Trade is also responsible for ministerial appointments. These appointments are made directly by the Minister and do not involve the Privy Council Office. They include:

1. Canadian seats on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Business Advisory Council (the Minister of International Trade recommends candidates for appointment by the Prime Minister);

The Minister of International Trade is responsible for a number of GIC and Ministerial appointments to bodies related to Canada’s free trade agreements, including:

1. Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)
2. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)
3. Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA)
4. Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement
5. Canada-U.K. Trade Continuity Agreement (TCA)

2. The Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act

Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act

3. The department at a glance

ISSUE

• The department is responsible for managing Canada’s foreign policy, trade, consular relations, and international assistance with a view to advancing the security and prosperity of Canadians. Since 2013, these functions exist under a single roof.
• The scope of the department’s mandate and footprint is wide, with over 13,000 active employees in Canada and abroad, and a total budget of $9.2 billion in fiscal year 2024-2025.

BACKGROUND

What the Department Does

At its core, the work of the department is geared towards Canada’s and Canadians’ safety and prosperity through the management of the government’s relations with foreign governments, international organizations, and other stakeholders. The department is part of a broader ecosystem of other players who advance Canadian interests abroad, including other federal government departments, provinces/territories, and private citizens and businesses.

People and skills

GAC employees have a range of skills and functions. Employees include foreign service officers, whose career is geared towards representing Canada in work related to diplomacy, trade promotion, international assistance, and consular services. It also includes senior executives and heads of mission, who provide leadership at headquarters, in regional offices, and at Canada’s embassies, high commissions, consulates and trade offices abroad. There are approximately 1,500 foreign service officers and executives working abroad and in our regional offices. The work of representing Canada in the world is supported by approximately 5,500 locally engaged staff (these are employees hired under local labour laws). At headquarters, there are also approximately 6,500 staff comprising policy officers, programming specialists, and the administrative, financial, and IT support staff needed to keep a complex organization running.

The department has six regional offices in Canada, notably to engage with Canadian businesses. They are located in Vancouver, Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto, Montreal, and Halifax.

The international platform

A unique aspect of the department’s work is its responsibility for the government’s presence abroad, which includes a portfolio of properties and assets around the world. Working in 182 missions in 112 countries, the department’s international platform supports the work abroad of other government departments, agencies, Crown corporations, provinces and foreign government partners. While some missions are more focused on tracking political developments, and some others have a trade promotion or international assistance focus, all require office space, human resources, and material support often in complex operating environments.

Core work

A core part of the work of the department’s officials abroad concerns advocating and promoting Canada’s interests (as defined by the government). This takes place through building and maintaining bilateral and multilateral relationships; leading on global issues and negotiations; and encouraging respect for international law, including through the use of sanctions.

Through the approximately 1,100 employees of the Trade Commissioner Service, the department promotes expanded trade and investment for the benefit of all Canadians, including by fostering success of Canadian exporters and innovators. The department also works to safeguard an open rules-based global trading system, negotiates trade agreements, and manages international trade disputes.

In order to ensure the safety of Canadians abroad, the department provides travel information and consular services. This includes visits to places of detention; deployment of staff to evacuate Canadians in crisis situations (up 3.4 times over the past 5 years); and provision of emergency documentation.

The department also has legal responsibilities and is the principal source of advice on public international law as well as international trade and investment law, and treaty negotiation, for the government.

Various funding envelopes support the government’s international work. The most significant is the international assistance envelope, which totals $7.88 billion in 2024-25, of which $6.24 billion is administered by Global Affairs Canada. In 2024-25, this envelope was targeted towards: supporting poverty reduction; alleviating suffering in humanitarian crises; reinforcing opportunities for economic growth; promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment; and improving health and education outcomes. The envelope also supported activities that bolster peace and security, for example by countering violent extremism and terrorism, supporting the building of capacity to counter crime, and supporting peace operations and conflict management.

