Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy
Inuktitut version: ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᔪᓄᑦ
© His Majesty the King in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2024
Catalogue number FR5-236/2024E-PDF
ISBN 978-0-660-74228-1
Table of contents
- Forewords
- Executive summary
- Strategic challenges in the Arctic
- Arctic Foreign Policy pillars
- Asserting Canada’s sovereignty
- Advancing Canada’s interests through pragmatic diplomacy
- Leadership on Arctic governance and multilateral challenges
- Adopting a more inclusive approach to Arctic diplomacy
- Conclusion
- Annex: Canada’s Arctic foreign policy development process and Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (ANPF), published in 2019
Forewords
Message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs
Canada is at an inflection point in the Arctic.
For many years, Canada has aimed to manage the Arctic and northern regions cooperatively with other states as a zone of low tension that is free from military competition.
This approach had significant benefits, uniting the Arctic nations to advance cooperation on issues of common interest, such as sustainable development, environmental protection and scientific collaboration, including through the establishment of the Arctic Council in Ottawa in 1996.
However, the guardrails that we have depended on to prevent and resolve conflict have weakened. Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has made cooperation with it on Arctic issues exceedingly difficult for the foreseeable future. Uncertainty and unpredictability are creating economic consequences that Canadians are facing everyday.
Threats to Canada’s security are no longer bound by geography; climate change is accelerating rapidly; and non-Arctic states, including China, are also seeking greater influence in the governance of the Arctic. To respond, Canada must be strong in the North American Arctic, and it requires deeper collaboration with its greatest ally, the United States. Canada must also maintain strong ties with its 5 Nordic allies, which are now also all NATO members.
The evolving security and political dynamics in the Arctic have triggered a need for a recalibrated diplomatic approach to advancing Canada’s national interests in the region, based on the principles of pragmatic diplomacy.
The Arctic Foreign Policy, a diplomatic strategy, addresses the challenges and opportunities Canada faces today, as well as those it expects to face in the coming decades. It gives Canada the diplomatic tools it needs to continue to assert its sovereignty, advance its national security interests and promote a stable, prosperous and secure Arctic.
This policy is built on, and benefits from, the knowledge and perspectives of Indigenous Peoples who call the Arctic home. It comes from a place of understanding that there is a dark chapter in Government of Canada policy in the Arctic, which includes forced relocations of Inuit to the High Arctic and other colonial policies. These have inflicted significant intergenerational trauma on Indigenous Peoples.
The Arctic Foreign Policy also draws on our Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Future of Diplomacy initiative. It also complements, and benefits from, the historic investments Canada is making in its national defence and security through its 2024 defence policy update Our North, Strong and Free.
It will make Canada more secure, especially for Canadians living in the North. It will support strong and resilient Arctic and Northern communities. It will also serve to advance the interests and priorities of Indigenous Peoples and northerners who call the Arctic home.
Canada’s new policy is based on a shared vision of the Arctic’s future; I am confident Canada will realize its ambitions through this policy.
The Honourable Mélanie Joly, P.C., M.P.
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Message from the Minister of Northern Affairs
Released in 2019, the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (‘the Framework’) was co-developed with over 25 First Nations, Inuit, and Métis governments, organizations, and territorial and provincial governments. It laid out a shared vision to ensure that the needs and priorities of the North remain paramount: “Strong, self-reliant people and communities working together for a vibrant, prosperous and sustainable Arctic and northern region at home and abroad, while expressing Canada’s enduring Arctic sovereignty.”
The launch of Canada’s new Arctic Foreign Policy builds on the International Chapter of the Framework and is a pivotal moment in the realization of our shared vision for the Arctic. Informed by engagements with Indigenous Peoples and Northerners and their vast knowledge in the region, as well as with territorial and provincial governments, this Policy reflects the federal government’s international approach to the Arctic to ensure that Canada remains well-positioned as an Arctic leader.
The Arctic Foreign Policy will promote a safe, strong, and thriving future for those who live in the Arctic and the North, while protecting Canada’s enduring Arctic sovereignty. It considers the shifting geopolitical context and puts forward plans to ensure that the Canadian Arctic remains strong and adaptable on the international stage, now and into the future. Just as Indigenous partners are instrumental in the ongoing implementation of the Framework, the success of this new foreign policy will depend on continued learning from the immeasurable experience, knowledge, and wisdom of First Nations, Inuit, Métis, Modern Treaty and Self-Governing partners and communities. This shared learning is critical to a strong and sustainable Arctic and to the full and effective implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act.
Through this Policy, Canada’s approach to the Arctic will be developed with respect for Indigenous self-determination and the values, interests, cultures, and traditions of Arctic and northern Indigenous Peoples, including weaving traditional knowledge into Arctic decision-making at the global level.
The new Arctic Foreign Policy will expand and broaden Canada’s international engagement, strengthen relations with our international partners and exercise Canada’s sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic. It will also advance domestic priorities, including enhancing knowledge of the North, protecting the Arctic environment, and advancing reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples throughout the North.
By placing the invaluable perspectives, knowledge, and wisdom of Indigenous Peoples in the North, who have called the Arctic home since time immemorial, at the foreground this new policy and its implementation, we will ensure that the Arctic remains a vibrant, prosperous, and secure region now and for future generations.
The Honourable Dan Vandal, P.C., M.P.
Minister of Northern Affairs
Message from the Minister of National Defence
Canada has benefited enormously from our geography. Surrounded by 3 oceans, and our closest ally to the south, our country has enjoyed a degree of protection that has helped keep our borders safe and secure. That reality is changing in the Arctic. Where the polar ice caps provided physical protection, the region is now opening to the world as it warms at 4 times the global average.
In the coming decades, the Arctic Ocean will become a vital shipping route between Europe and Asia, while vast stores of natural resources become increasingly accessible. This growing access is already enticing nations to the region, heightening security challenges and geopolitical competition.
Canada must urgently strengthen our presence in the Arctic and northern regions as our adversaries aspire to a greater role in the region’s affairs. The physical threat of climate change is compounded by challenges from authoritarian states to the rules-based international order that Canada and its allies strive to uphold. Simultaneously, the character of conflict is changing with rapid technological and cyber advances.
Canada’s new Arctic Foreign Policy responds to these growing challenges by focusing on 3 key areas: asserting Canada’s sovereignty, advancing our interests in the region, and promoting a stable, prosperous, and secure North. The policy addresses current needs and challenges while anticipating how the region will change in the coming decades. It also provides the diplomatic tools we need to partner with Northern communities to assert Canada’s sovereignty and to support Arctic and Northern people so that they can thrive and remain secure.
The Arctic Foreign Policy complements the work and investments outlined in our new defence policy update Our North, Strong and Free, which was developed in part as a response to the emerging threats in the Arctic and around the world. Our North, Strong and Free focuses on Canadian values and strengths while underpinning our Arctic and Northern sovereignty, strengthening our diplomatic influence, and leveraging our world-leading cyber and space talent. It reinforces our capabilities and capacity in the region, in partnership with those who live there.
Canada remains committed to contributing to NATO and NORAD’s awareness of the threat environment across the Arctic region, including in the North American Arctic. We likewise support the continued leadership of like-minded Arctic states on matters of security and defence.
The Arctic security and continental defence investments made in Our North, Strong and Free and NORAD Modernization support NATO’s deterrence and defence agenda by protecting the Alliance’s Northern and Western flanks. It ensures that Canada can engage in the world and deploy from a secure base in support of NATO allies, when needed.
As we expand and enhance our presence in the Arctic, we recognize that this will also impact the communities who inhabit the region. Indigenous Peoples have called the Arctic home since time immemorial, and working with them will enhance the prosperity and defence of the region. Our government will continue to prioritize working with Indigenous communities in the Arctic and deepening our relationship with them.
As the world continues to evolve and threats intensify, the connection between foreign policy and defence policy must remain strong for the protection of our country and our values. This Arctic Foreign Policy complements Canada’s ongoing work in the region to expand our presence and safeguard our sovereignty in the Arctic.
The Honourable William Sterling Blair, P.C., C.O.M., M.P.
Minister of National Defence
Executive summary
Canada is an Arctic nation.
Canada launched the co-developed Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (ANPF) in 2019, which sets out a common vision of the Arctic and the North, in which the peoples there are thriving, strong and secure.
Since then, strategic competition has intensified across the globe as major powers that do not share Canadian interests and values seek to shape the international environment to their advantage. Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in 2022, for example, has shaken the foundations of international cooperation in the Arctic.
At the same time, the Arctic is experiencing the considerable impacts of climate change, with significant implications for the security of the communities and people who live in the Arctic. By 2050, the Arctic Ocean will become an increasingly viable shipping route between Europe and Asia during the summer.
More than ever, the Arctic is a theatre of interest for many non-Arctic states and actors aspiring for a greater role in Arctic affairs. Canada’s adversaries also try to achieve influence through non-military tactics, including cyber activities, foreign interference and economic coercion.
The North American Arctic is no longer free from tension. Canada must work even closer with its closest ally, the United States, to maintain a secure North American homeland. Canada should also be closer than ever to its Nordic allies.
To respond to these emerging geopolitical dynamics and to align more closely with the defence policy update Our North, Strong and Free, Canada has developed, in partnership with northern and Indigenous Peoples, the Arctic Foreign Policy to supplement the International chapter of the ANPF. This policy will help ensure that the Arctic remains a stable, prosperous and secure region for future generations.
The Arctic Foreign Policy provides new funding over the next 5 years to ensure that Global Affairs Canada Footnote 1 is fit-for-purpose in the Arctic. The policy also benefits Canadians who live in the Arctic and in the North, including by strengthening their ties and connections across borders.
To achieve its objective of a stable, prosperous and secure Arctic, Canada will continue to assert its sovereignty. Canada will also advance its national interests through pragmatic diplomacy; lead on Arctic governance and multilateral challenges; and adopt a more inclusive approach to Arctic diplomacy.
As part of this policy, Canada will:
- appoint an Arctic ambassador
- open a new consulate in Anchorage, Alaska
- open a new consulate in Nuuk, Greenland
- initiate an Arctic security dialogue with the ministers of foreign affairs of like-minded states in the Arctic
- expand information sharing with relevant territorial and provincial governments and Indigenous leaders on emerging and developing international Arctic security trends, including foreign interference threats
- support science and research coordination initiatives with foreign policy considerations as related to research security and science in the Arctic
- launch boundary negotiations with the United States regarding the Beaufort Sea and finalize the implementation of the boundary agreement between Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark regarding Tartupaluk (Hans Island)
Canada remains deeply committed to the full implementation of the ANPF, to Arctic state primacy and to upholding the rules-based international order Footnote 2 in the Arctic. The Arctic Foreign Policy will provide new tools for Canada to deliver on the objectives set out in the ANPF in a changing geopolitical context.
This foreign policy will secure its national interests and ensure stability and prosperity for the Indigenous Peoples who live in the Arctic and the North—including First Nations, Inuit, Métis, Modern Treaty and Self-Governing Partners—and other northerners. Canada’s diplomacy is stronger when it is informed by Indigenous Knowledge, culture and practices, as well as by the lived experiences of northerners who call the Arctic home.
Strategic challenges in the Arctic
1. Russia since 2022
Canada has been clear that there will be no business as usual with Russia, at the Arctic Council or elsewhere, since its illegal, full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed the geopolitical landscape, with spillover effects in the Arctic. It is an attack not only against Ukraine, but also on the fundamental principles of international relations, including respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and international law.
In addition to the existential threat Russian aggression poses to Ukraine and its people, Russian president Putin’s war on Ukraine risks setting a broader post-Cold-War precedent that borders can be redrawn through violence.
Northerners understand how close a neighbour Russia is. Canada must be clear-eyed about the implications of its geographic proximity to Russia. Canadian Forces Station Alert, on Ellesmere Island, Nunavut, is closer to the Russian military’s air force base at Nagurskoye, Russia, than Iqaluit is to Ottawa or Toronto is to Winnipeg.
For over a decade, Russia has invested in modernizing its Arctic infrastructure and its military capabilities in the Arctic to develop resources and control access to the region, with particular emphasis on its own western region and approaches. It is looking to profit from climate change in the region and will continue promoting the development of the Northern Sea Route as a major international shipping route. Given the strategic importance Russia places on its Arctic region, Canada expects these activities will continue.
Russia has also intensified its disinformation campaigns, conducted below-threshold military activitiesFootnote 3, and crafted a vehement domestic narrative of a “hostile, unfriendly West,” in part to justify its own militarization of the Arctic.
Russia’s historic posture has been to ensure sovereignty and control over its own Arctic region and to limit the role of non-Arctic states in Arctic affairs. However, because of sanctions and of its massive expenditures on its illegal war against Ukraine, Russia is increasingly reliant on China to fund and support the development of its projects in the Arctic. These include investments in Arctic research, oil and gas development, ports and other critical infrastructure. We anticipate this trend will continue and lead to increased activity by China in the Russian Arctic.
Russia and China are aligned in their desire to undermine the liberal-rules-based international system, but the power asymmetry between them often highlights the divergence in their interests. Russia is increasingly dependent on China and is reversing its historic posture by opening its Arctic to China. For instance, in July 2024, Russia and China, building on their 2022 statement to cooperate in the Arctic, conducted joint military exercises in the Russian High North. In addition, Russian and Chinese warships have conducted joint patrols in international waters off the Aleutian Islands; the 2 countries’ coast guards have conducted joint patrols into the Bering Sea; and Russian and Chinese military aircraft have been detected, tracked and intercepted by the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) while flying in Alaska’s Air Defense Identification Zone. This demonstrates the continued deepening of Chinese-Russian military cooperation, particularly in the North Pacific approaches to the Arctic.
2. Evolving security threats across the Arctic
The Arctic is a strategically important region for the defence of North America and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) northern and western flanks. However, the defence architecture and threat picture differ across the circumpolar north.
The safety, security and defence of the Canadian Arctic comprise a fundamental priority for the Government of Canada and are critical to the collective defence of North America. The Arctic regions of North America are protected by the armed forces of Canada and the United States, individually and bilaterally, and through NORAD, which is binational.
While the risk of military attack in the North American Arctic remains low, the region represents a geographic vector for traditional and emerging weapons systems that threaten broader North American and transatlantic security. Canada is seeing a number of potential threats, including increased Russian activity in Canadian air approaches, China’s regular deployment of dual-use—having both research and military application—research vessels and surveillance platforms to collect data, and a general increase in Arctic maritime activity. Adversaries and competitors also employ disinformation and influence campaigns, malicious cyber operations and espionage and foreign interference activities to target Canadians, including northerners.
Close partnership with the United States is essential to the maintenance of a secure, strong and well-defended North American homeland, on which the 2 countries’ mutual prosperity depends. It is critical in deterring and defending against increasingly sophisticated threats to North America, including in the Arctic and its approaches in the North Atlantic and North Pacific. We expect Canada–United States defence cooperation in the Arctic to continue to grow, as it is fundamental to both countries’ national security interests.
Strong and resilient Arctic and northern communities increase Canada’s defence against threats. With increased tension and with competitors looking to exploit vulnerabilities in the Canadian North, Canada must take action to build trust in public institutions and deepen ties with like-minded states. Canada’s diplomacy and defence and security policies must work hand in hand to keep these emerging threats in check.
The security of the European High North is also of critical importance to Canada’s security and economic well-being.
The European High North is a contested region militarily, including threats to critical infrastructure, maritime security, and safety, as well as access concerns. Russia has established a strong military presence in the Arctic, including with air and naval platforms equipped with missile systems capable of striking Europe and North America and of disrupting Canada’s ability to project forces in support of allies and partners. Russia’s below-threshold actions, military activities and continued weapons testing in the European High North and the Arctic are deeply troubling.
NATO has strengthened its deterrence and defence posture, including in the European High North, in response to the increased threat posed by Russia. The accessions of Finland and Sweden to NATO, in 2023 and 2024 respectively, reinforced the Alliance by bringing, among other things, their significant cold-weather experience and capabilities to NATO, thereby bolstering its strategic posture in the European High North. Canada was the first country to ratify each of their accessions. Canada will continue to share information on threats in the Arctic with allies and to support NATO operations and presence in the European High North.
Despite the changing threat picture, it is not in Canada’s strategic interest that the Arctic becomes a theatre of military conflict. Canada will continue working with territorial and provincial governments, Arctic and northern Indigenous Peoples and allies and partners throughout the Arctic region to enhance domain awareness, improve information sharing and strengthen interoperability and research security.
Canada must also take action to mitigate the impact that current and emerging defence and security threats to the Arctic have on the people who live in the region and who now find themselves at the frontlines of geopolitical competition.
3. Adapting to new dynamics for Arctic governance
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had cascading impacts on the governance of the Arctic. While Arctic states continue to fulfill the important responsibility of governing the Arctic region at a time of unprecedented change, like-minded countries are taking coordinated action to ensure it is not business as usual with Russia.
The Arctic Council is the pre-eminent forum for international Arctic cooperation and governance. It brings together the 8 Arctic states, the 6 Permanent Participant organizations representing Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic, and observers to address sustainable development and the environmental protection of the Arctic. The role of Arctic Indigenous Peoples, from the foundation of the Arctic Council in 1996 to the present, is one of the council’s greatest strengths and is unique in multilateral governance. The council sets the bar for meaningful Indigenous engagement, which continues to grow to this day. Arctic governance must be done with those who have lived in the Arctic for thousands of years, recognizing the strength of shared knowledge and decision making.
Meetings with all members of the council at the ministerial and Senior Arctic Official levels remain on hold. Arctic states and Permanent Participants are working at the expert and scientific level to advance important projects on climate change and biodiversity, emergency prevention and preparedness and sustainable development. These projects, along with the other work of the Arctic Council, are helping to drive meaningful change for people who live across the Arctic. This unique work, done in collaboration between the Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic and the Arctic states, is what makes the Arctic Council so valuable.
To ensure the maintenance of robust governance in the Arctic—governance that is capable of tackling the increasing challenges and opportunities the region is facing—cooperation must continue at the Arctic Council. Canada must also identify new forums and leverage existing ones in new ways to advance discussions on Arctic issues. Arctic and northern Indigenous Peoples must be active partners in the conduct of international relations in the Arctic.
Arctic states also meet in other regional and international forums that contribute to upholding the rules-based international order, including the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement. The latter came into force in 2021, establishing a precautionary 16-year ban on commercial fishing on the high seas of the Arctic Ocean.
Arctic states also play a leading role in advancing Arctic interests in broader global efforts through the UN system, such as the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO’s) ban on heavy fuel oil in the Arctic.
An extensive international legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean. The law of the sea, including as set out in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), determines states’ jurisdictions and their rights and obligations in various maritime zones. These rules apply to the delineation of the outer limits of continental shelves, navigation, the management of natural resources, the protection of the marine environment and other uses of the sea. Consistent with the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration Footnote 4, Canada remains committed to the orderly settlement of Arctic disputes in accordance with international law and expects the same of other signatories, including Russia.
Canada has a clear interest in maintaining the structures of governance in the Arctic that ensure Canada’s central role in guiding the region’s future. Canada especially values the Arctic Council because it provides a platform for Indigenous Peoples to help shape circumpolar affairs. Canada will not allow Russia to undermine, through its actions, the pillars of international cooperation in the Arctic.
4. Climate change: the overarching threat
Climate change is both the most pressing and the most proximate threat to Canada’s security in the Arctic and the people who live there. Its causes and effects are not bound by countries’ official borders.
Climate change is progressing at an alarming pace, with the Arctic warming 4 times faster than the global average, causing significant impacts on natural and human environments. These impacts serve as threat multipliers because changing environmental conditions create additional opportunities for foreign adversaries and competitors to covertly or overtly operate in the Canadian Arctic.
The total surface area of Arctic Ocean ice is shrinking, with varied implications for maritime shipping, trade and resource extraction across the Arctic. Maritime traffic in the Arctic will continue to increase, which will drive further foreign interest in the region. This includes maritime traffic in Canada’s Arctic archipelago, despite the risks and hazards associated with the unpredictable ice conditions.
With retreating sea ice and new technologies improving navigation and accessibility, foreign activity in the Arctic will continue to increase, bringing with it related safety, security and environmental challenges. With other Arctic states, Canada must be prepared to respond.
Climate change is also driving an increase in climate-related emergencies and disrupting ecosystems that Arctic communities rely on for their livelihoods, with significant implications for the security of northerners, including Indigenous Peoples, who are disproportionately affected by these changes.
Northerners, including Indigenous Peoples, have shared concerns about climate change and their ongoing efforts to improve their resiliency in the face of increased pressures on communities and livelihoods, food security and the destabilization of critical and civilian infrastructure. The disappearance of year-round ice cover and changes in the timing and durability of the floe edge; increasing subsidence due to permafrost thaw; and a greater frequency and severity of wildfires are examples of the impacts of climate change on Arctic communities, all of which have both material and psychological impacts.
For instance, communities in the North are often impacted by major wildfires. In 2023, more than half of the population of the Northwest Territories had to be evacuated.
There is an ongoing need to mitigate the adverse impacts of climate change in the Arctic to reduce vulnerabilities. Canada must support Arctic and northern Indigenous Peoples and other northerners in adapting to the environment as it is and will be—not as one wishes it would be.
In parallel, climate change is driving interest in the Arctic as a sustainable and reliable source of critical minerals, such as lithium, graphite, nickel, cobalt, copper and rare earth elements integral to the transition to a low-carbon economy. For Canada and its allies, the Arctic’s resource potential provides an opportunity to diversify critical mineral production in partnership with territorial and provincial governments, Arctic and northern Indigenous Peoples and local communities. This must be done carefully, respecting the livelihoods of local communities.
Climate change is a global problem; it requires global solutions and multilateral collaboration.
5. Increasing challenges to Arctic states’ primacy
Canada’s approach to the Arctic is guided by the fundamental principle that the Arctic should be governed by the Arctic states in collaboration with Arctic and northern Indigenous Peoples. As in other regions, strategic competition in the Arctic is growing, with non-Arctic states and actors increasingly expressing foreign policy or security aspirations, thereby pushing for greater roles in Arctic affairs.
Since 2019, there has been a growing narrative among some non-Arctic states that they should have a greater say in Arctic governance. China, in particular, has expressed an ambition to become a “polar great power,” by 2030.
Among China’s priorities in the Arctic are developing commercial shipping opportunities, including a “Polar Silk Road,” as well as natural resource exploitation, including of critical minerals, oil and gas and fish. China is also active in Arctic research, much of which can be considered dual use.
China seeks to shape the international order into a more permissive environment for interests and values that increasingly deviate from Canada’s commitment to a rules-based international system. China can be expected to use all the tools at its disposal to advance its geopolitical interests, including in the Arctic. Canada will challenge China when it ought to and cooperate when its interests align with China’s.
China, like all states, has rights and responsibilities related to its use of the world’s oceans that apply equally in the Arctic. For example, in accordance with UNCLOS, China can only conduct marine scientific research in the exclusive economic zone of another state with the consent of that state. Canada will carefully review any such requests related to its own exclusive economic zone and provide or withhold consent consistent with the provisions of the convention.
Consistent with its Indo-Pacific Strategy and in collaboration with partners, Canada will always act on matters of Arctic governance to protect national and northern interests, including when dealing with China. Canada will cooperate with China to address pressing global issues—such as climate change—that have impacts on the Arctic.
In the Canadian Arctic, Canada will always work to protect Canada’s economic security, safeguard Canadian values and protect Canadians from malign influence.
Canada will continue to work closely with the United States to counter all forms of malign influence and activity in the North American Arctic.
In the wider region, Canada will always uphold the founding principles that underpinned the Ottawa Declaration in 1996 on the establishment of the Arctic Council. These include Canada’s commitment to the well-being of the inhabitants of the Arctic; its commitment to sustainable development in the Arctic region, including economic and social development, improved health conditions and cultural well-being; its commitment to the protection of the Arctic environment; and its commitment to ensure full consultation with, and the involvement of, Indigenous Peoples and their communities and other inhabitants of the Arctic on Arctic Council activities.
At all times, Canada’s engagement in the Arctic will be focused first and foremost on promoting and defending Canadian national interests. Canada will adopt a pragmatic approach when circumstances require it.
Arctic Foreign Policy pillars
The Arctic Foreign Policy provides Global Affairs Canada with additional diplomatic tools to support a stable, prosperous and secure Arctic and to fully implement the objectives laid out in the International chapter of the ANPF given the changing geopolitical context.
We will do this by continuing to assert Canada’s sovereignty; advancing Canada’s national interests through pragmatic diplomacy; leading on Arctic governance and multilateral challenges; and adopting a more inclusive approach to Arctic diplomacy.
Asserting Canada’s sovereignty
1. Leveraging diplomacy to support national defence and security
The Government of Canada will continue to take a comprehensive approach to Arctic security by prioritizing the security, interests and priorities of the Arctic region and northerners, as well as Canadians more broadly. Canada’s foreign and defence policies are closely intertwined and complementary. Effective diplomacy is critical for shaping the international environment to defend and advance Canadian national interests; it is a first line of defence for Canada’s national security. Canada’s fundamental defence and security goal is to prevent and defuse potential crises before they can develop into conflict.
Canada’s national security is also supported by human security. Strong and resilient local communities are vital to national defence.
Canada engages in the Arctic from a position of strength thanks to the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF’s) presence and capabilities, exercises and operations, including those of the Canadian Rangers. Canadian Rangers are active, well-respected members of their communities, and they play a critical role in demonstrating Canadian sovereignty over the lands, waters and ice of Canada’s North and Arctic.
Building on the NORAD modernization investments announced in 2022, Canada’s defence policy update Our North, Strong and Free identified the Government of Canada’s most pressing priority as the continued assertion of Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic and northern regions. Canada is making investments to ensure that the CAF has the capabilities required to operate in an evolving geopolitical context. By 2030, Canada will have almost tripled its defence spending from 2015.
Strengthened military capabilities will bolster the CAF’s ability to conduct and sustain operations in the Arctic and create opportunities for strengthened collaboration with allies and partners. Canada regularly invites select allies and partners to take part in Operation NANOOK, the CAF’s signature northern operation series. Canada also works with allies and partners on multinational research and development activities relevant to the conduct of defence and security operations in the polar regions.
In addition to NORAD modernization and the defence policy update, Canada is pursuing historic investments to increase its military capability in the maritime domain in the Arctic. Ensuring that Canada’s internal waters in the Arctic are well defended is a critical component of maintaining a secure North American homeland. Canada will maintain strong defence capabilities in its internal Arctic waters, including in the Northwest Passage.
Here is a summary of key defence and security investments:
- Several military capabilities will play a key role in exercising Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic and northern waters, including Canada’s 6 new Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships; up to 15 new River Class Destroyers; 11 new MQ-9B Sky Guardian drones; up to 16 new P-8A Poseidon multi-mission aircraft specialized in anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare; and 88 new F-35A fighter aircraft.
- Canada’s $38.6 billion plan to modernize NORAD will significantly enhance domain awareness in the Arctic and the North through the establishment of a new northern approaches surveillance system to complement the North Warning System and further investment in space-based surveillance. It also includes further investment in space-based polar communications; additional air-to-air refuelling aircraft to support and extend the reach of CAF operations—and NORAD operations—in Canada; additional and longer-range air-to-air missiles for Canada’s fighter fleet; significant infrastructure upgrades at airfields used to support NORAD forward operations; and more than $4 billion in new funding for science and technology.
- The defence policy update announced an additional $8.1 billion in spending over the next 5 years and $73 billion over the next 20 years to support Canada’s national defence and security in the Arctic. This includes a new fleet of airborne early warning and control aircraft; specialized maritime sensors, including some that can be deployed by Harry DeWolf-class Arctic Offshore Patrol vessels; a new fleet of tactical helicopters; and a new satellite ground station in the Arctic to enhance the use of Canadian, U.S. and other Allied space capabilities.
- The defence policy update will also establish a new network of Northern Operational Support Hubs to further enhance the CAF’s presence, responsiveness and partnerships across the Arctic and the North and invest in multi-use infrastructure that also meets the needs of the territories, Indigenous Peoples and northern communities.
- In July 2024, Canada announced it would initiate new spending programs to put the country on track to reach NATO’s target of 2% of GDP spending by 2032. This will include the purchase of up to 12 conventionally powered, under-ice-capable submarines by the Royal Canadian Navy.
- In 2024, the Government of Canada initiated the procurement of 8 new icebreakers made in Canada to support Canadian Coast Guard operations in the Arctic, including 2 polar icebreakers that will enable year-round icebreaker presence in the Arctic. The icebreakers will contribute to the protection of the marine environment, the resupplying of communities and the collection of data that enhances Canada’s maritime domain awareness in support of maritime safety and security, climate resilience and scientific research.
- In July 2024, Canada, the United States and Finland announced an enhanced trilateral partnership called the ICE Pact. It is a collaborative effort to build best-in-class Arctic and polar icebreakers and other Arctic and polar capabilities in each of the countries by sharing expertise, information and capabilities. This partnership also bolsters the ability of like-minded nations to uphold international rules, norms and standards to ensure safety and to sustain peace and stability in the Arctic.
The diplomatic initiatives in the Arctic Foreign Policy will complement all of these investments by better aligning Canada’s strategic approaches and by strengthening its relationships with its Arctic allies, with territorial and provincial governments and with Arctic and northern Indigenous partners.
i. Bridging the intelligence gap
To address the complex range of threats faced in the Arctic, Canada must conceptualize security not only in military terms. Security in the Arctic includes community security, research security, economic security, security against disinformation and any other form of interference and physical and digital infrastructure security.
We will work with Public Safety Canada to support efforts to strengthen Canadian national resilience to counter malign influence and activities of foreign powers. Canada will strengthen the defence of its critical infrastructure across the country, including in the Arctic, to protect northern communities against foreign interference. This can be achieved through the Investment Canada Act; by strengthening Canadian cyber security systems; and through new legislation to address foreign interference.
We will provide relevant territorial, provincial and Indigenous governments with regular briefings and information on emerging and developing international security trends, including threats affecting the Arctic, to ensure that they are equipped to support communities in Canada’s Arctic and North and to make informed decisions about the security of their communities.
This will be achieved in collaboration with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Communications Security Establishment, the Department of National Defence and Public Safety Canada.
ii. Strengthening research security
International scientific collaboration plays an important role in addressing gaps in knowledge of the Arctic region, including in relation to climate change. The last 20 years have seen a marked increase in international research activity across the Canadian and circumpolar Arctic.
While Canada continues to welcome scientific collaboration in the Arctic, Canada’s oversight, regulatory, safety and security bodies must be equipped to address potential threats and harms at all levels. In particular, Canada must guard against foreign research in the Canadian Arctic and North that is dual use—having both research and military application.
This requires balancing between the important priority of advancing recognized areas of needed international scientific collaboration, such as climate change research, with necessary due diligence to protect Canada’s most sensitive research.
Canada will support territorial, provincial and Indigenous authorities in taking into account a national security lens to foreign research in Canada’s Arctic.
Global Affairs Canada will support the work of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs and its portfolio agencies, the Department of National Defence, Natural Resources Canada and Fisheries and Oceans Canada, among others, to support the scientific research permitting process in the Arctic, particularly for international applicants undertaking research that can be considered dual use.
To help ensure emerging challenges concerning research security and science collaboration in the North are addressed, we will help by increasing our capacity to learn about concerns from those on the ground, holding annual round-table meetings on science and research relating to Canada’s Arctic foreign policy priorities. We will work closely with other federal government departments and agencies to organize the round-table meetings.
The Arctic ambassador will work with Indigenous Peoples and partners from territorial and provincial governments, as well as across the Government of Canada, to contribute to the efforts to address climate change, biodiversity and other areas where Indigenous Knowledge, science and technologies could contribute solutions to the challenges in the Arctic.
The Arctic ambassador will also work with Canada’s Chief Science Advisor on issues related to science and research.
iii. Partnering with the Canadian Coast Guard to support defence and security
The Canadian Coast Guard, alongside other partner departments and agencies, is responsible for maritime domain awareness and plays a critical role in supporting the defence and security of the North.
Building on the Canadian Coast Guard Arctic Strategy, released in 2024, the Canadian Coast Guard will continue to contribute to Canada’s national security, including through its assistance to Arctic scientific research expeditions.
The Canadian Coast Guard currently operates up to 6 icebreakers in the Arctic from June to November each year, which helps advance maritime safety and security. In the coming years, the Canadian Coast Guard will acquire 8 new icebreakers, including 2 polar icebreakers that will provide capacity for year-round presence in the Arctic.
The Canadian Coast Guard also helps to deepen Canadian defence cooperation with Arctic allies through Operation Pacer Goose. The annual operation resupplies the United States’ Pituffik Space Base (formerly known as Thule Air Base) in Greenland, ensuring that essential supplies are safely delivered in challenging Arctic conditions.
To strengthen the interconnections between the Arctic Foreign Policy and the Canadian Coast Guard Arctic Strategy, we will collaborate more closely with the Canadian Coast Guard to leverage its maritime domain expertise and support its work with international partners. Through its operations and activities, the Canadian Coast Guard helps contribute to stronger relationships with Canada’s Arctic allies. Through deeper collaboration, the Canadian Coast Guard will also be able to expand its partnerships with regional coast guards from like-minded states.
iv. Strengthening regional defence and security architectures
To respond to the evolving threat landscape in the Arctic, Canada will strengthen coordination and dialogue with Arctic allies on security issues.
Alongside the Department of National Defence, we will increase our information sharing with NATO on circumpolar threats. We will improve interoperability and increase the collective understanding of the evolving security situation in the Arctic and enhance the Alliance’s cold-weather capabilities. Canada will continue to be an active participant in NATO exercises and operations, including in the European High North.
To ensure seamless situational awareness and information sharing on northern threats that do not recognize borders or military command areas of responsibility, Canada supports greater coordination and collaboration between the military forces of like-minded Arctic states, including in the context of NATO and NORAD activities.
Canada will explore and foster new partnerships to strengthen the strategic resilience of the North American Arctic, particularly with Alaska, the Yukon, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut and Greenland.
To complement existing defence forums, Canada is exploring opportunities to deepen security dialogue among all like-minded states in the Arctic, including through regular security discussions.
Canada will initiate an Arctic security dialogue with the ministers of foreign affairs of like-minded states in the Arctic. Discussions will focus on sharing information on, and on analyses of, issues relating to international Arctic relations and security; as well as discussing national approaches to cross-cutting security challenges; advancing opportunities for collaboration; and increasing collective resilience.
2. Upholding the rules-based international order
The waters of Canada’s Arctic archipelago, including the various channels comprising the Northwest Passage, are internal waters of Canada by virtue of historic title and in accordance with international law. Canada’s Arctic sovereignty encompasses land, sea and ice. It extends without interruption to the seaward-facing coasts of the Arctic islands and beyond. These islands are joined, not divided, by the waters between them and are bridged for a large part of the year by ice.
Indigenous Peoples in Canada have used and occupied the ice and waters as they have used and occupied the lands for thousands of years. Every day, through a wide range of activities, Arctic and northern Indigenous Peoples and governments, as well as territorial and provincial governments and other northerners, share stewardship over the Arctic lands and waters of Canada. It is through the reciprocal recognition of each other’s mutual interests in these lands and waters that Canada and Arctic and northern Indigenous Peoples share in the stewardship of them—further codified in modern treaties and self-government agreements. Sovereignty and sovereign rights in the Arctic are inextricably linked to issues of Indigenous self-government. Canada possesses environmental, economic, cultural and historical interests unique to the region, the reality and importance of which are clearly evidenced by long-standing usage.
Canada will work with Arctic and northern Indigenous partners to assert shared interests and priorities in the region, such as through partnerships with the Inuit Marine Monitoring Program and the Indigenous Guardians program Footnote 5. These initiatives provide Indigenous Peoples with greater opportunities to exercise responsibility for the stewardship of their traditional lands, waters and ice.
Canada intends to continue to act as a responsible sovereign of its Arctic territories and waters, relying on the rules-based international order and supported by historical and scientific evidence. Canada’s commitment to ensuring that maritime claims are addressed in a manner that is consistent with international law is one of its key enduring priorities in the Arctic.
i. Managing Arctic boundaries through a rules-based approach
At a time when the rules-based international order is under unprecedented threat, it is critical that states resolve their disputes responsibly, through dialogue and negotiation. Canada has made resolving boundary disputes in accordance with international law one of the foundational principles of its foreign policy in the Arctic.
Enhanced international cooperation on maritime boundaries also helps secure states’ respective national interests over their resources, including energy, minerals, fish and wildlife.
Canada will advance efforts to resolve Arctic boundary disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS, and in consultation with Indigenous partners, particularly where these international boundaries may affect treaty rights.
Canada–Kingdom of Denmark boundary agreement
Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, and Greenland have resolved the maritime boundary and long-time dispute over Tartupaluk. In June 2022, following 5 years of intensive negotiations, the Canadian, Nunavut, Danish and Greenlandic governments agreed on a modernized single maritime boundary, from the Lincoln Sea in the north to the Labrador Sea in the south—a distance of over 3,000 kilometres—which established the longest bilateral maritime boundary in the world. The agreement also resolved the overlap in our respective continental shelves in the Labrador Sea.
With the Kingdom of Denmark, Canada agreed to divide the island of Tartupaluk roughly in half; Canada is now advancing discussions on an agreed border regime for Tartupaluk, which requires engagement with the Government of Nunavut and local Inuit communities. This is the last step before the agreement can come into force, which Canada is committed to completing in the near future.
Extended continental shelf
In December 2022, Canada filed an addendum to its Arctic Ocean extended continental shelf submission with the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in response to Russia’s addendum, which was filed in March 2021. Russia’s addendum greatly expanded the size of the continental shelf included in its submission and tripled the area that overlaps with Canada’s own continental shelf. Canada’s 2022 addendum rebalanced the overlap area.
In December 2023, the United States published the outer limits of its extended continental shelf in the western Arctic Ocean. This announcement offers an opportunity for Canada to renew negotiations with the United States regarding the overlap of the countries’ respective continental shelves. These discussions are expected to begin in late 2024.
Canada, like all Arctic Ocean coastal states, remains committed to settling continental shelf overlap areas peacefully and in accordance with international law.
Canada–United States Beaufort Sea boundary
In September 2024, Canada launched negotiations with the United States to resolve the 2 countries’ long-standing maritime boundary dispute in the Beaufort Sea. The area in question is north of the Yukon and Alaska and measures approximately 270,000 square kilometres. Both countries claim jurisdiction over the disputed region by way of differing legal interpretations of the 1825 treaty between Russia and Great Britain.
Reflecting the Government of Canada’s commitment to partnership and reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples, the boundary negotiations will involve impacted Inuit Treaty Organizations and close consultations with territorial and Indigenous governments.
Advancing Canada’s interests through pragmatic diplomacy
A fundamental principle of Canadian foreign policy is that the Arctic should be governed by the Arctic states. This has long been a shared principle of the Arctic states and has produced a long period of peaceful cooperation and development in the region.
1. Strengthening Canada’s partnerships with Arctic allies
i. The United States
The United States is Canada’s closest partner and ally in the Arctic, and this collaboration extends across many shared interests. Collaboration is advanced by Canada’s extensive diplomatic network of 13 missions across the United States and through various bilateral mechanisms.
The Canada–United States defence partnership is essential to maintaining a secure North American homeland. Canada welcomes the continued participation of the United States’ military and coast guard in Canada-led exercises and operations in Canada’s Arctic and North.
With the United States, Canada shares a unique relationship shaped by geography, history, shared values, common interests and strong people-to-people connections. This is especially the case in the Arctic, particularly among Indigenous Peoples, whose history, culture and connections transcend national borders.
Going forward, Canada will continue to advance bilateral cooperation with the United States in the North at all levels of government in existing areas of importance and explore new avenues of cooperation in critical areas of national interest, including: security and safety; the defence of North America; science and research technology; energy security; supply chains; climate change; critical minerals; sustainable development; Indigenous cross-border mobility; economic development; marine and terrestrial conservation; and the protection of transboundary species, including salmon and the Porcupine caribou herd.
ii. The Nordic states
Canada maintains close relations with its Nordic Arctic neighbours; specifically, the Kingdom of Denmark (consisting of Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. These close relationships are underpinned by shared values, a common outlook on the world and a shared commitment to ensuring a peaceful and stable Arctic through the enduring success of NATO. They continue to grow stronger, with a particularly marked increase in dialogue and cooperation since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Now more than ever, it is critical for Canada to have strong partnerships with the Nordic states, as Canada and they are all now members of NATO and Russia’s actions have complicated cooperation in multilateral spaces of Arctic governance. Examples of Canada’s close relationships with its Nordic Arctic neighbours include the following:
- In 2022, Canada was the first country to ratify the accessions of Finland and Sweden to NATO.
- In June 2023, Canada’s prime minister was the invited guest at the Nordic prime ministers’ annual meeting, in Iceland.
- In June 2024, the Government of Canada committed up to $20 million in funding for an international research initiative on the sustainable development of the Arctic in collaboration with NordForsk, an organization under the Nordic Council of Ministers. It will support collaborative and multi-disciplinary scientific efforts and contributions from across the Arctic region and include Indigenous perspectives.
- In September 2024, Canada’s minister of foreign affairs and the premier of Nunavut co-hosted representatives from the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden for the first Canada-Nordic Strategic Dialogue, in Iqaluit, Nunavut.
Canada is committed to deepening its partnership with the Nordic countries as friends and allies with common values and shared stewardship over the Arctic. Strengthening Canada’s cooperation will also help it respond to new threats and below-threshold activities by its adversaries in both the North American Arctic and the European High North.
Working in collaboration with other federal departments, we will increase our support for bilateral and regional cooperation with the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden in Arctic science and technology, climate change, culture, Indigenous-to-Indigenous ties, natural resources, sustainable development through trade and infrastructure and defence and security.
We will also create a new position in one of Canada’s Nordic missions with responsibility for increasing coordination and information sharing, including on security issues, with Nordic partners.
iii. The North American Arctic: Alaska and Greenland
The North American Arctic encompasses the vast northern territories of 3 countries: Alaska (the United States) in the west; northern Canada in the centre; and Greenland (the Kingdom of Denmark) in the east. The relationships in this region are unique due to geographical proximity and the ancestral relations that exist between Indigenous Peoples, which give rise to a number of shared interests, including on security, defence, climate change, sustainable development, critical minerals, trade, culture and Indigenous mobility.
The ANPF emphasizes increasing cooperation among federal, territorial, provincial and Indigenous governments and other organizations in and across the Canadian Arctic and with Canada’s North American Arctic partners.
The Arctic Foreign Policy complements this by re-emphasizing the importance of deepening Canada’s diplomatic engagement with its neighbours, the United States, including Alaska, and the Kingdom of Denmark, including Greenland. This will make the Canadian and North American Arctic more secure and create new opportunities for economic cooperation, scientific collaboration and cultural exchange.
To do this, we will open new consulates in Anchorage, Alaska, and Nuuk, Greenland.
Alaska is a key partner on a range of issues, including border security and crossings, security and defence in the Arctic, climate resilience and conservation, energy security, critical minerals and Indigenous affairs.
Members of the CAF are stationed in Alaska to support the NORAD mission and work alongside their U.S. military counterparts in the defence of North America.
In addition, the Yukon also has mature and close-knit bilateral relations with Alaska from both a political and trade perspective.
The consulate in Anchorage will help promote trade and economic ties between Canada’s territories and provinces and Alaska; improve security and defence partnerships; strengthen collaboration on environmental and wildlife issues; engage with Alaskan communities, including Indigenous communities; and support cross-border people-to-people ties.
Many ties, both formal and informal, have been forged over the years at all levels of government and between Inuit organizations in Canada and Greenland. Several bilateral initiatives have been advanced in recent years, including the Letter of Intent for Cooperation on the Pikialasorsuaq (2023) and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Greenland and the Government of Nunavut (2022). However, cooperation to date has largely occurred organically, without an overarching foreign policy framework.
In recognition of the growing importance of Greenland as a key Arctic partner, a more coordinated approach with Greenland, including with the government of Nunavut, is a priority in ensuring that Canadian interests are being advanced effectively.