CONSIDERATIONS

Three dedicated Deputy Ministers support, respectively, the Minister of Foreign Affairs; the Minister of International Trade; and the Minister of International Development. There is also an Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. The department is in the midst of a transformation effort that includes a new organizational structure and governance model. This is in recognition that the department needs to evolve to better serve Canadians both at home and abroad, to face changing global contexts.

Twelve branches are headed by assistant deputy ministers, reporting to the deputy ministers. These assistant deputy ministers work with ministers, their own staff, and external partners to deliver on government priorities, with their responsibilities ranging from geographic regions to functional and corporate issues.  

A departmental plan normally provides an overview of policy priorities, planned results and associated resource requirements for the coming fiscal year. It is approved by the ministers and normally tabled in Parliament in February/March. The plan also presents the performance targets against which the department will report results. A departmental results report is then tabled in Parliament in the fall. 

The department’s total 2024-25 budget to date is $9.2 billion. This amount includes: 

• Operating costs: $2.4 billion 
• Capital costs: $212.9 million
 
• Grants and contributions: $6.1 billion 
• Locally engaged staff pension, insurance, social security programs: $113.0 million 
• Statutory items (e.g., direct payments to international financial institutions; contributions to employee benefit plans): $389.0 million.

Budget distribution by core responsibility of the department in 2024-25:

4. Deputy ministers and Assistant deputy ministers

DEPUTY MINISTERS

USS – David Morrison, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

On October 12, 2022, David Morrison was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Prior to this, Mr. Morrison served as Deputy Minister of International Trade. He was also Foreign and Defence Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister (2019-2022), the Personal Representative of the Prime Minister for the G7 Summit (2018-2022) and held roles such as Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (2017-2019) and Assistant Deputy Minister of the Americas Branch at Global Affairs Canada (2013 2017).

Earlier, Mr. Morrison was Senior Vice-President at the former Canadian International Development Agency (2012-2013). He was also Executive Secretary of the UN Capital Development Fund (2008-2012) and Spokesperson at the UN Development Programme (2004-2008). He began his career with the UN Development Programme in North Korea and held various diplomatic and leadership roles.

Mr. Morrison holds a Master of Philosophy from Oxford and a BA from Yale.

DMT – Rob Stewart, Deputy Minister of International Trade

Rob Stewart was appointed Deputy Minister of International Trade in October 2022. Before this, he served as Deputy Minister of Public Safety for three years, providing leadership on national security, community safety, and emergency management.

Mr. Stewart spent most of his career at the Department of Finance Canada, starting in 1993. He was the Government of Canada's finance deputy for the G7, G20 and the Financial Stability Board (2016-2019) and held roles such as Assistant Deputy Minister of International Trade and Finance (2010-2014) and Assistant Deputy Minister of Financial Sector Policy (2008-2010). Before joining the Department of Finance Canada, Mr. Stewart worked at Export Development Canada and in the Canadian sport system.

He holds a BA from Carleton University and an MBA from the University of Ottawa.

DME – Christopher MacLennan, Deputy Minister of International Development

Christopher MacLennan was appointed Deputy Minister of International Development in January 2022. Prior to his current role, he was the personal representative of the Prime Minister for the G20 Summit (2020-2024) and the Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (2020 2022). As Assistant Deputy Minister at Global Affairs Canada, he led Canada's international development assistance efforts and served as Canada’s G7 foreign affairs sous-sherpa (2017-2020).

Mr. MacLennan has held various roles in the Privy Council Office, including Acting Assistant Secretary for Priorities and Planning and Assistant Deputy Minister of Policy Innovation (2015-2017). He also held executive roles in the former Canadian International Development Agency, such as Director General, Health and Nutrition (2013-2015), and Director General, Thematic and Sectoral Policy Directorate (2009-2013).

Mr. MacLennan holds a Ph.D. from Western University, specializing in constitutional development and international human rights.

DMA – Sandra McCardell, Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Sandra McCardell was appointed Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in July 2024. Prior to this, she was Assistant Deputy Minister of the International Affairs Branch of Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC). She has held several senior positions such as Assistant Deputy Minister of Europe, Arctic, Middle East, and Maghreb Branch at Global Affairs Canada (2020-2023) and Director General of the Middle East Bureau (2019-2020).

Ms. McCardell served as High Commissioner of Canada to South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Mauritius, and Madagascar (2015-2019), Ambassador of Canada to Morocco and Mauritania (2012-2015) and Ambassador of Canada to Libya (2009-2011). In line with her commitment to a healthy workplace, Sandra has been the co-champion for values and ethics at ECCC and champion for women at GAC (2020-2023).

Ms. McCardell holds a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Alberta.

ASSISTANT DEPUTY MINISTERS

FUNCTIONAL BRANCHES

CFM – Tara Denham, ADM, Emergency Management, Legal and Consular Affairs Branch and Senior Official for Hostage Affairs

Tara Denham is the Assistant Deputy Minister of Emergency Management, Legal and Consular Affairs (CFM) & Senior Official for Hostage Affairs. Previously, Ms. Denham was the Director General for Human Rights, Freedoms and Inclusion at Global Affairs Canada and the Senior Official on cyber, digital and emerging technology policy issues.

IFM – Richard Arbeiter, ADM, International Security and Political Affairs Branch and Political Director

Richard Arbeiter is currently acting Political Director and Associate Deputy Minister for International Security and Political Affairs. From 2018 to 2024, Mr. Arbeiter served as Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, New York.

RFM – Catherine Jobin, ADM, Strategy, Policy and Public Affairs Branch

Catherine Jobin is Assistant Deputy Minister, Strategy, Policy and Public Affairs. Earlier in her career, Catherine worked at the Privy Council Office’s Priorities and Planning Secretariat, with the Canadian International Development Agency, and was posted at the Canadian Embassy to Afghanistan.

TFM – Sara Wilshaw, Senior ADM, International Trade Branch and Chief Trade Commissioner

Sara Wilshaw is currently Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, International Trade and Chief Trade Commissioner. Prior to this, Ms. Wilshaw served as Director of Operations, Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat at the Privy Council Office.

YFM – Leslie Norton, ADM, International Assistance Partnerships and Programming Branch

Leslie E. Norton is the Assistant Deputy Minister of the International Assistance Partnerships and Programming Branch. Prior to this, she was appointed Canada’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

GEOGRAPHIC BRANCHES

EGM – Alexandre Lévêque, ADM, Europe, Middle East and Arctic Branch

Alexandre Lévêque is the Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for Europe, the Middle East and the Arctic. Previously, he was the Assistant Deputy Minister for Strategic Policy at Global Affairs Canada and Assistant Secretary to Cabinet at the Privy Council Office’s Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat. He also served as High Commissioner of Canada in Tanzania, with concurrent accreditation in the Republic of the Seychelles, and Ambassador to the Union of the Comoros.

NGM –Shalini Anand, ADM, Americas Branch

Shalini Anand is the Assistant Deputy for the Americas. Most recently, she was the Director General of the Trade and Export Controls Bureau, Trade Policy and Negotiations Branch. She served abroad during three postings in Asia, across foreign policy and trade promotion portfolios, including as Consul and head of the political sector at the Consulate General of Canada in Hong Kong.

OGM – Weldon Epp, ADM, Indo-Pacific Branch

Weldon Epp is the Assistant Deputy Minister for Indo-Pacific. Prior to this, he was the Director General of the Northeast Asia Bureau. Abroad, he has served as Consul General in Guangzhou and in Shanghai, and has had assignments in Jakarta, Taipei, and Beijing.