The consulate in Nuuk will be a valuable resource for coordinating and advancing Canadian interests in Greenland, enhancing bilateral and commercial relations, facilitating research collaboration and supporting increased engagement and collaboration across many policy spaces.
We welcome Greenland’s commitment to open a representational office in Canada.
2. Holding Russia accountable
Russia represents a generational geopolitical challenge. Although Russia accounts for 50% of the Arctic geographically, bilateral cooperation between Canada and Russia, including in the Arctic, will remain exceedingly difficult for the foreseeable future.
Canada will continue to hold Russia accountable in regional and multilateral forums for its actions and counter disinformation promoted by the Russian regime, including through Canada’s leadership of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism. This includes countering disinformation targeting communities in the Canadian Arctic.
Alongside allies and partners, Canada will continue confronting Russian aggression, including through Canada’s enduring support for Ukraine, and by continuing to meet NATO defence commitments.
Together with the United States, Canada will defend NATO’s western flank, and with Arctic allies, Canada will defend NATO’s northern regions and approaches.
Canada acknowledges that the actions of the Putin regime do not always reflect the values of the Russian people. This policy clearly differentiates between government actions and those of the broader Russian population, including its Indigenous Peoples, who themselves have been marginalized by the Russian regime.
Across all multilateral bodies, Canada will maintain its policy of limited engagement with Russian officials. It is for Russia to create the conditions that will enable a return to political engagement and cooperation by ending its war in Ukraine and acting in accordance with international law.
3. Pragmatic diplomacy with non-Arctic states and actors
While Canada will continue to prioritize cooperation with Arctic states, especially when it comes to setting the rules that govern the region, cooperation with a wider set of actors is beneficial and necessary to address challenges to the Arctic emanating from global issues, such as climate change.
Given the prospect of growing competition in the Arctic, Canada will be strategic in prioritizing pragmatic cooperation with non-Arctic states and actors that align with Canadian values, interests and objectives.
Canada will be guided by the following principles:
- Respect for Arctic states’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic.
- Support for the rules-based international order in the Arctic and a demonstrated commitment to regional peace and stability.
- Respect for Indigenous self-determination, Indigenous rights and the values, interests, cultures and traditions of Arctic Indigenous Peoples, including the participation of Indigenous Peoples in Arctic decision making, and other Arctic inhabitants.
- Respect for the extensive legal framework that applies to the Arctic Ocean, including UNCLOS.
- Recognition of interests and expertise that are relevant to, and aligned with, Canada’s Arctic and northern priorities, as well as its national defence and security interests.
- Maintaining a commitment to uphold and advance democratic values, human rights and gender equality according to international standards, regulations and principles.
- Openness with regard to scientific data sharing and collaboration with Canadian researchers and local communities, including their representative governments.
- Commitment to sustainable development, conservation, environmental protection and fighting climate change.
Engagement with non-Arctic states and actors will be channeled through a variety of multilateral forums, such as the Arctic Council, appropriate UN bodies, NATO and the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, as well as treaties that apply to the Arctic, such as the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement, and bilateral and multilateral platforms and projects that we will drive with other federal departments and agencies.
Going forward, based on the above principles, Canada will place particular emphasis on cooperation with non-Arctic states and actors in 2 regions: the North Atlantic and the North Pacific.
The North Atlantic
Canada will strengthen engagement on Arctic matters with the European Union, the United Kingdom and other key North Atlantic states through established mechanisms, such as the Canada–European Union Strategic Partnership Agreement. Science, technology and innovation will remain the focus of Canada’s cooperation with the European Union and key European states through Canada’s engagement on the European Union–United States–Canada Arctic Working Group of the All-Atlantic Ocean Research and Innovation Alliance; the Canada-European Union Ocean Partnership Forum; and the Horizon Europe program.
Other priorities for Arctic cooperation include facilitating the mobility of Inuit between Canada and Greenland; facilitating the trade of, and access to, the seal products of Inuit and other Indigenous Peoples, in the E.U. market; the conservation of fish stocks through the Canada–European Union High-Level Dialogue on Fisheries; environmental protection; climate mitigation and adaptation; trade and sustainable economic development; security cooperation through high-level dialogues; and the Canada–European Union Green Alliance.
The United Kingdom is another close partner in the North Atlantic based on Canada’s deep partnership with the country and their historic ties and shared values. The 2 countries enjoy a close-knit defence partnership, and they cooperate on shared priorities in the Arctic, including on climate change and research through the Canada–Inuit Nunangat–United Kingdom Arctic Research Programme.
The North Pacific
Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy recognizes that several Indo-Pacific states are looking to the Arctic as a region of opportunity and as a means through which to engage with Canada.
The strategy recognizes the North Pacific as part of Canada’s neighbourhood. The North Pacific, through the Bering Strait, is one of the key approaches to the North American Arctic. Canada must not undervalue the strategic importance of these approaches—Canada’s adversaries do not underestimate them. In line with the strategy, Canada will explore ways to deepen Arctic cooperation with key North Pacific states on issues of mutual interest while also responding to the emerging challenges some may represent.
In addition to Canada’s long-standing partnership with the United States on Arctic issues, focus will be given to increasing cooperation with other key partners in the region—Japan and the Republic of Korea—given the mutual long-standing relationships and shared values of the 3 nations.
Canada will work through established forums and mechanisms, such as the Arctic Council, the Canada-Japan Action Plan for Contributing to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region and the Canada-Korea Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, to identify concrete opportunities to deepen cooperation between the 4 countries on shared priorities, such as maritime security, science and technology, trade and sustainable economic development and fisheries.
While Canada is pleased to engage with Indo-Pacific states making positive contributions in the Arctic according to the principles for engagement with non-Arctic states, Canada will closely scrutinize activities of states whose ambitions or activities are potentially counter to Canadian values, interests or objectives in the region.
Leadership on Arctic governance and multilateral challenges
Despite exceedingly difficult relations with Russia, Arctic states continue to preside over a well-governed region operating under extensive national and international legal frameworks.
The Arctic Council remains the leading forum for Arctic cooperation and is complemented by other regional and international organizations, forums, declarations and legally binding treaties. These include several UN organizations that make decisions affecting the Arctic on a wide range of global issues, including climate change.
1. Reinforcing the Arctic Council
Canada is firmly committed to the enduring value of the Arctic Council and is adhering to its established Rules of Procedure. Canada remains focused on continuing the council’s important work for the benefit of the Arctic region and the people living there, including Indigenous Peoples.
Since 2021, our Global Arctic Leadership Initiative has funded the establishment of a permanent secretariat of the Arctic Council’s Sustainable Development Working Group in Canada and provided over $2 million in funding for more than 25 Arctic Council initiatives with national, civil society and Indigenous partners.
The Arctic Council exists thanks in part to Canadian and Indigenous leadership. Canada will not allow Russia’s actions to undermine the integrity or functionality of this important body. The people of the Arctic, who benefit so deeply from the important work of the council, should not be made to suffer because of Russia’s choices.
We will increase our contributions to the Arctic Council to allow for more Canadian engagement and leadership in council projects and greater institutional support for the council, as well as provide funding for innovative Indigenous and youth ideas in the council. This support is critically important as the council continues to increase its activities.
Canada will increase its leadership in the council in preparation for Canada’s third chairship of the Arctic Council, from 2029 to 2031. Working with Canadian and Arctic Council partners, Canada will meaningfully engage the Permanent Participants from Canada, territorial and provincial governments of Canada and other Indigenous partners on the planning and development of Canada’s Arctic Council chairship program.
Those essential building blocks will also provide guidance on how Canada engages in other international polar processes, such as the International Polar Year: 2032 to 2033, which is an opportunity to showcase Canada’s leadership through scientific and technological achievements, as well as by amplifying Indigenous Peoples’ voices and their rich knowledge.
2. Addressing regional and global challenges
i. Climate change and environmental protection
While the triple crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution is a global problem that requires urgent collective action, the impacts of this triple crisis are disproportionately felt by northerners. Canada has taken a dual-track approach to addressing these issues, with engagement at the multilateral level through the UN system and at the regional level through the Arctic Council.
In addition to robust domestic measures to address climate change, Canada is also working with international partners to boost global efforts to achieve the Paris Agreement goal of limiting warming to 1.5°C to avoid the most devastating impacts for the world, including the Arctic.
Cutting emissions of black carbon is the most powerful action to take to slow the pace of near-term warming in the Arctic. For this reason, Arctic states agreed to collectively reduce emissions of black carbon by 25% to 33% of 2013 levels by 2025. Canada is on track to do its part in achieving this collective goal.
Canada is also doing its part to address biodiversity loss and advance conservation domestically and globally. Canada continues to work toward conserving 30% of its lands and oceans by 2030. A large part of Canada’s protected and conserved areas fall within Canada’s Arctic and North, and many are being co-managed with Indigenous Peoples. Footnote 6
To increase cohesiveness, we will continue to leverage our diplomatic resources in support of all government efforts led by Environment and Climate Change Canada in the UN system to ensure implementation of the historic Paris Agreement, of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and of the Kunming-Montréal Global Biodiversity Framework under the Convention on Biological Diversity.
Canada’s ambassador for climate change will continue to advocate for international partners to join Canada-led initiatives on phasing out coal; reducing short-lived climate pollutants; finalizing a global treaty to end plastic pollution; protecting more of nature; and other related initiatives. The ambassador will also continue to promote any other diplomatic initiatives that address climate change. The Arctic ambassador will support this work.
Additionally, in the context of the Arctic Council’s initiatives on climate change, Canada will continue its ongoing work at a regional level to develop scientific assessments on the impacts of climate change and the state of biodiversity in the Arctic; to reduce short-lived climate pollutants in the Arctic region; to encourage the use and development of renewable energy in remote Arctic communities to exchange knowledge and implement solutions on wildfires and climate change adaptation in an Arctic context; to develop a pan-Arctic network of marine protected areas; and to implement the regional action plan on marine litter in the Arctic.
Elsewhere, we will encourage all allies to join NATO’s Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence, which is based in Montréal. Working with the Department of National Defence, we will also leverage the centre’s expertise to promote research and knowledge sharing on climate security threats in the Arctic and elsewhere.
ii. The Arctic Ocean
Canada’s exclusive economic zone in the Arctic Ocean comprises more than 3 million square kilometres. This imposes a responsibility on Canada to ensure that the area is well managed. Canada is collaborating closely with fellow Arctic Ocean coastal states and other interested parties to implement the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement, which established a precautionary 16-year ban on commercial fishing on the high seas of the Arctic Ocean, as well as a program for joint scientific research and monitoring that includes Indigenous Knowledge as a vital component to ensure that the best available knowledge is used in decision making. Canada is also ensuring that Inuit in Canada continue to be part of this process.
Canada is also prioritizing the protection of the marine environment in the Arctic Ocean in cooperation with its like-minded international and Indigenous partners. Canada maintains an indefinite moratorium on offshore oil and gas development in its Arctic waters. Canada also supports, in the absence of both a comprehensive understanding of seabed mining’s environmental impacts and a robust regulatory regime, a moratorium on commercial seabed mining in areas beyond national jurisdiction, including in the central Arctic Ocean.
Canada is committed to reinforcing rules-based initiatives in the Arctic Ocean.
In support of Fisheries and Oceans Canada, we undertake to advocate for the development of marine protected areas and other effective conservation measures in the central Arctic Ocean under the Arctic Council, thereby enabling Arctic states to lead by example in implementing the UN agreement on marine biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
We will work with other departments and agencies to continue to develop and implement international measures to promote safe and responsible shipping in the Arctic, including by supporting efforts at the IMO and the Arctic Council that complement the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (known as the “Polar Code”) and the ban on heavy fuel oil in Arctic waters.
Across all areas of Canada’s multilateral cooperation in the UN system, at the Arctic Council and under the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement, it is imperative that Arctic and northern Indigenous Peoples be meaningfully engaged in discussions when their rights or interests could be potentially impacted.
We will continue to provide funding to Indigenous Permanent Participant organizations in Canada to engage in this work. We will also advocate, alongside Arctic and northern Indigenous Peoples, for the equal treatment and inclusion of Indigenous Knowledge and science.
Adopting a more inclusive approach to Arctic diplomacy
1. Ensuring Arctic diplomacy is informed by and benefits Arctic and northern Indigenous Peoples and other northerners
The Arctic is home to more than 4 million people, including Indigenous Peoples who have inhabited the region for thousands of years. Canada is committed to a more inclusive approach to this foreign policy that ensures people living in the North, including Indigenous Peoples, are involved in international decision making on matters that affect their rights or interests.
Arctic diplomacy should be informed by and benefit Arctic and northern Indigenous Peoples and other northerners. We remain committed to this goal and will strengthen our efforts in this area, building on the approach adopted in the ANPF to remain open to holding discussions within more appropriate distinctions-based frameworks, like the Inuit-Crown Partnership Committee.
To move forward, Canada acknowledges the damaging impacts of colonialism on the Indigenous Peoples of Canada’s Arctic and North. Grounded in a commitment to reconciliation, this policy seeks to build in the Arctic foreign policy space a renewed Inuit-Crown and nation-to-nation relationship with Indigenous Peoples based on the recognition of rights, respect, cooperation and partnership.
Our work on this foreign policy will be guided by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; treaties, including land claims agreements; self-government agreements with Arctic and northern Indigenous Peoples; and the Inuit Nunangat PolicyFootnote 7. Canada’s Arctic foreign policy will also be guided by respect for territorial and provincial jurisdiction, including the devolution agreements with the Northwest Territories, Nunavut and the Yukon.
i. Arctic ambassador
The geopolitical landscape in the Arctic has become increasingly complex and competitive. To ensure that the Canadian Arctic remains a region that is stable, prosperous and secure, we need to deepen our engagement with like-minded states, as well as with territorial and provincial governments, Indigenous Peoples and other domestic partners.
To lead this effort, we will establish the position of Arctic ambassador.
The ambassador’s responsibilities will include making linkages between domestic issues and those relating to Canada’s foreign affairs; serving as Canada’s Senior Arctic Official and advancing Canada’s polar interests in multilateral forums; engaging with counterparts in Arctic and non-Arctic states, as well as with Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic; and raising awareness internationally of Indigenous rights in the Arctic context. The ambassador will also support the work of Global Affairs Canada and other departments on Arctic research security. In carrying out these duties, the ambassador will work closely with Arctic and northern Indigenous Peoples, territorial and provincial governments and other northerners.
The ambassador will serve as a representative in our diplomatic corps and distinguish himself or herself by ensuring that the Arctic Foreign Policy remains connected to the reality of Canadians living in the Arctic. The ambassador will also play an important role in Canada’s broader efforts toward reconciliation. The ambassador will have an office in Canada’s North.
ii. Northern and Indigenous diplomacy on the world stage
Canada remains committed to providing international platforms for northerners, including territorial, provincial and Indigenous partners and youths, to engage in and to represent their own international Arctic views, especially on issues that impact their rights or jurisdiction. Canada also welcomes made-in-the-North initiatives to support homegrown policy development that enhances northern and Indigenous diplomacy on the world stage.
a. Sub-national governments
Arctic and northern public governments play a strategic role in Canada’s Arctic diplomacy efforts. Canada remains committed to including territorial government officials in the Canadian delegation to Arctic Council meetings.
b. Arctic and northern Indigenous diplomacy
The Arctic Foreign Policy recommits to enhancing the representation and participation of Arctic and northern Indigenous Peoples in relevant negotiations and international forums, such as the Arctic Council and the United Nations, including the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and all other bodies that Arctic and northern Indigenous Peoples judge to affect them.
We have heard clearly from Arctic and northern Indigenous partners that they are looking for more than a platform where they are only one voice consulted among many. Instead, Indigenous partners require and demand meaningful continuous engagement to actively partake in and shape decision making at the international level that reflects their roles as rights holders. We will uphold the role of Arctic and northern Indigenous Peoples as active partners in the conduct of international relations in the Arctic and support their efforts to advance this goal.
The Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council International and the Inuit Circumpolar Council currently sit at the Arctic Council as Permanent Participants with membership from Canada.
Since 2020, Canada has increased funding to the 3 Permanent Participants in Canada, allowing each of them to receive up to $650,000 each year. This support is strengthening Indigenous voices in international Arctic matters, particularly at the Arctic Council.
With Transport Canada, we will support opportunities for the Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada to represent Inuit Knowledge and perspectives in international forums, including on Arctic shipping and environmental matters at the IMO.
Canada will also support similar efforts by other Arctic and northern Indigenous Peoples to increase their representation at relevant international forums to ensure their rights and perspectives inform decision making at the global level. Canada will work with Indigenous partners to identify possible ways of improving the capacity and role of Indigenous Peoples in international Arctic affairs.
Canada remains strongly committed to the ANPF’s objective of providing Arctic and northern youths with additional opportunities to participate in, and benefit from, Canada’s international Arctic agenda. We have leveraged support for UArctic (an international network of universities, colleges, research institutes and other organizations concerned with education and research in and about the Arctic) to provide opportunities for Canadians to study in different parts of the circumpolar Arctic, to generate regional solutions and to support collaboration in Indigenous research and education.
iii. Northern and Indigenous representation at Global Affairs Canada
Indigenous Peoples and northerners are underrepresented at Global Affairs Canada, and sustained efforts are needed to boost recruitment and retention.
In line with the Future of Diplomacy, the department is developing a new external recruitment strategy that will be launched in 2025. The strategy will support outreach across Canada to identify Canadians with the skills needed to deliver on our various mandates and will include specific outreach to under-represented communities, including among Indigenous Peoples and northerners.
To support our recruitment efforts and increase Indigenous perspectives in the department, we will establish a paid Arctic and northern Indigenous youth internship program that will consider the need of Arctic and northern Indigenous youths to remain close to their families and communities and ensure that appropriate support is in place.
We will also work with partners to identify other avenues for increasing the representation of Indigenous Peoples and northerners at Global Affairs Canada.
2. Advancing Indigenous and northern foreign policy priorities
Broadening Canada’s international engagement to contribute more directly to domestic issues, such as closing socio-economic gaps, supporting infrastructure development, enhancing knowledge of the North, protecting the Arctic environment and advancing reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples, remains a priority. Key issues include those described below.
i. Cross-border mobility
First Nations, Inuit and Métis communities in Canada’s Arctic and North share long-standing spiritual, cultural, political, economic, social and family connections with Indigenous communities in the United States and Greenland. The introduction of modern international borders and the associated controls on cross-border mobility have negatively impacted Indigenous Peoples’ ability to maintain familial, economic and cultural ties and traditional practices.
Canada has been working with Indigenous partners and the United States, Denmark and Greenland to find solutions to address border crossing and migration challenges faced by First Nations, Inuit and Métis Peoples.
This commitment is reflected in Action Plan Measure Shared Priorities 52 of the Action Plan to implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act.
To address border mobility challenges faced by First Nations, Inuit and Métis Peoples who live in the United States, including Alaska, Canada intends to bring forward legislation and regulatory measures.
ii. Market access
Indigenous Peoples also face unjustifiable barriers to trade—barriers that also restrict international market access to Indigenous-harvested and -produced goods, such as seal fur and ivory products.
The traditional harvesting of seals and other species by Inuit and other Indigenous Peoples of Canada is both a sustainable and a valuable contributor to Arctic and northern communities. Trade barriers by key partners, such as the United States, the European Union and other countries, have a broad detrimental impact on life in Canada’s remote Arctic and northern communities.
In August 2024, Canada submitted a response to the European Commission’s review of its regulation on the trade of seal products. Canada requested that the European Union repeal its regulations and replace them with rules that offer access to ethically and sustainably harvested products.
Canada will continue to advocate for a repeal of the seal product ban. We will also promote awareness of sustainable seal products and harvest management by hosting officials-level dialogues with Arctic countries and Indigenous partners at our missions to the European Union and the United States.
iii. Indigenous Knowledge and participation
Canada supports Indigenous advocacy against pervasive colonial approaches to Arctic science and research, which marginalize and discredit Indigenous Knowledge and participation.
We will continue to support equitable research partnerships at the international level between Indigenous and non-Indigenous researchers, such as the Canada–Inuit Nunangat–United Kingdom Arctic Research Programme.
iv. Indigenous languages
Indigenous languages, such as Inuktut Footnote 8, are essential to the preservation of Indigenous culture and the well-being of Indigenous Peoples and communities. Canada will therefore enhance its efforts to work with its Arctic and northern Indigenous partners to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and best practices related to Indigenous language assessment, monitoring and revitalization.
Looking forward, we will continue to contribute to federal efforts on a broader range of northern and Indigenous priorities, and we will collaborate with Arctic and northern Indigenous partners, territorial and provincial governments and other northerners on international advocacy as appropriate. This includes promoting investment in critical minerals development; transportation; energy and electrification; broadband connectivity; cultural diplomacy; and the conservation of the Porcupine caribou herd. We will also work with Indigenous partners, Canadian Heritage and other relevant government departments to advocate for the repatriation from across the globe of artifacts originating from First Nations, Inuit and Métis communities.
v. Supporting northern and Indigenous trade and export
In line with Canada’s inclusive approach to trade and its Export Diversification Strategy, we are committed to supporting northern and Indigenous exporters in accessing global markets.
The Trade Commissioner Service (TCS) recognizes that building strong relationships with our northern and Indigenous partners is key to this mission. Dedicated trade commissioners, based in regional offices for British Columbia and the Yukon; Alberta and the Northwest Territories; Quebec and Nunavut; Manitoba and Saskatchewan; and Atlantic Canada, work closely with Canadian businesses in the Arctic and northern regions to support their global expansion. The TCS network also continues to actively support and develop tailored programming for northern and Indigenous exporters, including through business delegations and export training and accelerator programs, among other ways.
Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) into northern and Indigenous communities will also play a vital role in economic and infrastructure development in the region. Through our increasing engagement with Northern and Indigenous communities via the CanExport Community Investments program, we will continue to support municipalities and economic development organizations in seeking and retaining FDI in the North while ensuring that Canada’s environmental and national security interests are protected.
3. Transforming Global Affairs Canada’s domestic engagement processes
We are committed to pursuing an ongoing collaborative approach to domestic engagement that is informed by early, sustained and meaningful engagement with territorial and provincial governments, Arctic and northern Indigenous governments and organizations and northerners more generally.
The Arctic Cooperation Advisory Committee is a Canadian forum for the engagement of relevant federal departments, territorial and provincial governments and Permanent Participant partners on the development and implementation of Canada’s international Arctic policy, including Arctic-Council-related matters. It will remain an important mechanism for dialogue and engagement on the development and implementation of Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy.
We are committed to exploring distinctions-based engagements with First Nations, Inuit, Métis, Modern Treaty and Self-Governing Partners from Canada’s Arctic and North.
For example, we are committed to engaging directly with Inuit through the Inuit-Crown Partnership Committee as we apply the Inuit Nunangat Policy to our programs, policies and services.
In addition, we will expand opportunities for territorial and provincial governments and Arctic and northern Indigenous partners to join or support Canadian delegations at bilateral or international Arctic meetings and treaty negotiations if, in such meetings and negotiations, their rights or interests could potentially be impacted.
We will also continue to provide a critical coordination function for multi-stakeholder Arctic events to support a strong Canadian presence.
Conclusion
The Arctic is a region of tremendous opportunity thanks to its plentiful resources and resilient people.
However, Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine, rapidly advancing climate change and increasing interest in the Arctic from non-Arctic states has led to increased competition and geopolitical tension in the region.
To ensure that the Arctic remains stable, prosperous and secure and to fully implement the objectives laid out in the International chapter of the ANPF, Canada needs a diplomatic strategy that responds to this evolving geopolitical context.
The Arctic Foreign Policy reorients Canada’s approach to the Arctic based on a clear-eyed assessment of the threats Canada faces today, and those it anticipates in the future. It aligns Canada’s foreign and defence policy to ensure the security of Canadians and ensures that together with its allies, Canada can guard against and defend itself against threats from its adversaries in the Arctic.
By reinforcing the pillars of Arctic governance and the principles of the rules-based international order, this policy will help to safeguard the collective interests of the peoples of the Arctic from those who would seek to impose their wills.
This policy will strengthen our relationships with territorial and provincial governments, Arctic and northern Indigenous governments and organizations and other northerners. It will produce new and more effective ways of working together on Arctic diplomacy that will transform Canada’s approach to international engagement.
Canadian diplomacy has a role to play in building renewed relationships with First Nations, Inuit, Métis, Modern Treaty and Self-Governing Partners; relationships that are based on the recognition of rights, respect and partnership.
The Arctic Foreign Policy is built on a vision of shared cooperation and prosperity for all the peoples of the Arctic who are committed to peace and stability. Together, we can realize this future and ensure Canada’s place as a leader in the Arctic for generations to come.
Annex: Canada’s Arctic foreign policy development process and Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (ANPF), published in 2019
Canada’s Arctic foreign policy development process
In the spirit of the principle of “nothing about us without us,” the Arctic Foreign Policy was developed on the basis of extensive and distinctions-based engagement and on collaboration and cooperation with domestic rights holders from Canada’s Arctic and North, including First Nations, Inuit, Métis, Modern Treaty and Self-Governing Partners and organizations; the territorial governments (the Northwest Territories, Nunavut and the Yukon); and provincial governments (Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador and Quebec). We engaged partners in a variety of formats, including bilateral meetings, regional round-table discussions and ANPF governance mechanisms.
The Arctic Foreign Policy is guided by all relevant treaties and self-government agreements with Arctic and northern Indigenous partners, including obligations Canada has to Indigenous Peoples under those treaties and agreements, and the rights recognized and affirmed under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. It is further guided by the Yukon Northern Affairs Program Devolution Transfer Agreement (2003), the Northwest Territories Devolution Agreement (2014), the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (endorsed by Canada in 2020), the Inuit Nunangat Policy (2022) and the Nunavut Lands and Resources Devolution Agreement (2024).
The policy development process was also informed by engagement with like-minded Arctic states; specifically, the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the United States.
Canada’s ANPF
Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy complements and supports the implementation of the ANPF, which was published in 2019. The ANPF was co-developed with over 25 First Nations, Inuit and Métis governments and organizations, as well as with territorial and provincial governments.
The ANPF sets out a common vision of a future where Arctic and northern peoples are thriving, strong and safe. The framework includes a co-developed policy statement and the whole-of-government International chapter, which articulates Canada’s goals and objectives for the circumpolar Arctic in 3 key areas that remain in effect:
- Strengthening the rules-based international order in the Arctic
- More clearly defining Canada’s Arctic boundaries
- Broadening Canada’s international engagement to contribute to the priorities of the Canadian Arctic
The implementation of the International chapter has been supported by Global Affairs Canada’s Global Arctic Leadership Initiative with an annual budget of $7 million each year to strengthen Canada’s global leadership in the Arctic.
The ANPF’s Safety, security and defence chapter also underlines the importance of strengthening cooperation with international partners on safety, security and defence issues.
Canada remains committed to strengthening Arctic and northern infrastructure and to closing infrastructure gaps with other regions of Canada to forge opportunities for economic development, to address reconciliation, to increase resilience and to contribute to Arctic defence and security.
Inuktitut version
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᔪᓄᑦ
English version: Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy
ᐃᓗᓕᖏᑦ
- ᑎᑭᑎᑕᐅᔪᑦ
- ᐊᒃᓚᑕᐅᒋᐊᖕᖓᐅᑏᑦ ᓀᓪᓕᑎᕐᓯᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃ
- ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᐅᒍᒪᔪᑦ ᐱᔭᕐᓃᑑᒍᑎᖏᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ
- ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᒪᓕᒉᑦ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖏᑦ
- ᐅᖃᒻᒪᕆᐅᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖃᕈᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ
- ᓇᓪᓕᖁᐊᖑᑎᑦᓯᓂᖅ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓯᕐᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᓴᐳᑦᔭᐅᓯᒪᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒍᑎᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᓗ
- ᐱᑐᑦᑎᓯᓂᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᓪᓚᕆᓖᑦ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᖕᖏᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ
- ᓲᖕᖑᓯᒋᐊᕆᓂᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒍᑎᓂᒃ
- ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᑖᕐᓂᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᓯᑦᔭᖁᑎᒥᓂᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔨᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᒥᓪᓗ
- ᓲᖕᖑᓯᒋᐊᕆᓂᖅ ᓄᓇᑖᕆᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᐅᑉ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ
- ᓴᐳᑦᔨᓯᒪᓂᖅ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒨᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᒪᐅᑎᒥᒃ
- ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᓂᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐃᓱᓕᑦᑕᕕᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖃᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᓱᒍ ᐱᕈᔭᓂᒃ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᓵᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎ
- ᓯᕗᒧᑦᑎᓯᓂᖅ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᓱᓕᓪᓚᕆᒍᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᖅ
- ᓯᕗᓕᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓯᕐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᓕᖓᔪᑦ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᕈᑎᐅᒋᐊᓖᑦ
- ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᓯᓂᖅ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᓴᐅᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ
- ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᕙᒪᑦᑐᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᑎᑕᐅᑦᓯᐊᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᖁᑎᑖᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᓪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᖑᒻᒥᔪᑦ
- ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᖓ
- ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᓪᓗ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑕᐅᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᓄᑦ
- ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᕆᒋᐊᓕᖓ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᔭᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ
- ᓯᕗᒧᑦᑎᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᑎᒍᑦ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐅᔭᐅᒍᒪᔪᓂᒃ
- ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᖁᑎᓖᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖓᑕ ᑎᑦᑕᖓᒍᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖅ
- ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕐᕕᒧᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᒍᓐᓇᓂᖅ
- ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᖏᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᖏᓪᓗ
- ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐅᖃᐅᓯᖏᑦ
- ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᓗ ᑕᐅᕐᓰᑲᑦᑕᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᓂᐅᕕᐊᑦᓴᓕᐅᕈᓐᓇᓂᒃᑯᓗ.
- ᓴᖑᑎᑦᓯᓂᖅ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᖃᖃᑕᐅᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᓯᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑕᐅᔪᓄᑦ
- ᐱᔭᕇᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍ
- ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕈᑏᑦ: ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᒪᓕᒐᖓ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑕᐅᓂᖓᑕ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑕᐅᓂᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᒧᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓄᓪᓗ ᒪᓕᒐᖓᑕ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖓ(ANPF), ᐊᒃᓚᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ 2019ᒥ
ᑎᑭᑎᑕᐅᔪᑦ
ᑐᕐᖃᑕᕐᕕᒧᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓂ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᓂᕐᓄᑦ
ᑲᓇᑕ ᐃᓂᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᖓᒥᓱᐃᖑᒍᑕᐅᕗᖅ ᓄᕗᓐᓄᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ.
ᐊᕐᕌᒍᓂ ᐊᒥᓱᓂ,ᑲᓇᑕ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕈᒫᕐᓂᐊᓲᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᓄᓀᑦ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᓯᒪᓂᖓᓃᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓗᓂ ᐊᓯᒥᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖃᕐᒥᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᓯᒪᓂᖅ ᓄᓪᓚᖓᓇᕐᓱᓂ ᐱᑕᖃᕋᓂ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᓂᒃ ᐱᓕᐅᑎᔪᓂᒃ.
ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᓵᑦᓯᒋᐊᓂᖅ ᐃᑉᐱᓇᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᒥᒃ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᓇᕐᑐᑕᓕᒃ, ᑲᑎᑎᑦᓯᓂᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᓯᕗᒧᒋᐊᕐᑎᓱᒋᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᒥᒃ ᐱᒍᒪᓂᖃᕈᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ, ᒪᑯᑎᒎᓇ ᐱᑕᙯᓐᓇᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑦᓯᓂᖅ, ᐊᕙᑎᐅᑉ ᓴᐳᑦᔭᐅᒪᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᑯᐃᔦᔩᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖓ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᖃᕐᓂᐊᑐᑦ ᐋᑐᕗᐊᒥ 1996ᖑᑎᓪᓗᖑ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ.
ᑌᒣᒐᓗᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ, ᓴᐴᓗᑌᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᕕᒋᓲᕗᑦ ᓱᔭᐅᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐋᕐᕿᕈᑎᑦᓴᓯᐅᕈᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᓱᑎᒃ ᓴᖕᖐᓕᓯᒪᓕᕐᒪᑕ. ᕉᓯᐊᑉ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᓂᖓ ᐊᖏᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᒋᓇᒍ ᔪᑯᕇᓂᐊᓐᒥᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᒍᑕᐅᓚᕿᓯᒪᓕᕐᒪᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᔭᕐᓃᑐᒻᒪᕆᐊᓗᖕᖑᑎᑦᓯᓱᓂ ᓯᕗᓂᖅ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓂᐊᕐᒪᖔᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᒐᓱᐊᕈᓐᓇᓂᕐᒥᒃ. ᓱᕐᖁᐃᓱᖕᖏᓂᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᒐᓱᐊᕈᓐᓇᓂᖅ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓂᐊᓕᕐᒥᒪᖔᑦ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓯᒪᓕᕐᒪᓃᒃ ᑮᓇᐅᑦᔭᓴᕈᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᔭᖓᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᑕᒫᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ.
ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑎᓯᔪᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒍᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᒍᓐᓀᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᐅᑉ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ; ᓯᓚ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓕᕐᑐᖅ ᓱᑲᑦᑐᐊᓗᒻᒥᒃ; ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᖕᖏᑐᑦ ᓄᓀᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᓭᓃᓯᒃᑯᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖓ, ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᒥᓱᓂ ᐊᖏᓂᕐᓴᒥᒃ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᕕᖃᕈᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ. ᑭᐅᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᓲᖑᔫᒋᐊᓕᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂᒃ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᑎᓂᕐᓴᒥᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᐃᓚᒋᓗᒍ ᐊᖏᓂᕐᐹᒥᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᒥᒃ.ᓱᓕᓗ ᑲᓇᑕ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᑦᓯᐊᖏᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᐊᑦᑕᓀᑦᑐᒥᒃ ᑖᒃᑯᓄᖓ ᑕᓪᓕᒣᓄᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᒥᓄᑦ, ᑖᒃᑯᐊᓗ ᐃᓘᓐᓇᑎᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᓕᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᖑᑲᑎᒌᑦ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᓂᖏᓐᓄᑦ.
ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᓂᖓ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᐅᑉ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᓂᕐᑎᒍ ᓄᐃᑎᕐᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᑑᑎᓚᕿᒋᐊᖃᕐᑎᓯᓯᒪᓕᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᑭᖕᖒᒪᓇᕐᓯᓱᓂ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᐅᑉ ᓵᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᓕᕐᓂᖓ ᐊᕗᖓᐅᓕᒋᐊᕐᑎᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᐅᔪᒥ, ᑐᖕᖓᕕᒋᓗᒍ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᕐᑐᑕᐅᒪᐅᑎ ᓱᓕᑦᓯᐊᑑᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᒍᓯᖅ.
ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᑉ ᐊᓯᐊᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ, ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᓂᕐᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑏᑦ, ᑲᒪᒍᑕᐅᒻᒪᑦ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᕈᑕᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᓪᓗ ᐊᑑᑎᔭᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐅᓪᓗᒥ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓂᕆᐅᓐᓂᖃᕈᑎᖏᑦ ᑲᒪᒋᒋᐊᖃᓛᕐᓱᒋᑦ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᓂ ᙯᔪᓂ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᕈᑎᖏᑦ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᓂᒃ ᑭᖕᖒᒪᓇᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖃᕈᑎᓂᒃ, ᐊᕗᖓᐅᓕᑎᓗᒍ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑎᓯᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐊᑦᑕᓀᑦᑑᓗᓂ, ᐱᑕᖃᑦᓯᐊᓂᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑦᑕᓀᑦᑑᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ.
ᑖᓐᓇ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᕙᓪᓕᐊᔪᖅ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᖁᑎᑖᕐᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᐅᕙᖕᖓᑦ, ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᒐᓱᐊᕈᓐᓇᓂᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᖃᕐᓂᕋᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ. ᐱᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᐃᓂᒥᒃ ᑐᑭᓯᒪᓂᓕᒻᒥᑦ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖓ ᑖᕐᑐᐊᓗᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᑎᑦᓯᓯᒪᔪᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᓂᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᖁᑎᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᒥᒃ, ᒪᑯᓂᖓ ᐃᓚᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᓱᕕᖃᖕᖏᑑᑎᑦᓯᓱᓂ ᐊᐅᓪᓛᑎᑦᓯᓯᒪᓂᖓ ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓇᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᖁᑦᓯᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᑎᒍᓪᓗ ᐊᑦᓯᑦᔩᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᐅᓯᒪᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᑭᓇᐅᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ. ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓯᒪᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᑦ ᐃᑉᐱᓇᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᑭᖑᕚᕇᓂᒃ ᖁᐊᕐᓵᓇᕐᑐᑰᕐᑎᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᐃᓄᓐᓂᒃ.
ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᑉ ᐊᓯᐊᓅᓕᖓᔪᒥᒃ ᒪᓕᒐᖁᑎᖓ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓯᒪᒋᕗᖅ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖁᑎᖃᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒥᒃ ᐸᓯᕕᒃᒥᒃ ᐃᓂᓐᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓯᕗᓂᕐᒥ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓯᐅᓂᐊᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ. ᖃᐅᔨᕙᓪᓚᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂᓗ, ᐱᕙᓪᓕᖁᑎᑖᕐᕕᐅᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂᓗ , ᐊᑑᑎᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᑭᖑᓂᕐᒥ ᑭᖑᕝᕕᑐᐃᒍᑎᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᒍᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᒃ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒃᑎᓯᑌᓕᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᓱᒍ 2024ᒥ ᐱᖃᔭᓕᐊᕕᓂᖅ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᑕᐅᓯᓕᑎᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖓ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᓲᖑᔫᓗᓂ ᐃᓱᒪᕐᓱᓇᕐᑑᓱᓂᓗ.
ᑲᓇᑕᒥᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓀᑦᑐᒦᑦᑎᓯᓂᕐᓴᐅᒍᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᖅ, ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ. ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᓐᓇᓂᐊᕐᓱᓂ ᓲᖑᔪᓂᒃ ᓴᐱᓕᓱᐃᑦᑑᓱᑎᓪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂᒃ. ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒍᓐᓇᓂᐊᕐᓱᓂᓗ ᓯᕗᒧᒋᐊᕈᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᓗᓂ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐅᑎᒍᒪᔭᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᖃᕐᓂᕋᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᕐᖃᒥᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᖁᔭᖁᑎᖓ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᓕᒃ ᑲᑐᑦᔭᐅᓱᓂ ᑕᐅᑐᕐᖂᕈᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᒥᒃ ᐱᑦᓪᓗᒍ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᓯᕗᓂᑦᓴᖓ; ᐃᓱᒫᓘᑎᖃᖕᖏᓚᖓ ᑲᓇᑕ ᐊᑑᑎᑎᑦᓯᓂᐊᕆᐊᖓ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕈᒪᔭᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᓗᒍ ᑖᓐᓇ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ.
ᓲᓱᒋᔭᐅᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᒥᓚᓂ ᔮᓖ, P.C., M.P.
ᑐᕐᖃᑕᕐᕕᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᖕᖏᑐᒥ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᐅᔪᓄᑦ
ᑐᕐᖃᑕᕐᕕᒧᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᔭᐅᒍᑎᓄᑦ
ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ 2019ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ, ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓄᓪᓗ ᒪᓕᒐᐅᑉ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖓ (ᑐᖕᖓᕕᒃ) ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᑲᑐᑦᔨᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᓄᑦ 25ᓄᑦ, ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ ᐊᓪᓓᓗ ᒦᑏ ᑲᕙᒪᖏᓐᓄᑦ, ᐱᓇᓱᕝᕕᐅᔪᓄᑦ, ᓄᓀᓪᓗ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᓯᒪᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᓂᓕᓐᓄᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᓄᑦ. ᓄᐃᑦᓯᒍᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᑲᑐᑦᔭᐅᓱᓂ ᑕᐅᑐᕐᖂᕈᑎᐅᓯᒪᔪᒥᒃ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᑭᖕᖒᒪᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐅᔭᐅᒋᐊᓖᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑕᐅᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐅᔭᐅᓂᖏᑦ: ᓲᖑᔫᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓴᐱᓕᔪᐃᑦᑑᓱᑎᓪᓗ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᓖᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖏᑦ ᑲᑦᓱᙰᑦᑑᒍᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ, ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓂᖃᕈᑕᐅᒍᓐᓇᓯᐊᕐᓱᓂᓗ ᐱᑕᙯᓐᓇᓂᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐ ᓄᓀᑦ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᕆᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓃᑦᑐᑦ, ᓄᐃᑕᑎᑦᓯᒍᑕᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᑑᑎᔭᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᒥᒃ ᓲᖑᓂᖃᕈᑎᖓᓂᒃ.’’
ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓂᖓ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᓄᑦ ᓄᑖᖑᑦᓱᓂ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒨᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᐊᓪᓗᕆᐊᕐᓂᖅ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᑭᑖᕈᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐊᑑᑎᒍᓐᓇᓯᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᒥᒃ ᑕᐅᑐᕐᖂᕈᓯᕐᒥᒃ ᐃᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒧᑦ. ᖃᐅᔨᒪᑎᑦᓯᒍᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑕᐅᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᒻᒪᕆᓐᓂᖏᓐᓄᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᒻᒥᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓀᑦ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᓯᒪᓂᖏᓐᓂ ᐃᓂᓖᑦ ᑲᕙᒣᑦ, ᑖᓐᓇ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᓄᐃᑕᑎᑦᓯᔪᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᑕ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᓵᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᖏᑦ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕ ᐃᓂᖃᖏᓐᓇᖁᓪᓗᒍ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᑎᐅᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ.
ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᓐᓅᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓂᐊᕐᖁᖅ ᐊᑦᑕᓀᑦᑐᒦᓐᓂᒥᒃ, ᓲᖑᔫᓗᓂ,ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᔭᖃᑦᓯᐊᓯᒪᓗᓂ ᓯᕗᓂᕐᒨᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᑖᒃᑯᓄᖕᖓᓕᖓᔪᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᓕᓐᓄᑦ, ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑕᐅᓗᓂᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖃᕐᕕᖃᕈᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦ. ᐃᓱᒪᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᑕᕈᓐᓇᐅᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᒥᒃ ᐊᒃᓚᑕᐅᒪᐅᑏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓯᕗᒧᑦᑎᓯᒍᑎᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐸᕐᓇᓯᒪᒍᑎᓂᒃ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓ ᓲᖑᔫᖏᓐᓇᖁᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑑᑎᔭᐅᒍᓐᓇᖏᓐᓇᓗᓂ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᖑᖃᑎᒌᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᐅᓯᖏᓐᓄᑦ, ᒫᓐᓇ ᓯᕗᓂᕐᒥᓗ. ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᒍᓐᓇᕈᑎᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑦᓯᒍᓐᓇᕈᑎᐅᑦᓱᑎᓪᓗ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᓕᐊᖑᔪᓂᒃ, ᑖᑦᓱᒪ ᓄᑖᑉ ᒪᓕᒐᐅᑉ ᐃᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓄᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᒍᓐᓇᑎᑕᐅᓚᕿᓂᐊᕐᖁᖅ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑕᐅᑉᐸᑦ ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᐃᓕᑦᓯᖃᑦᑕᓂᖅ ᐊᑑᑎᓯᒪᔪᓂᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᓕᓐᓂᓗ ᑲᔪᓯᔭᐅᑉᐸᑦ ᐃᓕᑦᓯᕕᖃᖃᑦᑕᓂᖅ ᐊᕗᙰᓐᓈᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᐊᑑᑎᓕᓂᐅᓂᖅ, ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᖅ , ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓯᓚᑐᒍᑎᖏᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᑦ, ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ ᐊᓪᓓᓗ ᒦᑏᑦ, ᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᒋᓯᒪᔭᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓇᒻᒥᓂᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᒍᓐᓇᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᐅᔪᑦ ᓄᓇᓖᓪᓗ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᑲᑐᑦᔭᐅᓱᓂ ᐃᓕᓐᓂᐊᑕᐅᔪᖅ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᖅ ᓲᖑᔫᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᑕᙯᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᓱᓂᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑕᖏᕐᓱᓂ ᐊᑑᑎᖃᑦᓯᐊᓱᓂᓗ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᓯᒍᑎᖓ ᑲᑐᑦᔨᓱᒍ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐅᖃᒻᒪᕆᐅᑎ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᖏᑦ ᐱᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐱᖁᔭᖁᑎᖓ.
ᐊᑐᕐᓗᒍ ᑖᓐᓇ ᐱᖁᔭᖅ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓵᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᖓ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᖁᖅ ᓲᓱᑦᓴᕈᑎᐅᓗᓂ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᓇᒻᒥᓂᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᒍᓐᓇᕈᒪᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᖁᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ, ᑐᓱᒋᔭᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᕐᖁᓯᖓᓂᓪᓗ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ. ᐱᐅᓯᑐᖃᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ, ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓂᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᓄᓐᓂᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐃᓚᖁᐊᖃᕐᒥᓗᓂᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒍᓐᓇᓗᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᑐᑭᑖᕈᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᓕᕐᐸᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒨᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᑐᑭᑖᕐᑎᓄᑦ.
ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᒪᓕᒐᖁᑎᖓ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓂᐊᕐᖁᖅ ᓯᐊᒻᒪᑎᑦᓯᓕᐅᒥᓗᓂᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᕆᓲᖓᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᓄᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑑᑎᒍᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖃᕐᕕᖃᕈᑎᖓᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂᒃ. ᓯᕗᒧᑦᑎᓯᒋᐊᕈᓐᓇᕈᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᒥᔪᖅ ᐃᓚᒌᑦ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐅᑎᒍᒪᔭᖏᓐᓂᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓂᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ, ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐊᕙᑎᖓᓂᒃ, ᓯᕗᒧᑦᑎᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᐅᒻᒥᓗᓂᓗ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᖃᑎᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓕᒫᓂᒃ.
ᓄᐃᓪᓗᒍ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᐅᓯᖅ, ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᖅ, ᓯᓚᑐᓂᖓᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ, ᑌᒪᖕᖓᓂᑐᖃᖅ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᖃᕐᓂᕋᕐᑐᑦ, ᑭᓯᐊᒐᕆᔭᐅᑦᓯᐊᓗᓂ ᑖᓐᓇ ᓄᑖᖅ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᖓᓗ, ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖃᑦᓯᐊᓂᖓᓂᒃ, ᐱᑕᖃᑦᓯᐊᓂᖓᓂᓪᓗ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᑎᑦᓯᓗᓂᓗ ᒫᓐᓇ ᓯᕗᓂᑦᑎᓂᓗ ᐃᓅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑌᒣᒍᓐᓇᑎᑦᓯᒍᑕᐅᓗᓂ.
ᓲᓱᒋᔭᐅᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᑖᓐ ᕚᓐᑖᓪ, P.C., M.P.
ᑐᕐᖃᑕᕐᕕᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦ
ᑐᕐᖃᑕᕐᕕᒧᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ
ᑲᓇᑕ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᖁᑎᖃᕐᓯᒪᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᖅ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᑦᑎᓂᒃ. ᐱᖓᓱᐃᓂᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖁᑎᑕᖃᕐᓱᓂ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᓂᓐᓂᐸᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓯᕿᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᕗᑦ,ᓄᓇᖁᑎᕗᑦ ᑲᓇᑕ ᐊᑑᑎᑦᓯᐊᕈᓐᓇᓚᕿᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᓯᒪᔭᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᓄᓇᐅᑉ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᓯᒪᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᖕᖏᓂᕐᒥᓗ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐱᐅᓯᖅ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓕᕐᑐᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ. ᓯᑯᐃᑦ ᐊᕝᕕᐊᓗᑕᐅᒍᓐᓇᖃᑦᑕᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ, ᒫᓐᓇ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᐃᓐᓇᐅᕙᓪᓕᐊᓕᕐᑐᖅ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒧᑦ ᐅᕐᖂᓯᐅᒥᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓ ᐱᓂᕐᓴᐅᓱᓂ ᓯᑕᒪᕕᓪᓗᐊᓱᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ.
ᐊᕐᕌᒍᓂ ᙯᔪᓂ, ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖓ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᖕᖑᓛᖁᖅ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᓄᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᓂᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᓭᓃᓯᓄᓪᓗ, ᑌᒣᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᑦᓴᖑᕈᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᐊᖏᔪᐊᓗᐃᑦ ᑎᑭᐅᑎᒐᑦᓴᖑᕐᐸᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᓗᑎᒃ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐊᑐᕐᓴᕈᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖓ ᑐᓱᒋᔭᐅᓕᕇᕐᑐᖅ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓄᑦ, ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂᓗ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᐅᑉ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᓐᓇᐅᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᓂᐅᑉ ᐱᓕᐅᑎᒍᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ.
ᑲᓇᑕ ᐅᐃᒪᓗᓂ ᓱᖕᖑᓯᒋᐊᕆᐊᖃᓕᕐᑐᖅ ᓄᐃᑕᓂᕐᒥᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒦ ᓄᓀᑦ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᕕᖏᓐᓂ ᐊᑭᕋᕐᒥᑕ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕈᒪᔭᖏᑦ ᐱᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᖏᓂᕐᓴᒥᒃ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᖃᓯᓗᓂ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᔭᐅᒍᓯᖏᑎᒍᑦ. ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᒨᕆᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓᑕ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓯᒪᓕᕐᒪᑦ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᕐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖃᕈᑎᓕᓐᓂᑦ ᓄᓇᓂᑦ ᐱᖁᔭᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᖑᖃᑎᒌᑦ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᒪᐅᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᖏᑕᓗ ᑎᒍᒥᐊᖏᓐᓇᕈᒪᔭᖏᑎᒍᑦ, ᑲᔪᓰᓐᓇᑐᒥᒃ, ᖃᓄᐃᑦᑑᓂᖓ ᐹᕐᓯᒪᐅᑎᒍᓯᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓕᕐᓱᓂ ᓱᑲᑦᑐᒥᒃ ᖃᕆᑕᐅᔭᕉᑏᑦ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᓕᕐᑎᑕᐅᒍᓐᓇᓕᕐᓱᑎᒃ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᖁᔭᕐᑖᖃᒻᒥᖓ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᐃᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓄᑦ ᑭᐅᑦᔪᑎᐅᕗᖅ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᓄᑦ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᕐᓇᑐᓄᑦ ᑭᓯᐊᒐᕆᓗᒋᑦ 3 ᐊᑑᑎᒍᓐᓇᕈᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᑦ: ᓱᕐᖁᐃᕈᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓲᖑᓂᖃᕈᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ, ᓯᕗᒧᒋᐊᕈᑎᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ᓄᓇᒥ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᓇᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒍᑕᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓀᑦᑐᒥᒃ, ᐱᑕᖃᑦᓯᐊᓱᓂ, ᐊᑦᑕᓀᑦᑑᓱᓂᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ. ᐱᖁᔭᖅ ᓵᑦᓯᒍᑎᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᒫᓐᓇ ᑭᖕᖒᒪᓇᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᐅᑦᓱᓂᓗ ᖃᓄᖅ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᐅᔪᖅ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓂᐊᓕᕐᒪᖔᑦ ᓯᕗᓂᑦᑎᓂ, ᐱᑕᖃᕈᓐᓇᐅᑎᐅᑦᓱᓂᓗ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᓂᕐᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᒍᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᑖᕈᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓂᒃ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖃᕐᕕᖓ ᐱᑕᙯᓐᓇᖁᓪᓗᒍ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑕᐅᓗᓂᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᐃᓄᑦᑕᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᑲᔪᓯᑦᓯᐊᖏᓐᓇᕈᓐᓇᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓀᑦᑐᒦᖏᓐᓇᓗᑎᓪᓗ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᓄᐃᑕᑎᑦᓯᔪᖅ ᐱᓇᓱᓐᓂᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᒌᒍᑎᓂᒃ ᓄᐃᑕᑎᑦᓯᓱᓂ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ᓄᑖᒥ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᒥ ᓄᑕᐅᓯᓕᑎᑦᓯᒪᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ, ᓲᖑᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐃᓱᒪᕐᓱᕈᓐᓇᓇᕐᓂᖓᓂᓪᓗ, ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑭᐅᑦᔪᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᓄᐃᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᓄᑦ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥᓗ.ᑕᕐᕋᖁᑎᕗᑦ, ᓲᖑᔫᑦᓱᓂ ᐃᓱᒪᕐᓱᓇᕐᑐᖅ ᑭᓯᐊᒐᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᖁᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᖏᓐᓄᓗ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖃᕈᑎᒥᒃ.ᓲᖕᖑᓯᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᒍᑎᑦᑎᓂᒃ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓇᓪᓕᖁᐊᖕᖑᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᓂᑎᓐᓂᒃ ᖃᕆᑕᐅᔭᓕᕆᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓯᓛᓗᒻᒥᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᑦᑎᓂᒃ. ᑫᒥᑦᓯᒍᑎᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕈᓐᓇᓂᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᑦᑎᓂᓪᓗ ᑕᒫᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᓖᑦ.
ᑲᓇᑕ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᓕᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᒪᒍᓐᓇᓂᕐᒥᓂᒃ NATO ᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ NORAD’s ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᒦᒍᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᕙᑎᒧᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᓕᒫᒥ,ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓃᑦᑐᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ. ᑌᒫᑦᓭᓇᕐᓗ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᑲᔪᓯᔪᒥᒃ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᖃᑎᒌᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓂᖓ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᒧᓪᓗ.
ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᖓ ᓄᓇᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᑭᖑᕝᕕᑐᐃᒍᑎᓕᐊᖑᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᖁᑎᑦᑎᓂ, ᓲᖑᔫᑦᓱᓂ ᐃᓱᒪᕐᓱᓇᕐᓱᓂᓗ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓂᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᖕᖏᑑᑦᓱᓂ ᐃᓂ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᓐᓇᓱᓂNORAD ᐅᓪᓗᒥᒨᓕᕐᑎᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᖓᓂᒃ NATO’s ᐊᑑᑎᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᒍᓯᖓ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᕐᒧᓗ ᑐᑭᒧᐊᒍᑎᖓ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᐅᐊᓕᓂᖓᓃᑦᑐᓂᓪᓗ ᐃᓱᓕᕝᕕᖏᓐᓂᒃ. ᓱᕐᖁᐃᕈᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᑲᓇᑕ ᐃᓚᐅᒍᓐᓇᕆᐊᖓᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ NATO ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ, ᑭᖕᖒᒪᓇᓕᕋᒥᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᕙᑦᓱᑎᒃ.
ᓯᐊᒻᒪᓗᑕ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᓗᑕᓗ ᑕᑯᑦᓴᐅᓂᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᖃᐅᔨᒪᒻᒥᔪᒍᑦ ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᓱᕐᕃᓂᖃᓚᖓᒻᒥᒋᐊᖓᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ. ᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᖃᕐᓂᕋᕐᒪᑕ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒥᖓ. ᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᖃᕐᓂᕋᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑌᒪᖕᖓᓂᑐᖃᖅ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᑖᒃᑯᓂᖓ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᐱᑕᖃᑦᓯᐊᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓂᓪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ. ᑲᕙᒪᕗᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᖃᕐᓂᐊᑐᖅ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐅᔨᓗᓂ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᑎᓯᐅᒥᑎᓗᒍ ᐃᓅᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᖓ ᑖᒃᑯᓂᖓ.
ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᖅ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᓂᖓ ᑕᑯᑦᓱᒍ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᖃᓄᑎᒌᕐᓂᖏᑦ, ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᓂᖏᑦ ᒪᓕᒑᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᔫᑉ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᓲᖑᔫᖏᓐᓇᓯᐊᕆᐊᓖᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑕᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᖁᑎᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᖁᑎᑦᑎᓂᓪᓗ. ᑖᓐᓇ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᖕᖏᑐᒧᑦ ᐃᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᓄᐃᑕᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᐅᔪᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᖃᕙᒪᖓᑕ ᐱᓇᓱᐃᓐᓇᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓯᐊᒻᒪᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᑕᑯᑦᓴᐅᓂᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂᓗ ᓲᖑᓂᖃᕈᑎᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ.
ᓱᓱᒋᔭᐅᒍᑎᓕᒃ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᐃᓕᐊᒻ ᓯᑑᓕᖕ ᐱᓕᐅᕐ, P.C., C.O.M., M.P.
ᑐᕐᖃᑕᕐᕕᑭ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ
ᐊᒃᓚᑕᐅᒋᐊᖕᖓᐅᑏᑦ ᓀᓪᓕᑎᕐᓯᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃ
ᑲᓇᑕ ᐃᓄᖁᑎᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ.
ᑲᓇᑕ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓚᐅᔪᕗᖅ ᑲᑐᑦᔭᐅᓱᓂ ᐊᒃᓚᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᒥᒃ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᒥᒃ ᐃᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒧᑦ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖏᓐᓂᒃ (ANPF) 2019ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ, ᐃᓂᓪᓓᒍᑎᐅᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᒥᒃ ᑕᐅᑐᕐᖂᕈᑎᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ, ᑕᒃᒐᓂᓗ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐱᔭᖃᑦᓯᐊᓯᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓲᖑᔫᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒐᑎᓪᓗ.
ᑌᒪᖕᖓᓂᑦ ᑕᒐ, ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᐅᒐᔭᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᓕᐅᑎᒍᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᓯᒪᔪᒻᒪᕆᐊᓗᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᒪᑯᑎᒎᓇ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖃᕐᕕᒪᕇᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᕕᖃᕋᑎᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᖁᑎᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕈᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᕙᑎᒨᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᓇᒻᒥᓂᖅ ᓯᕗᒧᒍᑎᒋᒍᓐᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᒥᓂᒃ.ᕉᓯᐊᑉ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᖏᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᖕᖏᑐᒥᒃ ᐃᑖᕐᓯᒪᓂᖓ ᔪᑯᕇᓐᒧᑦ 2022ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ, ᐅᑦᑑᑎᒋᓗᒍ, ᐊᐅᓚᑦᔭᑎᑦᓯᓯᒪᒻᒪᑦ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᑲᑐᑦᔨᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ.
ᐊᑑᑎᒻᒥᓱᓂᓗ ᐊᑕᐅᑦᓯᑰᖃᑎᐅᔪᒥᒃ, ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐃᓱᒫᓗᓐᓇᑐᒥᒃ ᐊᕙᑎᖓ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓱᓂ, ᐃᑉᐱᓇᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᒥᒃ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓱᓂ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓖᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ. 2050ᐅᓕᕐᐸᑦ,ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖓ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒍᓐᓇᓯᓕᐅᒥᒻᒪᕆᓛᕐᖁᖅ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᕕᐅᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᑯᕐᖓᓂ ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᑕ ᓭᓃᓰᓪᓗ ᐅᐱᕐᖔᑯᑦ.
ᓯᕗᓂᖓᒍᑦ ᑌᒣᓚᐅᕐᓯᒪᖕᖏᓗᑐᕐᓱᓂ, ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᑕᑯᑦᓴᐅᕗᖅ ᑐᓱᓐᓇᓂᖓ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᓄᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᖕᖏᑐᓄᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓂᕆᐅᒍᑎᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᖏᓂᕐᓴᒥᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᒍᓐᓇᕈᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᔭᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᓴᕐᑐᑎᖏᑦ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᒥᔪᑦ ᓲᖑᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᑐᕈᓐᓀᓗᑎᒃ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᓂᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᖃᕆᑕᐅᔭᓕᕆᐅᑎᓂᒃ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓂᒃ ᐱᔪᑦ ᐊᕝᕕᖁᑦᑕᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓵᓚᕐᖄᖃᕈᑎᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕈᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ.
ᐊᒥᕆᑲᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓ ᐊᑦᑐᐊᔭᐅᖕᖏᑑᒍᓐᓀᑐᖅ ᐅᖁᒣᑦᑐᓄᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᓕᐅᑎᒋᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᓕᕐᑐᖅ ᖃᓂᓐᐸᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᒥᓂᒃ, ᐊᒥᕆᑲᒥᒃ, ᑎᒍᒥᐊᖏᓐᓇᓂᐊᕈᓂ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᖕᖏᑑᑦᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᕆᔭᐅᔪᒥᒃ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᖃᓂᑦᑑᒍᓐᓇᕕᓕᒫᕆᐊᖃᓕᕆᕗᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓄᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᒥᓄᑦ.
ᑭᐅᑦᔪᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑖᒃᑯᓄᖓ ᓄᐃᔪᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᐅᓯᕐᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᐅᓯᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑕᐅᑦᓯᑰᖃᑕᐅᓕᐅᒥᑎᓗᒍ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑏᓕᓂᕐᒨᓕᖓᔪᒧᑦ ᓄᑕᐅᓯᓕᑎᕐᑕᐅᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ, ᓲᖑᔫᑦᓱᓂ ᐃᓱᒪᕐᓱᓱᓂᓗ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓯᒪᔪᖅ, ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ, ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᑦ ᐊᓯᐊᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᒥᒃ ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕆᒍᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᐊᒃᓚᓯᒪᔪᖁᑎᖓᓂᒃ ANPF. ᑖᓐᓇ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᒪᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓐᓇᖏᑦᑐᒦᑦᑎᓯᓗᓂ, ᐱᑕᖃᑦᓯᐊᓗᓂ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᖕᖏᑑᓗᓂᓗ ᑭᖑᕚᖑᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐱᓪᓗᒋᑦ.
ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᑦ ᐊᓯᐊᓅᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᓄᑖᓂᒃ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᖁᑎᖃᕐᑎᓯᒍᑕᐅᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᓂ ᑕᓪᓕᒪᓂ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᒍᓰᑦ ᐱᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ Footnote 1-1 ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᓈᒻᒪᓈᕐᖁᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ. ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᑎᑦᓯᒥᕗᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᓲᖕᖑᓯᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᕐᓂᖅ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᒍᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᓀᑦ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᓯᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ.
ᐱᔭᖃᕐᓂᐊᕈᓂ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒥᖓ ᐊᐅᓚᖕᖏᓂᕐᒥᒃ, ᐱᑕᖃᑦᓯᐊᑑᑦᓱᓂ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒐᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᖃᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᐊᑦᑕᓀᓕᑎᕆᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖃᕈᑎᒥᓂᒃ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᓱᓕ ᓯᕗᒧᒋᐊᕐᑎᓯᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᓱᓕᑦᓯᐊᑑᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᓂᖅ; ᓯᕗᓕᕈᑎᖃᕐᓗᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓯᕐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᕈᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ, ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᓯᓗᓂᓗ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᓴᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᓂᕐᓄᑦ.
ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑖᑦᓱᒧᖓ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᒧᑦ:
- ᑎᒃᑯᐊᓯᓂᐊᕐᖁᖅᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᑦᐱᓪᓗᒋᑦᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎᓴᒥᒃ
- ᐅᒃᑯᐃᑕᐅᓗᓂᓄᑖᖅᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᕕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅᐋᖕᖑᕆᑦᐊᓛᔾᑲᒥ
- ᐅᒃᑯᐃᓗᒍᓄᑖᖅᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᕕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅᓅᒃᒥ, ᐊᑯᑎᑦᑐᒥ
- ᐱᒋᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍᑕᕐᕋᒥᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑎᓯᑦᑏᓕᓂᐅᑉᐅᖄᔭᐅᖃᑦᑕᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᐅᖃᖃᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦᑐᕐᖃᑕᕐᕖᑦᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉᓯᓚᑖᓃᑦᑐᓄᑦᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᔭᐅᒍᑎᓄᑦᐃᓱᒪᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦᓄᓇᖁᑎᖏᑦᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ
- ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᓗᒍᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃᖃᐅᔨᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᖃᖃᑦᑕᓂᖅᐃᓚᒋᓗᒋᑦᐊᑦᑐᐊᔭᐅᔪᑦᓄᓀᑦᐊᕕᑦᑐᓯᒪᓂᖏᓐᓃᑐᑦᐊᒻᒪᓗᑲᕙᒣᑦᓄᓇᖁᑎᑖᕆᓯᒪᔭᒥᓐᓃᑐᑦᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉᐊᕕᑦᑐᓯᒪᓂᖏᓐᓂᐊᒻᒪᓗᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᑦᓯᕗᓕᕐᑏᑦᓄᐃᕙᓪᓕᐊᔪᓄᑦᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᖓᑕᐊᐅᓚᑦᔭᑕᐅᒍᑎᒋᓯᒪᓕᕐᑕᖏᓐᓄᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉᓯᓚᑖᓂᑦᐱᔪᑦᐅᓚᐱᑦᑐᑦᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᓯᓯᒪᓂᖏᑦ
- ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓗᒍᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᖅᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᓗᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᖏᑦᑕᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᑦᒪᓕᒐᖅᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᔪᖅᐃᓱᒪᒋᖃᓯᐅᑦᔨᓯᒪᑎᓪᓗᒍᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᓂᖏᓐᓄᑦᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᒧᑦᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᒧᑦᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᕐᒧᓗᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ
- ᐱᒋᐊᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦᓄᓇᐅᑉᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᑦᓴᖏᓐᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᑎᒃᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᐅᒋᐊᓖᑦᐃᓚᒋᓗᒍᒋᑦᐊᒥᕆᑲᒥᐅᑦᐱᓪᓗᒍᐃᒪᕐᐱᒃᐴᕚᕐᒥᐱᔭᕇᕐᓗᒍᓗᓄᓀᑦᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᑦᓴᖏᑦᑕᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᑲᓇᑕᒨᓕᖓᔪᖅᑎᓐᒫᒃᒧᓗᐱᓪᓗᒍᑖᕐᑐᐹᓗᒃ (Hans Island)
ᑲᓇᑕ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᑐᓂᒪᓂᕐᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᑕᖏᕐᓗᓂ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᑕᐅᒋᐊᓕᒻᒥᒃ ANPFᒥᒃ, ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓂᖏᑦᑕ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᒪᓕᒉᑦ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᓖᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒨᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᒪᐅᑎ Footnote 1-2 ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᖅ. ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᓄᑖᓂᒃ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐱᓇᓱᒍᑎᑦᓴᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᓐᓄᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᑎᑦᓯᒍᓐᓇᓯᓗᓂ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ANPF ᒧᑦ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᑐᕈᑎᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᐅᑎᓂ ᐊᒃᓚᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᓐᓂ.
ᑖᓐᓇ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓄᓕᖓᔪᓄᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᖃᕐᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᖓᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓀᓕᑎᑦᓯᓂᐊᕐᖁᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᓪᓗ ᐊᑦᑕᓀᑦᑐᒦᑦᑎᓯᓗᓂ ᐱᑕᖃᑦᓯᐊᖏᓐᓇᕈᓐᓇᑎᑦᓯᓗᓂᓗ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᖃᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ-ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᓪᓓᑦ, ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ-ᐊᒃᓚᖓᔪᐃᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᕙᒪᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᐅᕐᓰᑲᑦᑕᐅᑎᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓇᒻᒥᓂᖅ ᐃᓱᒪᕐᓱᕈᓐᓇᓯᒍᒪᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑕᐅᔪᑦ-ᐊᓯᖏᓪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᖑᖃᑕᐅᒻᒥᔪᑦ.ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᖏᑦ ᓲᖑᓂᕐᓴᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᐅᒍᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᖏᑎᒍᑦ, ᐱᕐᖁᓯᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕈᓯᖏᑎᒍᓪᓗ, ᐃᓚᐅᒻᒥᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐃᓅᓯᕐᒥᓂ ᐊᑑᑎᖃᑦᑕᓯᒪᔭᖏᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᖃᕐᓂᕋᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ.
ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᐅᒍᒪᔪᑦ ᐱᔭᕐᓃᑑᒍᑎᖏᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ
1. ᕉᓯᐊ ᑌᒪᖕᖓᓂᑦ 2022ᒥᓂᑦ
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᑐᑭᓯᓇᑦᓯᐊᓯᒪᒻᒪᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᓂᐊᕆᐊᖓ ᕉᓯᐊᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ, ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᑎᒍᓪᓘᓃᑦ, ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᖏᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᒐᓂ, ᐱᕕᓕᒫᒥᓄᑦ ᐃᑖᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖓ ᔪᒃᕇᓐ ᕕᕈᐊᕆ 2022ᒥ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᓱᓂ.
ᕉᓯᐊᑉ ᐱᕕᓕᒫᕐᓱᓂ ᐃᑖᕐᓯᒪᓂᖓ ᔪᑯᕇᓐᒧᑦ ᐃᑉᐱᓇᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᒥᒃ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᑎᑦᓯᓯᒪᒻᒪᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᒍᓯᐅᑉ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓂᖓᓂᒃ, ᓯᑦᓯᑐᕐᓱᒍ ᐊᓪᓛᑦ ᓱᕐᕋᑕᐅᓂᖓ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ. ᐅᓇᑕᕐᓂᓂᖅ ᔪᑯᕇᓐᒥᑐᐃᓐᓇᐅᖏᑦᑐᖅ, ᒪᑯᑎᒎᓇᒐᓴᒃ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᒻᒪᕆᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᖑᖃᑎᒌᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖏᑦᑕ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᓲᓱᒋᔭᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖃᕐᕕᖃᕈᑏᑦ, ᓄᓀᑦ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᑦᑕ ᓱᓕᑦᓯᐊᕈᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᑦᑕ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒨᓕᖓᔫᓪᓗ ᒪᓕᒐᐅᑉ.
ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑕᑯᑦᓴᐅᓂᖓ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᓂᖓᑕ ᕉᓯᐊᑉ ᐱᕙᒃᔪᐊᓱᓂ ᐊᑑᑎᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᖓ ᔪᑯᕇᓂᐊᓐᒥᒃ ᐃᓄᖏᓐᓂᓗ, ᕉᓯᐊᑉ ᐊᖓᔪᕐᖄᖓ ᐴᑎᓐ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᓂᖓ ᔪᑯᕇᓂᐊᓐᒥᒃ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᒨᕐᑎᓯᓯᒪᒻᒪᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᑎᑦᓯᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᓂᔪᐊᒥᒃ ᐃᒣᑦᑎᓯᒍᓐᓇᓱᓂ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᑦ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᑦ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᑐᓚᕿᑎᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᑉᐱᐊᓇᕿᓂᖅ ᐊᑐᕐᓗᒍ.
ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ ᑐᑭᓯᒪᒻᒪᑕ ᖃᓄᑎᒋ ᖃᓂᑦᑑᑎᒋᒻᒪᒐᑦ ᕉᓯᐊ ᑕᕐᕋᒧᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕ ᑕᑯᓐᓇᕋᓱᑦᓯᐊᕆᐊᓕᒃ ᐱᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᒣᓐᓂᕋᕈᑎᖏᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖃᕐᓂᕋᕐᓂᑯᑦ ᖃᓂᑕᖃᕐᓂᖓ ᕉᓯᐊᒥᒃ.ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑉ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᖏᑦᑕ ᐃᓂᖓ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᒐᓱᐊᕐᕕᒋᑦᓱᒍ, ᐃᓂᓕᒃ ᐳᑦᔪᓇᒥ ᕿᑭᕐᑕᒥ, ᓄᓇᕗᑦ, ᖃᓂᓐᓂᓴᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑏᑦ ᕉᓯᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᒥᕝᕕᖁᑎᖓᓐᓄᑦ ᐃᓂᓕᒻᒧᑦ Nagurskoyeᒥ, ᕉᓯᐊᒥ,ᐃᖃᓗᐃᑦ ᖃᓂᖕᖏᓂᕐᓴᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐋᑐᕗᐊᒧᑦ ᑐᕌᓐᑐᒧᓪᓘᓃᑦ ᕗᐃᓂᐲᒃᒧᓘᓐᓃᑦ.
ᐊᕐᕌᒍᐃᑦ ᖁᓕᑦ ᐅᖓᑖᓄᑦ ᕉᓯᐊ ᓴᓂᕐᕚᔦᖃᑦᑕᓯᒪᓕᕐᑐᖅ ᓄᑕᐅᓯᓕᑎᕆᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐱᐅᓕᓂᐊᒐᖁᑎᒥᓄᑦ ᐃᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᖏᑦᑕ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᕆᒍᓐᓇᑕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᐃᑎᕆᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᒍᓐᓇᓯᒍᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᓪᓗ ᑎᑭᐅᑎᒍᓐᓇᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒧᑦ,ᐱᑦᔪᑎᑐᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᓇᒻᒥᓂᕐᒥᓄᑦ ᐅᐊᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᒥᑎᒍᑦ ᓵᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᒥᑎᒍᓪᓗ. ᑕᐅᑐᑦᑕᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᖁᑎᖃᕐᓂᐊᕆᐊᒥᓂᒃ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ᐃᓂᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᖃᓚᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᑯᑦ ᐊᕐᖁᓯᐅᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᐱᕙᕐᔪᐊᓗᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᓄᑦ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᑰᕐᑎᓯᒍᓐᓇᓯᕕᒋᓗᒍ. ᐃᓱᒪᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᐅᒋᐊᓖᑦ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᕉᓯᐊ ᐃᓂᓪᓓᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᖁᑎᒥᓂ, ᑲᓇᑕᓗ ᓂᕆᐅᒋᔭᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑏᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑕᐅᓚᖓᒋᐊᖏᑦ.
ᕉᓯᐊ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᒍᑎᖃᕐᓯᒪᒻᒥᔪᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᑎᑦᓯᓯᐊᖕᖏᑑᒍᒪᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᒥᓂᒃ, ᐊᑑᑎᔭᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑏᑦ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ, Footnote 1-3 ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑑᑎᑎᑦᓯᓱᓂ ᑲᑉᐱᐊᓵᕆᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒪ ᑐᖕᖓᓀᑦᑐᔪᐊᖑᑦᓱᓂ, ᐃᓅᖃᑎᒌᑦᓯᐊᓇᖕᖏᑑᓱᓂ ᐅᐊᓕᓂᕐᒦᑐᓄᑦ,’’ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᓇᒻᒥᓂᖅ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᑕᖃᕐᑎᓯᑦᓱᓂ ᓱᓕᔫᓂᕋᕈᑎᒋᑦᓱᖑ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ.
ᕉᓯᐊᑉ ᐊᑑᑎᓯᒪᓂᕐᒥᒍᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᐅᓯᖓ ᐃᒣᒻᒪᑦ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᕕᖃᕐᕕᖃᕋᓱᐊᕐᓱᓂ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓗᒍᓗ ᓇᒻᒥᓂᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᖁᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓱᓕᕝᕕᖃᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᓱᓇᔨᐅᕕᖃᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᖕᖏᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑏᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᔭᐅᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ.ᑌᒣᒐᓗᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ, ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᖏᕐᑕᐅᒍᑎᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᖏᔪᒻᒪᕆᒻᒥᒃ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᕐᑐᓂᖓ ᐊᖏᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᖕᖏᑐᒥᒃ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᓱᓂ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᓱᒍ ᔪᑯᕇᓂᐊᓐ, ᕉᓯᐊ ᑭᖕᖒᒪᑦᓯᐸᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᖅ ᓭᓇᒥᒃ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᖃᕐᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᓂᕐᒥᓗ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑕᒥᓄᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ. ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊ ᐃᓚᓖᑦ ᐱᑦᓴᒫᕈᑎᑦᓴᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᐅᕐᓱᕈᑎᑦᓴᔭᒥᒃ ᐅᕐᓱᐊᓗᑦᓴᔭᒥᓪᓗ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᔭᐅᒍᑎᖏᑦᓐᓂᒃ,ᐄᒐᕐᕖᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᓪᓗ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᓖᑦ ᐱᐅᓕᓂᐊᒐᒻᒪᕇᑦ. ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᕗᑦ ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐊᑑᑎᔪᖅ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑕᐅᓚᖓᒋᐊᖓ ᓯᕗᓕᕈᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᓭᓇᐅᑉ ᕉᓯᐊᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ.
ᕉᓯᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᓭᓇᒥᐅᓪᓗ ᑐᑭᓯᒪᐅᑎᒍᑎᓖᑦ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕈᒪᔭᒥᓂᒃ ᐲᕐᓯᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒎᑕᐅᓯᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᓂᒃ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᐱᐅᓯᖃᕈᑎᑎᒍᑦ, ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᑖᒃᑯᓅᖓ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᕋᓕᓲᐹᓗᒃ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᖕᖏᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᖏᑦᑕ. ᕉᓯᐊ ᑭᖕᖒᒪᑦᓯᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᖅ ᓭᓇᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓴᖑᑎᑎᕆᓕᕐᓱᓂ ᐊᑑᑎᖃᑦᑕᓯᒪᔭᒥᑎᒍᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᐅᓯᕐᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᕈᐃᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᖁᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᓭᓇᒧᑦ. ᐅᑦᑑᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᔪᓓ 2024ᒥ, ᕉᓯᐊᓗ ᓭᓇᓗ, ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓱᑎᒃ 2022ᒥ ᐅᖃᒻᒪᕆᐅᑎᒥᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᐊᓂᕋᐅᑎᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᑲᑐᑎᑦᓱᒍ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᓂᒃ ᐱᔭᕆᐅᕐᓴᑎᑦᓯᓂᖅ ᕉᓯᐊᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖁᑎᖓᓂ.ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍ, ᕉᓯᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᓭᓃᓰᓪᓗ ᐅᓇᑕᐅᑎᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᖁᑎᖏᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᐊᖃᑎᒌᑦᑐᕕᓃᑦ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᔭᕐᕕᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐃᒪᖁᑎᖃᕐᕕᖓᓐᓂᒃ Aleutian ᕿᑭᕐᑕᖏᓐᓂ, ᒪᕐᕉᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔨᖏᒃ ᑲᑐᑎᑦᓱᒍ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᔭᕐᕕᓕᕕᓃᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥᒃ; ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᕉᓯᐊᑉ ᓭᓇᐅᓪᓗ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᖏᑦ ᖃᖓᑦᑕᔫᒃᑯᑦ ᖃᖓᑕᑎᑕᐅᖃᑦᑕᓯᒪᓕᕐᓱᑎᒃ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᕉᓯᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᓭᓃᓰᓪᓗ ᖃᖓᑦᑕᔫᖏᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᔭᐅᖃᑦᑕᓯᒪᓕᕐᓱᑎᒃ, ᓇᒧᖕᖓᓂᖏᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᔭᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᕐᖃᑎᑕᐅᖃᑦᑕᓯᒪᓕᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᔨᓄᑦ (NORAD) ᖃᖓᑕᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᓛᔅᑲᐅᑉ ᕿᓚᒃᑯᑦ ᐃᑖᕐᑕᐅᑌᓕᕕᖓᑕ ᓇᓗᓀᕐᑕᐅᒪᕕᖓᓂ.ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᓄᐃᑕᑎᑦᓯᔪᖅ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᑐᑦᔨᓱᑎᒃ ᓭᓃᓰᑦ ᕉᓯᐊᒥᐅᓪᓗ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᖏᑦᑕ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ, ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐸᓯᕕᒃᒥ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᕕᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ.
2. ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕈᑏᑦ
ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐸᕐᓇᓯᒪᓂᕐᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᕗᖅ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᑕ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑑᑉ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᐅᑉ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖓᑕ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᑕᐅᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ (NATO’s) ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐅᐊᓕᓂᕐᒥᓗ ᐃᓱᓕᕝᕕᖏᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕈᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ, ᕋᓗᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ, ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᓂᖓᑕ ᑕᑯᑦᓴᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᓕᒫᒦᑦᑐᑦ.
ᐊᓐᓇᐅᒪᒍᓐᓇᓂᖅ, ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᓗ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᓂᖓᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖁᑎᖓᑕ ᐱᖕᖑᐊᕈᑕᐅᒐᓂ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐅᔭᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᐃᓕᖓᔪᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᓐᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᓱᓂ ᑐᑭᓯᒪᐅᑎᒍᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᑕ.ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᑖᕆᓯᒪᔭᖏᑦ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᑕ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᒍᑎᓖᑦ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᓄᑦ ᖃᖓᑦᑕᔫᒃᑯᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᒥᐅᓄᓪᓗ, ᑖᑯᐃᓇᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᒪᕐᕈᐃᖑᑦᓱᑎᓪᓘᓃᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍ NORAD, ᑖᓐᓇ ᒪᕐᕈᐃᖑᕕᐅᔪᖅ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᓄᑦ.
ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕈᑕᐅᓂᖓ ᐅᓇᑖᕐᑏᑦ ᓱᒋᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᑦᑕ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᑕ ᑕᕐᕋᖁᑎᖓᓂ ᐊᑑᑎᓂᐅᔭᓪᓗᐊᖏᑦᑑᒐᓗᐊᖅ, ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᓄᓇ ᓄᐃᑕᑎᑦᓯᒪᑦ ᓄᓇᖕᖑᐊᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐱᐅᓯᕆᔭᐅᔪᑐᖃᕐᓄᑦ ᓄᐃᕙᓪᓕᐊᔪᓄᓪᓗ ᓱᒋᐅᑎᓄᑦ ᐱᐅᓯᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑎᓯᔪᓄᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᒃᓛᓐᑎᒃ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᐅᓂᖓᑕ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᓐᓄᑦ.ᑲᓇᑕ ᑕᑯᖃᑦᑕᓕᕐᒪᑦ ᐊᒥᓱᓂᒃ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᒨᕈᑕᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᕉᓯᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᓕᐅᒥᓯᒪᓂᖓ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᖃᖓᑦᑕᔫᒃᑯᑦ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ, ᓭᓇᐅᑉ ᖃᖓᑦᑕᑎᑦᓯᕋᓕᖃᑦᑕᓂᖓ ᒪᕐᕈᐃᖑᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᑐᓚᖓᔭᒥᓂᒃ-ᑕᒣᑎᒍᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᑯᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᑎᑦᓯᓂᒃᑯᓗ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᓂᒃ-ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᑎᓂᒃ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᓂᒃ ᐃᓄᑦᑕᖃᕐᑎᓯᓂᒃᑯᓗᑦᓄᐊᑦᓯᒍᑎᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᖃᕆᑕᐅᔭᒦᑦᑐᓴᓂᒃ,ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᑯᑦ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᓃᑦ. ᐊᑭᕇᕃᑦ ᐱᓕᐅᑎᔩᓪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑕᐅᑎᑦᓯᒥᔪᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᓴᐅᒪᔮᑦᑕᐅᑎᑦᓯᓱᑎᒃ ᑐᓱᓕᕐᑎᓯᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᓂᒃ, ᐱᑦᓯᐊᖏᑦᑑᓱᑎᒃ ᖃᕆᑕᐅᔭᕈᑏᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᓱᒋᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑎᕐᓕᐊᓯᔨᖁᑎᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐅᓚᐱᑦᓱᑎᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᖁᑎᒋᖕᖏᑕᒥᓂᒃ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᓱᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ.
ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᖃᓂᑕᕆᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᒥᐅᑦ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᖅ ᑲᒪᒋᑦᓯᐊᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓀᑦᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᐅᑉ,ᓲᖑᔫᓗᓂ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᑦᓯᐊᓗᓂᓗ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᑕ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᕆᔭᐅᓂᖓ, ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᒪᕐᕈᐃᖑᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᒃ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᒥᒃ ᐱᑕᖃᑦᓯᐊᓂᐊᕈᒪᒍᑎᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᕕᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ.ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᖅ ᐊᑑᑎᑎᑦᓯᓭᓕᓂᖅ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᕐᓗ ᑌᒣᕝᕕᒋᓗᒋᒃ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ ᐊᑦᓛᓐᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂᓗ ᐸᓯᕕᒃ. ᓂᕆᐅᒋᔭᖃᕐᑐᒍ ᑲᓇᑕ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᓗ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᐊᕆᐊᖏᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍᓗ, ᐊᑑᑎᔭᐅᒋᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᒻᒪᑦ ᑌᒣᓐᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥ ᐊᑦᑕᓀᑦᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᑕᖏᑎᒍᑦ.
ᓲᖑᔫᑦᓱᓂ ᓴᐱᓕᔪᐃᑦᑑᓱᓂᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᓖᑦ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᕕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᓐᓄᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᐱᓪᓗᒋᑦ.ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓗᒍ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓ ᐅᖁᒣᓪᓕᐅᑎᑕᐅᓂᐅᑉ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓕᐅᑎᖃᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᖓᑦ ᐱᔭᐅᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ,ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᔭᕆᐊᕈᑎᖃᕆᐊᓕᒃ ᓲᓱᒋᔭᐅᒍᓐᓇᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᓇᐅᓕᒫᓅᓕᖓᔪᓂ ᐱᓇᓱᕝᕕᐅᔪᓂ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᓗᒍ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᓂᖅ ᐃᓱᒪᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖃᕐᓗᑎᒃ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᑕ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᔭᐅᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᒧᓪᓗ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᐅᒋᐊᓖᒃ ᑲᑐᑎᓗᒋᒃ ᑕᒪᒃᑯᓂᖓ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᒨᕈᑎᐅᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᐃᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᐅᓗᑎᒃ.
ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᖁᑦᓯᑐᒥ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑌᒫᓪᓗᐊᖅ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᓂᖃᕐᒥᔪᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕐᕕᓴᑦᓯᐊᖑᓂᖓᑕᓗ ᖃᓄᐃᖕᖏᓯᐊᖏᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ.
ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᓂᒥᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖁᑎᖓ ᐱᓕᐅᑎᒍᑕᐅᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᖅ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᓄᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕈᑎᒋᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᓕᖏᑦ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᑦ ᐱᖁᑎᒻᒪᕇᑦ, ᐃᒪᑉᐱᐅᑉ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓ,ᐃᓱᒫᓗᓐᓇᖏᑦᑑᓗᓂᓗ, ᐃᓚᐅᒻᒥᑎᓪᓗᒋᓪᓗ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᐃᓱᒫᓗᒋᔭᐅᒍᑎᖏᑦ.ᕉᓯᐊ ᐅᐸᐅᑎᑎᑦᓯᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᖁᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᒍᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᖃᖓᑦᑕᔫᒃᑯᑦ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᑎᒍᓪᓗ ᐅᓇᑕᐅᑎᑕᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐅᓇᑕᕈᑎᓪᓗᐊᖑᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᓂᒃ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᐅᓪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᒪᓐᓇᓗ ᐱᓀᓗᑕᖕᖑᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕈᓐᓇᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑎᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒥᓂᓪᓗ. ᕉᓯᐊᑉ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᕕᖃᕐᕕᒥᑕ ᐅᖓᑖᓄᑦ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᖏᑦ, ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑏᑦ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᑲᔪᓯᔪᒥᓪᓗ ᐆᑦᑐᕋᖃᑦᑕᓂᖓ ᐅᓇᑕᐅᑎᓂᒃ ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᑕ ᑕᕐᕋᖁᑎᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓀᓗᑦᓰᓯᒪᒻᒪᕆᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ.
NATO ᓲᖕᖑᓯᒋᐊᕆᓯᒪᓕᕐᑐᖅ ᐃᓱᓕᑦᑕᕕᓕᐅᕆᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᓐᓂᐊᓂᕐᒧᓗ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᐅᓯᕐᒥᓂᒃ,ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᑕ ᑕᕐᕋᖁᑎᖓ, ᑭᐅᑦᔪᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᓄᑦ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᑎᑕᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᕉᓯᐊᑉ. ᐱᒍᓐᓇᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᖏᑦ ᕕᓐᓚᓐ ᒧᕗᐃᑕᓐᓗ NATOᒥᒃ 2023 ᐊᒻᒪᓗ 2024ᒥ , ᑖᓐᓇᑐᐊᖑᑦᓱᓂ,ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑕᐅᓚᐅᔪᕗᖅ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᓂᒃ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᐅᓯᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃ, ᑎᑭᐅᑦᔨᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᓯᖏᑦ ᐱᒐᓗᐊᕐᒥᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ, ᐃᑉᐱᓇᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᒥᒃ ᕿᐅᔭᓇᕐᑐᒦᓕᓂᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖃᑦᓯᐊᓱᑎᓪᓗ, NATOᒨᕈᑦᔨᓱᒍ,ᑕᒃᒎᓇ ᓲᖕᖑᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᑕ ᑕᕐᕋᖁᑎᖓᓄᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐸᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐋᕐᕿᒋᐊᕆᓚᐅᔪᔪᖅ ᐊᑐᓂ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᒋᓯᒪᔭᒥᑎᒍᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕ ᑲᔪᓯᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᑎᑦᓯᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑑᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍᓗ NATO ᐊᐅᓚᑕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐅᐸᐅᑎᓯᒪᓂᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᑕ ᑕᕐᕋᖁᑎᖓᓄᑦ.
ᐊᓯᑦᔨᕋᓗᐊᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᑯᑦᓴᐅᒍᓯᖏᑦ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᓯᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᓖᑦ, ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᒥᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᒍᒪᓯᒪᖕᖏᑕᖓ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᓄᑦ ᐹᕐᓯᖓᐅᑎᕕᐅᓯᓗᓂ.ᑲᓇᑕ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᖃᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᕆᓲᒥᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᒃᑯᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᓐᓃᑐᓂᒃ, ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᓂᓪᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᒥᓂᓪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒥᓂᓪᓗ ᐃᓘᓐᓈᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᓕᐅᒥᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑏᑦ, ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐅᒥᑎᓗᒍ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓲᖕᖑᓯᐅᒥᑎᓗᒍ ᓇᒻᒥᓂᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᒍᓐᓇᓂᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᓂᖅ.
ᑲᓇᑕ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᔭᕆᐊᕈᑎᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᒥᔪᖅ ᓱᕐᕋᑕᐅᓪᓗᐊᖏᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᒫᓐᓇᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᓄᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓄᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᐅᓗ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᒨᕐᑕᐅᒍᑎᒋᓯᒪᓕᕐᑕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐃᓄᐃᓪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑑᑎᓕᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᒫᓐᓇ ᐃᓂᒥ ᐱᓕᐅᑎᕕᐅᔪᒥ.
3. ᓱᖏᐅᑎᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᓄᑖᓂᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᔭᐅᓕᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓯᕐᓂᒃ
ᕉᓯᐊᑉ ᐃᑕᕐᓯᒪᓂᖓ ᔪᑯᕇᓂᐊᓐᒥᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᑎᑦᓯᒪᑦ ᓱᕐᕋᑕᐅᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᑲᕙᒪᑕᐅᒍᓯᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ. ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᐅᔪᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑕᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᔭᕆᔭᐅᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᖏᑦ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᑦᓴᑖᕆᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᓕᕆᒍᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᒋᔭᐅᔪᓂ ᐊᑑᑎᓂᕐᒦᓱᑎᒃ ᓂᕆᐅᓇᕐᓯᒪᖕᖏᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᕈᑎᓂᒃ, ᐅᑦᑑᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑐᑭᒧᐊᒍᑎᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᔭᕆᐊᕈᑎᓂᒃ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᖃᐅᑕᒫᕐᓯᐅᑎᑐᐃᓐᓇᐅᖏᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᑯᑦ ᕉᓯᐊᒥᐅᓂᒃ.
ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔩᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᓄᑦ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐸᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᕗᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒍᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓯᕐᓄᓗ. ᑲᑎᑎᑦᓯᓱᑎᒃ 8ᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ,6 ᑲᔪᓯᔪᒥᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᕕᓖᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᕝᕕᐅᔪᑦ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᐃᓄᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᖃᐅᔨᒪᒐᓱᐊᕐᑏᑦ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᑦᓴᖑᓕᕐᕿᑕᕈᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᑉ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ. ᓱᓇᔨᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᑦ, ᐱᓯᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖏᓐᓂᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓖᑦ 1996ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐅᓪᓗᒥᒧᑦ ᑎᑭᑦᓱᒍ, ᓲᖑᓂᕐᐹᒥᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔩᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑦᔨᐅᖏᑦᑐᒥᒃ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓯᕐᓂᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᑦᓱᓂ. ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔩᑦ ᑎᑭᐅᑎᑦᑕᕕᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐋᕐᖀᓲᑦ ᑐᑭᖃᑦᓯᐊᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ, ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᓱᑎᓪᓗ ᐅᓪᓗᒥᒧᑦ ᑎᑭᓱᒍ. ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓯᐅᒋᐊᓖᑦ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᑕᐅᖃᑦᑕᕆᐊᖃᕐᖁᑦ ᐃᓚᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᓖᑦ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᒐᓴᑦᔪᐊᓂ ᐊᓂᒍᕐᑐᓂ,ᐃᓕᑕᕆᓗᒋᑦ ᓲᖑᓂᖏᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᕐᓂᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᑎᑦᓯᖃᑦᑕᐅᑎᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᑭᑖᕆᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᑐᑭᑖᕈᓯᖏᑦ.
ᑲᑎᖕᖓᖃᑎᒌᖃᑦᑕᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᓘᓐᓇᑎᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔩᑦ ᑐᕐᖃᑕᕐᕕᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑎᑐᖃᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᓱᓕ ᕿᑲᕐᑎᑕᐅᔪᖅ.ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᔩᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᔪᒥᓪᓗ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᓖᑦ ᐃᓕᓐᓂᐊᓯᒪᐅᑎᓖᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᑯᐃᔦᔩᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦᑕ ᓯᕗᒧᑦᑎᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑕᐅᒍᑎᒋᒋᐊᓕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓᑕ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᑦᓴᖑᓕᕐᕿᑕᕈᓐᓇᑐᑦ, ᐅᐃᒪᓇᕐᑐᒥᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᓂᖅ ᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᐅᒪᓂᕐᓗ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑦᓯᓂᖅ.ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓕᓐᓄᑦ, ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑐᑭᖃᑦᓯᐊᑐᓂᒃ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑦᓯᒍᑕᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᓅᓐᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐃᓂᓕᓐᓄᑦ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐊᑦᔨᐅᖏᑦᑑᓱᓂ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑕᐅᔪᖅ, ᐊᑑᑎᔭᐅᔪᖅ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᓯᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ, ᑌᒣᒻᒪᓗ ᑖᒃᑯᓂᖓ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᓪᓚᕆᐅᑎᑦᓯᕗᖅ.
ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᓄᑭᖃᑦᓯᐊᕈᑕᐅᖏᓐᓇᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᓕᕆᔭᐅᒍᓯᖏᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ- ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓰᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᔭᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᓱᒋᐊᕆᒍᑎᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᕐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᑦᓴᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᓪᓗ ᐊᑑᑎᔭᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐅᓪᓗᒥ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᐅᔪᒥ-ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖅ ᑲᔪᓯᔭᐅᒋᐊᓕᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓕᓐᓄᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᓇᓗᓀᕐᓯᒋᐊᖃᕐᒥᔪᖅ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᖕᖏᑐᒥᒃ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᑦᓴᓂᒃ ᓇᓪᓕᖁᐊᕆᔭᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐅᓪᓗᒥ ᓄᐃᑕᒌᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᐱᐅᓯᕐᑖᖃᒻᒥᐅᓂᐊᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᓯᕗᒧᒋᐊᕐᑎᓯᒍᑎᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐅᖄᖃᑎᒌᒍᓯᕐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᐅᖃᓕᒪᔭᐅᓕᕐᐸᑕ. ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐃᓄᐃᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᒋᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᒃᑯᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑕᐅᓕᕐᐸᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᖃᓲᓄᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ.
ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᔨᐅᑎᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᓯᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓀᑦ ᑲᑎᓲᖑᒻᒥᔪᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᑕᒪᓐᓇᓗ ᐊᑑᑎᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᓂᒃ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓄᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᓯᑦᔭᖓᑕ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᓂᖓᑕ ᑲᑐᑦᔨᖃᑎᒌᒍᑕᐅᓂᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᕿᑎᖓᓃᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖓᑕ ᐃᖃᓗᓐᓂᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᑦ. ᓯᕗᓕᐅᕐᓯᒍᑎᓕᐊᖅ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ 2021ᒥ, ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᓯᒍᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐃᑉᐱᒍᓱᑦᓯᐊᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᒧᑦ 16ᓂ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᓂ ᐊᑑᑎᔭᐅᕐᖃᔦᕐᑎᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐃᖃᓗᓐᓂᐊᕈᓐᓇᐅᑎ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᖁᑦᓯᑐᒥ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᒥ.
ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓖᑦ ᓱᓕ ᐱᔭᑦᓴᖃᕐᒥᔪᑦ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᓯᕗᒧᑦᑎᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐱᔭᐅᒍᒪᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᓯᐊᒻᒪᓯᒪᓂᕐᓴᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐊᔪᐃᓐᓇᕈᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍ UN ᐊᐅᓚᒍᓯᖓ, ᐅᑦᑑᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥᒃ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᖓ (IMO’s)ᐊᑑᑎᔭᐅᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᒍᑎᖓ ᐅᕐᓱᐊᓗᒻᒥᒃ ᐅᕐᓱᕈᑎᓐᓂᐊᓂᕐᒥᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ.
ᐃᓘᓐᓈᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᓄᑦ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᓕᐊᖑᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᐊᑐᕐᑐᖅ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒧᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᒧᑦ. ᐱᖁᔭᖅ ᐃᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒧᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᒻᒥᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ UN ᑲᑎᒪᓂᖃᕐᑎᓯᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᐅᑉ ᐱᖁᔭᖓ(UNCLOS), ᑐᑭᑖᕆᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖁᑎᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᕕᖃᕐᕕᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᑲᒪᒋᒋᐊᓕᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᐅᑉ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ. ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊ ᒪᓕᒉᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒋᐊᓖᑦ ᑐᑭᖃᕐᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᐅᑉ ᑎᑦᑕᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᓱᓕᑦᑕᕕᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᑦ ᑎᑭᐅᑎᓯᒪᕕᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᑖᕆᓯᒪᔭᒥᑎᒍᑦ, ᐊᐅᓚᑲᑦᑕᓂᖅ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᑯᑦ, ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᐱᑦᓴᖑᕈᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᓱᕐᕋᒣᑦᑐᑦ, ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᒍᑎᖏᑦ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᐅᑉ ᐊᔭᑎᖓᑕ ᐊᓯᖏᑎᒍᓪᓗ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒍᓐᓇᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᐅᑉ.ᒪᓕᑦᓱᓂ 2008ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐃᓗᓕᑦᓴᐅᑉ ᐅᖃᒻᒪᕆᐅᑕᐅᒍᑎᒋᓯᒪᔭᖓᓂᒃ, Footnote 1-4 ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᓕᒃ ᑐᓂᒪᕕᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖓ ᐁᕙᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖓᑕ ᒪᓕᑦᓱᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒨᓕᖓᔪᒥᒃ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᒥᒃ ᑌᒫᑦᓭᓇᕐᓗ ᓂᕆᐅᕝᕕᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᐊᓯᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᑎᓕᐅᖃᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᕉᓯᐊ.
ᑲᓇᑕ ᑐᑭᓯᓇᑦᓯᐊᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᒍᑎᖃᕈᒪᕗᖅ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖓ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓯᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᑕ ᑲᒪᕐᖄᑎᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓ ᓯᕗᓕᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᓯᕗᓂᖓᓅᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ.ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᖁᑎᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᐱᑕᖃᕐᑎᓯᒍᑕᐅᒻᒪᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᓄᐃᑕᑎᑦᓯᕕᐅᒍᓐᓇᓱᓂ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᐃᓄᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᒪᑎᑦᓯᒍᓐᓇᓱᓂ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᔭᐅᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕ ᐊᑐᑎᑎᑦᓯᓚᖓᖕᖏᑐᖅ ᕈᓯᐊᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᓲᓱᑦᓴᖏᓐᓂᒥᒃ, ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᒥᑎᒍᑦ, ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᕕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒌᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ.
4. ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓ:ᐱᔭᑦᔪᐊᓱᑎᒃ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕈᑎᐅᔪᑦ
ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓ ᑕᒣᑎᒍᑦ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐸᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐊᑑᑎᑎᑦᓯᕗᖅ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᑦᑕᓀᑦᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᕐᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐃᓄᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᑦᑕᓀᑦᑐᒦᑦᑎᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ. ᐊᑑᑎᓚᕿᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᑦ ᐱᓚᕿᑎᑕᐅᓯᒪᖕᖏᑐᑦ ᓱᕐᕋᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᖁᑎᓖᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖏᑦᑕ ᐃᓱᓕᑦᑕᕕᖏᓐᓄᑦ.
ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᖅ ᐃᓱᒫᓗᓐᓇᓱᓂ ᐊᑑᑎᓂᖓ, ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐅᕐᖂᓯᕙᓪᓕᐊᓱᓂ ᓯᑕᒪᕕᓪᓗᐊᑐᒥᒃ 4 ᓱᑲᓐᓂᓴᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᑕᑯᓗᒍ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᖅ,ᐊᑑᑎᑎᑦᓯᓕᕐᓱᓂ ᐃᑉᐱᓇᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᒥᒃ ᓱᕐᕋᑕᐅᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐃᓄᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᕙᑎᒥᓪᓗ ᓱᕐᕋᑕᐅᒻᒣᑐᒥᒃ.ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊ ᓱᕐᕃᓯᒪᐅᑏᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᑎᑦᓯᔪᑦ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᒥᒃ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓂᖓ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᓪᓗ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᒪᑦ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᒋᐊᓪᓚᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᖑᖕᖏᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᑭᕋᕐᓂᒃ ᐱᓕᐅᑎᔨᓂᓪᓗ ᒪᓂᒪᑐᐃᓐᓇᑎᑦᓯᓕᕐᓱᓂ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ.
ᖄᖓ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᑕᕆᐅᖓᑕ ᓯᑯᖓ ᓵᓕᓯᒪᓕᕐᑐᖅ, ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓱᓂ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᖕᖏᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᑯᑦ, ᑕᐅᕐᓰᑲᑦᑕᐅᑎᓂᕐᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᑦᓴᑖᖑᒍᓐᓇᑐᓪᓗ ᑎᒍᓚᔭᐅᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᓕᒫᒥ.ᐃᒪᕐᐱᑯᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑲᑦᑕᓂᖅ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᑯᑦ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑐᐃᓐᓇᓚᖓᔪᖅ, ᑕᒪᓐᓇᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᖑᖕᖏᑐᓄᑦ ᑐᓱᒋᔭᐅᓂᕐᓴᖑᕐᑎᓯᓗᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐃᓚᓕᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᕕᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᓄᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᖁᑎᖓᓂᒃ, ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑑᒐᓗᐊᕐᐸᑦ ᓱᒃᑯᐊᕿᓐᓇᕋᓗᐊᕐᐸᓗ ᐱᓚᕿᑎᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᓇᖕᖏᑐᓄᑦ ᓯᑰᑉ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓕᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ.
ᑐᕙᕐᖃᔦᓕᕐᓂᑯᖓᓄᑦ ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᕆᑕᐅᔭᕐ ᐊᑐᕐᓱᒍ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᑐᓂᐅᑉ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᑯᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᑦᓴᖃᓕᐅᒥᓕᕐᓱᓂ, ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᓂᒥᐅᑦ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᕆᓲᖏᑦ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᓚᖓᓕᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᒪᓕᑦᑕᐅᓱᓂᓗ ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐊᑦᑕᓀᑦᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᐅᑉ ᐃᓱᒫᓗᓐᓇᕈᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦ, ᐃᓱᒫᓗᓐᓇᖏᑦᑑᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᕈᑕᐅᓚᕿᐅᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦ. ᐃᓚᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖃᖃᑕᐅᔪᑦ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᐅᒪᒋᐊᓕᒃ ᑭᐅᑦᔪᑎᑦᓴᖃᑦᓯᐊᓗᓂ.
ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓂᖓ ᓱᓕ ᐊᑑᑎᑎᑦᓯᓕᕐᒥᔪᖅ ᓯᓚᒥᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐅᐃᒪᓇᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕝᕕᖁᑦᑕᓕᕐᓱᓂ ᐃᒪᐅᑉ ᐱᐅᓯᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ ᑕᑎᖓᓂᒃ ᐃᓅᓯᕐᒥᓂ ᐱᐅᓯᕐᒥᓄᑦ, ᐃᑉᐱᓇᓪᓚᕆᑦᓱᓂ ᐅᓚᐱᑦᓯᓕᕐᓱᓂ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ, ᑐᑭᓯᒪᓇᖕᖏᑐᒃᑯᑦ ᓱᕐᕋᑕᐅᒪᒻᒪᕆᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒧᖓ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓂᕐᒧᑦ.
ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ, ᐊᑦᔨᒌᒥᒃ ᐃᓱᒫᓘᑎᖃᓕᕐᑐᑦ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓂᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᒋᒐᓱᑦᑕᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᔪᐃᓐᓈᕆᑦᓱᒍ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐅᒥᒍᑎᑦᓴᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᒍᓐᓇᓂᕐᒥᓂᒃ ᑕᑯᑦᓴᐅᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᓄᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᓕᕐᑕᒥᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᓐᓂ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓅᑦᔪᓯᒥᑎᒍᑦ, ᓂᕿᑦᓴᖃᑦᓯᐊᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᓱᒃᑯᑕᐅᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᑦ ᐱᐅᒃᑯᑎᒻᒪᕇᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᓪᓗ. ᓯᑯᕐᖃᔦᕐᓂᖓ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᓕᒫᒥ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓᑕᓗ ᓯᑯᕙᓪᓕᐊᓂᕆᓲᖓᑕ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕈᓐᓀᓂᕆᓲᖓᓗ ᓯᓈᑉ; ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᓂᖓᑕᓗ ᖁᐊᑦᓯᐊᖃᔦᕐᓂᐅᑉ ᓄᓇᐅᑉ ᐃᑭᐊᖓᑕ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᕐᓴᐅᓕᕐᓂᖓ; ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑑᑎᒐᔪᓐᓂᓴᐅᓕᕐᓂᖓ ᓄᓇᐅᑉ ᐃᑯᐊᓚᓂᖓᑕ ᐆᑦᑐᕋᐅᑎᑦᓯᐊᖑᕗᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂ ᓄᓇᓕᓐᓂ, ᐃᓘᓐᓇᑎᓪᓗ ᐱᐅᒃᑯᑎᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒃᑯᓗ ᓱᕐᕃᓱᑎᒃ.
ᐅᑦᑑᑎᒋᓗᒍ, ᓄᓇᓖᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᑦ ᓱᕐᕋᑕᐅᕙᓐᓂᖏᑦ ᐃᑯᐊᓚᔪᒧᑦ ᓄᓇᒧᑦ. 2023ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐃᓄᖁᑎᖏᑦᑕ ᕿᑎᕐᖃᖏᑦᑕ ᐅᖓᑖᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᑦᓯᐊᒥᐅᑉ ᕿᒫᑎᑕᐅᒋᖃᓚᐅᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᑯᐊᓚᒥᒃ.
ᑲᔪᓯᔪᕐᑕᓕᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᓪᓗᐊᖏᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᓱᕐᕃᓯᒪᐅᑎᒋᓕᕐᑕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓᑕ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᒦᖕᖏᓂᕐᓴᐅᑎᑦᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᒧᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᓴᐳᑦᔨᓯᒪᒋᐊᓕᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᐃᓄᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᓯᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᖑᖃᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᒍᓐᓇᓯᑎᒐᓱᐊᕐᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᕙᑎᒥᒃ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᑐᒥᒃ ᐱᐅᓯᕆᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᓕᕐᑕᖓᓂᓪᓗ-ᑌᒣᑦᓴᓚᐅᕐᓕᑑᕐᓯᒪᑐᐃᓐᓇᕈᓐᓀᓗᓂ.
ᐊᑕᐅᑦᓯᑰᖃᑕᐅᒻᒥᔪᖅ ,ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓂᑯᖓᓄᑦ ᑐᓱᒋᔭᐅᓕᕐᓱᓂ ᐱᑦᓴᑖᕐᕕᓴᐅᓂᖓ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐅᔭᕋᓐᓂᐊᕋᑦᓴᑕᖃᕐᓂᒥᓄᑦ, ᒪᑯᓂᖓ ᐃᑯᒪᐅᑎᑦᓴᔭ,graphite, ᑭᑭᐊᑦᓴᔭ, cobalt, ᑲᔪᖅ ᑭᑭᐊᑦᓴᔭ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᕆᑕᐅᔭᕈᑎᓕᐊᑦᓴᔭ ᓄᓇ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᔪᑦ ᑕᐅᕐᓯᔭᐅᑎᑦᓯᕙᓪᓕᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓱᒃᑯᑎᕆᖕᖏᓂᕐᓴᓄᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕᒧᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᖏᓐᓄᓗ, ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᑦ ᐱᑦᓴᑖᕐᕕᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᓯᐊᖑᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᖃᕈᑕᐅᕗᑦ ᓴᖑᑎᑦᓯᒍᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᐅᔭᕋᓐᓂᐊᓂᕐᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᓄᓀᑦ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᑎᒍᑦ, ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᖑᖃᑕᐅᔪᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᓪᓗ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑕᐅᒋᐊᓕᒃ ᐃᑉᐱᒋᔭᐅᑦᓯᐊᓗᓂ, ᓲᓱᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᓅᓯᖏᑦ ᓄᓇᓯᒪᔪᑦ.
ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓂᖓ ᐱᓀᓗᑕᖕᖑᓯᒪᕗᖅ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ; ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᓕᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᐋᕐᕿᕈᑎᑦᓴᓯᐅᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᖑᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒥᒃ.
5. ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᕐᓇᑐᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓖᑦ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᖁᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᑕ ᓵᑦᓯᒋᐊᕐᓯᒪᓂᖓ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᑐᑭᒧᐊᑦᑎᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᒻᒪᕆᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᑲᕙᒪᓕᕆᔭᐅᒍᑎᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᒪᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᐃᓄᓐᓂᒃ. ᐊᓯᖏᓪᓕᑕᐅᖅ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ, ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᐅᒐᔭᕐᑐᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐱᓕᐅᑎᒍᑕᐅᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᒪᑕ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖃᖕᖏᑐᓄᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᑎᑦᓯᒐᓱᑉᐸᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᑕ ᒪᓕᒐᖁᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒍᓯᕐᒥᓘᓐᓃᑦ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᑕᒥᓂᒃ, ᑌᒣᒻᒪᑦ ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐊᔭᐅᕆᔪᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓱᓇᔨᐅᓂᕆᒋᐊᓕᖓᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᔭᐅᒍᑎᑎᒍᑦ.
ᑌᒪᖕᖓᓂᑦ 2019ᒥᓂᑦ, ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᐅᓂᒃᑲᐅᓰᑦ ᐊᑯᕐᖓᓂ ᐃᓚᖏᑦᑕ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖃᖕᖏᑐᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓘᖃᑕᐅᖃᑦᑕᓂᕐᓴᐅᒍᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᓕᕆᔭᐅᒍᓯᖏᑎᒍᑦ. ᓭᓃᓰᑦ ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒥᒃ ᐅᖃᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᑕᕐᖑᓯᕐᑐᑦ ᖁᑦᓯᑐᒥ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᒻᒪᕆᖃᓛᕈᒪᑦᓱᓂ 2030ᐅᓕᕐᐸᑦ.
ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᔪᖅ ᓭᓃᓰᑦ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐅᑎᒍᒪᔭᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑦᓯᓗᓂ ᓂᐅᕕᐊᑦᓴᑕᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᑦᓯᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᑖᕈᒪᓂᖓ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑕᕐᕋᑯᑦ ᐊᕐᖁᓯᐅᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᕕᑦᓴᒥᓂᒃ,’’ ᐅᔭᕋᓐᓂᐊᓂᖅ ᐃᓚᐅᒻᒥᔪᖅ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᑕᖏᓐᓄᑦ, ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᓄᑦ ᐱᑦᓴᖑᕈᓐᓇᑐᓄᑦ ᐅᔭᕋᓐᓄᑦ, ᐅᕐᓱᕈᑎ, ᐅᕐᓱᐊᓗᒃ ᐃᖃᓗᐃᓪᓗ. ᓭᓃᓰᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᐊᒻᒪᕆᒻᒥᔪᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓱᑎᒃ, ᐊᖏᔪᒻᒪᕆᒻᒥᓗ ᐊᑐᕋᑦᓴᐅᒐᔭᕆᐊᖓ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ.
ᓭᓃᓰᑦ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᒥᔪᑦ ᓄᐃᒐᓱᐊᕐᓱᒍ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᒪᐅᑎ ᐱᔭᕆᐊᑭᓐᓂᓴᕈᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᕙᑎ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᒥᓅᓕᖓᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐱᓪᓚᕆᖁᑎᒥᓄᓪᓗ ᓲᓱᑦᓴᕈᓐᓀᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑐᓂᒪᒍᑎᖓᓂᒃ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᑎᒎᕐᑐᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒨᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᐅᓯᐅᔪᒥᒃ.ᓭᓃᓰᑦ ᓂᕆᐅᒋᔭᐅᒋᐊᓖᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕆᐊᖏᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᓕᒫᓂᒃ ᓇᒻᒥᓂᖅ ᓯᕗᒧᒍᑎᒋᒍᓐᓇᑕᒥᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᓂᕐᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᒥᓂᒃ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᖏᓐᓄᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᐊᑭᓴᕐᑐᕆᐊᕐᐸᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᓭᓃᓯᓂᒃ ᕆᐊᖃᓕᕈᓂ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᖏᑦ ᐊᑦᔨᐅᓕᕐᐸᑕ ᓭᓃᓯᓄᑦ.
ᓭᓃᓰᑦ ᑌᒫᑦᓭᓇᖅ ᐊᓯᖏᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᖃᕐᒥᒪᑕ, ᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᑦᓴᔭᖃᕐᓱᓂᓗ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᓂᒃ ᑌᒫᑦᓭᓇᕐᓗ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᖓ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖓᑕ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᕕᒋᑦᓱᒍ. ᐅᑦᑑᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᒪᓕᑦᓱᒋᑦ UNCLOS,ᓭᓃᓰᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᐊᕈᓐᓇᑕᑐᐊᓖᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥᒃ ᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓐᓇᒍ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕐᕕᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᒥᑕ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖁᑎᖏᓐᓂ ᐊᖏᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖁᑎᓕᒻᒧᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᐃᑉᐱᒍᓱᑦᓯᐊᒪᕆᓪᓗᓂ ᕿᒥᕐᕈᖃᑦᑕᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᓇᓪᓕᑐᐃᓐᓇᖓ ᑐᑦᓯᕋᐅᑎᐅᓯᒪᑉᐸᑦ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖁᑎᖓ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕐᕕᒋᒍᓐᓇᓱᒍ ᑭᖑᓂᖓᒍᓪᓗ ᐊᖏᕐᓗᓂ ᐊᐅᑳᕐᓗᓂᓘᓐᓃᑦ ᕈᓐᓇᓱᓂ ᒪᓕᓪᓗᓂ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᓕᐊᖑᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᕐᒥ.
ᐊᑕᐅᑦᓯᑰᖃᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐸᓯᕕᒃ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᓗᒋᓪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᐅᒋᐊᓖᑦ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᔭᕆᐊᕐᕕᖃᕐᐸᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᑕᐅᒍᓯᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓂᓪᓗ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᓭᓃᓯᓂᒃ ᑲᒪᒋᐊᖃᓕᕐᐸᑕ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᐸᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᓭᓃᓯᓂᒃ ᑲᒪᒋᐊᖃᓕᕈᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᐊᓯᐊᒍᕐᕕᐅᖃᔭᕋᑎᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᐅᔪᓂᒃ-ᐅᑦᑑᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓ-ᓱᕐᕃᓯᒪᓕᕐᑐᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᑌᒪᖕᖓᑦ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᐸᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕐᕕᒋᒍᓐᓇᑕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒨᕐᑎᓯᑦᑌᓕᓗᓂ, ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᖁᑎᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓴᐳᑎᓯᒪᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᓱᒃᑯᑕᐅᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᓇᑐᓂᑦ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᙯᓐᓇᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒨᕐᑎᓯᑦᑌᓕᒍᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᓱᒃᑯᑕᐅᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᓇᑐᓄᑦ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ.
ᐊᖏᓂᕐᓴᒥ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᐅᔪᒥ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᑌᒪᖕᖓᑦ ᓴᐳᑦᔨᓯᒪᕙᓐᓂᐊᑐᖅ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᒻᒪᕆᖁᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᑦᔭᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐅᖃᒻᒪᕆᐅᑎᐅᓯᒪᔪᒧᑦ ᐋᑐᕗᐊᒥ 1996ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᒍᑎᒋᓯᒪᔭᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓖᑦ. ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊ ᐃᓚᓖᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᑕ ᑐᓂᒪᒍᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᖃᓄᐃᖕᖏᓯᐊᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ; ᑐᓂᓯᒪᕕᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᐱᑕᙯᓐᓇᕈᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᒍᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᒃ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕈᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᐃᓅᓯᕐᒨᓕᖓᔪᓪᓗ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᑦ, ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐅᒥᑎᓗᒍ ᑎᒥᒥᒍᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᖕᖏᓯᐊᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᐱᕐᖁᓯᕐᒥᑎᒍᓪᓗ ᖃᓄᐃᖕᖏᓯᐊᕈᑎᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖅ; ᑐᓂᓯᒪᒍᑎᖓ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓴᐳᑦᔭᐅᒪᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓ; ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᓂᓯᒪᒍᑎᒋᒻᒥᔭᖓ ᑐᓴᐅᒪᑎᑦᓯᓯᐊᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᐃᓘᓐᓀᓂᒃ ᑐᓴᐅᒪᔭᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᑐᓴᐅᒪᑎᑦᓯᓂᖅ, ᐃᓚᐅᓂᕆᒋᐊᓕᖏᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᓯᒪᔪᑐᙯᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᖏᑦᑕᓗ ᐊᓯᖏᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᓯᒪᖃᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᖃᓕᕐᐸᑕ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓖᑦ.
ᑌᒪᖕᖓᓕᒫᑦᓯᐊᖅ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᑕ ᐃᓚᐅᕕᖃᕐᓂᖓ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᑭᓯᐊᒐᙯᓐᓇᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐸᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᑎᑦᓯᓯᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓗᓂᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᐱᒍᒪᓯᒪᔭᖏᓐᓂᒃ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᐊᑑᓕᕐᑎᓯᕙᓐᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᑐᑭᖃᑦᓯᐊᑐᓂᒃ ᓵᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᓗᓂ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓂᐅᔪᖅ ᑌᒣᒋᐊᖃᕐᑎᓯᓕᕐᐸᑦ.
ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᒪᓕᒉᑦ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖏᑦ
ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᒪᓕᒉᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᑎᑦᓯᕗᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᐃᓚᐅᒍᓐᓇᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᓄᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐃᓚᖃᕐᒥᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕈᑎᓂᒃ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓀᑦᑐᒦᒍᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᓪᓗ, ᐱᑕᖃᑦᓯᐊᑑᓗᓂᓗ ᐊᑦᑕᓀᑦᑑᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓘᓐᓇᒋᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᓯᒍᑎᐅᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᓂᒃ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᓇᓗᓀᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ANPF ᐃᓱᒪᖃᕈᑕᐅᓯᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᓂᐅᑉ ᐊᒃᓚᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ.
ᑌᒣᒍᓐᓇᓚᖓᔪᒍᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐱᖃᕐᓂᕗᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓄᑭᖃᕈᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ; ᓯᕗᒧᑦᑎᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᐱᒍᒪᓯᒪᔭᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᓱᓕᑦᓯᐊᑑᑦᓱᓂ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓯᖅ; ᓯᕗᓕᕈᑕᐅᔪᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓯᕐᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᕈᑕᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓄᑦ; ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᓯᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᓴᒥᒃ ᓵᓯᒋᐊᕈᓯᕐᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᓕᕆᔭᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ.
ᐅᖃᒻᒪᕆᐅᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖃᕈᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ
1. ᓇᓪᓕᖁᐊᖑᑎᑦᓯᓂᖅ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓯᕐᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᓴᐳᑦᔭᐅᓯᒪᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒍᑎᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᓗ
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᖃᕐᓂᐊᖁᖅ ᑐᑭᓯᓇᑦᓯᐊᓗᑎᒃ ᓵᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐸᐅᑦᔭᐅᔪᑦᓴᓕᐊᕆᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒨᓕᖓᔪᑦ, ᐱᒍᒪᓯᒪᔭᖏᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒌᒃᑯᑎᑦᓴᖏᓪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓖᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓪᓗ, ᐃᓚᐅᒻᒥᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᑕ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᔪᓄᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᖏᑦ ᖃᓂᑕᕇᐸᐅᔮᓘᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᐅᓯᐅᕗᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕆᒍᑕᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ.ᐊᑑᑎᖃᑦᓯᐊᓗᓂ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓯᐅᑉ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᓐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᒍᑎᐅᓗᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔪᑦᓴᒥᒃ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᕆᒍᓯᕐᒥᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᐅᓗᓂ ᓯᕗᒧᒋᐊᕐᑎᓯᒍᑎᐅᓗᓂᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᐱᒍᒪᓯᒪᔭᖏᓐᓂᒃ; ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐸᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᒋᐊᖕᖓᓂᖅ ᓴᐳᑦᔨᓯᒪᐅᑎᓄᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᑦᔨᓯᒪᒍᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᓱᓂ ᓴᐳᑦᔨᓯᒪᐅᑎ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᓪ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᑕᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᓪᓚᖓᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᓗ ᐱᓗᑲᓐᓂᐅᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᓯᕗᓂᖓᒍᑦ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᖏᓐᓂᖏᓐᓂ ᐹᕐᓯᖓᐅᑎᓃᑦ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑎᓯᑦᑌᓕᒍᓯᖓ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᒋᕗᖅ ᐊᓂᕐᑎᕆᔪᓕᒫᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᓴᐳᑦᔭᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖓᒍᑦ. ᓲᖑᔫᓗᑎᒃ ᓴᐱᓕᔪᐃᑦᑑᓗᑎᓪᓗ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᒃᑯᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᒃ ᓴᐳᑦᔨᓯᒪᐅᑎᐅᓗᑎᒃ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᐃᓚᐅᕗᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓲᖑᓂᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᓇᑯᕐᒪᑕ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑏᑦ ᖃᖓᑦᑕᔫᒃᑯᑦ(CAF’s) ᐅᐸᐅᑎᓯᒪᓂᖏᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖏᓪᓗ, ᐱᔭᕆᐅᕐᓴᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖏᑎᒍᓪᓗ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᓴᖏᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᓭᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᑦ, ᓲᓱᒋᔭᐅᓂᖃᑦᓯᐊᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᖃᑎᒥᓄᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᐃᑕᑎᑦᓯᒍᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖃᕈᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᓂ, ᐃᒫᒍᑦ ᓯᑯᒃᑯᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ.
ᓄᐃᑦᓯᕙᓪᓕᐊᓂᖅ ᐊᑐᕐᓱᒍ NORAD ᐅᓪᓗᒥᒨᓕᖓᓕᕐᑎᓯᒍᑎᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᑦᓴᑖᕈᑎ ᐅᖃᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ 2022ᒥ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᑕ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓯᒪᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᖓ ᓄᑕᐅᓯᓕᑎᕆᒍᑎᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᖁᑎᑦᑕ, ᓲᖑᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐃᓱᒪᕐᓱᓇᕐᓂᖓᓂᓪᓗ ᓇᓗᓀᕐᓯᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᑕ ᐊᑑᑎᓕᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐸᐅᑦᔨᒋᐊᖃᓕᕐᑕᒥᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖃᕈᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᑖᕆᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪ. ᑲᓇᑕ ᐊᑐᕋᑦᓴᒫᒥᓂᒃ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᕙᓪᓕᐊᔪᖅ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊ CAF ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖃᕐᓂᐊᑐᐊᕐᐸᑕ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᕈᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᖏᓕᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᒍᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐊᒃᓚᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦ. 2030ᐅᓕᕐᐸᑦ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᐊᑑᑎᓯᒪᓛᓕᕐᑐᖅ ᐱᖓᓱᕕᓪᓗᐊᑲᓴᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᒋᐊᓕᒻᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᓯᒪᓕᕐᓗᓂ ᑌᒪᖕᖓᓂᑦ 2015ᒥᓂᑦ.
ᓲᖕᖑᓯᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᕐᓂᖅ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑏᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᒋᓐᓂᒃ ᓲᖕᖑᓯᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᖃᖓᑦᑕᔫᒃᑯᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᐊᕐᓗᑎ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᒃᑯᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᓂᒃ ᓲᖕᖑᓯᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᐅᒋᐊᓕᒻᒥᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒥᓂᓪᓗ.ᑲᓇᑕ ᙯᕐᖁᔨᕋᓕᓲᖅ ᓂᕈᐊᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᓱᑎᓪᓗ ᓂᕈᐊᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᓚᖓᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑕᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᓇᓄᖅ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᖏᑦ ᖃᖓᑦᑕᔫᒃᑯᑦ ᑎᑦᑕᓯᒪᔭᖓᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑕᖏᑎᒍᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᒥᔪᖅ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᓱᒋᑦ ᓂᕈᐊᕐᓯᒪᔭᒥᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᓱᒋᓪᓗ ᓂᕈᐊᕐᓯᒪᔭᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᒋᐊᓕᓐᓄᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᒍᑕᐅᓕᕐᐸᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑕᒥᑎᒍᑦ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᑐᒥ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᐅᔪᓂ.
ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍNORAD ᐅᓪᓗᒥᓯᐅᑎᓕᐊᖑᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᐅᑉ ᓄᑕᐅᓯᓕᑎᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖓ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᐊᑑᑎᓚᐅᕐᓯᒪᖕᖏᑕᒥᓂᒃ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᖏᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓱᓂ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᒥᑦᑕ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖓᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ.ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐃᒪᖁᑎᖏᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᒍᑎᖃᑦᓯᐊᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᒻᒪᑦ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᓗᓂ ᐱᑕᙯᓐᓇᖁᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᖕᖏᓂᖓ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᐅᓂᖓᑕ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᖃᕐᓂᐊᑐᖅ ᓲᖑᔪᒥᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᕐᒥᓂᒃ ᐃᒪᖁᑎᒥᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂ ᐃᒪᕐᓂ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐅᐊᓕᓂᖓᑕ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᐅᓂᖓ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᓄᑦ.
ᐅᑯᐊᑕᒐ ᓀᓪᓕᑎᕐᓯᒪᒍᑎᖏᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᕈᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒥᓗ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ:
- ᐊᒥᓱᒐᓓᑦᐅᓇᑕᕐᑏᑦᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖏᑦᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᖃᑦᑕᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᐊᑐᑦᐱᓇᓱᑦᑕᐅᓕᕐᐸᑦᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖃᕈᑎᖓᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦᑕᕐᕋᒥᐃᒪᕐᓂᓗᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂ,ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦᓄᑖᖑᑦᓱᑎᒃ 6 ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉᓯᑦᔭᖁᑎᖏᓐᓂᐃᖏᕐᕋᔭᑦᑏᑦᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᑦ; ᑎᑭᑦᓱᒋᑦ 15 ᓯᑯᓯᐅᑏᑦᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᑦ; 11 ᓄᑖᑦ MQ-9Bᕿᓚᒻᒥᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑏᑦᖃᖓᑕᓲᑦᐊᑦᔨᓕᐅᕆᒍᑎᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ; ᑎᑭᑦᓱᒋᑦ 16 ᓄᑖᑦ P-8A ᐊᒥᓱᐃᓂᒃᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃᖃᖓᑦᑕᔫᑦᐅᓇᑕᐅᑏᑦᓴᓇᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦᐊᕐᖃᐅᒪᔫᖃᕐᑎᓯᑦᑌᓕᒍᓐᓇᓱᑎᒃᐃᒫᓂᓗᐅᓇᑕᐅᑎᓂᒃᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᓯᑦᑌᓕᒍᓐᓇᓱᑎᒃ ; ᐊᒻᒪᓗ 88 ᓄᑖᑦ F-35A ᐅᓇᑕᐅᑏᑦ ᖃᖓᑦᑕᔫᑦ.
- ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉᑲᕙᒪᖓᑕ38.6ᐱᓕᐊᓐᐸᕐᓇᓯᒪᔭᖏᑦᐅᓪᓗᒥᓯᐅᑎᓕᐅᕈᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦNORAD ᒥᒃᐃᑉᐱᓇᓕᓪᓚᕆᑦᑎᓯᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦᐃᓂᐅᔪᓂᒃᑕᕐᕋᒥᐊᒻᒪᓗᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᓗᒍᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦᓄᑖᑦᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃᓵᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᑏᑦᐃᓄᑕᖃᕐᑎᓯᓂᒃᑯᑦᐱᐅᓰᑦᖃᐅᔨᕙᓪᓚᒍᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉᐃᓱᒫᓗᓐᓇᓯᓯᒪᓂᖓᓂᒃᐊᒻᒪᓗᐱᑕᖃᕐᑎᓯᓕᐅᒥᓗᑎᒃᕿᓚᒻᒥᓴᐳᑦᔨᓯᒪᐅᑎᐅᓗᑎᒃᐃᓄᑦᑕᖃᕐᑎᓯᓂᒃᑯᑦ.ᐃᓚᖃᕐᒥᔪᖅᐊᕗᖓᒋᐊᓪᓚᒃᐱᑕᖃᕐᑎᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃᕿᓚᒻᒥᑐᓴᐅᒪᖃᑦᑕᐅᑎᒍᑎᓂᒃ; ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕐᒥᓗᒍᖃᖓᑕᑦᓱᑎᒃᐅᕐᓯᑐᐃᒍᑏᑦᖃᖓᑦᑕᔫᑦᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦᐊᕗᖓᐅᓕᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒋᓪᓗᖃᖓᑦᑕᔫᒃᑯᑦᐅᓇᑕᕐᑏᑦᐊᐅᓚᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ-ᐊᒻᒪᓗ NORAD ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ- ᑲᓇᑕᒥ; ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕐᑕᐅᒥᓗᑎᒃᖃᓂᖕᖏᓂᕐᓴᓕᐊᕈᓐᓇᓱᑎᒃᖃᖓᑦᑕᔫᑦᐅᓇᑕᐅᑏᑦᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᖁᑎᖏᑦᑕᖃᖓᑦᑕᔫᖏᑦ; ᐃᑉᐱᓇᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᒥᒃᐱᐅᒃᑯᑎᒻᒪᕇᑦᓄᑕᐅᓯᓕᑎᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᑦᐊᐅᓚᓂᕐᒧᑦ- NORAD ᓯᕗᒧᒍᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦᐊᐅᓚᓂᖏᑦ; ᐊᒻᒪᓗᐅᒐᑖᓄᑦ $4ᐱᓕᐊᓐᑮᓇᐅᔭᖃᕐᑎᑕᐅᒍᑏᑦᐱᑕᖃᓚᐅᕐᓯᒪᖕᖏᑐᑦᓯᕗᓂᖓᒍᑦᐃᓕᖓᔪᑦᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᕐᒧᑦᖃᕆᑕᐅᔭᕈᑎᓄᓪᓗ.
- ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᕐᒧᑦᒪᓕᒐᐅᑉᓄᑕᐅᓯᓕᑎᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖓᐅᖃᕐᓯᒪᔪᕐᑕᓕᒃᐃᓚᒋᐊᕈᑎᓂᒃ $8.1ᐱᓕᐊᓐᓂᒃᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕆᐊᖏᑦ 5 ᐊᕐᕌᒍᐃᑦᐊᓂᒍᕋᓱᓐᓂᖏᓐᓂᐊᒻᒪᓗ 73ᐱᓕᐊᓐᐊᕐᕌᒍᐃᑦᐊᕙᑎᑦᐊᓂᒍᕋᓱᓐᓂᖏᓐᓂᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᐅᓗᑎᒃᑲᓇᑕᓕᒫᒥᒃᓴᐳᑦᔨᓯᒪᓂᕐᒧᑦᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᒧᓪᓗᑕᕐᕋᒥ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇᐃᓚᖃᕐᓱᓂᓄᑖᒥᒃ ᖃᖓᑕᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᓄᐃᔪᓂᒃ ᑯᑦᓴᓱᐊᑲᐱᒍᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᒍᑎᐅᓗᑎᓪᓗ ᖃᖓᑦᑕᔫᓂᒃ; ᐊᑦᔨᐅᖏᑦᑑᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒦᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᒍᓐᓇᐅᑏᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᓚᖏᑦ ᖃᖓᑦᑕᑎᑕᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᐆᒧᖓHarry DeWolf-ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᓯᑦᔭᖓᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᒐᓱᐊᕈᑏᑦ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᑦ; ᓄᑖᑦ ᖃᖓᑕᑎᑕᐅᖃᑦᑕᓗᑎᒃ ᖁᓕᒥᒎᓖᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ; ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᑖᖅ ᖃᖓᑦᑕᑎᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᐊᑐᕐᓗᒍ ᓄᓇᒦᑦᓱᓂ ᐃᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒍᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᒥᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᓯᖏᑦᑕᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᖏᑦᑕ ᕿᓚᒻᒥ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᕈᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ.
- ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᕐᒧᑦᒪᓕᒐᐅᑉᓄᑕᐅᓯᓕᑎᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖓᓄᐃᑦᓯᒍᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᒥᔪᖅᓄᑖᒥᒃᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᓂᕐᒥᒃᑕᒪᑦᓱᒥᖓᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᕕᐅᑉ ᐃᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᕗᖓᐅᓕᒋᐊᕈᑎᐅᓗᓂ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑏᑦ ᖃᖓᑦᑕᔫᒃᑯᑦ ᐅᐸᐅᑎᓯᒪᓂᖓᓂᒃ, ᑭᐅᒍᓐᓇᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᖏᑎᒍᓪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᓕᒫᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᒍᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᖁᑎᒻᒪᕆᓐᓂᒃ ᑭᐅᑦᔪᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᑭᖕᖒᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᑕᒪᒃᑯᓇᓂ ᓄᓇᓯᒪᔪᓂ, ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᓖᑦ.
- ᔪᓓ 2024ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉᑲᕙᒪᖓᐅᖃᓚᐅᔪᒻᒪᑦᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᓯᒐᔭᕐᓂᕋᕐᓱᓂᓄᑖᓂᒃᑮᓇᐅᔭᕐᑐᑎᐅᒐᔭᕐᑐᓂᒃᑲᓇᑕᒥᒃᐊᑕᐅᑦᓯᑰᖃᑕᐅᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᑦᓴᓂᒃᑎᑭᐅᑎᒍᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦNATO’ ᑐᕌᒐᖏᓐᓄᑦ 2% ᖏᓐᓂᒃ GDP ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᑎᑭᓪᓗᒍ 2032 ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊ ᐃᓚᖃᕐᓂᐊᑐᑦ ᓂᐅᕕᕈᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᓂᐅᕕᕈᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᓲᖑᔪᒻᒪᕆᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᐅᑎᓂᒃ, ᓯᑰᑉ ᐊᑖᓂ ᐊᕐᖃᐅᒪᔫᕈᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᑖᒃᑯᓄᖓ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᑯᑦ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᓄᑦ.
- 2024ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᓂᐅᕕᓚᐅᔪᔪᖅ ᐱᑖᕆᑦᓱᒋᑦ 8 ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᑦ ᓯᖁᓯᐅᑏᑦ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᓯᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᑖᕆᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᓯᑦᔭᖁᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᔨᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓄᑦ, ᐃᓚᖃᕐᒥᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ 2ᓂᒃ ᓯᑯᓯᐅᑏᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓯᑯᓂᒃ ᓯᖁᑦᑎᕆᒍᑎᒋᒍᓐᓇᓂᐊᕐᑕᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᓕᒫᒥ ᐊᑐᕈᓐᓇᑑᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᓯᐅᑎᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ.ᓯᑯᓯᐅᑏᑦ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᓚᖓᔪᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᓂᕆᒋᐊᓕᖓᓂᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᐅᑉ ᐊᕙᑎᖓᓂᒃ, ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᑯᑦ ᑎᑭᑕᐅᑦᑕᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᐅᒃᑯᑎᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᓖᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᐊᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᖃᕆᑕᐅᔭᒦᑦᑐᓴᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᒍᑎᑦᓴᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᓄᐃᑕᑎᑦᓯᓯᐊᓕᐅᒥᒍᑎᐅᓗᑎᓪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥ ᐃᓂᖏᑦᑕ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᒍᑎᑦᓴᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᓱᒫᓗᓐᓇᒋᑦᑐᒦᑦᑎᓯᓂᕐᒧᓗ, ᐊᕙᑎᒥᒃ ᐱᐅᓯᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᒍᓐᓇᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᒃᑯᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᒧᑦ.
- ᔪᓓ 2024ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ, ᑲᓇᑕ, ᐊᒥᕆᖃ, ᕕᓐᓚᓐᓗᐅᖃᐅᓯᖃᓚᐅᔪᔪᑦᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓂᐊᕆᐊᒥᒃᐱᖓᓱᐃᖑᓗᑎᒃᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᐊᓂᕐᒥᓂᒃᑌᔭᐅᔪᒥᒃᓯᑯᒧᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᑯᑦ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎ ᐱᐅᓂᕐᐸᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᓯᑯᓯᐅᑎᓂᒃ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᓗ ᓯᑯᓂᒃ ᓯᖁᑦᑎᕆᐅᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᓂ ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᖁᑎᓖᑦ ᐊᒥᕐᖄᕈᑎᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᕐᒥᓂᒃ, ᑐᓴᐅᒪᔭᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᓗ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᕐᒥᓂᓪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᒋᒻᒥᓱᒍ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖅ ᓲᖕᖑᓯᒋᐊᕆᓂᐅᒻᒥᔪᖅ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᓱᒪᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᖃᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᓂᒃ, ᐱᐅᓯᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᓂᒃ ᒪᓕᑦᑕᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᓯᖁᓇᒍ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓭᓕᖓᓇᑦᓯᐊᖏᓐᓇᖁᓪᓗᒍ ᓄᓪᓚᖓᓗᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ.
ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᑦ ᐊᓯᐊᓅᓕᖓᔪᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᑎᒍᑦ ᑭᐅᑦᔪᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᑖᒃᑯᓄᖓᓕᒫᖅ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᓕᓐᓄᑦ ᑐᑭᓕᐊᑦᓯᐊᓂᕐᓴᓕᐊᕆᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᑕᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᓕᐅᒥᓗᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᒥᓂᒃ, ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᓯᒪᓂᖏᓐᓂ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓖᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᖏᑦ ᐃᓚᖃᕐᒥᓗᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᓴᐅᓗᑎᒃ.
i. ᐱᑐᑦᑎᓯᓂᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᓪᓚᕆᓖᑦ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᖕᖏᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ
ᑲᒪᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐱᔭᕐᓃᑑᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᓯᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᔪᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᖃᑦᓯᐊᓕᐅᒥᒋᐊᓕᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᖕᖏᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᑎᒍᑐᐃᓐᓇᐅᖏᑦᑐᖅ. ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᖕᖏᓂᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐃᓚᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᓄᓇᓖᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᖕᖏᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ, ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᐅᑉ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᖕᖏᓂᖓᓂᒃ, ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕈᓐᓇᓂᐅᑉ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᖕᖏᓂᖓᓂᒃ, ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᖕᖏᓂᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᓱᓕᖕᖏᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᓯᓕᒫᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐅᓚᐱᑦᓯᓂᕐᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᐃᑕᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᑎᒍᑦ,ᖃᕆᑕᐅᔭᕈᑎᑎᒍᓪᓗ ᐱᐅᒃᑯᑏᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ.
ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᐊᑐᒍᑦ ᓇᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᔨᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᔪᐃᓐᓇᕈᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᓲᖕᖑᓯᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᓕᒫᒥ ᓴᐱᓕᔪᐃᑦᑑᓱᑎᒃ ᓵᓚᐅᑦᑌᓕᒍᓯᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓱᒃᑯᑕᐅᓐᓇᑐᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᖑᖕᖏᑐᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᕐᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ.ᑲᓇᑕ ᓲᖕᖑᓯᒋᐊᕆᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᕆᓲᒥᓂᒃ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᖁᑎᒻᒪᕆᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᓕᒫᒥ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᑦ, ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᓵᖕᖓᓯᒍᑎᒋᒍᓐᓇᓂᐊᕐᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᖑᖕᖏᑐᑦ ᐅᓚᐱᓐᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐱᔭᕆᔭᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᖅ ᐊᑐᕐᓗᒍ ᐱᑦᓴᑖᕐᓯᒪᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᖁᔭᖓᑎᒍᑦ; ᓲᖕᖑᓯᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᖃᕆᑕᐅᔭᕈᑎᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᐅᓯᖓᑎᒍᑦ; ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᓕ ᐊᑐᕐᓗᒍ ᓄᑖᖅ ᐱᖁᔭᖕᖑᑎᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᓵᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᖑᖕᖏᑐᑦ ᐅᓚᐱᑦᓯᐸᓐᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ.
ᐱᑕᖃᕐᑎᓯᓚᖓᔪᒍᑦ ᓈᒻᒪᓈᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᒍᑎᑎᒍᑦ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᓐᓂ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓕᓐᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᓪᓗ ᑲᕙᒪᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑐᓴᐅᒪᑎᑦᓯᐊᖏᓐᓇᓗᒋᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᑎᖏᓐᓇᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᐃᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᓱᑎᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᐅᓯᐅᔪᓂᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᑦ ᓱᕐᕃᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ, ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᐱᐅᒃᑯᑎᖃᑦᓯᐊᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᒥᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓃᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᑎᓗᒋᓪᓗ ᑐᑭᑖᕈᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᒻᒥᓂ.
ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐱᔭᕆᔭᐅᒍᓐᓇᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᓪᓚᕆᓖᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᔨᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ, ᑐᓴᐅᒪᖃᑦᑕᐅᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔪᑦᓭᑦ ᓄᐃᓗᒋᑦ, ᐱᑦᔪᔨᕕᓪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᔭᐅᒪᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓇᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐃᓚᐅᒻᒥᑎᓪᓗᒍ.
ii. ᓲᖕᖑᓯᒋᐊᕆᓂᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒍᑎᓂᒃ
ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᓱᑯᐃᔦᔩᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᕗᖅ ᐱᔭᑦᓴᕆᔭᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᑲᒪᒍᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᖕᖏᑐᓂᒃ ᑲᒪᒍᑎᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓ. ᐊᕐᕌᒍᐃᑦ 20 ᐊᓂᒍᕐᑐᑦ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᓯᒪᓕᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᓕᒫᒥ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᑐᓕᒫᒥᓗ.
ᑲᓇᑕ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᖃᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᑐᖕᖓᓱᑦᑎᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓱᑯᐃᔦᔩᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ,ᑲᓇᑕ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᓕᒃ, ᐱᖁᔭᓕᐊᖑᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ, ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐃᓱᒫᓗᓐᓇᖏᑦᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᒥᓪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᕝᕕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊᓗ ᐱᐅᒃᑯᑎᖃᑦᓯᐊᕆᐊᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᓵᑦᓯᒍᑎᒋᒍᓐᓇᕋᔭᕐᑕᒥᓂᒃ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᓯᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᓱᒃᑯᑕᐅᒍᑎᐅᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᓕᓐᓂᓗ ᐃᓘᓐᓀᑎᒍᑦ. ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒥᒃ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓯᐊᕆᐊᓕᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᕕᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᖑᖕᖏᑐᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᒪᓂᖏᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᓗ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᒪᕐᕈᐃᑎᒍᑦ- ᑌᒣᑎᒍᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᑯᑦ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᑕᖃᕐᓂᑯᓪᓗ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᑎᑕᒥᒍᑦ.
ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᓕᒃ ᓇᓪᓕᖁᐊᕇᑦᓯᐊᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐸᐅᑦᔭᐅᒋᐊᓕᑦᑎᒍᑦ ᓯᕗᒧᒋᐊᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᓕᕐᑐᑦ ᐃᓃᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᒍᑎᐅᒋᐊᓖᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᓄᑦ ᓱᑯᐃᔦᔩᓄᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᐅᓗᑎᒃ, ᒪᑯᑎᒎᓇ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ, ᐊᑑᑎᒍᑎᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᑉᐱᒋᑦᓯᐊᓚᕆᓪᓗᒍ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᓪᓗᑯᒍᑎᒋᒋᐊᖃᕐᓱᒍ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᖅ.
ᑲᓇᑕ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᐊᕐᖁᖅ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᕕᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᓪᓗ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᑐᖁᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᒪᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑕᑯᓐᓇᕋᓱᐊᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᖑᖕᖏᑐᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᕆᓲᖓᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᓂᒃ ᑲᕙᒪᒨᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᖓ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᐊᕐᖁᖅ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᓄᐃᑎᕆᓂᕐᒧᑦ, ᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐱᒋᐊᑎᓯᓂᕐᓗ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕈᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ, ᐊᑕᓂᐊᓘᑉ-ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᓪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᓕᕆᔭᐅᒍᓯᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᒃᓚᖁᑎᓕᕆᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑏᑦ, ᐱᑦᔪᔨᕕᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᓴᐳᑦᔭᐅᓯᒪᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᓐᓄᑦ, ᓱᑉᕋᒣᑦᑐᑦ ᓄᓀᑦ ᐱᑦᓴᑖᕐᕕᐅᒍᓐᓇᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐃᖃᓗᓕᕆᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᓕᕆᓂᕐᒧᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ, ᐊᓯᖏᑦ ᐱᒐᓗᐊᕐᒥᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ, ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐅᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᐅᔪᑦ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ,ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᑐᑦᓯᕋᐅᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕈᒪᐅᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᑕᒪᓐᓇᓗ ᐃᓱᒪᒍᑕᐅᒍᓐᓇᓱᓂ ᑌᒣᑎᒍᑦ ᒪᕐᕈᐃᓕᖓᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᓂᕐᒥᒃ.
ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᒪᒍᑎᐅᓗᓂ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒻᒃ ᓄᐃᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᕈᑕᐅᒋᐊᓖᑦ ᐱᓪᓗᒍᒋᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᖅ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᓗ ᓴᑯᐃᔦᔩᓪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᕆᒋᐊᓕᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᒍᓐᓇᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ, ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᒪᓂᐊᕐᑐᒍᑦ ᐊᖏᓕᒋᐊᕆᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᐃᓕᑦᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᓱᒫᓘᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᑖᒃᑯᓄᖓ ᓄᓇᓯᒪᔪᓄᑦ,ᐊᑑᑎᑎᑦᓯᕙᓪᓗᑕ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᑕᒫᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒥᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᒍᑎᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᒪᓕᒐᖁᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐸᐅᑦᔨᒍᒪᔭᑦᑎᒍᑦ. ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᙯᓐᓇᓚᖓᒻᒥᔪᒍᑦ ᐊᓯᑦᑕ ᑲᕙᒣᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᔨᔨᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᐸᕐᓇᖃᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᑕᒫᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᐅᖃᑦᑕᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ.
ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎ (ᑕᑯᓗᒍ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎ 4- ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᓯᓂᖅ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᓴᒥᒃ ᓵᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᕙᒪᓕᕆᒍᓯᕐᓂᒃ) ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕈᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᐃᓄᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᑖᕐᓗᓂ ᓄᓇᑖᕈᑎᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᓐᓂ ᓄᓇᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᕙᒪᖏᑎᒍᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᒻᒥᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᓕᒫᒥ ᑲᕙᒣᑦ,ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᒪᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐊᔪᐃᓐᓇᕈᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᒪᒍᑎᐅᒐᓱᐊᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ, ᐱᑦᓴᖑᓕᕐᕿᕈᓐᓇᑐᑎᒍᑦ, ᐊᓯᖏᑎᒍᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᖏᑎᒍᑦ, ᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᖅ ᖃᕆᑕᐅᔭᕐᑎᒍᓪᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᒍᓐᓇᑑᒃ ᐋᕐᕿᕈᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᒍᑎᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᕐᓇᑐᓂᒃ
ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎᖓ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᐊᒥᔪᖅ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᑎᖓᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᑕ ᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᒫᙰᕐᑎᒥᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᑐᐊᔪᓂᒃ ᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᒧᓪᓗ.
iii. ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᑖᕐᓂᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᓯᑦᔭᖁᑎᒥᓂᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔨᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᒥᓪᓗ
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᑦᔭᖁᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᔩᑦ, ᐊᑕᐅᑦᓯᑰᖃᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᒻᒥᔭᒥᑕ ᐱᑦᔪᔨᕕᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎᖏᑎᒍᓪᓗ, ᑲᒪᔨᐅᕗᖅ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥ ᐃᓂᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᕕᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᓱᓂᓗ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᕐᒥᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ.
ᐱᖕᖑᑎᑦᓯᕙᓪᓕᐊᓂᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᓯᑦᔭᖁᑎᖏᑦᑕ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᑦᓴᖏᓐᓂᒃ, ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓚᐅᔪᓂᒃ 2024ᒥ, ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᓯᑦᔭᖁᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᔩᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᖃᓚᖓᕗᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᒪᓂᕐᒥᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᓕᒫᒥ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑏᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒥᒍᑦ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᑦᔭᖁᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᔩᑦ ᒫᓐᓇᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑦᓯᔪᑎᑦ 6ᓂᒃ ᓯᑯᓯᐅᑎᓂᒃ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐱᒋᐊᓲᖑᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᔫᓂᒥ ᑎᑭᑦᓱᒍ ᓅᕕᒻᐱᕆ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᑕᒫᑦ,ᑕᒪᓐᓇᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᓯᕗᒧᒍᑎᐅᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂᓗ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᐃᓱᒫᓗᓐᓇᖏᑦᑑᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓂᓪᓗ. ᐊᕐᕌᒍᓂ ᙯᔪᓂ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᑦᔭᖏᓐᓂ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑎᓯᑦᑌᓕᔩᑦ ᐱᖃᓛᓕᕐᑐᑦ 8ᓂᒃ ᓄᑖᓂᒃ ᓯᑯᓯᐅᑎᓂᒃ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᓂᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᒃ ᒪᕐᕉᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓯᑯᓂᒃ ᓯᖁᑦᑎᕆᒍᓐᓇᑑᒃ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᕈᑎᐅᓛᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᓕᒫᒥ ᐅᐸᐅᑎᓯᒪᒍᓐᓇᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᑦᔭᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑎᑦᑌᓕᔩᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᒪᒻᒥᔪᑦ ᐊᖏᓂᕐᓴᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᒥᒍᑦ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑕᐅᔪᒃᑯᑦ ᑌᔭᐅᑦᓱᓂ Pacer Goose. ᐊᕐᕌᒍᑕᒫᑦ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᓂᕆᓲᖓ ᐱᑕᖃᕐᑎᓯᒋᐊᓪᓚᑐᖅ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᒥᐅᑦ’’ ᐱᑐᕝᕕᒥᒃ ᕿᓚᒻᒥ ᐃᓂᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᐃᓂᖓᓂᒃ(ᑌᔭᐅᒍᓯᖃᕐᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᑑᓖᑦ ᕿᓚᒻᒥ ᐃᓂᖁᑎᖓ) ᑲᓛᓖᑦ ᓄᓈᓐᓂ, ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᓕᓪᓚᕇᑦ ᐱᐅᒃᑯᑏᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᖕᖏᑐᑎᒍᑦ ᐅᓯᔭᐅᖃᑦᑕᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᕐᓇᑐᒥ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐱᐅᓯᖓᓂ.
ᓲᖕᖑᓯᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᓐᓂᑯᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᒪᓕᒐᐅᑉ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᓯᑦᔭᖁᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎ, ᐃᒣᒍᑎᒋᓚᖓᔭᕗᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᓂᕐᓴᕆᓕᕐᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᑦᔭᖁᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᔩᑦ ᓇᓪᓕᖁᐊᕆᓕᐅᑎᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥ ᐃᓂᖁᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᓪᓚᕆᒍᑎᓖᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑕᒥᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓃᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒥᓂᒃ.ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᑕᖓ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᒥᒍᓪᓗ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᑦᔭᖁᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᔨᖏᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᒪᕗᑦ ᓲᖑᓂᕐᓴᒥᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᒥᓂᒃ. ᐊᖏᓂᕐᓴᒥᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᑯᑦ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᑦᔭᖁᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᔩᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓯᓚᖓᒻᒥᔪᑦ ᓯᐊᒻᒪᑎᑦᓯᓕᐅᒥᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᑖᕆᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂ ᓯᑦᔭᓂᒃ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᔨᓂᒃ ᐃᓱᒪᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᖃᕐᓂᑯᑦ.
iv. ᓲᖕᖑᓯᒋᐊᕆᓂᖅ ᓄᓇᑖᕆᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᐅᑉ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ
ᑭᐅᑦᔪᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᓲᖕᖑᓯᒋᐊᕆᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒥᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑏᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᐅᑉ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ.
ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐱᑦᔪᔨᕕᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ,ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᓚᖓᔪᒍᑦ ᑐᓴᐅᒪᔭᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᑐᓴᐅᒪᔭᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑖᒃᑯᓄᖓ NATO ᖁᑦᓯᑐᒥ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᓖᑦ ᐱᓪᓗᒋᑦ.ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐅᒥᑎᒋᐊᓚᖓᒻᒥᔭᕗᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᕗᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᔨᕕᑦᑎᓂ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᑭᓯᒪᔭᐅᓂᕐᓴᐅᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᒥᒃ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᖅ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᐅᑉ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᐅᑕᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕈᑎᒋᓕᐅᒥᓗᒍ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑐᑦ ᕿᐅᔭᓇᕐᑐᒥ ᐊᑑᑎᒍᓐᓇᓯᐊᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕ ᑲᔪᓯᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᕐᒥᒍᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᖃᑦᓯᐊᓂᒃᑯᑦ NATO ᐊᑑᑎᔭᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᓂᖏᑎᒍᓪᓗ. ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᓂᒥᐅᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᖁᑎᖓ.
ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᑕᒣᑎᒍᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓂᐅᔪᒥᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᓴᐅᒪᔭᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᑐᓴᐅᒪᔭᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᖅ ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᒦᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᐃᓕᑕᕆᔭᖃᖕᖏᑐᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᐅᑉ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᓱᓕᕝᕕᓂᒃ ᐅᕝᕙᓗᓘᓐᓃᑦ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑏᑦ ᐃᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᒪᕕᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᕗᖅ ᑐᑭᒧᐊᑦᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑏᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᑕᓗ ᐃᓱᒪᖃᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓕᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍᒋᑦ ᐊᒃᓚᓯᒪᔭᖏᑎᒍᑦ NATO ᐊᒻᒪᓗ NORAD ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᕿᒥᕐᕈᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᐊᑑᑎᓗᓂᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᑖᕐᓗᓂ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᓚᐅᕐᓯᒪᖕᖏᑕᒥᓂᒃ ᓲᖕᖑᓯᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᒥᒃ ᓴᖑᑎᕆᓗᓂ ᕆᐊᖃᕈᓂ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᓕᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂᒃ, ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒥᒃ ᐊᓛᔾᑲᒥ, ᔫᑳᓐ,ᓄᓇᑦᓯᐊᕗᑦ,ᓄᓇᕗᑦ, ᑲᓛᓪᓖᓗ ᓄᓈᑦ. ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᑖᕆᓗᒋᑦ.
ᖃᐅᔨᕙᓪᓚᒍᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᑕᖃᕇᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑐᓂᒃ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᕿᒥᕐᕈᔪᖅ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᐅᒐᔭᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᓲᖕᖑᓯᐅᒥᖁᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᐅᑉ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖓ ᑌᒫᑦᓭᓇᖅ ᐃᓱᒪᖃᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐅᖃᓕᒪᒍᑎᙯᓐᓇᖃᑦᑕᓂᖅ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᕐᒥᒃ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᐊᑐᓯᑎᑦᓯᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᑐᑭᓯᒪᐅᑎᒍᑎᒥᒃ ᐃᓚᒋᓗᒍ ᑐᕐᖃᑕᕐᕕᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᔪᓄᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᓄᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᖃᖃᑕᐅᔪᓄᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᖃᖃᑕᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ. ᐅᖃᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖅ ᑭᓯᐊᒐᖃᕈᑕᐅᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᑐᓴᐅᒪᑎᑦᓯᖃᑦᑕᐅᑎᖃᓂᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᒪᑯᓂᖓ, ᕿᒥᕐᕈᔭᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᓂᒃ ᐱᓪᓗᒋᑦ, ᐱᑦᔪᑎᐅᔪᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᐅᑕᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒍᓰᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᕐᓗ;ᐃᓚᐅᒻᒥᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐅᖃᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᔭᕆᐊᕈᑎᒋᓯᒪᔭᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐅᖑᔨᒋᐊᕈᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᐅᑉ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᕈᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ;ᓯᕗᒧᑦᑎᓯᒋᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒧᑦ; ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᑑᑎᒍᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᓴᐱᓕᔪᐃᑦᑑᓗᓂ.
2. ᓴᐳᑦᔨᓯᒪᓂᖅ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒨᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᒪᐅᑎᒥᒃ
ᐃᒣᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᑕ ᐃᒪᖁᑎᖏᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓯᕗᓂᖓᒍᑦ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᐅᖃᑦᑕᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᓄᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐃᒪᖁᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᕗᑦ ᐃᒣᑦ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐱᖃᕐᓂᕋᕐᑕᐅᒍᓯᑐᖃᕐᒥᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᒪᓕᑦᓱᒍ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒨᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖃᕈᑎᖓ ᐃᓚᖃᕐᒥᔪᖅ ᓄᓇᓂᒃ, ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥᒃ ᓯᑯᒥᓪᓗ. ᐊᖏᓂᖓ ᐊᕗᖓᑐᐃᓐᓈᓱᓂ ᐊᕝᕕᐊᓗᑕᖃᕋᓂ ᓵᖕᖓᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓄᑦ ᕿᑭᕐᑕᓄᑦ ᐅᖓᑖᓄᓪᓗ. ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᕿᑭᕐᑌᑦ ᐱᑐᑦᑐᓯᒪᐅᑎᔪᑦ ᐊᕕᑦᓯᒪᖕᖏᑐᑦ, ᐃᒪᖅ ᐊᑯᓐᓂᖏᑎᒎᕐᓱᓂ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᖏᓂᕐᓴᒥᒃ ᓯᑯᒃᑯᑦ ᐅᑭᐅᒥ.
ᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐊᑐᓲᑦ ᐃᓂᒋᑦᓱᒍᓗ ᓯᑯᒥᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᒥᓗ ᑌᒫᓪᓗᐊᖅ ᓄᓇᒥᒃ ᐊᑐᓲᒍᒐᒥᒃ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᒐᓴᑦᔪᐊᓂ.ᖃᐅᑕᒫᑦ, ᖃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓇᖅ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᒥᒍᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᑲᕙᒣᓪᓗ, ᐃᓚᐅᒻᒥᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᒃᑯᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᓯᒪᓂᖏᓐᓃᑐᑦ ᑲᕙᒣᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᓪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᖑᒻᒥᔪᑦ, ᑲᑐᑦᔨᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᑉᐱᒍᓱᑦᑎᒋᔭᐅᕗᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓂᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᓂᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᖏᓐᓂᒃ. ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᓕᑕᕆᖃᑦᑕᐅᑎᑦᓱᑎᓪᓗ ᐊᑐᓂ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᒥᑎᒍᑦ ᑖᒃᑯᓇᓂ ᓄᓇᓂ ᐃᒪᕐᓂᓗ ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᑲᑐᑦᔨᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᑉᐱᒍᓱᑦᑎᐅᒪᑕ ᑕᒪᒃᑯᓂᖓ-ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᒋᐊᓪᓚᐅᑎᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᐅᓪᓗᒥᐅᓕᕐᑐᖅ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕈᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓱᒪᕐᓱᓗᓂ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓐᓇᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᑎᒍᑦ. ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᐅᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᓄᑭᖃᕈᑎ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᑖᖑᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑕᒃᒎᓇ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᕕᑎᑕᐅᕐᖃᔭᕋᑎᒃ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᕗᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᕐᓱᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᕙᒪᓐᓂᒧᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕ ᓇᒻᒥᓂᖃᕐᑎᐅᕗᖅ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᕆᓂᕐᒥᒃ,ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕈᓐᓇᐅᑎᓂᒃ, ᐱᕐᖁᓯᕐᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑑᑎᖃᑦᑕᓯᒪᔪᕐᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᔨᐅᖏᑦᑑᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒧᖓᓕᖓᔪᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᖑᓯᒪᔪᒧᑦ, ᑌᒣᓪᓗᑐᕐᓂᖓ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᓂᖏᓪᓗ ᑐᑭᓯᓇᑦᓯᐊᓚᕆᑦᓱᓂ ᓄᐃᑕᓂᖓ ᑌᒣᑎᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐊᑯᓂᕐᔪᐊᕌᓗᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᕐᒥᒍᑦ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᐊᑐᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓀᓕᑎᕆᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑌᒣᑕ ᐱᒍᒪᓯᒪᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐅᔨᒍᒪᓯᒪᑦᓱᒋᓪᓗ ᑕᒫᓂ ᓄᓇᒥ, ᒪᑯᑎᒎᓇ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᑖᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ ᐃᑉᐱᒍᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᑏᑦ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥᒃ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᓯᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ. Footnote 1-5 ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᑕᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᖃᕈᑎᐅᓂᕐᓴᐅᓂᐊᕐᖁᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓄᑦ ᐃᓄᓐᓄᑦ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᑖᓕᐅᒥᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᑦᓴᑖᕆᓯᒪᔭᒥᓂᒃ ᑲᒪᓇᓱᑦᑎᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᕐᖁᓯᒥᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᒥᓂᒃ, ᐃᒪᖁᑎᒥᓂᒃ, ᓯᑯᒥᓪᓗ.
ᑲᓇᑕ ᓱᓕ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᖃᖕᖑᓱᑦᑐᖅ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᖃᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑲᒪᔨᐅᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᑭᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᓗᓂ ᑕᒪᒃᑯᓇᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᐃᒪᖁᑎᒥᓂᓪᓗ, ᑐᖕᖓᕕᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᓂᒃ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᓖᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᒪᐅᑎᑎᒍᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᑦᓱᑎᓪᓗ ᐊᑑᑎᖃᑦᑕᓯᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᒃᑯᓗ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑕᐅᒍᑎᑎᒍᑦ.ᖃᓇᑕ ᑐᓂᓯᒪᕗᖅ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᐅᑉ ᐱᑖᕆᔭᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᑦ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᑦᓯᐊᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᐅᓯᖃᕈᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᒪᓕᑦᓯᐊᕈᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᒪᓕᒐᓕᐊᖑᓯᒪᔪᒥᒃ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᕗᖅ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᕈᑎᓄᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐸᐅᑦᔭᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ.
i. ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᓂᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐃᓱᓕᑦᑕᕕᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖃᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᓱᒍ ᐱᕈᔭᓂᒃ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᓵᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎ
ᐊᑑᑎᔭᐅᓕᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᓂᒃ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᒪᐅᑎᖓ ᓂᕆᐅᓐᓇᖏᑦᑐᓄᑦ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᒨᕐᑕᐅᓱᓂ,ᐊᑑᑎᒋᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᖅ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐋᕐᕿᕈᑎᑦᓴᑖᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐹᕐᓯᖓᐅᑎᒍᑎᒥᓄᑦ ᐱᑦᓯᐊᓗᒍ, ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐅᖄᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖅ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᓗ.ᑲᓇᑕ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᐋᕐᕿᕈᑎᑦᓴᐅᒐᔭᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᑎᑭᐅᑎᑦᑕᕖᑦ ᐹᕐᓯᖓᐅᑕᐅᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᒪᓕᑦᓱᒍ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒨᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᔪᖅ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐸᐅᑦᔭᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᓐᓄᑦ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓄᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ.
ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᓗᒍ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖁᑎᑖᖑᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑎᑭᐅᑎᑦᑕᕕᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᒋᕗᖅ ᐊᑦᑕᓀᑦᑐᒦᑦᑎᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᓲᓱᑦᓴᕈᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᑖᕐᕕᒋᒍᓐᓇᑕᒥᓂᑦ ᓇᒻᒥᓂᕆᑦᓱᒋᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐆᒻᒪᖁᑎᑦᓴᔭ, ᐅᔭᕋᓐᓂᐊᕋᑦᓭᑦ, ᐃᖃᓗᐃᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᓪᓗ ᓂᕐᔪᑏᑦ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᒋᐊᕈᑎᖃᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᐋᕐᖀᒍᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᑖᖑᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᓱᓕᑦᑕᕕᖏᑦᑕ ᐹᕐᓯᖓᐅᑎᒍᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᓂᑰᖕᖏᑐᖅ ᒪᓕᓪᓗᓂᓗ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒨᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᒥᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍUNCLOS, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᑎᕆᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒥᓂᒃ, ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒥᒃ ᓱᕐᕋᑕᐅᒍᑎᒋᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᓕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐃᓱᓕᑦᑕᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᓱᕐᕃᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᐸᑕ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕆᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖃᕐᕕᐅᔪᓂᒃ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ-ᐊᑕᓂᐅᕕᖓᑕᓗ ᑎᓐ ᒫᒃ ᐃᓱᓕᑦᑕᕕᓐᓄᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᖓ
ᑲᓇᑕ,ᐊᑕᓂᐅᕕᖓᓗ ᑎᓐ ᒫᒃ, ᑲᓛᓪᓖᓗ ᓄᓈᑦ ᐋᕐᕿᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᖃᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖁᑎᒥᑦᑕ ᐃᓱᓕᑦᑕᕕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑯᓂᕐᔪᐊᖅ ᐹᕐᓯᖓᐅᑎᒍᑎᒋᓯᒪᔭᒥᓂᒃ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᑖᕐᑐᐹᓗᒃ. ᔫᓂ 2022ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ, ᐊᑑᑎᖃᑦᑕᓚᐅᑲᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᓂ ᑕᓪᓕᒪᓂ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒐᓱᐊᕐᓱᑎᒃ,ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ, ᓄᓇᕗᑦ, ᑏᓂᔾ ᑲᓛᓪᓖᓗ ᓄᓈᑕ ᑲᕙᒪᖏᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᓕᕕᓃᑦ ᐅᓪᓗᒥᓯᐅᑎᓕᐊᕆᑦᓱᒍ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᐃᓱᓕᑦᑕᕕᒃ, ᐱᒋᐊᕐᓱᓂ Lincoln ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖁᑎᖓᓂᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᒥᒃ ᑎᑭᑦᓱᒍ ᓛᐸᑐᐊᑉ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖓ ᓯᕿᓂᕐᒦᑐᖅ-ᐅᖓᓯᓐᓂᓕᒃ ᐅᖓᑖᓄᑦ 3000ᑭᓚᒦᑌᑦ- ᑕᒪᓐᓇᓗ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᓯᓂᐅᓯᒪᕗᖅ ᑕᑭᓂᕐᐹᒥᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᐅᑉ ᐃᓱᓕᑦᑕᕕᓕᐅᕐᑕᐅᒍᑎᖓᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥ. ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎ ᐋᕐᖀᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᒻᒥᔪᖅ ᖃᓕᕇᕝᕕᐅᓯᒪᔪᒥᒃ ᐱᖃᖃᑦᒌᕝᕕᐅᓱᓂ ᓄᓇᑖᖑᓯᒪᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᓛᐸᑐᐊᑉ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖓᓂ.
ᐃᓚᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᐊᑕᓂᐅᕕᖓ ᑎᓐ ᒫᒃ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᐊᖏᕐᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᐃᓂᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᕿᑭᕐᑕᒥᒃ ᑖᕐᑐᐹᓗᒻᒦᑐᒥᒃ ᐊᕕᓪᓗᐊᓗᒍ;ᑲᓇᑕ ᒫᓐᓇ ᓯᕗᒧᒍᑎᖃᓕᕐᑐᖅ ᐅᖄᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᖃᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᐅᓯᒪᓕᕐᑐᒥᒃ ᐃᓱᓕᑦᑕᕕᐅᓂᐊᕐᓱᓂ ᑖᕐᑐᐹᓗᒻᒥ, ᑕᒪᓐᓇᓗ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᕕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᓯᒪᔪᑦ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᑭᖑᓪᓕᐸᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᔭᕆᐊᕐᓂᐅᓕᕐᑐᖅ ᓯᕗᓂᖓᒍᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᐅᑉ ᐊᑐᓯᓂᕆᒋᐊᓕᖓᑕ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᑐᓂᓯᒪᕕᓕᒃ ᐱᔭᕇᕐᓂᐊᓗᓂ ᖃᒻᒥᑯᑦ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒥᖓ.
ᐊᕗᖓᐅᓕᒋᐊᕐᑕᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖏᑦᑕ ᐃᓐᓈᕈᖏᑦ ᑎᑭᐅᑎᕕᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ
ᑏᓯᒻᐱᕆ 2022ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓚᐅᔪᕗᖅ ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕆᒍᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖁᑎᒥᓄᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᒧᑦ ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕐᓱᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᑖᕆᓯᒪᔭᒥᑦᑕ ᐃᓐᓈᕉᕐᓄᑦ ᑎᑭᐅᑎᑦᑕᕖᑦ ᒪᓕᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᒪᐅᑎ ᐊᑐᕐᓱᒍ ᐃᓱᓕᑦᑕᕕᓐᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᑖᖑᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᓐᓈᕈᖏᑎᒍᑦ >ᑭᐅᑦᔪᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᕉᓯᐊᒥᐅᑦ >ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕈᑎᓕᐊᖏᓐᓄᑦ, ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓚᐅᔪᒧᑦ ᒫᑦᔨ 2021ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ. ᕉᓯᐊᑉ ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕈᑎᖓ ᐊᖏᓕᒋᐊᕆᕐᔪᐊᓯᒪᒻᒪᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᑖᖑᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᓐᓈᕈᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑎᑭᐅᑎᑦᑕᕕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᒪᓂᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᖓᓱᕕᓪᓗᐊᓕᕐᓱᓂ ᖃᓕᕇᕝᕕᖃᓕᕐᓱᓂᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓇᒻᒥᓂᖅ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᓐᓈᕈᖁᑎᖏᓐᓂᓗ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕈᑎᓕᐊᕆᓯᒪᔭᖓ 2022ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐋᕐᕿᒋᐊᕆᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᖄᓕᕇᕝᕕᐅᓕᕐᑐᕕᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐃᓂᒥᒃ.