WGM/GFM – Cheryl Urban, ADM, Africa Branch and ADM, Pan-geographic Coordination Branch

Cheryl Urban is current the Assistant Deputy Minister for Africa and the Assistant Deputy Minister of Pan-Geographic Affairs. Prior to this, she was Director General for Economic Development, leading the department’s engagement with international financial institutions and policy in the areas of economic growth and governance.

CORPORATE BRANCHES

ACM – Stéphane Cousineau, Senior ADM, International Platform Branch

Stéphane Cousineau is leading the International Platform Branch as Senior Assistant Deputy Minister. Prior to this, he served as Senior Assistant Deputy Minister of Corporate Services at Shared Services Canada for nearly four years. His previous roles include Assistant Deputy Minister of Corporate Management Services and Chief Financial Officer at the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada.

SCM – Shirley Carruthers, ADM, People and Corporate Management Branch and Chief Financial Officer

Shirley Carruthers is the Senior Assistant Deputy Minister of the People and Corporate Management Branch, and Chief Financial Officer (CFO).

Between 2021 and 2023, Shirley occupied the position of ADM, Corporate Management and Services Sector, and CFO at Natural Resources Canada (NRCan), where she was responsible for finance, human resources, information management, information technology, real property, and security.

SPECIAL DIRECT REPORTS

DMFT – Antoine Chevrier, Chief Transformation Officer

Antoine Chevrier is the Chief Transformation Officer of the department. Prior to this, he was Director General for Pan-African Affairs and subsequently Assistant Deputy Minister for Intergovernmental Affairs at the Privy Council Office, before assuming the position of Assistant Deputy Minister for Sub-Saharan Africa.

DSMX – Daniel Desfossés, ADM, Summits Management Office

Daniel Desfossés was appointed Assistant Deputy Minister, Summits Management Office. Prior to this, Mr. Desfossés served as Regional Director General for Québec and Atlantic at Environment and Climate Change Canada.

5. Organizational structure

Annex: Global Affairs Canada Executive Organizational Structure (HQ)

Legend

ADM: Assistant Deputy Minister

AADM: Associate Assistant Deputy Minister

DG: Director General

Departmental symbols: Conventions and designations

At Global Affairs Canada, designations for symbols are three letters, with four letters for subgroups and special groups.

• The first letter represents the branch it is associated with (e.g. for TFM Branch, all symbols within the branch will start with “T”).
• The second letter of a branch symbol designates if it is a
  • functional (F), e.g. RFM;
  • geographical (G), e.g. NGM; or,
  • corporate (C) unit, e.g. SCM.
• The third letter of any symbol is determined by the level or function of the symbol:
  • branch-level symbols will end with “M”;
  • bureau-level will end with “D”; and,
  • divisional-level will end with other alphabetical letters.
• Associate ADMs will typically have the same branch symbol, ending with an “A”, for associate (TFMA)

There are exceptions to the general rules for special bureaus (e.g. DMFT, JUS, VBD, etc.).

6. Network Map

Text version

The world map serves as a visual representation of the global network of diplomatic missions and displays the distribution of 182 missions across 112 countries, as well as 6 Regional Offices in Canada. The map includes the number of positions abroad of 2,461 Canada-based staff and 6,163 Locally engaged-staff. It also displays the missions per designation with 82 Embassies, 24 High Commissions, 21 Offices, 2 Representative Offices, 12 Multilateral Missions, 26 Consulates General, 9 Consulates, and 6 Consular Agencies.