ᑏᓯᒻᐱᕆ 2023ᒥ, ᐊᒥᕆᑲᒥᐅᑦ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓚᐅᔪᕗᑦ ᐊᒃᓚᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᓱᓕᑦᑕᕕᖁᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᖏᓕᒋᐊᕐᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᓄᓇᑖᖑᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᓐᓈᕈᖁᑎᖏᑦᑕᓗ ᐃᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐅᐊᓕᓂᖓᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖓᑕ. ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒪ ᐅᖃᐅᑕᐅᓂᖓ ᒪᓂᔨᔪᖅ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒧᑦ ᓄᑕᐅᓯᓕᑎᕆᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᓂᒃ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᓗᒍ ᐊᒥᕆᑲ ᐱᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᖃᓕᕇᕝᕕᐅᔪᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᓄᑦ ᓲᓱᒋᔭᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᑖᖑᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᓐᓈᕈᕐᓄᑦ ᑎᑭᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ. ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒪ ᐅᖃᖃᑎᒌᒍᑕᐅᓂᑦᓴᖓ ᓂᕆᐅᒋᔭᐅᔪᖅ ᐱᒋᐊᕋᔭᕆᐊᖓ 2024 ᐊᕐᕌᒍᖓ ᐊᑐᕐᑐᖃᐅᓕᕐᐸᑦ.
ᑲᓇᑕ, ᑌᒫᑦᓭᓇᖅ ᐃᓘᓐᓇᖏᑦᑕ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖁᑎᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᓯᑦᔭᖏᓐᓂ, ᑐᓂᒪᕕᖃᖏᓐᓇᖁᖅ ᐋᕐᕿᕈᑎᑦᓴᓯᐅᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᑖᖑᓯᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᐃᓐᓈᕈᖏᑦ ᑎᑭᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᖃᓕᕇᕝᕕᐅᓱᑎᒃ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᓂᑰᑉᖏᑐᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᒪᓕᓪᓗᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒨᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᓂᒃ.
ᑲᓇᑕ- ᐊᒥᕆᑲᓗ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᐅᑎᒃᑯᑦ Beaufort ᐃᒪᕐᐱᐅᑉ ᐃᓱᓕᑦᑕᕕᖏᑦ
2024ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓚᐅᔪᔪᖅ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒐᓱᐊᕐᓱᒍ ᐊᒥᕆᑲ ᐋᕐᕿᕈᑎᑦᓴᓯᐅᕐᓱᓂ ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᒃ ᐊᑯᓂᐋᓗᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥ ᐃᓱᓕᑦᑕᕕᒃ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᐹᕐᓯᖓᐅᑎᒍᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖓᓂ Beaufort. ᐃᓂ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᒋᐊᓕᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓃᑦᑐᖅ ᔫᑳᓐ ᐊᓚᔅᑲᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᖏᓂᖃᕐᓱᓂ 270,000 ᐃᑎᒐᓐᓂᒃ ᐅᖓᓯᓐᓂᓕᒻᒥᒃ. ᑕᒪᕐᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖃᕐᓂᕋᕐᑐᐃᓇᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐹᕐᓯᖓᐅᑎᒍᑎᒥ ᐃᓂᒥ ᒪᓐᓇ ᐊᑐᕐᓱᒍ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᖕᖏᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᑐᑭᓯᓇᕐᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑖᑦᓱᒪ 1825ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑕᐅᓚᐅᕐᑐᕕᓂᐅᑉ ᑖᒃᑯᓅᖓ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᓄᑦ ᕉᓯᐊᒧᑦ ᖃᓪᓗᓈᕐᔪᐊᓄᓪᓗ ᐳᕆᑕᕐᒥᐅᓄᑦ.
ᓄᐃᑕᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᑕ ᑐᓂᓯᒪᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᑖᕈᒪᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᑐᖃᑎᖃᕆᐊᑦᓯᐊᕈᒪᓂᕐᒧᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᐃᓄᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᑖᕈᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᓱᓕᑦᑕᕕᖏᑦᑕ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒐᓱᐊᕈᑕᐅᓂᖓ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᐅᒋᐊᖃᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᓱᕐᕋᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕈᑎᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᑎᕇᓐᓇᓕᒫᕈᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᕕᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᖏᓐᓂᒃ.
ᓯᕗᒧᑦᑎᓯᓂᖅ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᓱᓕᓪᓚᕆᒍᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᖅ
ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᓕᓪᓚᕇᑦ ᑐᖕᖓᕖᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᒪᓕᒐᖁᑎᖏᓐᓂ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᔪᑦᓴᐅᒪᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᓄᑦ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐊᑯᓂᐋᓗᑦ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᒋᔭᐅᓯᒪᓕᕐᒪᑦ ᑲᑐᑦᔨᒍᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᖃᑦᑕᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᐊᑯᓂᐋᓗᒃ ᓭᒪᐅᑎᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒥᒃ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᓗ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒥᖓ ᐃᓂᒥᒃ.
1. ᓲᖕᖑᓯᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓂᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ
i. ᐊᒥᕆᑲ
ᐊᒥᕆᑲ ᖃᓂᓐᓂᐸᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᕙᐅᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖅ ᓯᐊᒻᒪᓯᒪᕗᖅ ᑕᒪᒃᑯᓇᓂᓕᒫᖅ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᒥᒃ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᐅᔪᑎᒍᑦ.ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖅ ᓯᕗᒧᑦᑎᑕᐅᓯᒪᕗᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᖏᔪᒻᒪᕆᒻᒥᒃ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᕕᖃᕐᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᔪᓂᒃ 13ᓂᒃ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᒪᐅᑎᓂᒃ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᒪᕐᕈᐃᖑᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᒍᓯᖏᑎᒍᑦ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ-ᐊᒥᕆᑲᐅᓪᓗ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖓ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᖅ ᑲᔪᓯᔪᒥᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑑᒦᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᕆᔭᐅᔫᑉ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᓄᑦ.ᑲᓇᑕ ᑐᖕᖓᓱᑦᑎᓯᔪᖅ ᑲᔪᓯᔪᒥᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᕆᓲᖓᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᒥᐅᑦ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᖏᑦᑕ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓯᑦᔭᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᑯᑦ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᔭᓲᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ-ᐱᒋᐅᕐᓴᓂᐅᓲᒥᓪᓗ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᓂᐅᓲᒥᓪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ.
ᐊᒥᕆᑲᒥᐅᑦ ᐃᓚᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᐊᑦᔨᐅᖏᑦᑐᒥᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕈᓯᖃᕐᖁᑦ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᒪᔪᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᐅᑉ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ, ᐊᑑᑎᖃᑦᑕᓯᒪᔪᑎᒍᑦ, ᑌᒣᑕ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᖁᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ, ᐊᑦᔨᒌᓂᒃ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᖃᕐᓂᒥᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓲᖑᔪᒥᒃ ᐃᓄᖁᑎᖏᑦ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᑌᒣᓕᖓᓗᐊᖕᖑᐊᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒥᒃ ᐊᑯᕐᖓᓂ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ,ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᐊᑑᑎᖃᑦᑕᓯᒪᔭᖏᑦ, ᐱᕐᖁᓯᖏᓪᓗ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖏᒍᑦ.
ᓯᕗᒧᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᖃᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᐊᕗᖓᐅᓕᒋᐊᕐᑎᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᒪᕐᕈᐃᖑᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᕆᓲᒥᓂᒃ ᐃᓚᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᒥᐅᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᑦ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᕆᒋᐊᓕᓕᒫᒥᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐃᓂᓂ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᑎᑕᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᕿᒥᕐᕈᓗᓂ ᐊᑑᑎᓚᐅᕐᓯᒪᖕᖏᑕᒥᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᑯᑦ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᓯᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᓖᑦ ᐃᓃᑦ ᐱᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᒍᒪᓯᒪᔭᖏᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ:ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒣᑦᑌᓕᓂᖅ ᐃᓱᒫᓗᓐᓇᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᓗ; ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᑕ; ᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᒧᓪᓗ ᖃᕆᑕᐅᔭᕈᑏᑦ;ᐆᒻᒪᖁᑎᑦᓴᔭᐅᑉ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᖓ,ᐅᓯᑲᑦᑕᕕᐅᓲᑦ ᐱᐅᒃᑯᑎᑦᓴᓂᒃ,ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓ;ᐊᑐᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᑭᓯᐊᓂᐅᔪᑦ ᐅᔭᕋᑦᓴᔦᑦ;ᑲᔪᓯᔪᒥᒃ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᒍᓐᓇᓂᖅ;ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᑳᑲᑦᑕᒍᓐᓇᓂᖏᑦ ᓄᓇᐅᑉ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ;ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕐᓂᐅᑉ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓ;ᐃᒪᕐᐱᐅᑉ ᓄᓇᐅᓪᓗ ᐱᐅᓕᐊᕐᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᒃ; ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᐆᒪᔪᐃᑦ ᑕᒣᓐᓂ ᓄᓇᑖᕆᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᓃᑦᑐᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓵᒣᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᒃᑐᐃᑦ.
ii. ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ
ᑲᓇᑕ ᑎᒍᒥᐊᖏᓐᓇᓂᐊᕐᖁᖅ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᓲᒥᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᖃᓂᑕᒥᓂᒃ; ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒥᒃ, ᐊᑕᓂᐅᕕᖓ ᑎᓐ ᒫᒃ(ᐅᑯᐊᖑᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑎᓐ ᒫᒃ, ᑲᓛᓪᓖᑦ ᓄᓈᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ Faroe ᕿᑭᕐᑕᖏᑦ) ᕕᓐ ᓚᓐ,ᐁᔅ ᓚᓐ, ᓄᐊ ᕗᐃ ᓱᕗᐃᑕᓐᓗ.ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᖏᓐᓇᓂᕆᓲᖏᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᑎᑕᐅᕗᑦ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᒥᒃ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᖁᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ, ᐊᑦᔨᒌᒥᓪᓗ ᑕᐅᑐᒍᓯᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑌᒫᑦᓭᓇᖅ ᑐᓂᒪᒍᑎᒥᑎᒍᑦ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᐅᓚᐱᑕᐅᓐᓇᕋᓂ ᑌᒣᓕᖓᑦᓭᓚᕐᓗᓂᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐱᖁᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐱᔭᕆᓯᒪᔭᖓ NATO.ᐱᕈᕐᐸᓕᐊᓂᖏᑦ ᓲᖕᖑᓯᕙᓪᓕᐊᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᑲᔪᓯᔪᖅ, ᐊᑐᕐᓱᒍ ᐊᑦᔨᐅᖏᑦᑑᓱᓂ ᓇᓗᓀᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖅ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓯᒪᒍᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᐊᑕᐅᑦᓯᑰᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒥᓪᓗ ᑌᒪᖕᖓᓂᑦ ᕉᓯᐊ ᐃᑖᓚᐅᔪᑎᓪᓗᒍᓂᑦ ᔪᑯᕇᓂᐊᓐᒥᒃ. ᑌᒣᓚᐅᕐᓯᒪᖕᖏᓯᐊᕐᓱᓂ ᓯᕗᓂᖓᒍᑦ, ᐊᑑᑎᒋᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᓕᕐᑐᖅ ᑲᓇᑕ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᓲᖑᔪᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖃᖃᑕᐅᒻᒥᔪᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ, ᑌᒫᑦᓭᓇᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᑎᑐᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᓯᕐᖃᒥᐅᒻᒥᔪᑦ NATOᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᕉᓯᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᓇᓗᓇᕐᓯᑎᑦᓯᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᐅᒋᐊᓕᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᖑᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᓕᕆᔭᐅᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ. ᐅᑦᑑᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᓪᓚᕆᓐᓂᕆᓲᖏᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᖃᖃᑕᐅᒻᒥᔪᓂᒃ ᖃᓂᑕᒥᓂᒃ ᒪᑯᓂᖓ ᐃᓚᖃᕐᖁᑦ:
- 2022ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐸᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᓂᑦ ᐋᕐᕿᒋᐊᕆᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᖏᕈᑎᖃᓚᐅᔪᕗᖅ ᐋᕐᕿᒋᐊᕐᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᕕᓐ ᓚᓐ ᓱᕗᐃᑕᓐᓗ NATOᒧᑦ.
- ᔫᓂ 2023ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ,ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉᐊᖓᔪᕐᖄᖓᙯᕐᖁᔭᐅᓯᒪᓚᐅᔪᕗᖅᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᑦᐊᖓᔪᕐᖄᑦᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᒥᓂᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᖃᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦᐊᕐᕌᒍᑕᒫᕐᓯᐅᑎᒥᓂᒃ, ᐁᔅᓚᓐᒥ.
- ᔫᓂ 2024ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉᑲᕙᒪᖓᑐᓂᔨᓚᐅᔪᔪᖅᑎᑭᑦᓱᒋᑦ$20 ᒥᓕᐊᓐ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᖃᕐᑎᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᒪᑯᓂᖓ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᒨᓕᖓᔪᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᓗᓂ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᒍᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᓗᒍ NordForsk, ᑎᒥᐅᔪᖅ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓖᑦ ᑐᕐᖃᑖᕐᕖᑦ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᐊᔪᐃᓇᕈᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᒪᔭᐅᓗᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓕᒫᓄᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᒥᓗᓂᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ.
- ᓯᑉᑎᒻᐱᕆ 2024ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉᑐᕐᖃᑕᕐᕕᖓᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉᓯᓚᑖᓄᓕᖓᔪᑦᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᔭᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦᑲᕙᖓᑕᓗᓄᓇᕗᑦᐊᖓᔪᕐᖄᖓᑲᑎᖕᖓᑎᑦᓯᖃᑎᒌᓚᐅᔪᕘᒃᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎᓂᒃᐱᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃᐊᑕᓂᐅᕕᖓᓂᑦᑎᓐᒫᒃ, ᕕᓐᓚᓐ, ᐁᔅᓚᓐ, ᓄᐊᕗᐃ, ᓱᕗᐃᑕᓐᓗᓯᕗᓪᓕᐸᐅᑦᓱᓂᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂᒃᐱᑦᔪᑎᖃᕐᓱᓂᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᐅᒐᔭᕐᑐᓂᒃᐅᖃᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ, ᐃᖃᓗᐃᑦ, ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒦᓱᑎᒃ.
ᑲᓇᑕ ᑐᓂᒪᒍᑎᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓂᐊᕐᓱᓂ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᕆᓲᒥᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᖁᑎᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᒥᒍᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᖃᕐᓂᒥᒍᓪᓗ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᓂᒃ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᖁᑎᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᑐᑎᑦᓱᒍ ᐃᑉᐱᒍᓱᑦᑎᐅᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᓕᒫᒥᒃ. ᓲᖕᖑᓯᒋᐊᕆᓂᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᕆᓲᖓᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᓂᐊᕆᕗᖅ ᑭᐅᑦᔪᑎᐅᓗᓂ ᓄᑖᓄᑦ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᒦᒍᑕᐅᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᓕᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᒋᐊᕈᑕᐅᓯᒪᓕᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᓄᑦ ᐊᑭᕋᕐᒥᓄᑦ ᑕᒣᓐᓂ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᑕ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ.
ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᔨᕕᐅᒻᒥᔪᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᒥ, ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓂᐊᕐᑐᒍᑦ ᒪᕐᕈᐃᖑᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᐅᑎᓖᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᕆᓲᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᓚᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑕᓂᐅᕕᖓ ᑎᓐ ᒫᒃ, ᕕᓐ ᓚᓐ, ᐁᔅ ᓚᓐ, ᓄᐊᕗᐃ, ᓱᕗᐃᑕᓐᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᓱᑯᐃᔭᕐᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᖃᕆᑕᐅᔭᖃᕐᑎᓯᓂᒃᑯᓗ, ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓ, ᐱᕐᖁᓯᖅ, ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᐅᖃᑎᒥᓄᑦ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᓂᖏᑦ, ᓱᕐᕋᒣᑦᑐᑦ ᐱᑦᓴᑖᕐᕕᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᓄᓀᑦ, ᑲᔪᓯᔪᒥᒃ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᒍᓐᓇᓂᖅ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑕᐅᕐᓰᑲᑦᑕᐅᑎᓂᖅ ᐱᐅᒃᑯᑎᒻᒪᕆᑎᒍᓪᓗ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᓗ ᐊᑕᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᕐᓗ.
ᐃᒣᓐᓂᐊᒥᔪᒍᑦ,ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓗᑕ ᐱᓇᓱᒐᐅᓚᐅᕐᓯᒪᖕᖏᑐᒥᒃ ᓇᓪᓕᐊᓂ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᓄᑦ ᐱᔭᕆᒐᓱᐊᕐᑕᖏᓐᓂ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᑦᓴᑖᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑐᑭᒧᐊᑦᑎᓯᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᒃᑯᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᔪᑦ, ᐃᓚᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᐅᔪᑦ.
iii. ᐊᒥᕆᑲᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓃᑦᑐᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ: ᐊᓛᔅᑲ ᑲᓛᓪᓖᓗ ᓄᓈᑦ
ᐊᒥᕆᑲᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓ ᐃᓘᓐᓈᓃᒃᑯᖅ ᐊᖏᔪᐊᓘᑦᓱᓂ ᐃᓂ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᑖᕆᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂ ᐱᖓᓱᐃᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᓄᑦ:ᐊᓛᔅᑲ, (ᐊᒥᕆᑲ) ᐅᐊᓕᓂᖓᓂ; ᑕᕐᕋᖓ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᕿᑎᖓᓃᑦᓱᓂ; ᑲᓛᓪᓖᓗ ᓄᓈᑦ ᐊᑕᓂᐅᕕᖓ ᑎᓐ ᒫᒃ) ᖃᕙᖕᖓᓂᕐᒦᑐᖅ. ᐃᓅᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖏᑦ ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᑕᒫᓂ ᐃᓂᒥ ᐊᑦᔨᐅᖏᑦᑑᕗᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᓄᓇᐅᑉ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓯᕗᓕᖏᑕ ᐃᓅᖃᑎᒌᖃᑦᑕᓯᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᐅᓯᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ, ᑕᒪᓐᓇᓗ ᐱᑕᖃᕐᑎᓯᕗᖅ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᓂᒃ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᖅ, ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᓂᖅ, ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓ, ᑲᔪᓯᔪᒥᒃ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᓂᖅ, ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᓕᓪᓚᕇᑦ ᐅᔭᕃᑦ ᐱᑦᓴᖑᕈᓐᓇᑐᑦ, ᑕᐅᕐᓰᑲᑦᑕᓂᖅ, ᐱᕐᖁᓯᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖓ.
ᑖᑦᓱᒪ ANPF ᑌᒣᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᕃᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᖏᓕᐅᒥᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᕃᕐᓱᓂ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒥᒃ ᑖᒃᑯᓂᖓ ᑲᕙᒪᓂᒃ, ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᒃᑯᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᖑᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓖᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᖏᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᑦᑕᓗ ᑎᒥᐅᔪᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᓕᒫᒥ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖏᑦ.
ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓄᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᐊᑦᔨᐅᕗᖅ ᑖᑦᓱᒧᖓ ᐊᑐᕐᓱᒍ ᐱᖁᔨᒍᑎ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᓕᕆᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᓚᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᖃᓂᑕᓂ, ᐊᒥᕆᑲᒥᒃ,ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᓛᔅᑲ, ᐊᑕᓂᐅᕕᖓᓗ ᑎᓐ ᒫᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑲᓛᓪᓖᑦ ᓄᓈᑦ.ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᐅᓪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓃᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᖕᖏᓂᕐᓴᒦᑦᑎᓯᒍᑎᐅᓚᖓᕗᑦ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᒍᑕᐅᓗᑎᓪᓗ ᓄᑖᓂᒃ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕐᓂᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒥᒃ, ᓱᑯᐃᔦᔩᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᕐᖁᓯᒥᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᐅᕐᓰᑲᑦᑕᐅᑎᓂᕐᒥᒃ.
ᑌᒣᓘᕈᓐᓇᕈᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᑎᓐᓂᒃ, ᐅᒃᑯᐃᓯᓚᖓᕗᒍᑦ ᓄᑖᓂᒃ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᕕᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐋᖕᑯᕆᔅᒥ, ᐊᓛᔅᑲ, ᓅᒃ,ᑲᓛᓪᓖᑦᓄᓈᑦ.
ᐊᓛᔅᑲ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᐅᒋᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᒃᑯᖅ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᑎᒍᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᑦ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᕕᖏᑦᑕ ᑎᑦᑕᖏᓐᓂ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐃᑲᑲᑦᑕᓂᕐᓄᓗ, ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᖅ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐱᐅᓯᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᒍᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᓄᖑᐃᓐᓇᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᓂᕐᓗ, ᐆᒻᒪᖁᑎᑦᓴᐅᑉ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᓯᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᖓ, ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᑦ ᐱᑦᓴᖑᕈᓐᓇᓱᑎᒃ ᐅᔭᕃᑦ, ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᓪᓗ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᖏᑦ.
ᐃᓚᐅᔪᑦ ᑖᑦᓱᒧᖓ ᖃᖓᑦᑕᔫᒃᑯᑦ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᓄᑦ ᐃᓂᖃᕐᖁᑦ ᐊᓛᔅᑲᒥ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓱᑎᒃ NORAD ᑐᕌᒐᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑕᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᐊᑕᐅᑦᓯᑰᖃᑕᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᐅᑉ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂᒃ.
ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍ, ᔫᑳᓐ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓯᒪᒻᒥᔪᖅ ᖃᓂᑕᕇᓪᓚᕆᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᒪᕐᕈᐃᖑᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᓛᔅᑲᒥᒃ ᑕᒣᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᓂᕐᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᐅᕐᓰᑲᑦᑕᐅᑎᓂᒃᑯᓗ ᐊᑑᑎᔭᐅᒍᒪᔪᑎᒍᑦ.
ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᕕᒃ ᐋᖕᑯᕆᔅᒦᑦᑐᖅ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᒪᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᐅᓗᓂ ᑕᐅᕐᓰᑲᑦᑕᐅᑎᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕐᓂᒧᓪᓗ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᒍᑎᓂᒃ ᑕᒣᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᓄᓇᑖᕆᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓀᓪᓗ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓖᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐊᓛᔅᑲᒥᓗ;ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐅᒥᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᖅ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᓗ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖅ; ᓲᖕᖑᓯᐅᒥᑎᓗᒍ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒋᒃ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᑉ ᓂᕐᔪᑏᓪᓗ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᓂᖏᑦ; ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᓛᔅᑲᒦᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓖᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᒻᒥᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᖏᑦ, ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓗᒋᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᑉ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖓᑕ ᑎᑦᑕᖏᓐᓃᑐᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐃᓅᖃᑎᒥᓄᑦ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᓂᖓᑦ.
ᐊᒥᓱᑦ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᓃᑦ, ᑕᒣᑎᒍᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᔪᑎᒍᑦ ,ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᖕᖏᑐᕐᑎᒍᓪᓗ, ᓱᓕᖕᖏᑑᓯᒪᓕᕐᖁᑦ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᓂ ᐊᓂᒍᕐᑐᓂ ᓱᑯᑦᓯᓕᒫᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᐅᑉ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ ᑎᒥᖁᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᑲᓛᓪᓖᓗ ᓄᓈᓐᓂ.ᐊᒥᓱᒐᓓᑦ ᒪᕐᕈᐃᖑᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖏᑦ ᓯᕗᒧᒋᐊᕐᑎᑕᐅᓯᒪᓕᕐᑐᑦ ᖃᒻᒥᖁᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᒃᓚᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒥᒃ ᑖᑦᓱᒥᖓ ᐱᑭᐊᓚᓲᕐᔪᐊᒥᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᓕᒃ (2023) ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᑐᑭᓯᒪᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒧᑦ ᐊᑯᕐᖓᓂ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᑕ ᑲᓛᓪᓖᑦ ᓄᓈᑕ ᓄᓇᕗᓪᓗ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᑕ (2022). ᕋᓗᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ, ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖅ ᐅᓪᓗᒥᒧᑦ ᑎᑭᑦᓱᒍ ᐊᑑᑎᖃᑦᑕᓯᒪᓕᕐᑐᖅ ᓱᒃᑫᑑᑦᓱᓂ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓐᓇᒍ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐸᐅᑦᔭᐅᒋᐊᖃᕈᑎᖓ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓃᑦᑐᓄᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᐅᑉ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖓ.
ᐃᓕᑕᕐᓯᒪᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᓄᑦ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᑎᑕᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓄᑦ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ᑲᓛᓪᓖᑦ ᓄᓈᓐᓂ ᐃᓚᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᑭᓯᐊᓂᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᑐᑭᒧᐊᑦᑎᑕᐅᓂᕐᓴᐅᓗᓂ ᓵᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎ ᐃᓚᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᓛᓪᓖᑦ ᓄᓈᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᑦ, ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐸᐅᑦᔭᐅᒋᐊᓖᒃ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᐱᒍᒪᓯᒪᔭᖏᑦ ᓯᕗᒧᑦᑎᑕᐅᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓈᒻᒪᓈᑦᓯᐊᑐᒃᑯᑦ.
ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᕕᒃ ᓅᒃᒦᑦᑐᖅ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᐱᑦᓴᑖᕐᕕᐅᒍᓐᓇᓗᓂ ᑐᑭᒧᐊᑦᑎᓯᕕᐅᓗᓂ ᓯᕗᒧᑦᑎᓯᒍᑎᐅᓗᓂᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᓛᓪᓖᑦ ᓄᓈᓐᓂ, ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓕᐅᒥᒍᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᒪᕐᕈᐃᖑᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕐᓂᒧᓪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒍᓯᖏᓐᓂᒃ, ᐱᔭᕆᐊᑭᓕᑎᕆᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑐᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᒋᒋᐊᓕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍᓗ ᐊᖏᓂᕐᓴᒥᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᓕᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᒥᓪᓗ ᑕᒣᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒥᓱᑦ ᒪᓕᒉᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᓗᒋᑦ.
ᑐᖕᖓᓱᑦᑎᓯᔪᒍᑦ ᑲᓛᓪᓖᑦ ᓄᓈᑕ ᑐᓂᓯᒪᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐅᒃᑯᐃᓯᓂᐊᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑕᐅᕕᑦᓴᒥᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ.
2. ᐸᓯᔭᑦᓴᖑᕐᑎᓯᒍᓐᓇᓂᖅ ᕉᓯᐊᒥᒃ
ᕉᓯᐊ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᖁᖅ ᑭᖑᕚᕇᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᐅᑉ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᒍᑕᐅᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᕈᑕᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ. ᕉᓯᐊ ᐸᓯᔭᑦᓴᖑᕈᑎᖃᕈᓐᓇᕋᓗᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ 50% ᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᓄᓇᑎᒍᑦ, ᒪᕐᕈᐃᖑᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᓗ ᕉᓯᐊᓗ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ, ᐱᔭᕐᓃᑐᒻᒪᕆᐊᓘᖏᓐᓇᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᑮᑕᐅᖕᖏᑐᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᒣᓛᕐᖂᓯᒪᒍᓐᓇᓃᑦ ᓯᕗᓂᕐᒥ.
ᑲᓇᑕ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᖃᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᐸᓯᔭᑦᓴᖑᕐᑎᓯᒍᓐᓇᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᕉᓯᐊᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᓄᓀᑦ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᒍᓯᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᑎᒍᓪᓗ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᐅᖃᑦᑕᕆᐊᓕᑦᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᓴᐅᒪᑎᑦᓯᓯᐊᖕᖏᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᑌᒣᓚᕿᑎᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᕉᓯᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᑎᐅᓂᖓ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒥᖓ G7 ᒥᒃ ᓱᑲᑦᑐᒥᒃ ᑭᐅᒍᑎᓂᒃ ᐱᐅᓯᖏᑎᒍᑦ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐃᓚᖃᕐᒥᔪᖅ ᐊᑭᓴᕐᑐᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑐᓴᐅᒪᑎᑦᓯᓯᐊᖕᖏᓂᕐᒥᓗ ᑐᕌᕐᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ.
ᐊᑕᐅᑦᓯᑰᖃᑕᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᖏᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖏᓪᓗ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᑲᔪᓯᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᕙᓪᓚᖃᑦᑕᓗᓂ ᕉᓯᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐱᕙᑦᔪᐊᓂᖓᓂᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᑑᑎᔭᖓ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᔪᑯᕇᓂᐊᓐᒥᒃ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᔪᓯᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᑲᑎᓯᖃᑦᑕᓂᕐᒥᒃ NATOᐃᑖᒐᐅᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑐᓂᓯᒪᒍᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ.
ᐁᑉᐸᕆᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᒥᐅᑦ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓚᖓᕗᖅ NATO ᐅᐊᓕᓂᕐᒥᑑᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᐅᑉ ᑎᑦᑕᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᓂᐅᔪᓂᒃ, ᐃᓚᒋᒻᒥᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᖏᑦ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓚᖓᒻᒥᓱᓂ NATO ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᔭᕆᐊᕈᑎᒋᓯᒪᔭᖏᓐᓂᓗ.
ᑲᓇᑕ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᐴᑎᓐ ᑎᓕᐅᕆᒍᑎᖏᑦ ᑌᒪᖕᖓᐅᖏᑦᑐᖅ ᐊᑑᑎᓲᖑᒋᐊᖏᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᑎᒃ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᖁᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᕉᓯᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐃᓄᖏᑦᑕ. ᑖᓐᓇ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᑐᑭᓯᓇᑦᓯᐊᓚᕆᑦᓱᓂ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᖕᖏᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᐃᑕᑎᑦᓯᒪᑦ ᑲᕙᒣᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᔭᕈᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᓄᓀᑦ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑎᑕᖓᓂᓪᓗᐊᖅ ᐃᓂᓖᑦ ᕉᓯᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐃᓄᖁᑎᖏᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᖁᑎᖏᑦ, ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᓱᖁᑎᒋᔭᐅᖕᖏᑑᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᕉᓯᐊᑉ ᐱᖁᔭᖏᑎᒍᑦ.
ᐃᓘᓐᓀᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᖑᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑎᒥᐅᔪᑎᒍᑦ, ᑲᓇᑕ,ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᖃᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᒪᓕᒐᖁᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᐃᓱᓕᑦᑕᕕᖃᕐᑎᓯᓗᓂ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᕐᒥᓂᒃ ᕉᓯᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦ. ᕉᓯᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᒋᐊᖃᕐᒪᑕ ᒪᓕᑦᑕᐅᔪᑦᓴᓂᒃ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓯᒍᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᒥᓂᒃ ᐅᑎᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᓕᕆᔪᓄᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑕᐅᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᕐᖃᑎᑦᓯᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᓂᒥᓂᒃ ᔪᑯᕇᓂᐊᓐᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᒥᓂᒃ ᒪᓕᓪᓗᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒨᓕᖓᔪᒥᒃ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᒥᒃ.
3. ᓱᓕᑦᓯᐊᓗᓂ ᑲᕙᒪᓕᕆᓂᖅ ᐃᓚᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖃᖕᖏᑐᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᑎᖁᑎᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ
ᑲᓇᑕ ᑲᔪᓯᓚᖓᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐅᔭᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᒥᒍᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓕᓐᓂᒃ, ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒥᒃ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᒋᐊᖃᓕᕈᓂ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᓂᒃ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒥᖓ ᓄᓇᒥᒃ, ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂ ᐊᖏᓂᕐᓴᒥᒃ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᑎᓕᐊᖑᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᓇᕐᑐᑕᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᓱᓂᓗ ᓵᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᐅᓗᓂ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᕐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᐃᓚᕿᑎᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᔪᓄᑦ, ᐅᑦᑑᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓ.
ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓗᒍ ᑕᑯᑦᓴᐅᓕᕐᓂᖓ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᐱᓕᐅᑎᓃᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᒥᑎᒍᑦ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐅᔭᑦᓴᖁᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᓱᓕᑦᓯᐊᑑᓗᓂ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒥᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖃᖕᖏᑐᑦ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᑎᑕᐅᔪᓪᓗ ᓇᓪᓕᐅᑎᓪᓗᐊᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᖁᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦ, ᐱᒍᒪᓯᒪᔭᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖏᓐᓄᓗ.
ᑲᓇᑕ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᑕᐅᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᐅᑯᓄᖓ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᓐᓄᑦ:
- ᓲᓱᑦᓴᕈᑎᑕᕐᕋᒥᓄᓇᖁᑎᓕᓐᓂᒃᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖃᕈᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ, ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑏᑦ, ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖃᕐᓂᓗᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ.
- ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓗᒍᐱᖁᔭᓂᒃᑐᖕᖓᕕᓕᒃᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂᑎᓕᔭᐅᒪᐅᑎᒥᒃᑕᕐᕋᒥᐊᒻᒪᓗᑕᑯᑦᓴᐅᑎᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅᑐᓂᒪᓂᖅᑕᒃᒍᖓᓄᓇᖁᑎᒧᑦᐃᓱᒫᓗᓐᓇᖏᑦᑑᓱᓂᑌᒫᑦᓭᓇᓕᐅᒐᕐᓱᓂᓗ.
- ᓲᓱᑦᓴᓂᖅᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᑦᐃᓱᒪᕐᓱᓗᑎᒃᐊᐅᓚᒍᓐᓇᕈᒪᓂᖕᓐᓂᒃ, ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᖏᑦᐱᒻᒪᕆᖁᑎᖏᓪᓗ, ᐱᖑᒪᔭᖏᑦ, ᐱᕐᖁᓯᖏᑦᐱᐅᓯᖃᕈᓯᖏᓪᓗᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦᐃᓄᐃᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍᐃᓚᐅᓂᖏᑦᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦᐃᓄᐃᑦᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃᑐᑭᑖᕈᑎᖃᕋᓱᐊᕐᑐᖃᓕᕐᐸᑦ, ᐊᓯᖏᑕᓗᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃᓄᓇᖃᖃᑕᐅᒻᒥᔪᑦ.
- ᓱᓱᒋᓗᒍᐱᑦᔪᑎᓕᒃᓯᐊᒻᒪᑎᑦᓯᓯᒪᓂᕐᒥᒃᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦᑐᖕᖓᕕᐅᔪᓂᒃᐊᑑᑎᔪᓂᒃᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᒧᑦᐃᒪᕐᐱᒧᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᒻᒥᑎᓪᓗᒍ UNCLOS.
- ᐃᓕᑕᕐᓯᒪᔭᖃᕐᓂᖅᑕᒪᒃᑯᓂᖓᐱᒍᒪᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃᐱᒍᓐᓇᑐᓪᓚᕆᐅᓂᕐᒥᓗᓈᒻᒪᓈᕐᓱᑎᒃ, ᓇᓪᓕᖁᐊᕆᔭᐅᑦᓱᑎᓪᓗ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᓄᑦᓯᕗᓪᓕᐸᐅᑦᔨᒍᒪᓯᒪᔭᖏᓐᓄᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᒻᒥᑎᓪᓗᒍᑲᓇᑕᒥᐃᑖᒐᐅᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᓗᐱᒍᒪᔭᖏᑦ.
- ᑐᓂᓯᒣᓐᓇᕕᒋᓗᒍᓴᐳᒻᒥᓗᒍᓗᓯᕗᒧᑦᑎᓗᒍᓗᓇᒻᒥᓂᖅᐊᐅᓚᒍᓐᓇᕈᒪᓂᐅᑉᐱᒻᒪᕆᖁᑕᐅᓂᖓ, ᐃᓄᐃᑦᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᖏᑦᐊᒻᒪᓗᐊᖑᑎᐅᑉᐸᑦᐊᕐᓇᐅᐸᓪᓘᓃᑦᓇᓪᓕᖁᐊᕇᑦᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᑦᒪᓕᓪᓗᒋᑦᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒨᓕᖓᑦᓱᑎᒃᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑏᑦ, ᒪᓕᒐᖏᑎᒍᑦ, ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖏᑎᒍᓪᓗ.
- ᒪᓂᒪᓂᖅᐱᓪᓗᒍᓱᑯᐃᔦᒍᑎᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᓐᓄᓗᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᓄᑦᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑎᓄᑦᐊᖏᕐᕋᓯᒪᔪᓄᓪᓗ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎᖏᑦᑲᕙᒣᑦ.
- ᑐᓂᒪᓂᖅᑲᔪᓯᒍᓐᓇᓱᑎᒃᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑕᐅᔪᓄᑦ, ᓄᖑᐃᓐᓇᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᓂᖅ, ᐊᕙᑎᒥᒃᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᖅᐊᒻᒪᓗᐊᖑᒪᒐᓱᐊᕐᓗᒍᓯᓚᐅᑉᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓ.
ᐃᓚᐅᕕᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖓᖕᖏᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᑎᒋᔭᐅᔪᓂᓪᓗ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᖃᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᖑᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᖃᖃᑦᑕᓗᑎᒃ, ᐅᑦᑑᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓖᑦ, ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᖑᖃᑎᒌᑦ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᕕᖓᓂᑦ ᐱᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑎᒥᐅᔪᑦ,NATO ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑎᓯᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔩᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᒻᒥᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᑖᕆᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᓂᓖᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᒪᑯᐊ ᕿᑎᖓᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖓᑕ ᐃᖃᓗᓕᕆᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖓ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᒪᕐᕈᐃᖑᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᖑᑦᓱᑎᓪᓘᓃᑦ ᓄᐃᑎᓯᒪᔭᖏᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑕᐅᔪᓪᓗ ᐃᓚᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᕙᒣᑦ ᐊᓯᕗᑦ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎᖏᓪᓗ.
ᓯᕗᒧᓐᓂᖅ, ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᐅᖃᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᐅᒋᐊᖏᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᓗᓂ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᐊᑦᔨᐅᖏᑦᑐᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᓯᒥᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓗᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖃᖕᖏᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑎᑕᐅᔪᓂᓪᓗ ᒪᕐᕉᓂ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᐅᔫᓐᓂ:ᑕᕐᕋᖓ ᐊᑦᓛᓐᑎᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᖓ ᐸᓯᕕᒃ.
ᑕᕐᕋᖓ ᐊᑦᓛᓐᑎᒃ
ᑲᓇᑕ ᓲᖕᖑᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᖃᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᕐᒥᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᓚᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᓂ ᐅᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᔪᖅ, ᐊᑕᓂᐅᕕᒻᒥ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᔪᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᓪᓗ ᐊᑑᑎᒍᓐᓇᕈᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ ᐊᑦᓛᓐᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᖃᕐᕕᐅᓂᖓᓂ ᐊᑐᕐᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᒍᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᓱᑎᒃ, ᒪᑯᐊ ᑲᓇᑕ ᑕᕆᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᑭᐊᓂ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᔪᑦ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᖓ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᐅᒋᐊᓕᒻᒧᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ. ᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᖅ,ᖃᕆᑕᐅᔭᕈᑏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᐃᑎᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑭᓯᐊᒐᕆᔭᐅᓂᕐᐸᐅᓂᐊᕐᖁᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᓂ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᖃᑎᒌᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᓂ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓖᑦ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᖓ ᑖᒃᑯᓄᖓ ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᓂ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᓖᑦ-ᐊᒥᕆᑲ-ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᓖᑦ ᑕᒫᓐᓇᓕᒫᖅ ᐊᑦᓛᓐᑎᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖓᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓃᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᐃᑎᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔩᑦ; ᑲᓇᑕ ᑕᕆᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᑭᐊᓂ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᔪᑦ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒨᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᓚᓱᖃᑎᒌᒎᑎᓖᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᖏᑦ; ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᕿᓚᐅᑉ ᑭᓪᓕᖓ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᓂ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑕᐅᔪᖅ.
ᐊᓯᖏᑦ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐅᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐱᔭᕆᐊᑭᓕᑎᕆᒍᑦᔨᓂᖅ ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᑯᕐᖓᓂ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ-ᑲᓛᓪᓖᓗ ᓄᓈᑕ; ᐱᔭᕆᐊᑭᓕᑎᕐᓗᒍ ᑕᐅᕐᓰᑲᑦᑕᐅᑎᓂᖅ ᒪᑯᓂᖓ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐅᐸᐅᑎᒍᓐᓇᓂᖅ, ᓇᑦᓯᕕᓃᑦ ᓴᓇᓯᒪᔭᖏᑦ ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᑕᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ, ᓂᐅᕕᕐᑕᐅᑎᑦᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᕕᖓᓂ ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᓂ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᔪᑦ; ᓄᖑᐃᓐᓇᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᓂᖅ ᐃᖃᓗᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᓗᒍ ᑲᓇᑕ-ᑕᕆᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᑭᐊᓂ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᓲᖑᔪᒥᒃ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᒍᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐃᖃᓗᓕᕆᓂᖅ;ᐊᕙᑎᐅᑉ ᓴᐳᑦᔭᐅᒪᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓ; ᓯᓚᒥᒃ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓗᐊᕐᑎᓯᑦᑌᓕᓂᖅ ᐊᑑᑎᒍᓐᓇᓂᕐᓗ;ᑕᐅᕐᓰᑲᑦᑕᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᓐᓇᑐᒥᓪᓗ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕐᓂᐅᑉ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑕᐅᓂᖓᓂᒃ; ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᓂᖅ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓪᓚᕆᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ; ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕ-ᑕᕆᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᑭᐊ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᔪᑦ ᓄᓇᒥᒃ ᓱᒃᑯᑎᕆᑦᑌᓕᒍᓯᖓ.
ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᔪᓄᑦ ᐊᑕᓂᐅᕕᒃ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᒻᒥᔪᖅ ᖃᓂᑕᕆᔭᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᐅᓂᕐᒥᒍᑦ ᐊᑦᓛᓐᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ ᐃᓂᒋᔭᐅᔪᒥ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᕕᒋᒻᒪᕆᑦᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᓯᒥᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑑᑎᖃᑦᑕᓯᒪᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᓂᕐᒥᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᓂᒃ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥᒍᑦ.ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᒪᕐᕉᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᒃ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᒍᑎᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᑑᒃ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᒥᑎᒍᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᓂᒃ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐅᑎᒍᒪᔭᒥᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᓗ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ ᓄᓇᖓᑦ-ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᔪᑦ ᐊᑕᓂᐅᕕᒻᒥᐅᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑕᖏᑎᒍᑦ.
ᑕᕐᕋᖓ ᐸᓯᕕᒃ
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐸᓯᕕᒃᒨᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᖓ ᐃᓕᑕᕆᔭᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᐊᒥᓱᒐᓓᑦ ᐸᓯᕕᒃᒥ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓖᑦ ᑕᑯᓐᓇᕋᓱᐊᕐᑕᖃᕐᒪᑕ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᑖᕐᕕᓴᐅᒋᐊᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐃᓚᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒧᑦ.
ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎ ᐃᓕᑕᕆᔭᓕᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᖓ ᐸᓯᕕᒃ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᒋᐊᖓ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᖃᓂᑕᖏᓐᓄᑦ. ᑕᕐᕋᖓ ᐸᓯᕕᒃ, ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᑕᕆᐅᕐᔪᐊᖅ, ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᔪᖅ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᕈᑎᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᓵᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᓐᓇᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᑕ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ. ᑲᓇᑕ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᓪᓗᐊᖏᑦᑑᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᑐᖅ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑏᑦ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊ ᓵᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᑏᑦ- ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᕋᖏᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᒃ ᓱᓇᐅᖕᖏᑑᑎᑦᓯᖏᒻᒪᑕ.. ᒪᓕᓪᓗᓂ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᒥᒃ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᕿᒥᕐᕈᓂᕐᓴᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᖅ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᐅᒋᐊᓕᒻᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᑎᒥᒃ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᓕᑦᑎᒍᑦ ᐸᓯᕕᒃᒥ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓖᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᒍᑕᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑭᐅᑦᔪᑎᒋᓗᒍᓗ ᓄᐃᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᓄᑦ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᕈᑎᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓄᑦ ᐃᓚᖏᑦᑕ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕈᑎᒋᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᓕᖏᑎᒍᑦ.
ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᑯᓂᐋᓗᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᖓᒍᑦ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᒥᒃ ᐱᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑏᑦ, ᑭᓯᐊᖓᕆᔭᐅᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒥᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᑎᑦᓯᒍᓐᓇᒥᔪᑦ ᑕᒫᓂ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᐅᔪᒥ-ᔮᐸᓃᓰᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑯᕆᐊᒥᐅᑦ-ᐃᓱᒪᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᐊᑯᓂᐋᓗᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᐅᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᓂᒃ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᖁᑎᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᐱᖓᓱᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᑦ.
ᑲᓇᑕ ᐱᓇᓱᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓇᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᐱᐅᓯᐅᔪᓪᓗ, ᒪᑯᑎᒎᓇ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓖᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ, ᑲᓇᑕ-ᔮᐸᓃᓰᓪᓗ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᔭᕆᐊᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐸᕐᓇᓯᒪᐅᑎᖓ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᓕᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐃᓱᒪᕐᓱᓇᕐᓗᓂ ᐊᕝᕕᐊᑕᐅᒍᓐᓀᓗᓂᓗ ᐸᓯᕕᒃ ᓄᓇᒋᔭᐅᓂᖓᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕ-ᑯᕆᐊ ᑐᑭᓯᒪᐅᑎᒍᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ, ᓇᓗᓀᕐᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᖕᖏᑑᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓕᐅᒥᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᑯᕐᖓᓂ ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᓯᑕᒪᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᑦ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᓂᒃ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐅᑎᒍᒪᔭᒥᑎᒍᑦ, ᒪᑯᑎᒎᓇ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᖅ, ᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᖅ ᖃᕆᑕᐅᔭᕈᑏᓪᓗ, ᑕᐅᕐᓰᑲᑦᑕᓂᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᑕᙯᓐᓇᕈᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕈᑎᑦᓭᑦ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑕᐅᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᖃᓗᓕᕆᓂᕐᓗ.
ᑲᓇᑕ ᐅᐱᒍᓱᓐᓂᒥᒍᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐸᓯᕕᒃᒥ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᐱᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᒍᑎᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᒪᓕᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᓕᐊᖑᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᕕᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖃᖕᖏᑐᑦ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑦᓯᐊᖏᓐᓇᖃᑦᑕᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᖁᑎᓖᑦ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᑕᖏᑦ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᖏᓪᓗ ᐸᕐᓯᖓᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᒪᖔᑕ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᑎᑕᖏᓐᓂᒃ, ᐱᒍᒪᔭᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖏᑎᒍᓪᓘᓃᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᒥᓂ.
ᓯᕗᓕᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓯᕐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᓕᖓᔪᑦ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᕈᑎᐅᒋᐊᓖᑦ
ᐱᔭᕐᓃᑐᒻᒪᕆᐅᒐᓗᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕋᓱᒋᐊᓕᒃ ᕉᓯᐊᒥᒃ, ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓖᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᖃᕐᖁᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒥᖓ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓯᕐᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᑦᓯᐊᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᒥ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᓱᓂ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᓯᒥᑦᑕ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖁᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ.
ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓖᑦ ᓱᓕ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᑎᐅᕗᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᕐᓂᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐊᓯᒥᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᒻᒥᔪᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᓗ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᑎᒍᑦ, ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᕐᑎᒍᑦ, ᐅᖃᒻᒪᕆᐅᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᓪᓗ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃ. ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊ ᐃᓚᖃᕐᒥᔪᑦ ᐊᒥᓱᒐᓚᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᔪᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᖁᑎᓖᑦ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᔭᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑐᑭᑖᕈᑎᐅᓲᓂᒃ ᓱᕐᕃᓚᖓᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᐱᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖏᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓ.
1. ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᓪᓚᓂᖅ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ
ᑲᓇᑕ ᑐᓂᒻᒪᒻᒪᕆᒍᑎᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᑎᑕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓖᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓈᓚᑦᓱᓂ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᓯᒪᔭᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᒪᓕᒐᐅᓂᐊᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᒍᓰᑦ.ᑲᓇᑕ ᑭᓯᐊᒐᙯᓐᓇᖁᖅ ᑲᔪᓯᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔩᑦ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᐊᕐᑕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᖁᑎᑦᓴᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓕᓐᓄᑦ ᐃᓄᓐᓄᓗ ᓄᓇᓯᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ.
ᑌᒪᖕᖓᓂᑦ 2021ᒥᓂᑦ, ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒨᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᓕᒃ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᑎᐅᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᖃᕐᑎᓯᓯᒪᕗᖅ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᒃᓚᕕᐅᑉ ᑲᔪᓯᓚᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓕᓐᓂ ᐱᑕᙯᓐᓇᕈᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᔭᐅᒍᑎᖏᑦᒍᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᑦᑐᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐅᖓᑖᓄᑦ 2ᒥᓕᐊᓐᓂᒃ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᖃᕐᑎᓯᒍᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐅᖓᑖᓄᑦ 25 ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓖᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖏᓐᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒧᑦ, ᐃᓅᖃᑎᒌᑦ ᑲᑐᑦᔨᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑕᐅᔪᑦ.
ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᓂᕐ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓖᑦ ᓄᐃᑕᔪᑦ ᓇᑯᕐᒪᑦ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᒻᒪᑕ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓄᓗ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᑎᐅᔪᓄᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕ ᐱᕕᖃᕐᑎᓯᓚᖓᖕᖏᑐᖅ ᕉᓯᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓱᓇᐅᑦᓴᖏᓐᓂᒧᑦ ᓱᓕᑦᓯᐊᕋᓱᐊᕈᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᒍᓯᖏᑎᒍᓪᓗ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒪ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᑎᒥᐅᔫᑉ.ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ, ᐱᕙᓪᓕᖁᑎᖃᓪᓚᕆᓲᑦ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑕᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔩᑦ, ᓲᖑᕐᓚᑎᑕᐅᔪᑦᓴᐅᖏᓪᓚᖅ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᕉᓯᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᓂᕈᐊᕐᓯᒪᔭᖓ.
ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᓚᖓᔪᒍᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᒪᓂᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᕐᓴᐅᓕᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᑎᐅᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔩᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑕᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᖏᓂᕐᓴᒥᓪᓗ ᓴᐳᑎᓯᒪᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔩᑦ, ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᒻᒥᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᖃᕐᑎᓯᓂᖅᓄᐃᒐᓱᐊᕐᑕᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐅᕕᒃᑫᓗ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᖏᑦᑕ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᑎᒍᑦ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᓪᓚᕆᐅᕗᖅ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔩᑦ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ
ᑲᓇᑕ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᑎᐅᓂᕐᒥᓂᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᓂ ᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᕈᕐᑎᕈᑎᖃᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᒪᑦᓱᒥᖓ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᖓᓱᐃᒋᔭᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑐᑭᒧᐊᑦᑎᓯᔨᑦᓴᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓕᓐᓄᑦ,2029ᒥ ᑎᑭᓪᓗᒍ 2031. ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓖᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ.ᑲᓇᑕ ᑐᑭᖃᑦᓯᐊᑐᒥᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᖃᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᐊᑕᔪᒥᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ, ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᕙᒣᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐊᓯᖏᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑕᐅᒻᒥᔪᑦ ᐸᕐᓇᑕᐅᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑕᐅᓂᖏᑎᒍᓪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔩᖏᑦ ᑐᑭᒧᐊᑦᑎᓯᔨᒨᓕᖓᔪᑦ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ.
ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᕙᓪᓕᐊᔪᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓯᒍᑕᐅᓚᖓᒻᒥᔪᑦ ᑐᑭᒧᐊᑦᑎᑕᐅᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᒪᑦᓱᒥᖓ ᖃᓄᖅ ᑲᓇᑕ ᐃᓚᐅᓲᖑᒻᒪᖔᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᓐᓂ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᓂ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᑐᒨᓕᖓᔪᑦ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ,ᐅᑦᑑᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᑐᒥᐅᑦ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᖁᑎᖓ:2032 ᑎᑭᓪᓗᒍ 2033, ᑕᒪᓐᓇᓗ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᐅᒍᓐᓇᓱᓂ ᑕᑯᑦᓴᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᖃᕆᑕᐅᔭᑎᒍᓪᓗ ᐱᔭᕆᓯᒪᓕᕐᑕᖏᓐᓂᒃ, ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᒻᒥᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᓂᐱᓕᔭᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓂᖅ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᖏᔪᒥᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᖃᕐᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ.
2. ᓵᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕆᓯᒪᔭᒥᓂ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᕈᑎᒋᒋᐊᓕᖏᑎᒍᑦ.
i. ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᓪᓗ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓ
ᐱᖓᓱᕕᓪᓗᐊᑐᒥᒃ ᐱᐅᖕᖏᓕᐅᒥᓯᒪᓕᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓂᑯᖓᓄᑦ, ᐱᑦᓴᖑᓕᕐᕿᕈᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᐱᑕᖃᕈᓐᓀᓂᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐳᔪᕐᓗᓄᑦ ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᐱᓀᓗᑕᐅᓕᕐᑐᖅ ᐊᑑᑎᒍᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᓕᕐᓱᓂ ᐅᐃᒪᓇᕐᑐᒥᒃ ᐊᑕᐅᑦᓯᑰᕈᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᔭᕆᐊᕈᑎᐅᓂᖓ, ᓱᕐᕃᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊ ᐱᖓᓱᕕᓪᓗᐊᑐᒥᒃ ᓱᒃᑯᐃᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᓱᒣᓐᓇᒪᕆᒃ ᐃᑉᐱᒋᔭᐅᕗᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓄᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕ ᐱᒋᐊᕈᑎᖃᕐᓯᒪᕗᖅ ᒪᕐᕈᐃᑎᒍᑦ ᓱᒨᒻᒪᖔᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᒐᓱᐊᕐᓱᓂ ᑲᒪᒍᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᒪᒃᑯᓂᖓ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᖑᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᔪᑦ ᐱᐅᓯᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓖᑦ
ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᓲᖑᔫᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᒍᓯᖏᑦ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᖃᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓂᖓᓂᒃ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᒥᔪᖅ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᓱᑲᓐᓂᓴᕈᕐᑎᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓱᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐊᔪᐃᓐᓇᕈᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᔭᖃᕋᓱᐊᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐸᕇ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑐᕌᒐᖓᓂᒃ ᐃᓱᓕᑦᑕᕕᑦᑖᑎᒐᓱᑦᓱᒍ ᓂᕈᒥᑦᓯᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓ 1.5°C ᐊᑑᑎᑦᑌᓕᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐱᐅᖕᖏᓂᕐᐸᐅᓱᓂ ᓱᕐᕋᑕᐅᒍᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒧᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ.
ᓄᕐᖃᑎᑦᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᓯᑦᓯᑐᐊᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐅᕐᓱᕈᑎᑦᓴᔭᐅᑉ ᓲᖑᓂᕐᐸᐅᓱᓂ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᐅᕗᖅ ᓱᒃᑫᓕᑎᑦᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓱᓂ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐅᕐᖁᓯᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᓕᕐᑐᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ.ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍ, ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓖᑦ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᑦᓯᒪᓕᕐᑐᑦ ᒥᑭᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒐᓱᐊᓚᖓᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐅᕐᓱᕈᑎᑦᓴᔭᐅᑉ ᐃᕐᖓᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐱᒋᐊᕐᓱᑎᒃ 25% ᒥᑦ ᑎᑭᓪᓗᒋᑦ 33% ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ 2013ᒥ ᑎᑭᑉᐸᑦ 2025 ᑌᒣᒍᓐᓇᓯᔪᑦᓴᐅᓱᓂ. ᑲᓇᑕ ᐊᑑᑎᓚᖓᓯᒪᔭᒥᑎᒎᑦᓯᐊᑐᖅ ᐱᔭᖃᕐᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒥᖓ ᐱᔭᕆᔭᐅᒐᓱᐊᓚᖓᓯᒪᔪᒥᒃ. Footnote 1-6
ᑲᓇᑕ ᐱᓇᓱᓚᖓᓯᒪᔭᒥᓂᒃ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᖃᕐᒥᔪᖅ ᐱᑦᓴᖑᓕᕐᕿᕈᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᐊᓯᐅᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓯᕗᒧᒍᑎᖃᕐᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᑕᙯᓐᓇᑎᑦᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥᓗ. ᑲᓇᑕ ᓱᓕ ᑲᔪᓯᔪᖅ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᐱᑕᙯᓐᓇᑎᑦᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᖅ 30% ᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖁᑎᒥᓂᓪᓗ ᑎᑭᓪᓗᒍ 2030.ᐊᖏᓂᕐᐸᐅᖃᑕᐅᔪᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᐱᑕᙯᓐᓇᑎᒐᓱᐊᕐᑕᖏᓐᓄᓗ ᐃᓂᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᑲᐅᑎᑦᓱᓂ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓄᑦ, ᐊᒥᓱᓪᓗ ᑐᑭᒧᐊᑎᑦᓯᖃᑎᖃᕈᑕᐅᕗᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᐃᓄᓐᓂᒃ.
ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᓂᕐᒥᒃ, ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᖃᓚᖓᔪᒍᑦ ᓇᓪᓕᖁᐊᕇᑦᑎᓯᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᓂᕐᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᑦᓴᑖᕐᕕᒋᒍᓐᓇᑕᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐃᓘᓐᓇᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᕙᒪᐅᑉ ᐊᔪᐃᓐᓇᕈᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᑕᐅᓱᓂ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᕆᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᑐᓄᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᖑᖃᑎᒌᑦ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᕕᖓᓂ ᐱᐅᓯᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᑕᐅᓂᕆᒋᐊᓕᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᓚᐅᕐᓯᒪᒐᓂ ᓯᕗᓂᖓᒍᑦ ᐸᕇ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒋᒍᑕᐅᓂᖓ, ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᓪᓗ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᕕᖓᒍᑦ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒪ ᑰᓐᒥᖕ ᒪᓐᑐᕆᐋᓪ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᐱᑦᓴᖑᓕᕐᕿᕈᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖃᕐᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᓱᒍ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᓄᓇᐅᑉ ᐱᑦᓴᖑᓕᕐᕿᑕᕈᓐᓇᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᒍᑎᖃᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎᖓ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓ ᑲᔪᓯᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᓗᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᒥᒍᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᓕᕐᕕᒋᓗᒍ ᑲᓇᑕᒧᑦ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᑕᐅᓱᓂ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᓄᑦ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᐃᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᔭᕆᒍᒪᔭᑦᑎᓂᒃ; ᒥᑭᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐳᔪᕐᓗᓂᒃ ᓯᓚᒨᔭᕐᑐᓂᒃ; ᐱᔭᕇᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᒋᒋᒐᓱᐊᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᕐᖃᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᓪᓓᒍᑎᑦᓴᔭᐅᑉ ᐳᔪᕐᓗᓕᐅᕈᑕᐅᓂᖓᓂᒃ; ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓕᐅᒥᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᓇᒥᒃ ᓱᕐᕋᒣᑦᑐᒥᒃ; ᐊᓯᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒧᖓ ᐊᑦᑐᐊᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᓂᒃ.ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒐᓱᐃᓐᓇᓚᖓᒻᒥᔪᖅ ᐊᓯᓕᒫᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᕙᒪᓐᓂᑯᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᒪᒍᑕᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ. ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒥᖓ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑕᐅᔪᒥᒃ.
ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕐᒥᓗᒍ, ᐊᒃᓚᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᓐᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓖᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖏᓐᓂ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᖃᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑕᒥᓂᒃ ᑲᔪᓯᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᓱᕐᕃᓯᒪᐅᑎᒋᓕᕐᑕᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓᑕ ᐱᑦᓴᖑᓕᕐᕿᕈᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ; ᒥᑭᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐳᔪᕐᓗᑕᑦᓯᑐᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂ ᓄᓇᓂ; ᑲᔪᖏᕐᓭᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑕᐅᓂᖓᓂᓪᓗ ᐱᑦᓴᖑᓕᕐᕿᒍᓐᓇᑑᑉ ᐆᒻᒪᖁᑎᑦᓴᔭᐅᑉ ᐅᖓᓯᑦᑐᒦᑦᑐᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᓕᓐᓂ ᑕᐅᕐᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᕐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐋᕐᕿᕈᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᓇᐹᕐᑐᐃᑦ ᐃᑯᐊᓚᓂᕆᓲᖏᑦᑕ ᓄᕐᖃᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᑦᓴᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓯᒪᓕᕐᓂᖓᓂ ᐊᑑᑎᒍᓐᓇᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ; ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᓂᐊᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᓪᓗᒍᒋᑦ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥ ᓴᐳᑦᔭᐅᒪᐅᑎᓖᑦ ᐃᓃᑦ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ; ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᔭᕆᐊᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐸᕐᓇᓯᒪᐅᑎ ᓴᓂᓕᐅᕐᓂᖅ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ.
ᐊᓯᖏᓐᓂ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒪ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᑲᔪᖏᕐᓭᓚᖓᕗᒍᑦ ᐃᓘᓐᓇᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᑎᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᓕᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᕕᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᓂᐅᔪᒥ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒪ ᐱᐅᓂᕆᒋᐊᓕᖏᑎᒍᑦ, ᐃᓂᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᒪᓐᑐᕆᐋᓪᒥ. ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᔨᕕᒃ, ᐃᒣᓚᖓᒻᒥᔪᒍᑦ ᓱᓕ ᓇᓪᓕᖁᐊᕆᓕᐅᑦᔭᐅᑎᑦᓯᓗᑕ ᐱᓇᓱᕝᕕᐅᑉ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᓪᓚᕆᓐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᔭᐅᖁᓪᓗᒍ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᕐᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᑎᒍᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᑉ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᖓᑕ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᓯᑎᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᓯᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᓄᓇᓂ.
ii. ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖓ
ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐃᓚᖃᕐᓂᖓ >ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕐᕕᐅᒍᓐᓇᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᓇᓗᓀᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᒥ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖓᓂ ᐊᖏᓂᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᐅᖓᑖᓄᑦ 3ᒥᓕᐊᓐ ᓯᒃᑭᑌᑦ ᑭᓚᒦᑌᑦ.ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᑦᓴᔭᖓ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖁᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᓯᐊᕈᓐᓇᖁᓪᓗᒍ. ᑲᓇᑕ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᙯᓐᓇᓕᒫᕐᒥᔪᖅ ᖃᓂᑕᒥᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖃᕐᒥᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᓯᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᐃᒻᒥᒎᕐᒥᓱᑎᒃ ᑲᒪᖃᑕᐅᒻᒥᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᕿᑎᖓᓂ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᐅᑉ ᐃᖃᓗᓕᕆᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᒥᒃ, ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᐃᑉᐱᒍᓱᑦᓯᐊᒪᕆᒍᑎᐅᒋᐊᓕᒻᒥᒃ 16ᓂ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᓂ ᐃᖃᓗᓐᓂᐊᕕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕋᓂ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕈᑎᑦᓴᓂᒃ ᖁᑦᓯᑐᒥ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖓᓂ, ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᒻᒥᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑕᐅᔪᖅ ᑲᑐᑎᓗᒍ ᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᖅ ᐃᑉᐱᒍᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᓗ ᐃᓚᖃᕐᑎᓗᒍ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐ ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒦᒃ ᐱᐅᓂᕐᐹᒥᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᕆᔭᐅᔪᖅ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᖃᑦᑕᖁᓪᓗᒍ ᑐᑭᑖᕋᓱᐊᕐᑐᖃᓕᕐᐸᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᑌᒪᖕᖓᓕᒫᖅ ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓇᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᖏᓐᓇᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒪ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᔭᐅᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ.
ᑲᓇᑕ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐅᔭᐅᑎᑦᓯᕙᓪᓕᐊᒥᔪᖅ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᐅᑦ ᐊᕙᑎᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖓᓂ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᐃᓱᒪᖃᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒥᓂᒃ. ᑲᓇᑕ ᑎᒍᒥᐊᖏᓐᓇᒥᔪᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᕐᖃᔭᕐᓇᖏᑦᑐᒥᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖃᕐᓂᖓ ᐊᐅᓚᒍᓐᓀᖃᑦᑕᓱᓂ ᓯᑦᔭᖓ, ᐅᕐᓱᐊᓗᓐᓂᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐅᕐᓱᕈᑎᓐᓂᐊᓂᕐᒧᓗ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ. ᑲᓇᑕ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒥᔪᖅ, ᑕᒣᑎᒍᑦ ᑐᑭᓯᓇᑦᓯᐊᕋᑎᒃ ᐃᕐᖃᒥ ᐅᔭᕋᓐᓂᐊᓂᑯᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᐊᕙᑎᖓᑕ ᓱᕐᕋᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓲᖑᔫᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᒪᓕᒐᖃᕐᑎᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑏᑦ, ᖁᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᓯᒪᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕐᕕᐅᒍᓐᓇᓱᓂ ᐃᕐᖃᖅ ᐃᓂᓂ ᐅᖓᑖᓄᐊᓗᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖁᑎᖓᑕ ᑎᑦᑕᑕᐅᓯᒪᕕᖏᓐᓂ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᕿᑎᖓ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ.
ᑲᓇᑕ ᑐᓂᒪᒍᑎᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᖁᔭᓂᒃ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᖓᓂ.
ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᓗᒋ ᐃᖃᓗᓕᕆᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᓕᕆᓂᕐᒧᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ, ᑎᒍᓯᓯᒪᔪᒍᑦ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕈᑎᑖᕐᓱᑕ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᔭᐅᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᐅᑉ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᒍᑎᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓄᑦᐊᓯᖏᑎᒍᓪᓗ ᐊᑑᑎᖃᑦᓯᐊᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᑕᙯᓐᓇᑎᑦᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐱᐅᓯᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᐅᑉ ᑭᑎᖓᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓖᑦ, ᑌᒣᑦᑎᓗᒍ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓯᑎᑦᓯᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓕᓐᓂ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᓂᐊᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐅᑦᑑᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᓯᓂᖅ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᕕᖓᑕ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᒋᓯᒪᔭᖓ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᒥ ᐱᑦᓴᖑᓕᕐᕿᑕᕈᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᐃᓂᓂ ᐅᖓᑖᓄᐊᓗᒃ ᑎᑭᑦᓱᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᒋᔭᐅᔫᑉ.
ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᐊᒥᔪᒍᑦ ᐊᓯᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᔨᕕᐅᒻᒥᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑎᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᓯᓂᕐᒥᓗ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᔪᑦᓴᓂᒃ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᒋᒐᓱᐊᕐᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᖕᖏᑑᓗᓂ ᐃᑉᐱᒍᓱᑦᓯᐊᓗᑎᓪᓗ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᓂᒃ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᐅᔪᑦ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ IMO ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓖᑦ ᑖᒃᑯᐊᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᕙᓪᓚᒍᑎᖃᕈᓐᓇᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᖓᓂᒃ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᑑᑉ ᐃᒪᖏᑎᒍᑦ (ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᒍᑎᖓ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᑐᒥ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᕈᑎ’’) ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᕐᖃᖓᑎᑕᐅᓂᖓ ᐅᕐᓱᐊᓗᓐᓂᐊᓂᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐃᒪᖁᑎᖏᓐᓂ.
ᑕᒪᒃᑯᑎᒎᓇᓕᒫᖅ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᒋᐊᓕᑦᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒧᑦ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᑯᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᐱᐅᓯᕆᒋᐊᓕᖏᑦᑎᒍᑦ, ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓕᓐᓂ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᒪᕐᐱᐅᑉ ᕿᑎᖓᑕ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ, ᐊᓯᐊᒎᕐᕕᖃᖕᖏᓚᕆᒃᑯᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑕᐅᑦᓯᐊᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᐅᖃᖃᑎᒌᑦᑐᓄᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᖏᑦ ᐱᒍᒪᓯᒪᔭᖏᓪᓗ ᓱᕐᕋᑕᐅᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᐸᑕ ᐃᓚᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᑦ.
ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᖃᓚᖓᔪᒍᑦ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᖃᕐᑎᓯᓂᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᖏᓐᓇᓕᒫᕈᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑎᒥᖁᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐃᓚᐅᒍᑎᒋᓂᐊᕐᓱᒋᑦ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒪ ᐱᓇᓱᑦᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦ. ᓱᓕᓗ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᓚᖓᒻᒥᓱᑕ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ, ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᑦᑎᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᖃᕐᕕᑯᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᕐᒥᒃ.
ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᓯᓂᖅ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᓴᐅᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ
1. ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃᑕᕐᕋᒥᑲᕙᒪᑦᑐᑦᖃᐅᔨᒪᑎᑕᐅᑦᓯᐊᓗᑎᒃᐊᒻᒪᓗᐱᕙᓪᓕᖁᑎᑖᕐᓗᑎᒃᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᑦᐊᒻᒪᓗᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦᐃᓄᐃᑦᐊᓯᖏᓪᓗᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᖑᒻᒥᔪᑦ
ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᕆᔭᐅᕗᖅ ᐅᖓᑖᓄᑦ 4ᒥᓕᐊᓐ ᐃᓄᖃᕐᓱᓂ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᕐᓯᒪᓕᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᒐᓴᑦᔪᐊᓂ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒥᖓ. ᑲᓇᑕ ᑐᓂᒪᕕᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᓴᐅᓚᖓᓕᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᑖᓐᓇ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᖁᔭᐅᑉ ᐃᓱᒫᓗᓐᓇᕇᒃᑯᑎᖓᓂᒃ ᐃᓄᓂᒃ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᒍᓐᓇᓯᓗᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖃᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᑐᑭᑖᕋᓱᐊᕐᑐᖃᓕᕐᐸᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖏᑦ ᑐᑭᑖᕋᓱᐊᕈᑕᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᓱᕐᕃᓂᖃᓚᖓᑉᐸᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᒍᒪᓯᒪᔭᖏᑎᒍᓪᓘᓃᑦ.
ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᖃᕋᓱᐊᓲᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᑎᑕᐅᔪᑦᓴᐅᕗᑦ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒋᓪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᐃᓄᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᓯᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᖃᖃᑕᐅᒻᒥᔪᓂᒃ. ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒥᖓ ᑐᓂᒪᕕᖃᕐᓂᕗᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᒋᔭᕗᑦ ᐱᔭᕆᔭᐅᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᖓᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᒍᑎᖃᓚᖓᑦᓱᑕ ᐊᔪᐃᓐᓇᕋᓱᐊᕐᓂᑎᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ᐃᓂᒥ, ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑦᓯᓂᖅ ᓵᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᑕᐅᓚᐅᔪᓂᒃ ANPF ᒪᓂᒪᕕᒋᖏᓐᓇᓚᖓᑦᓱᒍ ᐅᖄᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᖃᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᓈᒻᒪᓈᕐᓂᓴᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖓᑕ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖏᑎᒍᑦ, ᐅᑦᑑᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ ᐊᑕᓂᐊᓘᓪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒧᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᖏᑎᒍᑦ.
ᓯᕗᒧᒍᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᖃᐅᔨᕙᓪᓚᒍᑎᖃᕐᓯᒪᕗᖅ ᓱᒃᑯᑎᕆᓯᒪᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᓱᕐᕃᓱᓂ ᖃᓪᓗᓈᖕᖑᑎᑦᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᐅᓯᒪᔫᑉ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᐃᓄᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂᒥᐅᓂᒃ. ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᓱᓂ ᑐᓂᒪᓂᕐᒥᓂᒃ ᐱᑑᑎᒋᐊᓪᓚᕋᓱᐊᕐᓂᒧᑦ, ᑖᓐᓇ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᕿᓂᕈᑎᐅᕗᖅ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᓗᓂ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᒥ ᐃᓂᑖᖁᓪᓗᒍ ᓄᑕᐅᓯᓕᑎᕐᓯᒪᓗᓂ ᐊᑕᓂᐊᓗᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᓪᓗ ᐃᓅᖃᑎᒌᑦᔪᐊᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒍᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖃᕐᓗᓂ ᐃᓕᑕᕐᓯᓯᒪᐅᑎᓂᒃ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ, ᓱᓱᑦᓴᕈᑎᐅᓗᓂ, ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᑯᑦ ᐁᑉᐯᕇᓐᓂᑯᓪᓗ.
ᐱᓇᓱᓐᓂᕗᑦ ᑖᑦᓱᒥᖓ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᒥᒃ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᑕᐅᓂᐊᕐᖁᖅ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᐱᑐᑦᑐᓯᒪᐅᑎᕕᖓᑕ ᐅᖃᒻᒪᕆᐅᑎᖓᓄᑦ ᐱᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᖏᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ;ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᑖᕆᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ; ᓇᒻᒥᓂᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᒍᓐᓇᕈᒪᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᓪᓗ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ; ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ ᓄᓇᖓᓐᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ. Footnote 1-7 ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᑕ ᐱᖁᔭᖓ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᔪᓄᑦ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᑕᐅᒍᑎᖃᓚᖓᒋᕗᖅ ᓱᓱᑦᓴᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᑖᖑᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᒋᔭᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᒋᔭᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎᐅᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒋᓯᒪᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᑦᓯᐊᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓖᑦ, ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ, ᔫᑳᓐᒥᓗ.
i. ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᖓ
ᓄᓀᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᑦᑕ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖏᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᑦ ᐃᒣᑎᑕᐅᓕᕐᐸᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᑐᕐᖁᓯᒪᔫᔮᕐᓱᓂ ᐱᓕᐅᑎᒍᑎᐅᓕᐅᒥᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂᓗ. ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᖓ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑌᒫᑦᓭᓇᓕᑦᓯᐊᖁᓪᓗᒍ, ᐱᑕᖃᑦᓯᐊᓗᓂ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᓐᓇᖏᑦᑑᓗᓂᓗ, ᐱᓕᐅᒥᒍᑎᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᑐᒍᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᑦᑎᒍᑦ ᑖᒃᑯᓄᖓ ᐃᓱᒪᖃᖃᑕᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖃᕐᒥᓱᑎᒃ, ᓱᓕᓗ ᐃᓚᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᓪᓗᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓖᒃ ᑲᕙᒪᖏᓐᓂᒃ, ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᓄᓇᓯᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᔭᐅᒋᕗᑦ.
ᓯᕗᓕᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒥᖓ ᐊᔪᐃᓐᓇᕈᑕᐅᔪᒥᒃ, ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓚᖓᔪᒍᑦ ᐃᓂᒋᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎᐅᑉ.
ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎᐅᑉ ᐱᔭᑦᓴᕆᓚᖓᔭᖏᑦ ᒪᑯᐊᖑᓂᐊᕐᖁᑦ ᐱᑐᑦᑎᓯᓂᖅ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᖑᖕᖏᑐᓂᒃ;ᐱᑦᔪᔨᓗᓂ ᐊᑯᓃᕐᓂᐸᐅᓂᕐᒥᒍᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᓂᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓯᕗᒧᑦᑎᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᐅᓲᕐᑎᒍᑦ;ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᖅ ᓇᓪᓕᖁᐊᒥᓂᒃ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᑕᒥᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖃᖕᖏᑐᓂᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᒻᒥᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ; ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᐃᓕᐅᒥᓗᒍ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᒋᐊᓕᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒧᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐱᑕᖃᕐᑎᑕᐅᓂᖓ. ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᐊᕐᒥᔪᖅ ᐱᓇᓱᒍᑕᐅᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᑲᕙᒪᓐᓂᐅᑉ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐊᓯᖏᑕᓗ ᐱᑦᔪᔨᕕᐅᔪᑦ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᐅᑉ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᒋᐊᖃᖕᖏᓂᖓ.ᑕᒪᒃᑯᓂᖓ ᐱᔭᑦᓴᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ, ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᙯᓐᓇᖃᑦᑕᕆᐊᖃᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᐃᓄᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᕕᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᓂᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᕙᒪᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᖑᒻᒥᔪᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᐅᒐᑎᒃ.
ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎ ᐱᑦᔪᔨᒍᑎᖃᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎᐅᓗᓂ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑎᒥᖁᑎᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᓗᓂ ᐊᑦᔨᐅᖏᓐᓂᒥᓂᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᔨᓂᑦᑎᒍᑦ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᓕᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓂᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒣᓐᓇᖁᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᑑᑎᓪᓗᑐᕐᑕᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ.ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎ ᐱᔭᑦᓴᖃᓚᖓᒻᒥᔪᖅ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᒻᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᔪᐃᓐᓇᕈᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᑑᑎᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᓪᓚᕋᓱᐊᕐᓂᒧᑦ. ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎ ᐊᒃᓚᕕᖃᕐᓂᐊᖁᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ.
ii. ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᓪᓗ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑕᐅᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᖓ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᓄᑦ
ᑲᓇᑕ ᑐᓂᒪᕕᖃᖏᓐᓇᑐᖅ ᓱᓕ ᐱᑕᖃᕐᑎᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᓂᑯᕐᕋᕕᖓᓐᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓂᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕆᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᒦᑦᑐᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑕᐅᔪᑦ, ᐅᕕᒃᑫᓗ, ᐃᓚᐅᒍᓐᓇᓱᑎᒃ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕈᑎᖃᕐᓗᑎᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒨᓕᖓᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᐅᑐᑦᑕᒥᒍᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ, ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒥᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᓱᕐᕋᑕᐅᒍᑎᒋᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᓕᒻᒥᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᒥᓄᑦ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᓂᕐᒥᒍᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕ ᑐᖕᖓᓱᑦᑎᓯᒻᒥᔪᖅ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᓕᐊᖑᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᓯᒪᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᖁᔭᓂᒃ ᓄᐃᑎᕆᒍᓐᓇᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᐃᑕᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒍᑕᐅᓚᖓᓗᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᓪᓗ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓯᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᓗᑎᒃ.
a. ᐊᓯᒋᐊᓪᓚᕆᒻᒥᔭᖏᑦ ᐃᓅᖃᑕᐅᒻᒥᔪᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᖏᑦ
ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐃᓄᓕᒫᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑲᕙᒣᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᕕᖃᓪᓚᕆᒃᑯᑦ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᓕᓂᐅᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓯᐅᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᔪᐃᓐᓇᕈᑕᐅᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕ ᑐᓂᒪᒍᑎᙯᓐᓇᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᖏᑦᑕ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎᖏᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓖᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᖃᓕᕐᐸᑕ.
b. ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒐᓱᐊᕈᓐᓇᓂᖓ
ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᔪᓄᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᑐᓂᒪᒋᐊᑦᓯᐊᕈᑎᐅᒻᒪᑦ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᕐᓴᐅᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒍᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᕐᓴᐅᑎᑦᓯᓱᓂᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᐃᓄᓐᓂᒃ ᑖᒃᑯᓄᖕᖓᓕᖓᔪᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒐᓱᐊᕈᑕᐅᓕᕐᐸᑕ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᓪᓗ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᖃᓕᕐᐸᑕ, ᒪᑯᐊ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓖᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᕕᖓᓂ ᐃᓅᖃᑎᒌᑦᔪᐊᑦ,ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᕕᖓᓂ ᐃᓅᖃᑎᒌᑦᔪᐊᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᔪᒥᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᖃᕐᕕᖓᓂ ᐱᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖏᑦ, ᐊᓯᓕᒫᑦᓯᐊᖏᓪᓗ ᑎᒥᐅᔪᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᖃᕐᖄᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᓱᒫᓘᑎᖏᑦ ᓱᕐᕃᓚᖓᒋᐊᖏᑦ ᑖᒃᑯᓂᖓ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ.
ᑐᓴᕐᓯᒪᔪᒍᑦ ᑐᓴᑦᓯᐊᓗᑐᕐᓱᑕ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓂᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᑦᑎᓂᑦ ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᕿᓂᕆᐊᖏᑦ ᐅᖓᑖᓄᑦ ᐱᖁᔨᒍᑎᓕᐅᑐᐃᓐᓇᓂᐅᑉ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᒍᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᓂᐱᖃᕈᑎᖃᕐᒪᑕ ᖃᐅᔨᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᑦ ᐱᒐᓗᐊᕐᒥᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ.ᐃᒣᖔᕈᒪᔪᓪᓕ, ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᐅᔪᑦ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᓖᑦ ᐊᑕᕐᖑᓯᕈᑎᖃᕐᓱᑎᓪᓗ ᑐᑭᖃᑦᓯᐊᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᔪᓯᓗᓂᓗ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᐅᒋᐊᓕᒻᒥᒃ ᑲᔪᓯᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᒍᒪᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑖᒃᑯᓇᓂ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑐᑭᑖᕈᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᑐᑭᑖᕋᓱᐊᓕᕐᐸᑕ ᓄᐃᑕᑎᑦᓯᔪᓂᒃ ᓱᓇᔨᐅᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᓂᒃ ᐱᖃᕐᓂᒥᒍᑦ. ᑎᒍᒥᐊᖏᓐᓇᓂᐊᕐᑐᒍᑦ ᓱᓇᔨᐅᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᔪᒥᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑕᐅᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᐊᕐᑕᐅᓂᖓᓂ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒪ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒎᓐᓇᓯᒍᑕᐅᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓗᒋᓪᓗ ᐊᔪᐃᓐᓇᕈᑎᖏᑦ ᓯᕗᒧᒍᑎᒋᒐᓱᐊᕐᓱᒍ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒥᖓ ᐱᔭᕆᔭᐅᒍᒪᔪᒥᒃ.
ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐋᓴᐹᔅᑲᓐ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᖏᑦ, ᑯᕗᐃᑦᓯᓐ ᐊᓪᓓᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᖏᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᑐᕐᒥᐅᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᖏᑦ ᒫᓐᓇᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᖃᑕᐅᓲᑦ ᑖᒃᑯᓄᖓ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᓄᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᔪᒥᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᕕᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᒍᑎᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᒍᑎᖃᖃᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᑲᓇᑕ.
2020ᒥᓂᑦ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᐅᓄᕐᓯᒋᐊᕆᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᖃᕐᑎᓯᒍᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᑖᒃᑯᓄᖓ ᐱᖓᓱᓄᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑕᐅᔪᓅᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ, ᐱᒍᓐᓇᑎᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᐊᑐᓂ ᑎᑭᑦᑐᓂᒃ $650,000 ᓄᑦ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᑕᒫᑦ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎ ᓲᖕᖑᓯᒋᐊᕆᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᓂᐱᓕᔭᕈᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᒃᖔᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓗᒫᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᓕᕆᓂᖓᓂ, ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓖᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᖓᓂ.
ᐃᓚᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᓕᕆᓂᖓ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ, ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓚᖓᔪᒍᑦ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓇᓄᑦ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᑐᕐᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕈᑎᖃᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᖓᓂ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐅᒥᐊᕐᔪᐊᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᑦᓯᓂᖅ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᓪᓗ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᒃᒐᓂIMOᒥ.
ᑲᓇᑕ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓚᖓᒻᒥᔪᖅ ᐊᑦᔨᐸᓱᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᔪᐃᓐᓇᕈᑕᐅᔪᕐᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᑦᑕ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᖑᒻᒥᔪᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓈᒻᒪᓈᓕᕐᐸᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᖑᖃᑎᒌᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᖃᕐᑎᓗᒋᑦ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᖏᑦ ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖏᓪ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᑎᑦᓯᒍᑕᐅᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᑐᑭᑖᕋᓱᐊᕐᑐᖃᓕᕐᐸᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑎᒍᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᐊᑐᖅ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᓇᓗᓀᕐᓯᖃᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓱᓇᔨᐅᓂᖏᑎᒍᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᐅᖄᒍᑎᖃᓕᕐᐸᑕ ᑲᕙᒪᓐᓂᒧᑦ.
ᑲᓇᑕ ᑲᔪᓯᔪᖅ ᓲᖑᔪᒥᒃ ᑐᓂᒪᓂᕐᒥᓂᒃ ᑕᒃᒍᖓ ANPF’ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᐱᑕᖃᕐᑎᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᐅᕕᒃᑲᓂᒃ ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐅᑯᓇᓂ, ᐱᕙᓪᓕᖁᑎᑖᕐᕕᒋᓗᒋᓪᓗ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒨᓕᖓᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᑦ ᑐᑭᒧᐊᒍᑎᖏᑦ. ᓇᓪᓕᖁᐊᕈᕐᑎᓯᓯᒪᓕᕐᑐᒍᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ (ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐃᓕᓐᓂᐊᕕᕐᔪᐊᖏᑦ ᐱᑐᑦᑐᓯᒪᑎᑦᓱᒋᑦ, ᐳᕐᑐᓂᕐᓴᒋᐊᓪᓚᒥ ᐃᓕᓐᓂᐊᕖᑦ, ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᕖᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᓪᓗ ᑎᒥᐅᒻᒥᔪᑦ ᐃᓱᒫᓘᑎᓖᑦ ᐃᓕᓐᓂᐊᓯᒪᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᕙᑎᖓᓂᓗ) ᐱᑕᖃᕐᑎᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᖕᖏᑐᓂ ᐃᓂᓂ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᑐᒥ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ, ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐋᕐᕿᕈᑎᑦᓴᕆᓂᐊᕐᑕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᕆᒋᐊᓕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᓪᓗᒋᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᖅ ᐃᓕᓐᓂᐊᓯᒪᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᓗ.
iii. ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᕆᒋᐊᓕᖓ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᔭᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ
ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᒍᕗᑦ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑕᐅᓯᐊᕋᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᔭᐅᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᔪᓯᓂᐊᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᔪᐃᓐᓇᕈᑏᑦ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᖁᓪᓗᒍ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᑐᓴᕐᓯᐅᓂᖅ ᐊᑌᓐᓇᑎᑦᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᓗ ᓄᕐᖃᑲᑦᑕᑐᐃᓐᓇᕈᓐᓀᓗᑎᒃ.