List of Canada's missions abroad and Canadian regional offices by designation, as of March 31st, 2024

Mission	Country	Office Designation
Abidjan	Côte d'Ivoire	Embassy
Abu Dhabi	United Arab Emirates	Embassy
Abuja	Nigeria	High Commission
Acapulco	Mexico	Consular Agency
Accra	Ghana	High Commission
Addis Ababa	Ethiopia	Embassy
Addis AU	Ethiopia	Permanent Mission
Ahmedabad	India	Office of the High Commission
Algiers	Algeria	Embassy
Amman	Jordan	Embassy
Ankara	Türkiye	Embassy
Astana	Kazakhstan	Embassy
Athens	Greece	Embassy
Atlanta	United States	Consulate General
Auckland	New Zealand	Consulate
Baghdad	Iraq	Embassy
Bamako	Mali	Embassy
Bandar Seri Begawan	Brunei	High Commission
Bangkok	Thailand	Embassy
Barcelona	Spain	Office of the Embassy
Beijing	China	Embassy
Beirut	Lebanon	Embassy
Belgrade	Serbia	Embassy
Belo Horizonte	Brazil	Office of the Embassy
Bengaluru	India	Consulate General
Berlin	Germany	Embassy
Bern	Switzerland	Embassy
Bogota	Colombia	Embassy
Boston	United States	Consulate General
Brasilia	Brazil	Embassy
Bratislava	Slovakia	Embassy
Bridgetown	Barbados	High Commission
Brussels	Belgium	Embassy
Brussels EU	Belgium	Permanent Mission
Brussels NATO	Belgium	Permanent Mission
Bucharest	Romania	Embassy
Budapest	Hungary	Embassy
Buenos Aires	Argentina	Embassy
Cairo	Egypt	Embassy
Calgary	Canada	Canadian Regional Office
Canberra	Australia	High Commission
Cancun	Mexico	Consular Agency
Caracas	Venezuela	Embassy
Chandigarh	India	Consulate General
Chennai	India	Office of the High Commission
Chicago	United States	Consulate General
Chongqing	China	Consulate General
Colombo	Sri Lanka	High Commission
Copenhagen	Denmark	Embassy
Cotonou	Benin	Program Office of the Embassy
Dakar	Senegal	Embassy
Dallas	United States	Consulate General
Damascus	Syria	Embassy
Dar es Salaam	Tanzania	High Commission
Denver	United States	Consulate General
Detroit	United States	Consulate General
Dhaka	Bangladesh	High Commission
Doha	Qatar	Embassy
Dubai	United Arab Emirates	Consulate General
Dublin	Ireland	Embassy
Dusseldorf	Germany	Consulate
Erbil	Iraq	Office of the Embassy
Fukuoka	Japan	Office of the Embassy
Geneva PERM	Switzerland	Permanent Mission
Geneva WTO	Switzerland	Permanent Mission
Georgetown	Guyana	High Commission
Guadalajara	Mexico	Consulate
Guangzhou	China	Consulate General
Guatemala City	Guatemala	Embassy
Halifax	Canada	Canadian Regional Office
Hanoi	Vietnam	Embassy
Harare	Zimbabwe	Embassy
Havana	Cuba	Embassy
Helsinki	Finland	Embassy
Ho Chi Minh City	Vietnam	Consulate General
Hong Kong	China	Consulate General
Houston	United States	Consulate
Hyderabad	India	Office of the High Commission
Islamabad	Pakistan	High Commission
Istanbul	Türkiye	Consulate General
Jakarta	Indonesia	Embassy
Jakarta ASEAN	Indonesia	Permanent Mission
Johannesburg	South Africa	Office of the High Commission
Juba	South Sudan	Embassy
Kabul	Afghanistan	Embassy
Karachi	Pakistan	Office of the High Commission
Khartoum	Sudan	Embassy
Kigali	Rwanda	High Commission
Kingston	Jamaica	High Commission
Kinshasa	Democratic Republic of Congo	Embassy
Kolkata	India	Office of the High Commission
Kuala Lumpur	Malaysia	High Commission
Kuwait City	Kuwait	Embassy
Kyiv	Ukraine	Embassy
La Paz	Bolivia	Program Office of the Embassy
Lagos	Nigeria	High Commission
Lima	Peru	Embassy
Lisbon	Portugal	Embassy
London	United Kingdom	High Commission
Los Angeles	United States	Consulate General
Lusaka	Zambia	Program Office of the High Commission
Madrid	Spain	Embassy
Managua	Nicaragua	Program Office of the Embassy
Manila	Philippines	Embassy
Maputo	Mozambique	High Commission
Mazatlan	Mexico	Consular Agency
Mexico City	Mexico	Embassy
Miami	United States	Consulate General
Milan	Italy	Consulate
Minneapolis	United States	Consulate General
Monterrey	Mexico	Consulate General
Montevideo	Uruguay	Embassy
Montréal	Canada	Canadian Regional Office
Moscow	Russia	Embassy
Mumbai	India	Consulate General
Munich	Germany	Consulate
Nagoya	Japan	Consulate
Nairobi	Kenya	High Commission
New Delhi	India	High Commission
New York	United States	Consulate General
New York PERM	United States	Permanent Mission
Oslo	Norway	Embassy
Ouagadougou	Burkina Faso	Embassy
Palo Alto	United States	Office of the Embassy
Panama City	Panama	Embassy
Paris	France	Embassy
Paris OECD	France	Permanent Mission
Paris UNESCO	France	Permanent Mission
Phnom Penh	Cambodia	Program Office of the Embassy
Playa del Carmen	Mexico	Consular Agency
Port of Spain	Trinidad and Tobago	High Commission
Port-au-Prince	Haiti	Embassy
Porto Alegre	Brazil	Office of the Embassy
Prague	Czechia	Embassy
Pretoria	South Africa	High Commission
Puerto Vallarta	Mexico	Consular Agency
Punta Cana	Dominican Republic	Consulate
Quito	Ecuador	Embassy
Rabat	Morocco	Embassy
Ramallah	West Bank and Gaza	Representative Office
Recife	Brazil	Office of the Embassy
Reykjavik	Iceland	Embassy
Riga	Latvia	Embassy
Rio de Janeiro	Brazil	Consulate General
Riyadh	Saudi Arabia	Embassy
Rome	Italy	Embassy
San Diego	United States	Consulate
San Francisco	United States	Consulate General
San José	Costa Rica	Embassy
San José del Cabo	Mexico	Consular Agency
San Salvador	El Salvador	Embassy
Santiago	Chile	Embassy
Santo Domingo	Dominican Republic	Embassy
Sao Paulo	Brazil	Consulate General
Sapporo	Japan	Office of the Embassy
Seattle	United States	Consulate General
Seoul	Republic of Korea	Embassy
Shanghai	China	Consulate General
Singapore	Singapore	High Commission
Stockholm	Sweden	Embassy
Suva	Fiji	High Commission
Sydney	Australia	Consulate General
Taipei	Taiwan	Representative Office
Tallinn	Estonia	Embassy
Tegucigalpa	Honduras	Program Office of the Embassy
Tel Aviv	Israel	Embassy
The Hague	Netherlands	Embassy
Tokyo	Japan	Embassy
Toronto	Canada	Canadian Regional Office
Tripoli	Libya	Embassy
Tunis	Tunisia	Embassy
Ulaanbaatar	Mongolia	Embassy
Vancouver	Canada	Canadian Regional Office
Vatican	Vatican City State	Embassy
Vienna	Austria	Embassy
Vienna OSCE	Austria	Permanent Mission
Vienna PERM	Austria	Permanent Mission
Vientiane	Laos	Program Office of the Embassy
Vilnius	Lithuania	Embassy
Warsaw	Poland	Embassy
Washington OAS	United States	Permanent Mission
Washington, DC	United States	Embassy
Wellington	New Zealand	High Commission
Winnipeg	Canada	Canadian Regional Office
Yangon	Myanmar	Embassy
Yaoundé	Cameroon	High Commission
Yerevan	Armenia	Embassy
Zagreb	Croatia	Embassy

Legend

Acronym	Organization
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
EU	European Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PERM	Permanent Mission to International Organizations
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
WTO	World Trade Organization