ᐊᑕᐅᑦᓯᑰᖃᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᓯᕗᓂᕐᒥ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᐅᖃᑦᑕᕆᐊᓕᓐᓄᑦ, ᐱᑦᔪᔨᕕᒃ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᕙᓪᓕᐊᕗᖅ ᓯᓚᑎᒥᓂᑦ ᐱᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᐅᒐᔭᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓛᕐᑐᓂᒃ 2025ᖑᓕᕐᐸᑦ.Iᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᓕᐊᖅ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᕈᑎᐅᓛᕐᓱᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᒋᐊᕐᕕᖃᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᓕᒫᒥ ᓇᓗᓀᕐᓯᓂᐅᓗᓂ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᐅᒋᐊᓖᑦ ᑭᖕᖒᒪᓇᕐᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᒍᓐᓇᕈᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᖕᖏᑐᑎᒍᑦ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᒪᐅᑎᓂᒃ ᐃᓚᖃᕐᓂᐊᒥᑦᓱᓂ ᓱᓇᐅᓂᓪᓗᑯᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒋᐊᕐᕕᖃᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑕᐅᓯᐊᖕᖏᑐᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᓐᓄᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᖑᖃᑕᐅᒻᒥᔪᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᐅᒐᑎᒃ.
ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐃᓐᓄᐃᕙᓪᓕᐊᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐊᔪᐃᓐᓇᕈᑎᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᓇᕈᑎᖏᑦ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ᐱᑦᔪᔨᕕᒻᒥ, ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓚᖓᔪᒍᑦ ᐊᑭᓕᕐᑕᐅᒍᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᓗᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐅᕕᒃᑫᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᒐᕆᓂᐊᕐᑕᖓᓂᒃ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᒥᒃ ᑕᒃᒍᓇ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᖃᕈᑕᐅᒍᓐᓇᓚᖓᓗᓂ ᑭᖕᖒᒪᒋᔭᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐅᕕᒃᑫᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᖃᓂᑕᙯᓐᓇᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᓚᒥᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᒻᒥᓂᓪᓗ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᓪᓗ ᓈᒻᒪᓈᕐᑐᑯᑦ ᓴᐳᑦᔭᐅᒪᐅᑎᖃᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ.
ᐱᒐᓱᐊᖃᑎᖃᓚᖓᒻᒥᔪᒍᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᓲᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᓇᓗᓀᕐᓯᒐᓱᐊᖃᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒍᓐᓇᕋᔭᕐᒥᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᔭᐅᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ.
2. ᓯᕗᒧᑦᑎᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᑎᒍᑦ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐅᔭᐅᒍᒪᔪᓂᒃ
ᐊᖏᓕᒋᐊᕆᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᒪᓂᕐᓴᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᓇᑦᑎᓂ ᐱᑦᔪᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ, ᒪᑯᑎᒎᓇ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᒐᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᓱᖕᖏᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᕐᑎᒍᑦ, ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᐅᒃᑯᑎᒻᒪᕇᑦ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᔭᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ, ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᓗᒍ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᒍᓯᖓ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ, ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᐅᑉ ᐊᕙᑎᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓯᕗᒧᑦᑎᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐱᑐᖃᑎᖃᕐᓯᒪᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᐱᑐᖃᑎᒋᓯᒪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ, ᓱᓕ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐅᔭᑦᓴᐅᖃᑕᐅᖏᓐᓇᑐᖅ. ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓯᒍᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᑕᒪᒃᑯᓂᖓ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᑕᐅᓇᓂᒋᐊᖅ ᐅᖃᕐᑕᐅᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᔪᑦ.
i. ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᖁᑎᓖᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖓᑕ ᑎᑦᑕᖓᒍᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖅ
ᐊᓪᓓᑦ, ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ, ᐊᓪᓚᖓᔪᐃᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᖏᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂ ᐊᑯᓂᐊᓗᒃ ᐊᒥᕐᖄᕈᑎᖃᕐᓯᒪᓕᕐᖁᑦ ᐊᓂᕐᓂᑰᕐᓂᒥᒃ, ᐱᕐᖁᓯᕐᑎᒍᑦ, ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᓂᕐᑎᒍᑦ, ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕈᓐᓇᐅᑎᑎᒍᑦ, ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐃᓚᒌᓪᓗ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᓂᖏᑦ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᖃᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᖏᑦ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᒥ, ᑲᓛᓪᓖᓗ ᓄᓈᓐᓂ. ᖃᐅᔨᑎᑦᓯᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖓ ᖃᐅᔨᔭᐅᑎᑕᐅᓂᖓ ᐅᓪᓗᒥᐅᓕᕐᑐᖅ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᒥᑦᑕ ᑎᑦᑕᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒧᖓ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᒍᓰᑦ ᑖᒃᑯᓇᓂ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖏᑦᑕ ᑎᑦᑕᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᕐᓄᑦ ᐱᐅᑦᓯᐊᖏᑦᑐᑯᑦ ᓱᕐᕃᓯᒪᓂᖃᕐᒪᑕ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᑕᙯᓂᓇᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᓇᕐᑐᓂᒃ, ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕐᓂᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᕐᖁᓯᒥᑎᒍᓪᓗ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᓂᕐᒥᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᐅᓯᕐᒥᑎᒍᑦ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᐸᑐᖅ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᒥᐅᓂᒃ, ᑎᓐ ᒫᒃ, ᑲᓛᓖᓪᓗ ᓄᓈᓐᓂᒃ ᕿᓂᖃᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᐋᕐᕿᕈᑎᑦᓴᓂᒃ ᑲᒪᒍᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᑉ ᑎᑦᑕᓯᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᑳᑲᑦᑕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᑦᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᕐᓇᑐᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᔭᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᓪᓓᑦ, ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ ᐊᓪᓚᖓᔪᐃᓪᓗ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ.
ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᑐᓂᓯᒪᓂᖅ ᓄᐃᑕᑎᑕᐅᔪᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᔭᕆᐊᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐸᕐᓇᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᕐᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᔭᐅᔪᑦᓭᑦ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐸᐅᑦᔭᐅᔪᑦᓴᐅᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᓘᓐᓀᓄᑦ 52ᖓ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᔭᕆᐊᕐᓂᐅᒋᐊᓕᐅᑉ ᐸᕐᓇᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖓᓂ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᓯᒍᑕᐅᓗᓂ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᒍᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐅᖃᒻᒪᕆᐅᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᒥ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᖏᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐱᖁᔭᓕᐅᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖓᒍᑦ.
ᑲᒪᒍᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᑦ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖏᑦᑕ ᑎᑦᑕᑕᐅᓯᒪᕕᖏᓐᓂ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᕐᒨᓕᖓᔪᑦ ᐱᔭᕐᓃᑑᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᕙᑦᑕᖏᑦ ᐊᓪᓓᑦ, ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ, ᐊᓪᓚᖓᔪᐃᓪᓗ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᖃᕐᑐᑦ ᐊᒥᕆᑲᒥ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᓛᔅᑲ,ᑲᓇᑕ ᐊᑑᑎᖕᖑᓱᑦᑐᖅ ᓯᕗᒧᑦᑎᓯᒋᐊᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᑲᕙᒪᑎᒎᕐᑐᑦ ᐱᖁᔦᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᒍᓯᖏᑎᒍᑦ
ii. ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕐᕕᒧᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᒍᓐᓇᓂᖅ
ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᒻᒥᔪᑦ ᓇᓗᓀᕐᑕᐅᖃᔭᖕᖏᑑᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖓ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᖏᑦᑑᒍᑎᒥᒃ ᑕᐅᕐᓰᓂᕐᒧᑦ-ᐱᕐᖃᔭᖕᖏᑎᑦᓯᒍᑏᑦ ᐱᕐᖃᔭᖕᖏᑑᑎᑦᓯᒥᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕐᕕᒥ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᓂᕿᑦᓴᐅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓴᓇᓯᒪᔭᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᓂᐅᕕᐊᑦᓴᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ, ᐅᑦᑑᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᕿᓯᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑑᒑᔦᑦ.
ᐱᐅᓯᕐᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᓂᕿᑦᓴᓯᐅᓂᖅ ᓇᑦᓯᒥᒃ ᐊᓯᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᐆᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᔭᖏᑦ ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᑦᑕᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᐅᒻᒥᔪᑦ ᑕᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᑌᒣᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᑕᙯᓐᓇᕈᓐᓇᓱᓂ ᐃᒃᓕᓇᕐᑑᓱᓂᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᒪᑦᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᓐᓂᒃ.ᑕᐅᕐᓰᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᕐᖃᔭᖕᖏᑎᑦᓯᒍᑏᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᓯᑎᑦᓯᔨᐅᒋᐊᓕᐅᒐᓗᐊᑦ ᑌᒣᑦᑎᓯᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ, ᐅᑦᑑᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐊᒥᕆᑲ, ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᓂᒥᐅᑦ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᕕᖓ ᐊᓯᖏᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᑦ, ᐊᖏᔪᒥᒃ ᓱᒃᑯᐃᓯᒪᒻᒪᑕ ᓱᕐᕃᓯᒪᒍᑎᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᓅᓯᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂᓪᓗ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᓕᓐᓂᒃ.
ᐊᐅᒃᒍᓯ 2024ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᒪᓂᔨᓚᐅᔪᒻᒪᑦ ᑭᐅᑦᔪᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᓂ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔩᑦ ᕿᒥᕐᕈᖁᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᐱᖁᔭᖁᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᑕᐅᕐᓰᑲᑦᑕᓂᖅ ᓇᑦᓯᔭᕕᓂᕐᓂᒃ.ᑲᓇᑕ ᑐᑦᓯᕋᕐᓱᓂ ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᓂᒥᐅᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔩᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᐊᑦᓯᐊᕈᑎᖃᖁᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᖁᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᑕᐅᕐᓯᓗᒋᓪᓗ ᒪᓕᑦᑕᐅᔪᑦᓴᓄᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᑎᑦᓯᓂᐊᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᓈᒻᒪᓈᑦᓯᐊᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᑕᙯᓐᓇᑎᑦᓯᒍᓐᓇᓗᑎᓪᓗ ᐆᒪᔪᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐱᑦᓴᖑᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ.
ᑲᓇᑕ ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᖃᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᓗᓂ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᐊᑦᓯᐊᕈᑕᐅᑎᑦᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᓇᑦᓯᔦᑦ ᓂᐅᕐᕈᑕᐅᕐᖃᔦᕐᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ. ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓚᖓᒻᒥᔪᒍᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᐱᑕᙯᓐᓇᕈᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᓇᑦᓯᒥᑦ ᐱᓯᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓂᐅᕕᐊᑦᓴᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓇᑦᓯᓂᐊᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᒍᑎᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᑎᑦᓯᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᓂᕈᐊᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᖁᑎᓖᑦ ᐃᓚᒋᓗᒋᑦ ,ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᒥᓗᑕ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᑕᑎᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖃᕐᓗᑕ ᑖᒃᑯᓄᖓ ᑕᕆᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᓂ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᕕᐅᔪᓄᑦ, ᐊᒥᕆᑲᒧᓪᓗ.
iii. ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᖏᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᖏᓪᓗ
ᑲᓇᑕ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᕗᖅ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐹᕐᓯᖓᓂᐅᔪᒥᒃ ᑲᔪᓯᑐᐃᓐᓇᕈᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᖃᓪᓗᓈᖕᖑᑎᑦᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᐅᔪᖅ ᑖᒃᑯᓄᖓ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓱᑯᐃᔦᓂᕐᑎᒍᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᑯᓪᓗ, ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᒥᑭᓪᓕᑎᕆᑦᓱᓂ ᓱᓇᐅᖕᖏᑑᑎᑦᓯᓂᐅᑦᓱᓂᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᖏᓐᓂᓗ.
ᑲᔪᓯᓚᒍᑎᖃᓚᖓᔪᒍᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᑦᑎᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᒥᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᐅᒋᐊᓕᒻᒥᒃ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ᓄᓇᓕᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᖓᓂ ᐊᑯᕐᖓᓂ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᐅᖕᖏᑐᓪᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑏᑦ,ᐅᑦᑑᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑲᓇᑕ-ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ ᓄᓇᖓ- ᐊᑕᓂᐅᕕᖓ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᒨᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑦᓯᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ.
iv. ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐅᖃᐅᓯᖏᑦ
ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐅᖃᐅᓯᖏᑦ ᒪᑯᐊ ᐃᓄᑦᑎᑐᑦ Footnote 1-8 ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᑦ ᐱᑕᙯᓐᓇᑎᓯᒍᑎᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐱᕐᖁᓯᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᖃᓄᐃᖕᖏᓯᐊᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᓄᓇᕷᖏᓐᓂ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᕆᑦᓱᒋᑦ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓ ᑌᒣᒻᒪᑦ ᐱᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᐊᔪᐃᓐᓇᓂᕐᒥᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᐅᒋᐊᓕᒻᒥᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐃᓄᖁᑎᓂ ᐱᔭᕆᐊᑭᓐᓂᓴᒥᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᑎᑦᓯᖃᑦᑕᐅᑎᒍᓐᓇᓯᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᐅᓯᕐᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᐅᓂᕐᐸᐅᓗᓂ ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᒥᒃ ᕿᒥᕐᕈᔭᐅᒍᑎᖓᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐅᖃᐅᓯᖓᑦᑕ, ᐃᑉᐱᒋᒐᓱᐊᕐᓗᒍᓗ ᓄᐃᑎᒋᐊᓪᓚᓗᒍᓗ.
ᑕᐅᑐᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᓯᕗᒧᑦ, ᑲᔪᓯᓚᖓᔪᒍᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕈᑎᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᑕ ᐊᔪᐃᓐᓇᕈᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᖏᓂᕐᓴᒥᒃ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᒐᓱᐊᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᓪᓗ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐅᑎᒍᒪᔭᖏᑎᒍᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᓚᖓᒻᒥᓱᑕ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᓲᑦᑎᓂᒃ, ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᓐᓂ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓖᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᓯᖏᓪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᒻᒥᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᕗᑦ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᓗᑕ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᓂᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᓈᒻᒪᓈᓕᕐᐸᑦ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐃᓚᖃᕐᒥᔪᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕐᓂᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᐅᔭᕋᓐᓂᐊᑕᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑕᐅᓂᖏᓂᒃ; ᐊᐅᓚᒍᑎᓕᕆᓂᖅ; ᐆᒻᒪᖁᑎ ᐃᑯᒪᐅᑎᑦᓴᔭᓕᕆᓂᕐᓗ; ᖃᕆᑕᐅᔦᑦ ᐊᑦᓱᓈᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᓂᖅ; ᐱᕐᖁᓯᐅᑉ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒐᓱᐊᕈᑕᐅᓂᖓ; ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᖑᐃᓐᓇᑎᑦᓯᑌᓕᓂᖅ ᑐᑦᑐᓂᒃ. ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᐊᒥᔪᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᓲᑦᑎᓂᒃ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᓪᓗ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᑕ ᐱᔪᖃᕐᓯᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᔨᕕᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᓯᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᐃᓚᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᕙᒪᐅᑉ ᐱᑦᔪᔨᕕᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᓗᑕ ᐱᕐᖃᔭᖕᖏᒍᑎᓂᒃ ᐱᐅᓕᓂᐊᒐᑐᖃᕕᓂᕐᓂᒃ ᐅᑎᕐᑎᑕᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᓯᐊᒻᒪᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᐅᓕᓂᐊᒐᑐᖃᕕᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ, ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ ᐊᓪᓚᖓᔪᐃᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᖏᓐᓄᑦ.
v. ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓂᓗ ᑕᐅᕐᓰᑲᑦᑕᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᓂᐅᕕᐊᑦᓴᓕᐅᕈᓐᓇᓂᒃᑯᓗ.
ᐊᑕᐅᑦᓯᑰᖃᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᑕ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᑕᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᑕᐅᕐᓰᑲᑦᑕᓂᖅ ᓂᐅᕕᐊᑦᓴᖃᕈᓐᓇᓂᕐᓗ ᐱᓪᓗᒋᒃ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᓕᐊᕆᓯᒪᔭᖓᓂᒃ, ᑐᓂᒪᕕᖃᕐᑐᒍᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᐊᕐᓱᑕ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᓂᐅᕕᐊᑦᓴᕆᒍᓐᓇᑕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᑦ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕐᕕᖓᒍᑦ.
ᑕᐅᕐᓯᑲᑦᑕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎᐅᑉ ᐱᑦᔪᔨᒍᑎᖓ(TCS) ᐃᓕᑕᕆᔭᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓲᖑᔫᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒥᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᓪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒋᓲᕗᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᕈᑎᐅᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒥᖓ ᐱᔭᕆᔭᐅᒐᓱᐊᕐᑐᒥᒃ.ᑕᐅᑦᓰᑲᑦᑕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑏᑦ ᑐᓂᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ, ᐃᓂᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖏᑦᑕ ᐃᓚᖏᓐᓂ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᓖᑦ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒥᖓ ᒪᑯᐊ, ᐳᕆᑎᔅ ᑲᓚᒻᐱᐊᒥᒃ, ᔫᑳᓐᒥᓪᓗ; ᐋᓪᐴᑕ, ᓄᓇᑦᓯᐊᓗ; ᑯᐯᒃ, ᓄᓇᕗᓪᓗ, ᒫᓂᑑᐸ, ᓴᔅᑳᑦᓱᕗᐊᓐ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᑦᓛᓐᑎᒃ ᑲᓇᑕ, ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᙯᓐᓇᓲᖑᕗᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕐᕈᑎᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓂᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓱᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᔭᐅᕙᓪᓕᐊᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ. ᑕᐅᕐᓰᑲᑦᑕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑎᐅᑉ ᐱᑦᔪᔨᒍᑎᖏᒍᑦ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᔪᑦ ᓱᓕ ᑲᔪᓯᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒋᕗᑦ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᖃᑦᑕᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᖕᖑᑎᑕᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᓪᓗ ᓂᐅᕕᐊᑦᓴᓕᐊᕆᖃᑦᑕᑕᖏᓐᓂᒃ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕈᓐᓇᓂᐅᑉ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᓂᐅᕕᐊᑦᓴᖃᕈᓐᓇᓂᐅᓪᓗ ᐱᔭᕆᐅᕐᓴᔭᐅᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑫᒥᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑕᐅᔪᑦ, ᐊᓯᖏᑦ ᐱᒐᓗᐊᕐᒥᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᐅᓯᐅᒻᒥᔪᑦ.
ᐱᒍᒥᓇᕐᓯᑎᑦᓯᓂᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᖑᖕᖏᑐᑦ ᑐᕃᓐᓇᑐᒥᒃ ᐱᑦᓴᓕᐅᕐᓂᖓᑎᑐᑦ(FDI) ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᖃᓪᓚᕆᓚᖓᒋᕗᖅ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐱᐅᒃᑯᑎᒻᒪᕆᖃᕐᓂᒧᓪᓗ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑕᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᑕᒫᓂ ᓄᓇᒋᔭᐅᔪᒥ.ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᓱᑕ ᐃᓚᐅᕙᓪᓕᐊᓂᕗᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓄᓗ ᑕᒃᒎᓇ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᓂᐅᕕᐊᑦᓴᓕᐅᕈᓐᓇᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᓐᓂ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑕᐅᔪᑎᒍᑦ, ᑲᔪᓯᓚᖓᔪᒍᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓂᕆᓲᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕈᓐᓇᓂᐅᑉ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᔭᐅᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑎᒥᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐱᔭᕆᐅᕐᓴᑎᑦᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍᓗ FDI ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᓪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᕙᑎᒨᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᓕᒫᒥᓪᓗ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐱᖑᒪᓯᒪᔭᖏᑦ ᓴᐳᑦᔭᐅᓯᒪᓗᑎᒃ.
3. ᓴᖑᑎᑦᓯᓂᖅᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓄᑦᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᖃᖃᑕᐅᓂᖓᓂᒃᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉᐊᖏᕐᕋᓯᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃᐃᓚᐅᓂᕐᒧᑦᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑕᐅᔪᓄᑦ
ᑐᓂᒪᒍᑎᖃᕐᖁᒍᑦ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᐸᓕᐊᔭᐅᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑲᔪᓯᔪᒥᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒌᐊᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᑲᔪᓯᒋᐊᕈᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᒥᒃ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᓯᒪᓗᓂ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᑦᓴᐅᑎᒋᓗᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᑎᑕᐅᓗᓂ, ᐱᒋᐊᑲᐱᓪᓗᓂ, ᐱᑕᙯᓐᓇᕈᓐᓇᓗᓂ ᑐᑭᖃᑦᓯᐊᓗᓂᓗ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᖅ ᐃᓚᐅᕕᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖓᓂ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓖᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᖏᑦ, ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᓪᓗ ᑲᕙᒪᖏᑦ ᑎᒥᐅᔪᓪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓪᓗ ᐃᓘᓐᓀᑎᒎᕐᓂᓴᐅᓗᓂ.
ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒧᑦ ᐃᒫᙰᕐᑏᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᖏᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᕕᐅᕗᖅ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᒋᐊᓖᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᖓᓂ ᐱᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᕕᖓ, ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᕕᖏᓐᓂ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓖᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᔪᓯᔪᒥᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑕᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᕙᓪᓕᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᓯᓂᕐᒧᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒨᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ,ᐃᓚᐅᒻᒥᔪᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᐅᒍᑎᓕᓐᓄᑦ ᐊᑦᑐᐊᔪᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᐅᔪᑦ. ᑲᔪᓯᓗᓂ ᐱᐅᓯᐅᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᐅᓯᖃᕈᓯᖅ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒧᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᕐᒧᓗ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑕᐅᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᑕᐅᕙᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᓪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ.
ᑐᓂᒪᔪᒍᑦ ᕿᒥᕐᕈᓚᖓᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᓯᒪᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᕆᒋᐊᓕᖓ ᐃᓚᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᓪᓓᑦ, ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ, ᐊᓪᓚᖓᔪᐃᑦ, ᐅᓪᓗᒥᓯᐅᑎ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᒃᑯᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕈᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓇᒻᒥᓂᖅ ᑲᕙᒪᓖᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᐅᔪᑦ ᐱᓯᒪᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂᑦ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᑐᒥᓪᓗ.
ᐅᑦᑑᑎᒋᓗᒍ, ᑐᓂᓯᒪᕕᖃᕐᑐᒍᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᑐᕃᓐᓇᑐᒃᑯᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᕕᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ ᐊᕐᖁᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ ᐊᑕᓂᐊᓘᓪᓗ ᑭᒃᒐᖓᑕ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒧᑦ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᔨᖏᑦ ᐊᑐᓯᑎᑦᓯᓯᒪᓂᑦᑎᓄᑦ ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ ᓄᓇᖓᑦᑕ ᐱᖁᔭᖓᓂᒃ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑕᑦᑎᓄᑦ, ᒪᓕᒉᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᔨᒍᑏᓪᓗ.
ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍ, ᐃᒣᓚᖓᒻᒥᔪᒍᑦ ᐊᖏᓕᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓗᑕ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᓂᐊᑕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᓯᒪᓂᖓᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᕙᒣᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᓪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᑦᑐᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᓕᕐᓗᑎᒃ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓗᑎᓪᓘᓃᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ᐱᑐᑦᓯᒪᐅᑎᓂᕐᒥ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓕᒫᓪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᑖᕋᓱᐊᕐᓂᒧᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒐᓱᐊᕐᓂᓂ ᐃᒣᑐᐊᕐᐸᑦ, ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᖃᕈᑕᐅᑦᓴᐸᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒐᓱᐊᕈᑕᐅᔪᖃᑦᓴᐸᓐᓘᓃᑦ, ᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᖏᓪᓘᓐᓃᑦ ᓱᕐᕋᑕᐅᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᖃᑐᐊᕐᐸᑕ.
ᑲᔪᓯᒍᑎᖃᓚᖓᒻᒥᔪᒍᑦ ᐱᑕᖃᕐᑎᓯᓗᑕ ᑐᑭᒧᐊᑦᑎᓯᓂᐅᒋᐊᓕᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᓕᒻᒥᒃ ᐊᒥᓱᐃᖑᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᓚᐅᕕᓖᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓱᒐᓱᐊᕈᑕᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᓲᖑᔫᓗᑎᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᓄᐃᑕᓂᖃᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ.
ᐱᔭᕇᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍ
ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᓄᓇᐅᕗᖅ ᐱᐅᔪᐊᓗᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᑖᕐᕕᐅᒍᓐᓇᓱᓂ ᓇᑯᕐᒪᑕ ᐱᑕᖃᑦᓯᐊᓂᖏᑦ ᐱᑦᓴᑖᖑᒍᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓴᐱᓕᔪᐃᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᐃᓄᑦᑕᖃᕐᓱᓂ.
ᑌᒣᒐᓗᐊᕐᑎᓗᒍ, ᕉᓯᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐅᓇᑕᕐᓂᖓ ᔪᑯᕇᓂᐊᓐᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᐱᖁᔭᒥᒃ ᒪᓕᖕᖏᑑᑦᓱᑎᒃ, ᓱᑲᓯᑎᑦᓯᓯᒪᔪᐸᐅᔮᓘᓕᕐᖁᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᑦᔨᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᓱᒋᔭᐅᓕᕐᐸᓕᐊᑎᑦᓯᑐᐃᓐᓇᓕᕐᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᑖᒃᑯᓄᖓ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖃᖕᖏᑐᓄᑦ ᑐᕌᕐᑎᓯᓕᕐᓱᓂᓗ ᐱᓕᐅᑎᓂᕐᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᓗ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓯᕐᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᑦᓱᕈᕐᓇᓯᑎᑦᓯᓯᒪᓕᕐᓱᓂ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ᓄᓇᒥ.
ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᑌᒣᓕᖓᑦᓭᓇᑦᓯᐊᓂᐊᑐᐊᕐᐸᑦ, ᐱᑕᖃᑦᓯᐊᑑᓗᓂ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᖕᖏᑑᓗᓂᓗ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓘᓐᓈᒍ ᐊᑐᓯᑎᑦᓯᓗᓂ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᓂᒃ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐊᒃᓚᑕᐅᒪᒍᑎᒋᓐᓂ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ANPF,ᑲᓇᑕ ᑭᖕᖒᒪᑦᓯᔪᖅ ᑲᕙᒪᓐᓂᑯᑦ ᐃᓂᓪᓚᓯᒪᐅᑎᐅᒐᔭᕐᑐᒥᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᒍᓐᓇᕈᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᓐᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᐃᑎᓯᒪᓕᕐᑕᖏᓐᓂᒃ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓄᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᑲᐅᑎᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᑦᓯᐊᕈᑎᐅᕗᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓵᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᒋᓯᒪᔭᖓᓂᒃ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᑕᑯᓐᓇᓯᐊᕐᓗᒋᑦ ᕿᒥᕐᕈᓂᐅᔪᑦ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᕐᑐᓂᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᓕᕐᑕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐅᓪᓗᒥ,ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕈᒪᔭᖏᑦ ᓯᕗᓂᕐᒥ. ᐊᑕᐅᑦᓯᑰᖃᑕᐅᔪᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓄᑦ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᓗ ᒪᓕᒐᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑕᐅᑦᓯᑰᖃᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᑎᖏᑦ, ᑲᓇᑕ ᓴᐳᑦᔨᓯᒪᒍᓐᓇᑐᖅ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᕕᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓴᐳᑎᓯᒪᕕᖃᕐᓗᓂ ᑯᑦᓴᓇᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᓕᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᑭᕋᕐᒥᓄᑦ ᑌᒣᓚᕿᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᒥᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ.
ᐊᑐᕐᑕᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᖃᕙᒪᒍᓯᕐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᖁᔦᑦ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᒪᐅᑎᖓᓂᒃ, ᑖᓐᓇ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᒍᓐᓇᕈᑎᐅᓚᖓᕗᖅ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᓕᖓᒍᑎᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᓄᓐᓄᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᑕᒪᒃᑯᓇᖕᖓᑦ ᓄᐃᑦᓯᑐᐃᓐᓇᕆᐊᓕᓐᓂᑦ ᐱᒍᒪᔭᒥᓂᒃ.
ᑖᓐᓇ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᓲᖕᖑᓯᒋᐊᕆᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᐃᓅᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᑎᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᓐᓂ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓕᓐᓖᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᖏᓐᓂᒃ, ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᖏᑦ ᑎᒥᐅᔪᓪᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᖑᖃᑕᐅᔪᓪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᐅᒐᑎᒃ.ᓄᐃᑦᓯᒍᓐᓇᓯᒍᑎᐅᓚᖓᔪᖅ ᓄᑖᓂᒃ ᐊᑑᑎᖃᑦᓯᐊᓂᕐᓴᐅᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᐅᓯᕐᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒧᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᕙᒪᓕᕆᓂᖅ ᓴᖑᑎᕆᒍᑎᐅᓂᐊᕐᓗᓂ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓵᑦᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᒋᓯᒪᔭᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᐅᒋᐊᓕᒻᒥᒃ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑲᕙᒪᓕᕆᒍᓯᖓ ᐱᔭᑦᓴᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓄᑕᐅᓯᓕᕐᓯᒪᓗᓂ ᐃᓅᖃᑎᒌᒍᓯᐅᒋᐊᓕᒻᒥᒃ ᐃᓅᖃᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᓪᓓᑦ, ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ, ᐊᓪᓚᖓᔪᐃᓪᓗ, ᐅᓪᓗᒥᐅᔪᖅ ᓄᓇᑖᕈᑎᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓇᒻᒥᓂᖅ ᑲᕙᒪᒍᓐᓇᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᐅᔪᑦ; ᐃᓅᖃᑎᒌᓐᓃᑦ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᓕᑕᕆᔭᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᔪᓂᒃ, ᓲᓱᒋᔭᐅᒍᑎᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᐅᒋᐊᓕᑦᑎᒍᓪᓗ.
ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓯᒪᕗᖅ ᑕᐅᑐᕐᖂᕈᑕᐅᑦᓱᓂ ᑲᑐᑎᓗᒍ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᑦᓴᖃᑦᓯᐊᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᓘᓐᓇᖏᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒦᑦᑐᑦ ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᑐᓂᒪᔪᑦ ᓄᓪᓚᖓᑦᓯᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑌᒫᑦᓭᓇᓕᑦᓯᐊᓂᕐᒧᓗ. ᑲᑐᑎᓗᒍ,ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐊᑑᑎᑎᒍᓐᓇᑕᕗᑦ ᓯᕗᓂᕐᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᕐᖁᐃᑐᒥᒃ ᑲᓇᑕ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᑎᐅᖏᓐᓇᖁᓪᓗᒍ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑭᖑᕚᖑᓂᐊᕐᑐᑦ.
ᐃᓚᒋᐊᕈᑏᑦ: ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᒪᓕᒐᖓ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑕᐅᓂᖓᑕ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑕᐅᓂᖓ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᒧᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᓄᓪᓗ ᒪᓕᒐᖓᑕ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖓ(ANPF), ᐊᒃᓚᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ 2019ᒥ
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉᒪᓕᒐᖓᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑕᐅᓂᖓᑕᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑕᐅᓂᖓ
ᐃᓱᒪᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᐅᒋᐊᖕᖓᑐᓂᒃ ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒪ’’ᐱᑕᖃᖕᖏᓚᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᑕ ᐃᓚᐅᖕᖏᑯᑦᑕ,’’ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᒪᓕᒐᖓ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᑦᓱᓂ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑕᐅᓂᖓ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓯᒪᕗᖅ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᒪᑯᓂᖓ ᐊᖏᔫᓗᓂ ᐃᑉᐱᓇᓪᓚᕆᓪᓗᓂᓗ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖓ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᑯᑦ ᒪᓕᓪᓗᓂ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᓪᓓᑦ, ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓀᑦ, ᐊᓪᓚᖓᔪᐃᓪᓗ, ᐅᓪᓗᒥᓗ ᓄᓇᑖᕈᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᓇᒻᒥᓂᕐᓗ ᑲᕙᒪᓐᓂᖅᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᒪᓕᑦᓯᐊᓂᕐᓗ ᐊᖏᕐᕋᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑕᕐᕋᖓᓂᑦ,ᐃᓚᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᓪᓓᑦ, ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓀᑦ, ᐊᓪᓚᖓᔪᐃᓪᓗ, ᐅᓪᓗᒥᓗ ᓄᓇᑖᕈᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᓇᒻᒥᓂᕐᓗ ᑲᕙᒪᓐᓂᒧᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᑎᒥᐅᔪᓪᓗ;ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᖏᑦ, ᓄᓇᑦᓯᐊᕗᑦ, ᓄᓇᕗᑦ, ᔫᑳᓐᓗ) ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᓐᓂ ᓄᓇᓖᑦ ᑲᕙᒣᑦ (ᒫᓂᑑᐸ, ᓂᐅᕙᐅᓐᓛᓐ ᓛᐸᑐᐊ ᑯᐯᒃᓗ). ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᔪᒍᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᑦᑎᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᖕᖏᑐᑎᒍᑦ ᐋᕐᕿᓱᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑎᒍᑦ, ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᒪᕐᕈᐃᓕᖓᔪᒥᒃ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓂᖃᕐᓂᖅ, ᓄᓇᑖᕐᕕᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂ ᑲᑎᖕᖓᓃᑦ ᐅᖄᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ANPF ᑲᕙᒪᓕᕆᒍᓯᖓᑕ ᐱᐅᓯᖏᑎᒍᑦ.
ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓄᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᑕᐅᕗᖅ ᐃᓘᓐᓇᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕈᑎᐅᖃᑦᑕᓯᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓇᒻᒥᓂᖅ ᑲᕙᒪᓐᓂᒧᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒋᓯᒪᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᙯᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑕᐅᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ,ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᓯᐊᒎᕐᕕᖃᕋᑎᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᑑᑎᒋᐊᓕᖏᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᑐᖃᕐᓄᑦ ᐃᓄᓐᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊ ᓄᓇᑖᕈᑎᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒎᑎᐅᓯᒪᔪᓪᓗ, ᐱᒍᓐᓇᐅᑏᓪᓗ ᐃᓕᑕᕆᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᑌᒣᓪᓚᕆᓐᓂᕋᕐᑕᐅᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᖁᔭᕐᔪᐊᒧᑦ 35ᒧᑦ ᑕᒃᒐᓂ ᐱᖁᔭᓕᐊᖑᓯᒪᔪᒥ 1982ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ. ᓯᕗᓕᕐᑕᐅᒋᐊᓪᓚᒥᑦᓱᓂᓗ ᒪᑯᓄᖓ ᔫᑳᓐᒥ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᓗ ᑲᕙᒪᓕᕆᐅᑏᑦ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᑭᒃᒐᑐᕐᑕᐅᓂᐅᑉ ᓄᑦᑎᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎ (2003ᒥᓂᑕᖅ), ᓄᓇᑦᓯᐊᒥ ᓄᑦᑎᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎ (2014ᒥᓂᑕᖅ) ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓀᑦ ᓄᓇᖓᓐᓅᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᒪᓕᒐᖅ (2022ᒥᓂᑕᖅ) ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ ᓄᓀᑦ ᐱᑦᓴᑖᕐᕕᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᑦ ᓄᑦᑎᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒌᒍᑎ 2024ᒥᓂᑕᖅ).
ᒪᓕᒐᕐᒥᒃ ᐱᖕᖑᐃᕙᓪᓕᐊᓂᐅᑉ ᐃᖏᕐᕋᑎᑕᐅᓂᖓ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᐅᓯᒪᒋᕗᖅ ᒪᑦᓱᒧᖓ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᓱᑎᒃ ᐃᓱᒪᖃᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᖃᕐᒥᓱᑎᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ; ᐱᓗᐊᕐᑐᒥᒃ, ᐊᑕᓂᐅᕕᖓ ᑎᓐ ᒫᒃ, ᕕᓐᓚᓐ, ᐁᔅ ᓚᓐ,ᓄᐊᕗᐃ, ᓱᕗᐃᑕᓐ, ᐊᒥᕆᑲᓗ.
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ANPFᖓ
ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᖁᔭᖁᑎᖓ ᖃᑕᑲᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᑖᓅᓕᖓᔪᓄᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᕙᓪᓚᒍᑎᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᓱᓂᓗ ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᑕᐅᒍᑎᖓᓂᒃ ANPF, ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ 2019ᒥ.ᑖᓐᓇ ANPF ᐊᒥᓱᐃᓄᑦ ᓄᐃᑕᐅᓯᒪᕗᖅ ᐅᖓᑖᓄᑦ 25 ᐊᓪᓓᑦ ᓇᓗᓀᒃᑯᑕᖏᑎᒍᑦ, ᐃᓄᑐᐃᓐᓇᓄᑦ ᐊᒃᓚᖓᔪᐃᓪᓗ ᑲᕙᒪᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᑎᒥᖁᑎᖏᓐᓄᓗ, ᐃᓚᐅᒻᒥᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑦ ᓄᓇᑖᕐᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᓪᓗ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᓐᓂ ᓄᓇᖁᑎᓖᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᖏᑦ.
ᑖᓐᓇ ANPF ᓄᐃᑦᓯᓯᒪᕗᖅ ᐊᑦᔨᒌᐸᓱᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᐅᑐᕐᖂᑕᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᓯᕗᓂᕐᒨᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ ᑖᒃᑯᐊ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᑲᔪᓯᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓲᖑᔫᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᖕᖏᑑᓗᑎᓪᓗ. ᑐᖕᖓᕕᓕᐊᖑᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᐃᓚᖃᕐᖁᖅ ᑲᑐᑎᔭᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᖕᖑᑕᐅᔪᕕᓂᕐᓂᒃ ᐅᖃᒻᒪᕆᐅᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓘᓐᓈᒍᑦ ᐊᒃᓚᑕᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᖏᑦ ᑲᕙᒪᒧᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᓕᒫᒥ, ᐅᖃᕐᓯᒪᔪᕐᑕᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐱᒐᓱᐊᕐᑕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖏᓐᓂᓗ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᑕᑐᒧᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᐱᖓᓱᐃᑎᒍᑦ ᓱᓕ ᑲᔪᓯᔪᒥᒃ ᐊᑐᕐᓂᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ:
- ᓲᖕᖑᓯᒋᐊᕆᓂᖅ ᒪᓕᒐᕐᓂᒃ ᑐᖕᖓᕕᖃᕐᓱᑎᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᒪᐅᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒨᓕᖓᔪᓂᒃ
- ᑐᑭᓯᓇᑦᓯᐊᓂᕐᓴᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᓇᓗᓀᕐᓗᒋᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓄᓇᑖᖑᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᓱᓕᑦᑕᕕᖏᑦ
- ᓯᐊᒻᒪᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᕐᓂᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᒍᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐸᐅᑎᒍᒪᔭᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᐅᖑᑦᓱᑎᒃ
ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᖓ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐊᕕᑦᑐᓯᒪᓂᕐᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᔭᕈᑎᒋᓯᒪᔭᖓ ᓴᐳᒻᒥᔭᐅᕗᖅ ᐅᑯᓄᖓ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᓕᕆᔭᐅᒍᑎᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒨᓕᖓᔪᖅ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᕕᖓᑕ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᖏᑎᒍᑦ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᑕᒫᑦ ᑮᓇᐅᔦᑦ ᑐᕌᒐᖏᑦ $7ᒥᓕᐊᓐ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᑕᒫᑦ ᐊᑐᓂ ᓲᖕᖑᓯᒋᐊᕆᒍᑕᐅᑦᓱᑎᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᕗᓕᕐᓂᖓᓂ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᓂᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᖅ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ.
ᑕᒪᑦᓱᒪ ANPF ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ, ᐃᓱᒫᓗᓐᓇᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᓗ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᓪᓗᕆᐊᕈᑎᖓ ᓄᐃᑕᑎᑦᓯᕗᖅ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓲᖕᖑᓯᒋᐊᕆᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᐅᒋᐊᓕᒻᒥᒃ ᐃᓚᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᐅᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᖃᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐱᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᓂᖅ, ᐃᓱᒫᓗᓐᓇᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᓗ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᑦᔪᑎᐅᔪᑦ.
ᑲᓇᑕ ᑲᔪᓯᔪᖅ ᑐᓂᒪᒍᑎᖃᕐᓱᓂ ᓲᖕᖑᓯᐅᒥᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᒃ ᑕᕐᕋᒥᓗ ᐱᐅᒃᑯᑎᒻᒪᕆᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᐅᒃᑯᑎᒻᒪᕆᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᐅᑉ ᑎᑭᐅᑎᓯᒪᖕᖏᒍᑎᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᓯᖏᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᖃᑕᐅᒻᒥᔪᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐃᓚᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᐊᔭᐅᕆᒍᑎᒋᑦᓱᒋᑦ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᐅᒍᓐᓇᑐᓂᒃ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕐᓂᐅᑉ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᔭᐅᒍᑎᒋᒋᐊᓕᖏᓐᓂᒃ, ᑲᒪᒍᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍ ᐱᑑᑎᑦᓯᐊᕆᐊᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᒥᒃ, ᐊᑐᓕᕐᑎᓯᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᓴᐱᓕᔪᐃᑦᑑᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐃᑲᔪᕐᓯᒍᑎᒋᑦᓱᒍᓗ ᑕᕐᕋᒥ ᐃᑖᒐᐅᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᑦᑕᓇᕐᑐᒦᑦᑌᓕᓂᕐᒥᓗ.
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